


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★ **ROMANO PRODI**
The Defence Industry in
the Perspective of the
Unified European Market

★ **BENEDETTO SPINELLI** ★
Army Managers

★ **RUDYARD KIPLING**
France at War





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EDIZIONE STRATEGIA
EDIZIONE ECONOMIA

BIMESTRALE

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Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

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Present conditions seem to be contributing to open a European path also to the defence industry, thus gradually overcoming the restrictions of the Rome treaty and above all national jealousies.

One can certainly not talk of an unambiguous and safe solution. But next to the framework of the concrete facts under way (one could almost say "the mole" of European integration), the "institutional" factors too have been recently pushing in this direction. As was said in the beginning, it is above all the pressure placed on the IEPG. In this context, a constant intense activity has put into motion a group of organic

and development of new trends through the EDIG, European Defence Industrial Group proposed as consulting body of the IEPG.

Very significant is a document recently published, "Overall Framework for an IEPG European Industry", which is the result of the activity of a specific team and in which are expressed guiding concepts and expectations of industry focused on the following principles: balance between cooperation and competitiveness; technology transfers; cooperation in research and development; "right profit" to be guaranteed to all Countries of the IEPG in return for the opening of the boundaries to

THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE UNIFIED EUROPEAN MARKET

proposals with the report "Towards a Stronger Europe", then through the ministerial meetings of 1987 and 1988 the general aims were undertaken, and a preliminary study was started by teams dealing with the following topics: Research and Technology; Competitiveness; Purchasing and Contracts; the Problems of the accomplishment of the right profit.

As we have said, the movement cannot be but cautious. But, the most interesting side is the direction taken; starting from research. The framework presented is in fact that of a system in which around a research topic there develops the competitiveness among enterprises or better still among consortiums within Europe, up to the prototype and the "demonstrator" level. It is then in the implementation and manufacturing stages that the principle of the right profit should prevail.

But what is particularly relevant is the awareness and will which at this stage are animating the industrial world. The enterprises are actively taking part in the definition

competitiveness within the community.

Moreover one must underline the fact that such regulations will be put into practice and give their results only within an "overall framework", an agreement between the IEPG members on the following topics:

- harmonization of the individual Countries' procurement programmes and policies;
- timely involvement of the enterprises in the purchasing programmes;
- creation of the possibility of achieving an economy of scale through joint access regulations for the enterprises of the different Countries;
- normalization of the technical detailed lists and of production standards.

The appointment with the European integration finds the Italian defence industry going through a particularly delicate stage. During the first half of the 80's, the Italian industry found itself facing the effects of a high demand due to the effect of the modernization programmes in some sectors of our

Armed Forces and mainly to the boost in foreign demand, especially from the Third World (about 80% of export), (see annex).

Our industry, the size of which, according to very general estimations is in terms of turnover equal to about one third that of France and half that of Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, presents a strong incidence of the exports on the turnover.

In 1985 the incidence of exports



(4,300 billion) on the turnover (7,500 billion) reached 57.3% compared to the average of 30-35% in the other major European countries. In 1987, due to a drastic reduction in exports, (minus 66%) the reactive incidence was reduced to 22.3%.

Even if in 1988 some enterprises managed to recover, the overall amount does not show signs of recovery.

The European prospect is thus vital for our industry.

As we have said, its size is smaller than that of the other major European countries. Moreover, no precise policy for national industrial consortiums has been undertaken.

But its participation in the European network of the consortiums for the programmes, is widespread and good. In the new European arena the competition rules have to follow the cooperation ones. The risk - intrinsic in such processes - is that of finding oneself facing a tendency, on

Left.

Antenna of the Pluto low-altitude surveillance radar, installed on a 55m self-rising telescopic tower.

Center.

Antenna of the tracking radar of the Spada missile system.

Top right.

German made BK 117 A-3M multiple-role helicopter.

Bottom right

Release of an Aspide by a launcher of the Skyguard-Aspide missile system.

behalf of the more influent member countries, to create or take advantage of situations of pre-eminence or monopoly in some sectors. In simple terms, Italian defence industries believe in Europe, but made up of equal partners - with same rights and duties - and look up at their Governmental Bodies and their representatives in the international structures, as the natural tutors of this growing reality which is the defence industry common market.

One can ask oneself if the famous - and by now mythical - date of 1992 has some meaning in the prospects of the European defence industry.

As we know, the military sector, was explicitly left out of the regulations of the Rome Treaty, thinking that, due to its nature, it was and had to remain a prerogative of the sovereignty and therefore of the free choices of the individual states. So, according to the mechanism described in art. 223, the sector of defence products was isolated.

Consequently the development and hypothesis of integration of the military productions, at an Atlantic and European level, continued to be placed within the traditional containers: first of all NATO then, as a European articulation, WEU.

Nowadays the Unique European Act, (in sub-section 6 of article 30), states the "willingness of member States to coordinate the respective functions on the political and economic aspects of safety "for which they declare themselves ready to "safeguard the necessary technological and industrial conditions. To achieve this, they "operate both at a national level and within the institutions and the bodies concerned".

And on this point art. 30 explicitly quotes "the existence of a closer cooperation in the framework of the Western European Union and of the Atlantic Treaty".

The direction and limits of this outlook seem clear. On the one hand, the community's possibility of giving itself a specific dimension in



the topic of defense policy, remains open in contents and time; on the other hand, it is underlined, at least tacitly, that, in the delays of this political redefinition of Europe's role, all possible integration mechanisms between European defense industries will be encouraged and promoted also within the existing institutional structures.

It is thus a declaration of will; its consequences will once again be fixed by a series of operational factors of various nature, which are present in the European and International framework.

And for many reasons these factors seem nowadays to be playing in favour of the process of European integration, gradually overcoming national viscosities.

A first factor is represented by the development and refining of the coordinating mechanisms within NATO, in which problems connected to the programming of armaments have been faced for decades. In this context, next to the cooperation mechanisms between United States and European allies, the ones between Europeans are gaining more importance.

And above all, in recent times, new openings are being created especially within the IEPG (Indepen-



Experimental operational station for airtraffic control.

dent European Program Group) which since 1976 combines the thirteen European NATO Countries. After years of debates, an "Action Plan" was set up, a "Common outlook" of the defence problems of the European industry: such document outlines the strategies for the strengthening of the industrial basis, and supplies the directions which will have to guide the process to change the purchasing procedures. The aim is that of significantly reducing costs and obtaining a certain interoperability of the systems, even by standardizing the components.

The Ministries of Defence of the 13 Countries members of the IEPG have subsequently underlined the

common objective of developing industrial cooperation with particular reference to research activities.

A second factor is represented by the tight network of agreements to carry out NATO programmes ranging from prototypes to production. These have given rise to the creation of common initiatives between European enterprises. It is a process destined to leave its mark in terms of ordinary work habits, birth of new projects, determination of spaces for complementarity and synergy (typical examples are Tornado and Eurofighter).

On the other hand, it is necessary to consider that the defence industry is part of the highly technological European Industry. For three years now, and for the first time 30 years after the Treaty of Rome, there has been a boom in the process of concentrations and basically inter-European agreements, that in any case are set in motion in the European area.

If on the one side it is true that the "military sections" of the enterprises involved are often excluded from this concentration process, the military/civilian synergies formed are however very evident.

But, the most important aspect is that of the trends involving both political-strategic and economic-financial dimension.

In the eighties there has been a progressive and general deceleration in the development of military expenses. In real terms they had grown by 20% in the triennium 1981-84 in the United States; in the subsequent triennium the growth was less than 10%. The data referring to Western Europe were +7% and +2%. Also in the markets of the Third World - Middle East, Africa and South America - the year which registered the maximum level of expenses is between 1980 and 1984, while in the subsequent phase one begins to register more or less evident declines.

One must take into account, at

least at this stage, that the containment of the expense level reflects basically economic and financial factors. It was in fact probable that the demanding rearmament programme, which Washington began from the second half of the seventies, - and based on the simultaneous launch of a wide range of



ATCR-44 radar for air-traffic control in terminal areas.

weapons - would, sooner or later, clash with budget restrictions; it was just as probable that the bewildering growth of indebtedness in Third World Countries would put rather strict restrictions on their capacity to import, especially with reference to the main weapons.

In the near future and in the horizon of the next decade the prospects of the military industry will however be strongly influenced also by a series of politico-strategic factors. They are factors which are in a certain way concurrent in the sense that they push, together,


towards a different qualification of military expenses.

We shall mainly list four of them: the beginning of a disarmament process between the two superpowers; the negotiations on the re-equilibrium of conventional forces at a European level; the end, or at least the reduction of the combat level in regional conflicts; the redefinition of the acquisition strategy of many Third World powers.

One can hardly deny the fact that these factors lead, individually and as a whole, to a reduction in the expense and therefore to a narrowing down of the defence industry market. It is interesting to underline that this "narrowing down" refers first of all to the United States and the Soviet Union. There will probably be a greater reduction in the USSR's military budgets than in those of the United States, and greater in nuclear arms than in the conventional ones; but however predictable also at a general level. And there will probably be a reduction in the United States' involvement in the European theatre, with a redistribution of the duties and responsibilities between "guiding-Country" and allied Countries.

It is hard not to think that the loosening of the tension and the end of many conflicts - from Central America to Southern Africa, from the Middle East to South East Asia - will led to a reduction in the imports of more complex and sophisticated weapons. It is clear that these would not only be supplied by the two superpowers; but it is just as clear that their part in this field is a rather consistent one.

The USA and USSR (which



Breda 40 mm twin-barrel AA light gun.

represent two thirds of the exports of big weapons systems) should:

- reduce their import levels;
- direct them to less sophisticated or however technologically simpler weapons systems;
- divide their orders among the greatest number of countries including the "emergent" ones of the south itself.

This reduction of the two super-powers' market spaces could, for various reasons, favour a kind of "multipolarism" in the field of army supplies, especially with the rise of the European dimension.

It is a possible evolution: but its development presents itself with a few problems. For example, it is true that the reduction of the part played by nuclear weapons in the European and Atlantic deterrence and defence systems, should reintroduce the importance of conventional weapons and the role of Europe in the defence policy. But, on the other hand, while there are still more or less strong political oppositions to

that increase in military expenses which would be needed to strengthen the conventional systems - oppositions deriving also from the existence of negotiations under way between East and West precisely on this topic - it is extremely probable that there could be a strong competitive pressure from the American industry in the attempt of recovering in the old continent the market spaces which it could have lost within the United States.

As for the fall in supplies in the no longer "hot" areas of the world, it has involved or will involve, in more or less great measure, European exporters: and not only the most important - like France, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany - but also those who, like Italy, have witnessed in the last four years a drastic cut in their export levels, precisely due to the closure (at least for what regards great weapon systems) of the Middle-East and African markets. Finally, the diversification of the supply source made

by many Third World Countries, is accompanied by the presence of a series of new producers on these markets, often belonging to the same geographical area.

Secondly, the predictable greater role of Europe within the Western defence system, will not necessarily imply the existence of greater market spaces for the European industry.

The European defence industry will thus go through a stage of ever growing competitive tension on all the markets and above all on its own domestic market.

However the evolution of the international, strategic and political scene seems destined to more or less change also the "qualitative" prospects of the demand for defence products.


With reference to this last point, one must note the progressive accentuation of the conventional dimensions of security. But this is just one of the important aspects of the change which is taking place. One can foresee others, of more or less the same relevance: the progressive adjustment of the weapon systems to a defensive type of strategy and furthermore the overall utilization of the "components" element linked to the absolute need to have qualitatively adequate, "precise" and "intelligent" weapon systems, always under control; and, at the same time, to check just as often, the accomplishments and the choices made by the "enemy side" (a need which becomes greater as we move towards disarmament).

From the picture which has up to now been outlined, one can note a situation which is no doubt a complex one but in which European integration seems to be most of all a need.

A need for the European governments, faced with the United States' request for a greater participation in the expenses and with the requirements of the changes due to the Washington agreement and to the prospects con-



ATCR-44 "Istrana" in-band, terminal-area radar.



AMX aircraft armed with air-to-air Sidewinder missiles.

sequent to the negotiations under way. The prospects towards a dé-

tente will require technologically sophisticated conventional defensive systems with subsequent cost increases. From this latter need, and from the above mentioned requests made by the United States, rises a pressure of the increase in the European countries' military expenses.

Coordination at European level represents the way through which the governments can rationalize such expenses through an improvement of their productivity.

A similar need rises in the European industry. As we have seen before in the next few years it will have to face the tensions due to both the reduction in the demand in Third World Countries and to the competitive thrust from the United States industry subsequent to the foreseeable "cuts" in the Federal budget. With the worsening of the conditions for competitiveness, the answer is that of reaching itself a higher level of competitiveness.

It is above all unconceivable that, faced with the needs created by new types of demand, which will need growing resources for research, each firm can deal with it having as main reference its national market. And however, leaving out the effects of the Rome Treaty, the production of military systems and armaments has remained in many aspects "isolated" from the dynamics of integration,

and the individual national defence industries have, in the majority of cases, set up commercial and production strategies focused on the domestic market, assigning to exports the role of creating additional volumes thanks to which it is easier to absorb the costs of research, development and production.

There are evident differences in dimension between Western Europe and the United States, if one considers that the defence expense in NATO European Countries (118 billion dollars in 1987) is only 40% that of the United States (275 billion). Moreover, while the United States imports only 5% of what it requires from abroad, the individual European Countries import nearly 40% of their requirements in the field of armaments: the largest quantity from the United States (i.e. 60%) and the rest from other European Countries (inter-European trade).

An important measurement of the discrepancy is given by comparing the size of firms on the two sides of the Atlantic, in three of the most important sectors in this field: defence systems, missiles and military aviation.

In the sector of defence systems, one can note that in the United States there are 3 firms with a turnover of more than one billion dollars in 1987 (General Dynamics with 2.6

billion, General Electric with 1 billion and Honeywell with 1.2 billion) against only one firm in Europe (the French Thomson with 1.3 billion).

In the field of missiles, there are 5 firms in the United States with a turnover of more than that figure (General Dynamics with 1.5 billion, Lockheed with 2.2, Martin Marietta with 2.2, Mc Donnell Douglas with 1 billion and Raytheon with 2.3) compared to only one in Europe (British Aerospace with 1.7 billion dollars).

In the field of military aviation there are 8 firms in the United States with a turnover of more than one billion dollars (Boeing with 4 billion, General Dynamics with 3.2, Grumman with 2.1, Lockheed with 4.6, Mc Donnell Douglas with 5.9, Northrop with 4.7, TRW with 1.3 and United Technologies with 1.2 billion dollars), while in Western Europe there are only 3 (Aérospatiale in France with 2.4, MBB in Germany with 1.1 and British Aerospace with 3 billion).

If one finally considers all three sectors, one can see that in the United States there are 13 firms all together with a turnover of over 1 billion dollars (with General Dynamics having 7.3 billion dollars) compared to 7 in Europe (British Aerospace with 3 billion dollars, followed by Aérospatiale with 2.4 billion dollars, while for Italy there is

the IRI Finmeccanica group with 1.6 billion dollars). (1)

The smaller size of the European defence industry is evident, compared to the competing enterprises in the United States. And it is clear that they cannot face the sharpening of such competitiveness, if they do not reach the essential "thresholds" to be able to meet the growing research and development expenses.

Due to this situation, the response inside the European industry in each one of the main countries is that of a polarization around the strongest group.

This can be seen in the field of aviation.

In France and Great Britain there are two industrial realities of notable dimensions, represented by Aerospatiale and British Aerospace, largely involved not only in the production of airframes, but also in missilery and space.

They are backed up by a small group of enterprises with a turnover of about 2 or 3 billion dollars, including the two leaders in the field of aeronautical mechanical engineering, i.e. Rolls Royce and Snecma, but

also the main German enterprise, MBB, and the second best French aeronautical builder, Dassault.

When in Germany Daimler Benz takes also control of the MBB, all three German aeronautical enterprises will be grouped into a new holding, Deutsche Aerospace, whose dimension will be similar to that of the two groups and very English and French in its management. So there could be the creation of a kind of triumvirate handling the European market.

The leading Italian enterprise, Aeritalia, is only in the seventh place, followed by Agusta in ninth position, and the turnover of both put together does not reach 2 billion dollars.

In the shipyard field, the largest specialized structure is that of the French military arsenals of DCN. But the choice of keeping a strong and qualified public presence has meant that the private yards have moved out of the scene and nowadays are drastically ridimensioned or changed for other productive activities.

The second place is occupied by Fincantieri which practically joins together all the Italian productive ca-

capacity, both military and civilian.

On the other hand, in Germany and Great Britain, there still are smaller yards, even if controlled by large industrial groups such as Thyssen and Gec guaranteeing the necessary productive integrations. These yards try to specialize in specific types and sizes of ships so as to reduce overlaps.

In the category of ground vehicles and armaments one must include the firms producing light and heavy weapons, fighting armoured vehicles and vehicles for civilian transport, since they are firms characterized by mechanical technology, even if in a different way.

In this sector the first places are occupied by the builders of commercial and industrial vehicles: Iveco, Renault, MAN and halfway down the list, Land Rover and Leyland.

The first true European producer of armaments is the French state group GIAT, including the arsenals and plants of the Defence Ministry. At the same level as for number of workers, but with a smaller turnover, is the similar British institution ROF, which has been recently transformed in a private firm and is now



controlled by British Aerospace.

Around the figure of 500 billion in turnover, one can find some specialists in heavy armaments, such as Krupp, Rheinmetall and Oto Melara, first Italian firm in this field.

Finally, with the exception of Creusot Loire, the list shows a considerable number of minor enterprises with a turnover of about 100 million and 1000 workers, characterized by high productive specialization. Nearly all of them, are however controlled by larger groups operating both within the defence sector and outside it.

This seems to be a characteristic common to the whole sector in which are present the main motor industries (Fiat, Renault, Daimler-Benz), the main iron and steel-mechanical groups (Efim, Matra). Very important is the presence of British Aerospace that not only controls Royal Ordnance, but, through the Rover group, is involved also in Land Rover and Leyland.

In the production of military electronic material there is a strong presence of the main groups in the sector.

For some, such as Siemens, it is a very low percentage.

On the other hand, other groups are more involved in the defence market with a percentage of about 50% their turnover, as is the case of the French Thomson and Matra.


In terms of dimension the top group is the English GEC which in turn controls the Marconi group.

These groups, which are the top eight in the category, have a size which enables them to be present in very different ways both in the military and civilian areas, reaching, at the same time, scale economies in the strategically most important activities.

Behind these leaders, there is a

small group of firms with a turnover ranging from 500 to 1000 billion dollars and about 10,000 workers. They are companies or minor groups characterized by a variable involvement in activities in the defence area. One can also note a greater specialization in production. The

An Aspide being released by a launcher of the Spada system.



smaller sizes, in fact, mean a more limited range of products/systems and applications.

This latter point is more true for the even smaller enterprises.

The end of the list is rather crowded, reflecting the vitality of the enterprises and the "young age" of this sector. Since there are very diversified applications and highly innovative technologies, there is still space for smaller enterprises. This explains their presence next to the big groups, that by themselves could in the future set up the necessary financial resources and technologies to keep up with the innovations brought about by the United States and Japan. After all it is not by chance that precisely in this sector, where there is greater turbulence in the market, one finds a significant American presence in the capital of some European firms. There has also been some inter-European movement, but to strengthen the industrial basis of the Old Continent, it is essential to move towards a greater integration not only with cooperation agreements, but also with the

creation of industrial groups comparable in strength to those on the other side of the ocean.

The field of munitions is witnessing the end of the process of concentration, with the rise of a top enterprise in each European

country. Only in France there are two producers. Outside there are only the small specialized firms dealing in munitions for light weapons.

From the above mentioned framework, one can understand that the defence industry has in the last few years moved towards a concentration mainly focused on the creation of leading national enterprises.

The extreme example is the operation under way for the creation of the big German aeronautical group headed by Daimler Benz.

But if one analyzes the integrations among the enterprises of different European countries, through the participation in the firms' capital, one can see that there are very few links established in this way which instead, as we have seen, is a method developed in many other European industrial sectors.

Of course, one can mention the cases of MBB which has 11% of shares in the Spanish firm CASA, of the three European groups GEC (English), Daimler (German) and Wallmberg (Swedish) which all



«Dauphin 2» SA 365-F helicopter.

together have more than 10% of the French firm Matra and the case of Aerospatiale (French) with has 10% of the shares of MBB.

There are also negotiations under way between Thomson and British Aerospace for cooperation in avionics and defence systems. And above all there is still under way an attempt of the German Siemens and the English GEC to take-over Plessey. The battle for this "take over" is under way, but it is however important that one of the most discussed points is that regarding the integrations initially foreseen, which would have placed Plessey Defence and the military sector of Marconi under the control of the consortium, while GEC would have acquired 50% of the military sector of Siemens. The reactions have led to a relevant change in their plan which now establishes that the military activities of Plessey will remain under British control through GEC which would have only 35% (if the German mili-

tary authorities will allow it) of the control of the defence sector of Siemens. The latter, even in this new scheme, would then acquire the control of the radar and military communications divisions of Plessey.

What is taking place in the battle to obtain the control of Plessey is extremely important on the one hand for the development of structural links in the European defence industry with the subsequent overcoming of the boundaries, and on the other hand of the natural oppositions made by the individual national states.

But it is in the field of cooperation and common programmes that the network of inter-European cooperation has become tighter. A picture of the main agreements is shown in the annex. One has in fact given way to a construction which shows the synergic work of Governments, Armed Forces and enterprises. The latter, above all, have become used to carrying out research and projects together, giving rise to common structures, which, in effect, represent the first true example of what the European firms will be like after the implementation of the Unique Act.

Of course the cooperations are very complex in nature; but no doubt they have represented the instrument through which it has been possible for the European industry to survive. In something, this process has been favoured by the objective rise of a productive model which no longer sees the strongly integrated firm with a high level of strict hierarchization, but the development of a network of enterprises.

And what is more, this development could be more appropriate to the new realities of the European productive system compared to the creation of national champions which are after all inadequate for the dimensions required.

In effect it is a process which is taking place also in other fields of advanced technology with the European programmes COMET, ESPRIT and EUREKA itself.

Romano Prodi

(1) In IRI Finmeccanica the turnovers of Aeritalia and Selenia Elsas are added together. The FIAT group has a turnover destined to defence of about 1.3 billion dollars, considering the FIAT group with the SNIA-BPD.

Austrian-made Noricum SM-4 four-barrel heavy mortar, mounted on a light truck.



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
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
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


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LOOKING FOR A
«PLEASANT» ARMY



Our national scenario is historically and traditionally lacking in feelings of affection towards the Armed Forces. Yet, cyclically these are deemed worthy, so to speak, of very lively but suspicious interest by the mass-media, aroused by contingent episodes, which are more or less instrumental, or just because of lack in news.

And this especially in summertime. It would be possible to draw a development curve in the time, and this, like all diagrams concerning dynamic events, should have a cyclic trend between maximum and minimum. And this would be physiologic. But it is not so, and the pathology can be found in that lack in feelings of affection we mentioned above. In fact even the most superficial readers of the not always objective History of our Risorgimento will notice that the Unity of Italy was not the result of victorious war events having as main character a National Army against occupying Armies, or Armies payed by or acting as garrison of the local despotism. So, it is difficult for us to draw those great historical pictures, that, even if sprinkled with rhetoric, glorify in everyone's memory the National Armies like it happens for example in the United States, France, Soviet Union, Venezuela, Spain and Portugal. The characters of the struggle for the independence of these Countries were a military uniform, were under the National Commanders' orders and strengthened their historical function in events characterized more by bloody operations on the battlefield than by political game.

Our emblematic characters are definitely more picturesque, and maybe we like it since it is suited to our nature, often wear fanciful uniforms, operate, outside the patterns well established by the military tradition, at the head of composite, often occasional, not always reliable units. And above all the political game is always present. It is the more or less suitable graft in the international plots, above all in that balance politics strengthened by the Congress of Vienna. Likewise, it is always present the direct or indirect influence of foreign Armies.

So the National Unit is the mainly political result of a long series of events in which the actions on the battlefield mostly led to honourable defeats. Not to mention then the postunitary wars, won at a high price or ruinously lost because of not much careful arrays.

Such a brief analysis is inevitably full of gaps.

But the purpose is not the historical exegesis of the reason of the national loss of affection for uniforms, helmets and panache, but the trifling of the reasons of historical/traditional conditionings that undoubtedly exist in our collective memory. If one accepts this preamble it would be easier to understand why the proposal thrown out by a political leader during a meeting of young people, genetically against the uniform, was enough to give rise to a lot of initiatives. Round tables, parliamentary debates, bountiful and detailed editorials about a problem



Above.

Balla: *Line of speed + Shape + Noise*, 1915. Oil on canvas and masonite.

Facing page.

Balla: *The rising of the Idea*, 1920. Oil on canvas.

that for a long time has urged and developed the national inclination towards discussions, above all on theoretic and undemanding subjects: in other words if we want an Army made up by professional people or by conscripts. But this is just the corollary, even if not expressed, of the goal of reducing the national service, *sic et simpliciter*, and of the establishment of a service substituting the military service. Of course our young people like it very much (we would be astonished at the contrary). In fact the hierarchy among conscripts, the idleness in the barracks and above all the fact someone has died during his military service become the reason of their dislike for the military life. Yet this cyclic wave of interest is not completely negative. Sometimes it is even positive. At least as provocation and this is useful to traditional organizations that, being naturally conservative, are unwilling to innovations.

So the common sense suggests to take advantage of this new wave of interest for what is "military" and to decide what to do.

Even if realizing the great difficulty of all public institutions to keep up pace with time, and because of this their potential unproductiveness, it is no more possible to ignore the changes, even radical, that took place in the last few years. So, a further gap between the way we are and the way we should or could be.

Let's make just a short list: the last political events that modified and diversified the threat, the almost paroxysmal development of the interest towards ecology, the last conquests of technology that made structures and systems obsolete, the impact of the in-


creasing deficit of public finances on the scarce available resources, and then the public opinion surveys that do not encourage the old rhetoric of the dual concept of number and power. Provided that it were necessary.

THE NEW SCENARIO

Let's start from the threat, that is the main element on which it is necessary to establish a military reply system. It is difficult to judge if the bear's libido for its neighbour's honey is now over or just temporarily under control. What happens seems to give rise to some hope. Nuclear moratorium, increasing attention and dislike for chemical weapons, decrease, and in some cases end of the military and political pressure beyond the boundaries, a certain trend to improve the internal standard of living. Without considering the endemic and increasing economic crisis of the Eastern Countries, endured with an intolerance that is proportional to the relentless development of the information. So the threat has weakened, at least the main one, even if the application point did not change. At least as long as we are part of NATO, naturally.

Yet the more the main pathology weakens, the more the symptoms of the minor ones become evident, so if it is allowed to doze at the fortress Bastiani it is not so at the front. But this concerns the sister Services. For the Army the need to be present on the whole territory still remains. And this out of duty, rather than because of a hypothetical threat from the South.

On the contrary the increasing ecologic awakening is a new factor. Of course we refer to the natural and legitimate sensitization of he who suffer, while trying to bathe and is worried about the constant destruction of the environment he lives in. This cannot be



Balla: *Pessimism and Optimism*, 1923. Oil on canvas.

ignored. Caterpillars damage, long columns of vehicles complicate the situation of our roads, above all in the North-East, hand-grenades explode loudly and of course do not improve the land, the utilization of large areas for training leads to criticism about the taking away of space from public pleasure.

Even if a recent publications of the Army General Staff seems to show the opposite. And then there are the increasing costs of the unavoidable technological updating. Today the cost of an arm system is so high that it is debatable whether conscripts should use it or not. But on the other hand the consequent exponential increase in power reduced the quantitative need for men and equipment. And we are very pleased about it. So there is no need for many full-time main characters any more, but for a higher number of part-time participants and "walkers-on". And this is the solution that seems to meet with the public's approval most of all. But in this case let's not give our imagination free rein.

The voluntary service in the Armed Forces will never be competitive with the voluntary service in Police. The reasons are well-known: unquestionable difference of economic treatment, greater personal prestige for the duties performed, possibility to serve near the place of residence since the Police Force is present on the whole national ter-

ritory and then the possibility of a permanent professional choice. In order to be competitive we should guarantee all volunteers the status and salary of non-commissioned Officers.

And this is not possible. Otherwise we should consider the voluntary service in the Armed Forces as compulsory for the admittance to all competitions in the Public Administration. And this seems to be unlikely, not to say impossible. So, an Army doing without conscripts under the present conditions is mere utopia.

As a consequence, also the reduction of the military service to six months is utopistic, unless we double the contingent to call up to arms. But this, besides dissipating resources, is unrealistic.

The high economic deficit does not give leave, even resorting to all our optimism, to rosy forecasts either short or mediumterm. So it is necessary to save resources, that means to optimize the employment. No news. The lack in resources is a rather common scenario, even at home.

Then the national public opinion surveys that, even trusting the "night activity" of the Italians, question their fertility. Few coffins and few cradles with the consequence that rest-homes are more and more crowded and schools and barracks less and less.

And then in connection with what said at the beginning, there is also that increasing lack in affection towards the compulsory military service, that even if laid down by

the Constitution, is constantly at risk because of laws already in force or next to pass. Which are the reasons? Many, but above all the fact that this matter arouses interest, so it is an irresistible temptation for any sort of politicians and clergymen wishing to be protagonists, for non-profit agencies et similia wishing to have cheap labour. And this leaving out of consideration a certain trend to unilateral disarmament and dislike for everything sounding like military.

In brief: threat decreased and modified in its forms, increasing ecological, social and religious intolerance towards the unavoidable troubles caused by the existence of the Armed Forces and their increasing costs compared with decreasing resources. So, in case we still want to postulate the necessity and existence of the Armed Forces, it is necessary to establish what to do to understand the needs of the new scenario, yet without altering their institutive function. This is what these notes aim at, trying to remain anchored to a certain level of conceptual pragmatism.

And this means: given what we have and what we could reasonably have, what is realistically possible to do to keep our Army at an acceptable level, also economic, to guarantee efficiency, avoiding it to die because of structural emphysema? The title says "A pleasant Army". In fact, according to the arguments put forward by the mass-media when they refer to us, it seems there is more interest for a pleasant rather



than efficient Army. Yet, every good soldier wishes himself to be part of a structure being also pleasant besides efficient. It does no harm. Also because it helps to solve that problem about the "military condition" that torments us so much.

POSSIBLE REMEDIAL MEASURES

It's now clear that, like in many other public institutions, a strict slimming cure will be necessary sooner or later. So, it is advisable not to follow the usual diet suggested by some magazines, that weakens, not to say destroys, health, but a healthy, gradual and efficacious therapy, being the result of a rational and concrete analysis of the situation. Heaven help to trust extemporary emotions or the wish to please the expectations of some circles or parties. When famous clinicians crowd the bed of an illustrious patient, one has to worry seriously for the health of the patient himself. In fact generally they give priority to the diagnosis rather than to the therapy. It brings honour to the one who strives to be protagonist.

Here is a list of what could be done to comply with the new conditions of the scenario.

The first step is to re-design the model, leaving more space to the professional component in the sectors having a higher technology. That means operators of more sophisticated arm, surveillance and commu-

nication systems. Adequate space must also be given to the logistic/administrative sector for the employment of uniformed women and civilian personnel. The latter should be mainly recruited among the employees of the Defence Agencies that should be inevitably abolished or reduced. In fact it is unthinkable not to extend the slimming cure the military part has to undergo, also to the civilian part of the Defence. It would be absurd to keep a staff of more than 50,000 civilian employees in support of a much less numerous military corps than the present one. All justifications concerning the problem of unemployment are valid from the social point of view but have no influence if it is necessary to give priority to the concept of cost and effectiveness.

The drastic reduction of the central bodies and those of the logistic territorial area is the necessary preliminary statement of what was said before. Natural corollary are those regulating measures attributing much more priority to the needs of functionality and responsibility than to the legitimate career expectations, above all in the hierarchic division of the highest ranks. So, a pyramid with a larger base and not a macrocephalous on a slight trunk. Of course these are uneasy measures. But it seems there is no choice, unless we want to privilege stripes to the detriment of efficiency. Sacrifices in this way, even without evoking the myth of Attis, would be much praised by the public opinion at least as a token of seriousness of

Balla: *Strength lines of a landscape + a feeling of amethyst*, 1918. Oil on linen paper.

intentions.

And moreover it seems necessary to instil more motivation in the conscript. In other words, to eliminate idleness and to increase interest and involvement as much as possible. But this is not easy at all. Idleness does exist, we cannot deny it. It exists both in the form of underemployment and in those repetitious activities which do not demand great commitment and concentration. If one succeeds in eliminating idleness, it is even possible to arouse interest. What to do? In this connection experience helps much more than science. But a bit of courage and freedom from prejudice is needed:

— an objective and modern revision of the unpleasant activities is the necessary premise. That is those activities military men in service mostly complain about and that are well imprinted in the memory of who is not in service any more. First of all the guard service that sometimes is redundant, often useless, always boring. It is not by chance that sentry-boxes have been often chosen as shelter for definitive solutions, even if matured before and somewhere else. The intervention can be synthesized in two concepts: grouping and concentration of the desirable purposes that are very few, and acceptance of some deal of risk.

Today the national territory teems with much more sensitive "civilian" targets which


are absolutely unguarded, or watched on and off. At the second place after the guard service there are those tasks concerning the running of the general services of barracks such as kitchen duties, cleaning and sentinel service. Without contesting the educative responsibility to see by oneself to the tidying and cleaning of the places where one lives and works, all the rest could be undertaken by civilians on contract. This already happens in the main Western Armies, a lot of which also entrust security tasks to others on contract;

— another measure to instil motivation is to increase the engagement and the individualization of the units. It would be necessary to instil in the battalions that regimental spirit, constituting, for example, the cement of the British Army. Of course it is clear that it is not possible to reproduce in all units the spirit of the Special Corps. Yet, this is the goal to achieve with the necessary adjustments aiming at individualization and not at boastfulness. It is not enough to roll up one's sleeves to be special;

— then to emphasize the individual test represents a very ethologically valid arm in the hands of Commanders at any level. Substantially this is the winning card of the Special Corps. Card to be played with the necessary adjustments of the military man's psychotechnical characteristics rather than of the unit's operative tasks. The individual test comprises all activities, above all physical, which are part of the combat training, and sport activities. In this field it is important for instructors to use their creative ability, provided that they are endowed with it.

In fact they have to work on the instinctive inclination of young people to competition and learning and to coach them in all those techniques that at the same time improve their physical training and develop their natural aggressiveness in a reactive and functional way.

Speaking of motivation of military men, priority must be given to the Cadres. It is an essential condition to instil motivation both in conscripts and non-conscripts. Without motivated Cadres any other measure is useless or scarcely productive. In this connection what is generally said about demotivation as the result of unfulfilled career expectations cannot be accepted. Career expectations are often subjective. The loss of motivation, on the contrary, is



Above.
Balla: *Self-pain*, 1947. Oil on wood.

Below.
Balla: *New forces*, 1919. Oil on canvas.

real and irreversible even to the extent of tragic decisions, when is caused by the consideration or even by the mere sensation that one's direct superiors, or in any case those holding top positions, are much more concerned about their own career possibilities than about the Institution. What is possible to do in this connection? Much. First of all the present economic treatment that aims more at privileging service seniority already makes and will make the expectations of hierarchical progression less and less harassing.

Then other not difficult or expensive measures can help:

— one is the awareness they can rely on a health service, that besides safeguarding dignity, a very expensive service in public structures, is becoming more and more qualified. This must be duly emphasized. No other public institution takes care of its employees so much. The same thing is valid also for other forms of assistance not aiming at health but at other logistic and recreative needs, such as apartments, guest-quarters, clubs and resorts;

— concerning one's career, everybody who holds the rank of Senior Officer should have

an idea, at least a general one, of what he can expect for the future. Above all as concerns possible transfers to other stations. Once achieved the position of Senior Officer it is legitimate to make some family programs.


There is often a working wife, and very often some children with specific school needs. The possibility to foresee and make programs for the future in advance is a reason for security in itself and increases motivation, also for those who have no more career expectations;


— the rank must correspond to a precise function and responsibility.

It seems logical and natural, but it is not so. Nothing is more humiliating than having to wait or being at the disposal of someone or something without precise tasks and functions. Some stars on the epaulet can make a good impression on relatives, friends and neighbours, but if they do not correspond to a real increase in responsibility and functions, in a short time they will lead to a more and more marked sense of frustration.

One ends up by feeling that the others just tolerate him and reacts either with the frenzied but pathetic participation to all public and private ceremonies or with the total and polemic withdrawal from public life. If the Institution is not able to guarantee an adequate employment, it would be better to reduce the number of people in the relative ranks and not to invent functions. It is much more serious. A magistrate can be both Councillor of the Supreme Court of Appeal and judge of a lower court at the same time and nobody realizes it. The military cannot, they wear the uniform and this allows immediate recognition both inside and outside the Institution.

A significant measure towards a "pleasant" Army is the decrease of the impact on the environment and of the disturbance of peace. This can be achieved, without losing efficiency, resorting to the aid of technology that, thanks to simulators, allows today the performance of most of the training activities inside our infrastructure. This besides making us less competitive users of the lines of communication and of areas belonging or not to the State, will allow us a considerable improvement in the ratio between cost and effectiveness. So the external training, rather than formative, will





Balla: *Villa Borghese - Park of the Fallow Deers*, 1910. Oil on canvas.

be a check of what has been learned.

Then an adequate availability of sport equipment and of audiovisual media will make satisfactory and busy the service time even inside our infrastructure. In fact, as already said above, the drastic reduction of the logistic apparatus falls within those measures, or better basic conditions, aiming at decreasing without destroying. In fact the logistic apparatus besides removing personnel of all ranks because of its basal metabolic rate, that often is the only operative result, causes a considerable drainage of personnel from the operative units, even if this is hardly noticed because of their territorial fragmentation. This because of the guard service, manual labour and those temporary support activities implying generally the transfer to the place of residence and therefore requested and urged by numerous petitioners. By eliminating these centres of aggregation, it would be possible to eliminate also temptations. And this is even ethical. So, it is necessary not to be allured by gradualness. It is very dangerous because it induces to have second thoughts. All that absorbs energies and overloads the organism is not only expensive and scarcely functional, but makes one lazy, dulls one's reactivity and leads to conservatism. In brief it is the same as that beclouding and torpid sleepiness following a heavy and generous meal.

It's useless to say that the remaining part has to be mechanized and computerized even by modifying the organizational structure, when these patterns cannot be translated into the computer's logical language. This would be a paying investment.

Another efficacious measure would be the revision of the mechanism of duty/right to the period of command of operative Units.

The appointment to the command of a

unit should not take place on the basis of a right, but of a qualification acquired through diligence and efficiency and according to a precise and responsible decision of the General Staff, the way it happens in all productive concerns. Anyone who has critically and objectively considered his personal experience as military man, will have of course realized that the damage caused by a weak and inefficient Commander is more serious and long lasting than the positive effects produced by any good command action, above all on men. That the Armed Forces, as said at the beginning, are periodically the subject of the not very benevolent attention of the public opinion (it doesn't matter if because of an occasional event or political design), is now physiological. Yet, this does not do any harm if the command structure holds out at all levels.

But if this is not so, it could happen that some episodes, even if dramatic, but in any case below the national statistics, are considered as specific of the system, the same way a school (or parish)-like promenade becomes a forced march. In other words, march or die! When and if it will be possible to carry out a selection among Commanders, keeping them at the command for all the time necessary, as it happens in other Armies, these Commanders will also be given more responsibility, including the responsibility about the distribution and employment of the funds destined to the unit among the various sectors of activity.


This way it would also be possible to judge the manager besides the Commander. In fact a Commander is not necessarily a manager, as who is rich in testosterone does not necessarily have the deepest cerebral convolutions, although this would be desirable. In any case, as concerns command it is better to privilege the above-mentioned increment. *Historia docet.*

CONCLUSIONS

The search for a pleasant Army is not conflicting with that for an efficient Army. The word "pleasant" is provoking since it comes from the consideration that outside, but sometimes also inside, people discuss about problems that in our economic, political and social scenario have a compulsory solution. Yet, they lead to the most daring and often as insubstantial as scholarly digressions.

Descartes was born beyond the Alps. It was not the purpose of this article to supply the remedy, but just to indicate some solutions being the result of experience, realism and common sense as much as possible. That is the result of the collective memory because they were dialectically analyzed and closely examined. These solutions are consequent on the pathologies that are objectively recognizable in the scenario. They can or can not be shared, but all of them are economically applicable, even if with different priority. In any case it is necessary to point out, and on this matter I can even allow myself the presumption of paradigm, that nothing is more inconclusive than the tactics of quick repartee. In fact this leads only to a series of often uncoordinated and sometimes clashing measures, because they are the result of emergency and not of a deep examination. It is necessary to work out a strategy involving even great sacrifices, but aiming at the formation of an organic and definitive structure. A structure being able to produce spontaneously the antibodies necessary to withstand the unavoidable future risks, thanks to its efficiency and the equilibrium among its components. Above all those risks not connected with war events, avoiding in this way to fall into the marsh of uncertainty, haziness and frustration.

Lt. Gen. Lucio Innecco



THE ROLE OF MILITARY INSTRUMENTS

Today, just as in the past, there is the need to wonder whether the thesis which sees the Armed Forces as the armed arm and the legal strength of the State, to be employed as extreme «ratio» in international relations, is still valid.



BETWEEN PEACE AND DISARMAMENT

Never before have mass media discussed the subjects of peace and disarmament as in these last months, probably because these subjects have become of public domaine after the emotional wave caused by **Gorbachev's** initiatives which the discharged Chief of Soviet Defence Staff, Marshal **Sergei Akromeev** himself has recently induced to consider with great caution. In an interview issued on 15 January, 1989 to *Sovietskaja Rossija*, the Marshal in fact underlined certain points of the military policy of the Soviet Union which according to him cannot be overlooked or relinquished.

Akromeev's first consideration is that there still exists a Western "nuclear and conventional threat" against the Soviet Union.

The second is that though sharing the strategy of negotiations «to be able to carry out a peaceful and self-sufficient policy, the Soviet Union will however require a military power».

The third point is that he rejects

sition of personal advisor to Gorbachev, this should be enough to understand that the Soviet President's proposal in the Western world should be examined with great attention and carefulness.

No less interesting is a belief expressed by Akromeev regarding the project to transform the military service in the Soviet Union by changing its length and traditional legal features.

Actually, he stated that no demobilization of the Soviet military apparatus would be possible also because, if it is true that there is a positive development of the international situation, «no one can guarantee that this is not reversible».

This last consideration also includes «in nuce» a potential and very authoritative standstill, though indirect, for the enthusiasm of the supporters of a total revision of the Italian defence pattern and of the opportunity, given for granted in view of the «irreversible process of reduction of the Warsaw Pact conven-

movements - according to which peace can be maintained and definitely established by means of a unilateral disarmament - prevail, the following considerations would be of no use whatever.

SUBJECTS OF GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE

The interest recently aroused by the subject of disarmament «at all costs» and by the rather revolutionary transformation of the military service may cause concern in all those believing in the lasting need for an efficacious, motivated and credible national defence.

Actually, not everyone is convinced that a unilateral declaration of peace will necessary be followed by the elimination of the well-rooted causes of conflict. Considering that those responsible for the Soviet Union do not seem to trust in an immediate accomplishment of the conditions necessary for a lasting peace,




with disdain the proposal of big cuts to the Soviet Armed Forces because «as a communist and a military man» he cannot but be against such a «moral demobilization».

If we consider that after abandoning his operative position as Chief of Defence Staff he occupied the po-

sition of personal advisor to Gorbachev, this should be enough to understand that the Soviet President's proposal in the Western world should be examined with great attention and carefulness.

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sition of personal advisor to Gorbachev could result rather different, in its aims, from the one many people have advanced and perceived. In fact the objective inter-connected with it could be that of convincing the Western world to disarm materially and morally, lower the guard and

be less attentive.

The immediate, almost inevitable, result of such a mistake on the part of the West would be the incapacity or an insufficient willingness to establish a coherent and convincing definition of the military policy to be carried out.

Tangible signs of this may be seen in the attempts of banalizing the above with elusive and elliptic expression such as: «a sufficient defence to replace an aggressive defence».

Meanwhile, there would be an increasing drive towards cancelling the primary aim of the Armed Forces by exalting subsidiary, albeit not quite marginal, tasks, in substitution or as an alternative form in respect of the primeval and original task of the defence of the national integrity.

By this cunning inversion of aims with the tasks, we run the risk of determining an irreparable distortion of optics and of the modalities of approach towards the problems of the military reality. This could result in

continue to face each other politically, economically and even strategically more than militarily.

Yet, if on the one hand these errors of outlook could be induced by an adequate and attentive Soviet strategy, we cannot, on the other hand, state that such mistakes are made out of mere short-sightedness.. In the West, in fact, there has never been so much talk of peace — as already said in the opening paragraph — as in this last period and it is discussed with an obstinacy unprecedented in history, even when there was a real danger of imminent, if not immanent, war.

Obviously the spasmodic desire for peace has been made more acute by the unconquerable fear of an impending nuclear catastrophe; but what most surprises in this attitude in the almost unaware removal of an indisputable fact; the fact, that is, that a great part of the world is dominated by an unbounded conflictuality.

To believe that peace can change

licts, should induce to consider the elimination of the latent state of war without having taken care to decrease the aggressivity of economic and industrial competition, the highly conditioning strength of propaganda and the overwhelming effect of consumism and materialism.

Weapons are not the «makers» or «destroyers» of peace; it is men, by selfishness and contrasting interests, who cause and create conflictuality. In view of the above, the theorizations on conflictuality as a co-existential element of man — as some believe — or as the inevitable result of the «appropriation logic» operating within human societies or — yet — as a particular form of subdivision of work and redistribution of the insufficient material goods available in the world, should not be taken into account.

In fact, as war and frailness of peace have so far been a constant of history, we could rightly interpret it as an unrefuted proof — and I wonder whether it could ever be con-



a guilty and provoked fade out of danger which would no longer be proclaimed, albeit latent, and in an under-evaluation and - worse still - oblivion of the dissimilarities (or asymmetries) which may easily be noticed by comparing the conventional forces of the two alliances which

from a desirable aim to a tangible reality only because it is passionately invoked, is something which risks to encourage and favour irrationality.

Even more so if the ensuing demonization of weapons and their reduction to objective cause of con-

The achievement of the objective «peace» imposes the adoption of a strategy which, on the one hand, sets disarmament as a final target, and on the other does not allow space for demonstrations of renunciation.

futable — of the lasting incapacity of man to bridge the gap between his yearning and his factual behaviour, between ethics and politics.

In view of this, the «pacifism» proclaimed and supported by certain movements, especially those established by young people, may be considered and evaluated from a particular point of view, from which the aims of this same «pacifism» could even be linked to a form of indirect strategy, operating within the international field and which proves fit to produce destabilizing effects within our system. This strategy particularly favours those who — sometimes with very valid argumentations of an ethical kind — appeal to the subjects of peace, the nuclear holocaust, famine and the dangerous race for armaments. Without considering the always possible political instrumentalization, the above argumentation of an ethical kind acquire an ever growing cultural importance which it would be neither easy nor convenient to undervalue or ig-

this does not greatly change the situation in Italy. In fact, though Italians like to quote Machiavelli, realism does not seem to be the matrix from which their prevailing attitudes and their fundamental options arise. In fact, Italian culture, generally speaking, seems to agree much more with utopianism than with empiricism. It ensues that we are more prone to imagine reality as we would like it to be than to analyze it as it actually is. Moreover, the realistic thought is basically critical and pessimistic, while the utopian thought almost inevitably tends — perhaps through self-propulsion — towards moralistic attitudes.

The result of this tendency is that social behaviours are generally spotted out as the consequence of opposing values rather than of actual opposing relations. Furthermore, while realism should take us to employ «rationality» as the means to examine conflicting interests, moralism takes us to rely on intuition often without proofs.

— is also without proofs. Reason, instead, seems to indicate as likely a completely different thesis: the balance of power centred on armaments is a factor of undisputable stability. Talks on disarmament and peace should thus start at this stage. In fact, there should be no doubt regarding the convenience of lowering this balance as far as possible, though gradually, in a balanced, contemporary and symmetric manner.

In view of the above, we deem it convenient to state that, in the present historical era, there is only one way to avoid war: discourage the eventual aggressor by adopting all the measures necessary to guarantee security.

STRATEGY FOR PEACE

The culture of peace, of the dialogue, of the refusal of the use of strength to overcome conflicts, besides being part of our moral heritage and tradition is an integrant part of our constitutional principles.



nore. In fact, amplified by the mass media, the above argumentation affect the movements of thought which enjoy much credit for their capacity of conditioning ever growing sectors of public opinion. It is true that the already mentioned argumentations may be critically refuted, but

Intuition without proofs is what must be considered the recurring statement that to achieve peace it is enough to really want it. The thesis that to achieve the scope it is sufficient to eliminate the instruments institutionally designed for war — Armed Forces and military arsenals

The fact of conceptually and emotionally adhering to these principles does not authorize us to believe that the process for the achievement of peace can easily be banalized. This process, in fact, insofar as it concerns everyone can but be carried out only

step by step, felling the subsequent barriers, established and firmly supported by conflicting interests and the lasting trends of many peoples who wish to prevail on the others in the distribution and the employment of world resources which are all but endless and not at all sufficient for everyone.

The problems of disarmament, famine, a more rational redistribution of resources do not allow for oversimplified designs and solutions, nor may we ask for thaumaturgical formulas for a rapid elimination of the deeply set causes which have determined its upspring. It may seem rhetoric and even misleading to present these problems and the search for the relative solution as the undebated alternative to the basic problem of the maintenance of security. The hope for peace does not exclude the will for defence which, indeed, it continues to solicit.

Welfare, development, the material and cultural growth of the peoples are all targets reached through

rity together with the always actual role of the Armed Forces as a means of contributing to the preservation of this precious value find an adequate and determining place in the strategy for peace.

In other words, the objective «peace» must be pursued with strength and may seem achievable — even if in the short and medium term it is very difficult to think of it as already achieved — but its accomplishment imposes the adoption of a strategy which, on the one hand sets disarmament as the final target and on the other hand cannot leave space to demonstrations of renunciation. A strategy that is which, while avoiding to cause conflicts aims at gradually and pragmatically removing the potential causes.

MILITARY INSTRUMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS


As the above mentioned strategy would continue to deploy «in poten-

ic weight both as the expression of leadership within the blocs and as capacity of aggregation and reduction of the will of the subjects to that of the bigger partners.

«Realpolitik» and «pragmatism» in the search for immediate advantages have dented the credibility of the super-powers and have involved their political, economic and ideological systems, that is their patterns of life, in the general fall of identity, thus reducing their previous capacity of handling crises on their own. This state of strategic confusion goes together with economic and financial disorder.

Hence the involution of **deterrence**, based on an undebated balance which has avoided the **spiralization** of local conflicts towards a nuclear conflict.

The scheme of relations among States — extrapolated from the comparison of the capitalist pattern with the communist pattern — is already overcome also because it cannot interpret the fluidity of the multiple



sufferings and fatigue and it is wrong to jeopardize them in the totalizing attempt to achieve an idea, worthy of respect if considered as tension and yearning, but most certainly utopian if pursued for the sole sake of a longing for it.

Thus, the effort to safeguard secu-

cy» the military instruments, it is logic to question oneself on their possible role in international relations.

Nowadays the international scene is no longer exclusively occupied by the super-powers. It is a long time since bi-polarism has lost its specif-

Problems of disarmament, famine and a fairer distribution of resources do not allow for oversimplified designs and solutions.

relations.

In this picture of trends, the role of military Institutions finds a qualification and a justification, rationally speaking, for maintaining a balance which will dissuade armed conflicts, especially if these could lead to a subsequent nuclear conflict.

The availability «in potency» of the above Institutions, though not causing difficulties as regards motivations and organizations, does not in fact avoid them. There is no doubt however that if we wish to reach the aim of dissuading, a military instrument prepared and capable of a high readiness of employment even if reduced at the potential state, is absolutely necessary. It is in view of this that the contribution that the military Institutions supply day by day to the achievement of a lasting peace becomes con-

CONCLUSION

Nowadays, as in the past, there is the need to ask oneself if the thesis that sees the Armed Forces as the armed arm and the legal strength of the State to employ as extreme «ratio» in international relationships is still valid.

In the absence of supernational legitimized organisms capable of imposing peace and settling conflicts of interests among the States, the classic attitude granting each of them the independent and sovereign evaluation of their own vital interests still exists. Only the destructive capacity of armaments questions the possibility and the suitability of achieving political objectives through the use of strength or whether, as is the case in Italy, the refusal to employ weapons to solve arising conflicts, except in the case of self-defence,

ally induced to avoid armed conflicts with the likelihood of cancelling "ipso facto" basically different interests and thus to be able to disarm albeit unilaterally, is too long a step to be reasonably and credibly sustained as regards the actual value of such a choice in international relations.

Thus it is indisputable that the balance of power based on armaments is a factor of stability and thus of peace.

In conclusion, to avoid war and endlessly look for a lasting peace adequate measures are absolutely necessary, in the military field as well; these are to guarantee the highest security aimed at continuing to discourage possible breaches of balance and ensuing overpowering by those who are stronger.

Gen. Francesco Cervone



crete and, though preluding disarmament, solicits, in the preceding stages, to continue to operate in a climate of security.

In sum, strange though it may seem, to «make peace» instruments suitable for war are necessary: «si vis pacem, para bellum», as long been well-known by everybody.

derives from a free and sovereign option.

Hence the concrete importance of the deterrence philosophy through the search and the maintenance of a balance of power which makes the employment of strength too dangerous.

However, to confuse the will mutu-

To believe that peace can change from a desirable aim to a tangible reality only because it is passionately invoked, is something which risks to encourage and solicit irrationality.

**THE ROLE OF
MILITARY
INSTRUMENTS
BETWEEN
PEACE AND
DISARMAMENT**



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ARMY MANAGERS

THE TRAINING OF CADRES AS
MILITARY LEADERS IN A TECHNOLOGICALLY
ADVANCED SOCIETY



With the advent of modern technology, the image of the military leader, once considered essentially a "warrior", has undergone a progressive evolution. The military leader has had to broaden his personal capabilities and preparedness to assimilate new scientific principles and to efficiently employ new means and methods. After World War II, this evolution assumed an ever more rapid, almost unstoppable pace, inexorably linked to the swift progress of technology. With the greater diversification and complexity of new techniques, the problems of management and administration have also increased. Consequently, the military leader has had to broaden and improve his managerial skills.

The profound changes which have taken place in Western industrialized nations have also affected personal values and ideals, thus making the soldier generally less receptive to the military ethic and less disposed to accept the sacrifices of military life. This factor renders even more difficult the task of transforming the civilian into a soldier, providing him with a military education, and preparing him for the rigors of an eventual war.

The Italian Army Scuola di Guerra (War College) has always proved to be sensitive to the rapid developments of advanced technology and, moreover, to the specific social repercussions of such developments. Consequently, over time the Scuola di Guerra has adapted both its structure and its programs of instruction to meet the needs of such changes.

The professional development of future military commanders is based upon the premise that, in any situation, an individual's characteristics or personality traits will determine whether he can decisively contribute to the attainment of a given objective. In practise, the "leader" is therefore the individual who has the ability to most rapidly effect those critical actions which are necessary

to not only achieve the group's objectives, but also to maintain and reinforce the group's cohesiveness. Thus, traditional charisma, once perceived as a quality which was based primarily upon sacred values, now assumes characteristics of efficiency and the capacity to react (both emotionally and rationally) to rapidly solve problems. In essence, "leadership" comprises all those actions performed by the commander which represent both the expectations of the subordinates and the obligations of the military leader. On the other hand, humanity is naturally disposed to structure society along the lines of a well-defined leadership system. Everything revolves around the conceptual role of leadership, adaptive behavior, and functional specialization.

The planning and administration of the course of study at the Italian Army Scuola di Guerra is therefore designed to provide officer students with a specific technical-professional capacity, a strong social awareness, and the ability to make timely decisions.

LEADER TRAINING

How can we produce such a "leader"? "Leaders are developed, not born". This is one of the mottos of one of the principal U.S. military schools. (1) Thus, leaderships can be taught and learned, and, of course, personal potential can also be improved.

But how can it be taught? It is easy to sense the need for leadership: it is the situation itself, as Weber states, which dictates the characteristics of the leaders. Historical events pose specific questions and require definitive answers. How can we choose leaders? How do we develop them? These are the critical questions which have been posited by various cultures and many generations of educators.

In the past, adaptive behavior (or instinct), such as the law of trial and error, the law of the survival of the fittest, etc., was a key factor. In periods of advanced cultural develop-

ment, such a leader does not spontaneously surface, but rather must be assisted in his initial development, be fully trained, and be pushed to the limits of his professional competence. Having reached those limits, the leader must know how to exceed them in order to control and dominate events.

The methodology adopted by modern technology suggests this method of selecting and nurturing the leaders of tomorrow. The professional schools for government officials, corporate directors and the leaders of the avant-garde are all institutions of selection and preparation for such leaders. With the establishment of academies and military schools, the military had long ago discerned the need to develop leaders without regard to the historical labels of class, nobility, charisma, family ties, or title.

But what leadership qualities must a military leader possess in the near future? How can he develop them? Which educational techniques must be employed, adapted, or devised? The answers to these questions are principal concerns for all military educators.

Several years ago, TRADOC (the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) had implemented an integrated plan for leadership development. It was an extremely interesting proposal which suggested that the problems of leadership development could be resolved at the group level. Now the concept can be broadened in an attempt to address the problem at the global level by overcoming the artificial barriers which have long separated the military and civilian sectors.

Let us now examine what has been accomplished to identify the parameters of leadership and the educational techniques which have been pursued in this regard.

Which leader?

The controversy regarding the nature of the military leader has by now subsided. Following bitter debate, which took place in the Unit-



Piero Sbano: *Trees, mixed technique on cardboard, 40cm x 50cm, 1989.*

ed States regarding the image of the officer after the Vietnam War, various ideas concerning military leadership were also examined in Italy. Culturally, these issues have been largely ignored in our country; the military leader has always had a clearly defined image as being a "leader of men".

In his memoirs, Kissinger said that in Vietnam, military leaders did not know how to carry out their duty; they had lost the combative spirit of their fathers, and did not know how to lead their men. Their leadership and managerial skills were not functional. (2) Less dramatically, but very clearly, the expectations which we had of our own military leaders also changed. Less dramatically because the issue had not been as controversial and emotional as in the U.S. and because the possible shifting away from the status quo would not immediately meet strong opposition. It was a change that took place over time in connection with the ideolog-

ical movements witnessed during the last few decades.

In democratic nations (and not only in those), the definition of the role of the military leader must also take into account the changing expectations which society has concerning that role. That change clearly appears in a recent study conducted by the Scuola di Guerra Department of Military Sociology and Psychology regarding a representative sample of draftees. (3) This research had the objective of studying the soldiers' relations with various components of society and with the military environment in particular. For a significant percentage of these young conscripts, the officer is an authority figure who is obeyed solely because he is of superior rank. This label taken by itself, seems contemptuous; but if it is considered along with the perceptions that these young men have regarding authority and leaders, this apparently negative term has another meaning. For the young people of today, one's father is "the old man", one's teacher is "the strict one", and the foreman is "the boss".

The instinctive perception of authority is evident in this terminology. Today the word "boss" has assumed a more functional meaning, and many of the emotional connotations of the past (such as "love" or "hate" for one's supervisor) have diminished. According to the same study, the virtues required of a commander are those which are most pragmatic and atavistic. These young men very explicitly require that the leader be more fair, demonstrate more sensitivity, and that he exemplify that which he preaches.

This aspect of psychological dependence found in young people today is more accentuated than in the past. They are willing to accept more readily the "boss" if he is a good leadership example, if he is fair and understanding and, foremost, if he is sensitive to his subordinates. The positive image of the leader, who strives to fulfill the needs of his subordinates (as noted by Darwin), can be clearly seen in this mentality.

Having dispelled the myths of the "leader" as one obeyed only for his rank or as one respected solely for his combat record, the human and pragmatic aspects of the leader resurface. For the draftee, the officer of today must essentially be fair, caring, professionally prepared, and an exemplary superior. The "Number One" of American thinking becomes the compassionate decisionmaker: the "boss" who must correctly understand his subordinates. Those leaders who possess such qualities are somewhat rare; therefore, it is necessary to develop them.

How can we do this? We can educate the most capable and qualified in the fundamental virtues of the military leader. Although such virtues are extremely difficult for individuals to actually put into practise, they are simple enough to identify. These basic attributes which a leader must possess are: courage and steadfastness in the face of any risk; caring and understanding with regard to others; a strong sense of duty; a keen sense of justice; and professional competence.

The establishment of an education

program designed to teach these virtues required particular care in the structuring of courses in the humanities and management. Thus same scientific and technical preparation was directed toward the development of operative plans which could be used during crisis situations. However, leaders now must resolve personnel, as well as operational problems. Thus, the significance of comprehension, affection, and devotion (key aspects of the human factor) becomes evident.

Academic research in the study of human leadership traits and values could very easily be integrated with that conducted by the military, as these are of interest to all educators. How do we define, categorize, and measure these traits and values? The answers to these questions could be researched by a joint working group of military and scholastic institutions.

Common ground for this research could be, for example, the study and analysis of crisis situations which the contemporary leader must know to master. To profoundly understand these crises and to train students to confront them, it is the responsibility of educators at all levels to avoid artificial cultural and institutional barriers between the civilian and military sectors of society. By now, the military's role is clear enough to all. It is a social function managed for the citizens to safeguard their national security and to provide for the defense of peace. It is no longer a force in the hands of a select few; it is not an instrument of power for a privileged class; and it is certainly not an entity separate and apart from the rest of the nation. It is a collective function which operates for the benefit of all and surely contributes to a realistic policy of progress and peace.

At the Italian Army Scuola di Guerra there has existed for several years a "Center of Analysis of Conflicts and Crisis Situations" (CACSC) whose objective is the study of crisis situations, their identification, and their management. To that end, the CACSC carries out

studies and research on the causes, contributing factors, and nature of world conflicts and emergency situations. For academic purposes, the CACSC monitors the management of conflicts and crises, and it conducts vulnerability analyses. Also, it studies the techniques and methods of international negotiation and of crisis control. Furthermore, the CACSC personnel research the indicators of high risk situations and conflicts, as well as those factors necessary for the analysis of global issues in their broadest sense. Additionally, the Center collects, compares, and synthesizes domestic and foreign research. Lastly, it publishes and disseminates its own research (in particular for instruction at the Scuola di Guerra), and its personnel collaborate closely with similar institutions. The CACSC is a tool that is available to instructors and officer students alike, which contributes efficiently to leader development.

Which technique?

Having briefly examined these characteristics of the modern leader and having identified the typical aspects of the military leader, we should now consider leadership development techniques.

Using the teaching techniques which foster the most effective learning is the primary goal of any scholastic institution, however, this becomes particularly important when the students are adults and have a great deal of cultural and professional experience. Teaching a manager to learn is just as stimulating, but also complex and difficult. The quality of instruction must be decidedly superior and the level of student involvement must be maximized. Besides the disciplining of student behavior, instruction techniques must focus on disciplining the mind and the spirit, a condition which is understood not as a restraint but as a social imperative.

This type of education has been in effect for quite some time at the Scuola di Guerra, an institution attended by Italian officers as well as

numerous foreign officers (from thirteen nations and four continents). These Italian and foreign officers all bring an invaluable wealth of experience and new ideas to the Scuola di Guerra. Learning, once considered merely as a duty within the military, has thus acquired new impetus: the need for efficiency, creativity, ingenuity, and adaptability in different situations.

Academic courses for instructors have been held at the Scuola for seven years: the first meeting (guided by various instructors of the University "La Sapienza" in Rome, of "La Cattolica" in Milan, and of the "Pontificio Ateneo Salesiano" also in Rome) had the objective of establishing the fundamental parameters of this particular academic field. The experience acquired, course after course, has served to establish the bases for the development of a truly separate field of study.

This year the topic examined was the "creative process". The requirement was, as always, extremely empirical, and the point of departure was strictly experimental. A sample of approximately 1,000 Italian officers (10 courses) was analyzed to define the average learning process. As a result, it was determined that, at the beginning of the Corso di Stato Maggiore (1st year course), students exhibit a passive learning style. After the first year of attendance, the process begins to change and interesting individual developments occur. By the end of the Corso Superiore (2nd year course), a change in learning behavior becomes evident for a significantly higher number of students. This new style tends to be one of active learning, greater creativity, and increased participation.

At this point, we should ask ourselves to what point might it be possible to further this growth toward creativity? Which other factor of this long learning process might be further strengthened?

We are, nevertheless, in the first stage of research and some results must yet be confirmed. The research

done thus far has inspired the researchers of the University "La Sapienza" in Rome, which may again present us with another opportunity to collaborate with the University. The Scuola di Guerra can be an excellent environment for research. It has a population of attendees that is extremely homogeneous. They are all adults, motivated, and contemporaries; they all are accustomed to a system of periodic education; and they possess very similar professional experience.

Over time, the continuous observation of these homogeneous classes has permitted us to identify certain elements of the most effective teaching techniques. Normally, these elements are well incorporated: lesson plans (by topic), short blocks of instruction, concepts which are based upon real situations, and information which are be readily used. Moreover, officer students do not assimilate much information "ex cathedra"; rather, they prefer to work intensely for short periods of time, they have the need for precise academic stimuli, and they feel the need to participate in order to more effectively understand.

Which values?

It should not seem strange that the section "values" was placed after the definition of the "leader" and after the discussion of developmental techniques: even values, in fact, must be learned and strengthened. It is necessary to start with basic definitions and primary concepts and to empirically demonstrate their validity. Mature cadre, even competent leaders, often need reinforcement, feedback, and re-definition of values. These tangible needs are reflective of change and the necessity for re-evaluation.

In particular, the young recruits are subject to a kind of fragility and instability. Their current cultural upbringing has rendered them somewhat insecure, anxious and uncertain. Military schools, in addition to specific military development, must often see to this profound re-

education of the draftee. Many draftees experience a period of crisis because they are not able to acquire new values and perspectives. He who has the duties and responsibility to lead must seek to identify those soldiers, understand them, and help them toward personal stability.

Which values then? Everything connected with the existential needs of the individual can be considered a value. To be able to live, develop oneself, and self-actualize at the professional and social level are basic needs. Everything that is dedicated to ensuring the satisfaction of these needs becomes the priority and is inviolable. It is difficult to reflect such basic principles in our current values; the Scuola di Guerra, however, must achieve precisely this melding of principles and values.



Piero Sbano: *Battle*, mixed technique on cardboard, 40cm x 50cm, 1989.

The Anglo-Saxon countries have long perceived the requirement to afford all of their citizens the opportunity to satisfy their basic psychological and social needs. (4) A similar undertaking must be institutionalized in our own nation. As such, these other national models should be identified and addressed in concert by principal educational institutions at our national level.

THE NEW MODELS

Not only are the character of the officer and the teaching methods changing rapidly, but also the methods of learning are similarly evolving. The revolution of data processing tends to greatly expand

man's intellectual capacity. Specifically, the power of the computer increases human capacity to memorize, to analyze, and to compile data. Despite the initial instinctive resistance to new things, this "damned machine" has become something more, as it has become associated with and has added to the traditional potential of the human mind. This type of machine helps man think more quickly, make more correlations, synthesize multiple processes, and comprehend more phenomena.

At the Scuola di Guerra, there is a study group for research, computer simulations, and the testing of models. Such research rose from the need to include in the Scuola di Guerra's curriculum, not only a general knowledge of the potential afforded by computers, but also first-hand experience in their capabilities and limitations. The computer was initially introduced as an arbiter in exercises. Then it was employed as a tool for weighing needs against resources in order to balance gains and losses. Now it is being used as a means of identifying probable outcomes across the gamut of operational situations.

To that end, a mathematical combat model has been developed. It considers not only material factors relative to the number and capabilities of equipment, but also it investigates foreseeable human behavior in various possible situations. This behavior is examined in relation to psychological factors and training as they are considered over a broad spectrum of environmental factors. This is rather a complex model which comprises a system of hundreds of differential equations, the parameters of which are extracted from an enormous data bank. The model is implemented in a way which renders its employment simple, sufficiently rapid, and well adapted to situations of interest to the Italian Army. Its use permits the evaluation of the operational capacity of military units in the face of various threats and in diverse situations. It also permits the verifications

of the possible means of employment of those units and to research the optimal composition of forces for the accomplishment of a specific mission. The system works well and it has already been used for wargaming various units opposing one another over different types of terrain.

The Scuola di Guerra is also in contact with the European Association for Computer Simulations, with the faculty of Electric Engineering of the University of Rome II, and specifically with the working group of Professor Jazeolla. Various analogous computer models developed in other countries have also been examined. (5) The most valid are not very different from those of the Scuola di Guerra, but they tend to be linked to the political-military situations and to the respective cultural bias of each country. Our model is formulated in such a way that it correctly corresponds with the actual geography of Italy, the needs of our nation, and the doctrine of our Armed Forces. The Scuola di Guerra has made great progress in this field, and it is dedicated to continuing its research always with an eye toward improvement.

CONCLUSIONS

It is difficult to synthesize the conclusions of such a fundamental analysis. It would be easy to imagine the leader of the future as a superman. Instead, this "super being" will have to consider himself a common man, he will have to live among normal men, but he will also have to be accustomed to intelligently manage the enormous complexities of the present and the future. And the military leader?

In the year 2000, in the opinion of some, war may be obsolete. Surely, however, there will still be the problem of managing human aggressiveness: aggressiveness just as dangerous for humanity; aggressiveness which must be prevented or minimized if possible; and aggressiveness which, at all costs, must be totally controlled. Our culture "must", in the broadest sense, meet this challenge

by countering the aggressive tendencies and attitudes which are considered immutable characteristics of human socialization.

This arduous task is the challenge for the military leader, a person empowered to control violence. His will not be an easy task, and he will need the collaboration of all because the decisive future step which could determine the survival of mankind will directly depend upon the success of his efforts.

Lt. Gen. Benedetto Spinelli

NOTES

- (1) U.S. Army War College.
- (2) Henry KISSINGER: Gli anni della Casa Bianca - Vol. 1, Sugarco Editors, 1980.
- (3) The sample is composed of approximately 6,500 men from a population of 150,000 conscripts at the end of their term of service. (This study was conducted with the collaboration of Professor MESSERI, Professor of Sociology at the University of Siena).
- (4) U.S. Army, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, American Heritage, p. 611.
- (5) During the April 1988 conference at the Defense Operational Analysis Establishment in West Byfleet (Great Britain), the following computer programs were compared: RIVAL 3 (Italian), IDAHTEX (British), HEJAS and KORA (German).



Lieutenant General Benedetto Spinelli attended the Military Academy, the Service Branch School and the 87th General Staff Course.

He served with the "Pozzuoli", "Legnano", "Centaurio" and "Ariete" Divisions, and participated in the rescue operations for the population hit by the earthquake in Friuli.

As General Staff Officer, Lt. Gen. Spinelli acquired a vast experience in national and international questions at Commands at all levels as well as at the Defence General Staff; he has been Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army Corps and of the 5th Army Corps.


Lt. Gen. Spinelli has been awarded the decoration of Grand Officer of Merit of the Republic of Italy, the Mauriziana Medal, the Silver Medal for Long Command and the Honorary Diploma of Lecturer at the Higher School of the Venezuelan Army.

He has been Commander of the 3rd Tank Battalion, Deputy Commander of the "Mamel" Armoured Brigade, Commander of the "Manin" Armoured Brigade, as well as 40th Commander of the "Ariete" Armoured Division; after a year as Deputy Commandant of the Army War College, he has been Commandant of the same Institute from October 1987 to November 1989.

At present, Lieutenant General Spinelli is the Commander of the 5th Army Corps.

PROMOTION BY SELECTION

A judgement of absolute merit



The laws about promotions, typical of military regulations, regulate the ways through which it is possible to reach the several ranks of the hierarchy.


Their definition is not always easy since it is necessary to take some conflicting needs into account: on the one hand, for example, the need for cadres, according to age and professional merits, to be kept at the highest level of efficiency by offer-

ing them adequate career prospects, and on the other the fact that it is impossible to guarantee everybody the achievement of top ranks.

This is due to the intrinsic nature of the hierarchy in which each rank has lower numerical needs than the previous rank. So, the solution of the complex problem of promotions can lie only in the balance between needs and possibilities, and the law in force about officers' promotions has been

drawn up according to these principles (1).

Through this law it has been possible to reach a right compromise between the conflicting needs, providing for a very rigorous selection mechanism only in some particular stages of the career, such as the promotion from junior to senior officer and the access to the various directing ranks, and allowing for the others almost automatic promotions. So in



Marasco:
Space conquest. Collage and tempera on cardboard.

end of the appraisal are summarized in a promotion judgement.

In the career progression by seniority the judgement is limited to the control about the fulfillment of the above-mentioned requirements and if this is positive, the officer is considered eligible and therefore promoted.

Instead, in the promotion by selection the procedure of appraisal is more complex. In fact, since the number of promotions to be granted is limited and since it is impossible to promote all those who are fit for the performance of the functions of the higher rank, but just the best of them, it is necessary to carry out a preliminary selection between fit and unfit officers and then a further selection among those who are fit. In particular the procedure consists of two consecutive phases.

In the first phase, as in the case of promotion by seniority, the Board starts the appraisal of fitness according to a general evaluation of the officers' career record. The only difference is that in the selection, according to the principle of greater severity in the judgement, a higher number of votes is needed, (two thirds, instead of half plus one).

In the second phase all those who are fit are assigned a point of merit from one to thirty. This point is determined through arithmetical operations, specified in detail by the law, the average among three different points (also in this case from one to thirty) for as many groups of elements.

In detail, the procedure is as follows. Each member of the Promotion Board assigns the officer to be examined a mark from one to thirty for each of the following groups:

- moral and physical qualities;
- merit and behaviour in war and professional merits shown during the career, especially in the rank held, with special consideration for the exercise of command or one specific functions as well as for the service

in other units;

- intellectual and cultural qualities with special consideration for the results of courses, exams and tests.

The sums of the marks assigned for each group are divided by the number of voters and the relative quotients, calculated with two decimal figures, are added up. The total obtained is divided by three calculating the quotient, with two decimal figures, that represents the point of merit assigned to the officer (3).

This way the Board carries out an analytic appraisal through which it is possible to check for each officer the level of personal qualities and professional merits necessary for promotion.

The described procedure could represent, at first sight, a system of promotion by comparative merit, but on the contrary it is an appraisal by absolute merit.

The administrative jurisprudence has constantly affirmed this in many sentences passed during the thirty-year enforcement of this law, maintaining that the particular forms of procedure provided for in the case of promotion by comparative merit are not applicable to the system by selection.

The system of promotion by comparative merit, used for the promotion of civil servants and disciplined by specific regulations (4), has definitely different characteristics.

In particular, the procedure is the following. During a preliminary phase the Board of directors, that is the organ concerned, establishes the general principles for the appraisal of qualifications, dividing them into categories and assigning particular numerical coefficients of evaluation to each category. According to the law, these categories must concern: efficiency, quality of service, ability as an organizer, original works carried out for the service itself, assignments progress made in the prescribed professional courses, to take on greater responsibilities.

the first case it has been established a system of promotion by selection and in the second by seniority.

Fundamental rule is that to be promoted to the higher rank the officer must fulfil physical, moral, personal, intellectual, cultural and professional requirements to perform the functions of the new rank (2).

Special collegiate bodies, the Promotion Boards, check the fulfillment of requirements, that at the

In the following phase, the real evaluation, it is possible to check the qualifications that, on their turn, are divided into previously established categories, thanks to the examination of the candidates' personal records.

Through the general principles and the comparison of the qualifications of each employee, it is possible to carry out an analytic comparison of the qualifications, that ends up with the assignment of a score for each category.

All individual scores are added to get a total coefficient for each candidate, according to which the Board draws up the final classification list.

In other words, the general principles, are established, the procedure of appraisal is conventional, mechanical, formal, since it is a mere comparison of the qualifications and qualities of each candidate.

On the contrary, in the system of promotion by absolute merit, the score is assigned to each officer, who is considered individually, and the classification list is not the result of a comparison among all candidates, but the result of a series of increasing scores showing most of all the capability to hold the higher rank.

Enrico Prampolini: *Study for the Recreation Center, G. P. O. Building, Trento (1933)*. Tempera on cardboard.

In other words, while in the comparative judgement the classification list represents the result of a comparison among all candidates, in the promotion by selection the score is a real value of judgement in itself.

The final list represents the individual merit position and leads to a comparative relation, even if it is not the result of a direct comparison.

In fact the assignment of the final score leaves out of consideration any comparison with officers of the same rank, and the following classification list is just the automatic and arithmetical result of the progression individually and autonomously assigned to each officer examined.

There can be no question that comparison is always part of an appraisal based on the choice of the best, but while in the judgement according to comparative merit the comparison is the way to attain the goal, in the system by selection the comparison is the result of the individual places within the merit list. In other words, it is the tangible result of the autonomous individual appraisals obtained through the application of the law.

And then, as the State Council confirmed in many cases, no regulation concerning promotions by selection describes the special and complex procedure as a scrutiny by comparative merit, since neither the formation of the merit list, nor the assignment of a score necessarily imply a comparison.

The procedure established in detail by law, consisting of the list of the qualifications that must be taken into consideration, their grouping into three categories and a certain score to be assigned to each group of titles, is so legally binding that any further of different determination of the principles and methods of procedure would be considered unlawful.

Fortunato Depero: *Study for a stained glass window, G. P. O. Building, Trento (1933)*. Tempera on paper.




Recently also the Constitutional Court intervened in this dispute during the examination of a petition about a question of constitutional legitimacy concerning the procedure of promotion by selection for officers, raised by the Administrative Courts of Piedmont and Liguria (5).

The High Court, rejecting the petition as groundless, reconfirmed the absolute character of the procedure of promotion by selection for officers.

Col. Giuseppe Giubbini Ferroni

Notes

- (1) Law 12 November 1955, n. 1137 concerning "Promotions of Army, Navy and Air Force officers".
- (2) Art. 1 *ibid*.
- (3) Art. 26 *ibid*.
- (4) DPR 10 January 1957, no. 3 concerning the "Single Text of regulations about the status of civil servants" and DPR 3 May 1957, n. 686 containing regulations for the implementation of the Single Text.
- (5) Constitutional Court, sentence of 24 March 1988, no. 409, about the constitutional legitimacy of art. 26 of Law 12 November 1955, no. 1137, after a petition presented by the Administrative Courts of Piedmont and Liguria.





R. Otterfeld

FRANCE

AT WAR



116. KEEPING A SHARP LOOK-OUT
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"Daily Mail" WHP POSTCARDS

V TRENCHES ON A MOUNTAIN SIDE

Very early in the morning I met Alan Breck, with a half-healed bullet-scraps across the bridge of his nose, and an Alpine cap over one ear. His people a few hundred years ago had been Scotch. He bore a Scotch name, and still recognised the head of his clan, but his French occasionally ran into German words for he was an Alsatian on one side.

"This", he explained, "is the very best country in the world to fight in. It's picturesque and full of cover. I'm a gunner. I've been here for months. It's lovely".

It might have been the hills under Mussoorie, and what our cars expected to do in it I could not understand. But the demon-driver who had been a road-racer took the 70 h.p. Mercédès and threaded the narrow valleys, as well as occasional half-Swiss villages full of Alpine troops, at a restrained thirty miles an hour. He shot up a new-made road, more like Mussoorie than ever, and did not fall down the hillside even once. An ammunition mule of a mountain battery met him at a tight corner, and began to climb a tree.

"See! There isn't another place in France where that could happen", said Alan. "I tell you, this is a magnificent country".

The mule was hauled down by his tail before he had reached the lower branches, and went on through the woods, his ammunition-boxes jinking on his back, for all the world as though he were rejoining his battery at Jutogh. One expected to meet the little Hill people bent under their loads under the forest gloom. The light, the colour, the smell of wood-smoke, pine-needles, wet earth, and warm mule were all Himalayan. Only the Mercédès was violently and loudly a stranger.

"Halt!" said Alan at last, when she had done everything except imitate the mule.

"The road continues", said the demon-driver seductively.

"Yes, but they will hear you if you go on. Stop and wait. We've a mountain battery to look at".

They were not at work for the moment, and the Commandant, a grim and forceful man, showed me some details of their construction. When we left them in their bower — it looked like a Hill priest's wayside shrine — we heard them singing through the steep-descending pines. They, too, like the 75's, seem to have no pet name in the service.

It was a poisonously blind country. The woods blocked all sense of direction above and around. The ground was at any angle you please, and all sounds were split up and muddled by the tree trunks, which acted as silencers. High above us the respectable, all-concealing forest had turned into sparse, ghastly blue sticks of timber — an assembly

of leper-trees round a bald mountain top.

"That's where we're going", said Alan. "Isn't it an adorable country?"


TRENCHES

A machine-gun loosed a few shots in the fumbling style of her kind when they feel for an opening. A couple of rifle shots answered. They might have been half a mile away or a hundred yards below. An adorable country! We climbed up till we found once again a complete tea-garden of little sunk houses, almost invisible in the brown-pink recesses of the thick forest. Here the trenches began, and with them for the next few hours life in two dimensions — length and breadth. You could have eaten your dinner almost anywhere off the swept dry ground, for the steep slopes favoured draining, there was no lack of timber, and there was unlimited labour. It had made neat double-length dug-outs where the wounded could be laid in during their passage down the mountain side; well-tended occasional latrines properly limed; dug-outs for sleeping and eating; overhead protections and tool-sheds where

needed, and, as one came nearer the working face, very clever cellars against trench-sweepers. Men passed on their business; a squad with a captured machine-gun which they tested in a sheltered dip; armourers at their benches busy with sick rifles; fatigue-parties for straw, rations, and ammunition; long procession of single blue figures turned sideways between the brown sunless walls. One understood after a while the nightmare that lays hold of trench-stale men, when the dreamer wanders for ever in those blind mazes till, after centuries of agonising flight, he finds himself stumbling out again into the white blaze and horror of the mined front — he who thought he had almost reached home!

IN THE FRONT LINE

There were no trees above us now. Their trunks lay among the edge of the trench, built in with stones, where necessary, or sometimes overhanging it in ragged splinters or bushy tops. Bits of cloth, not French, showed, too, in the uneven lines of débris at the trench lip, and some thoughtful soul





had marked an unexploded Boche trench sweeper as "not to be touched". It was a young lawyer from Paris who pointed that out to me.

We met the Colonel at the head of an indescribable pit of ruin full of sunshine, whose steps ran down a very steep hillside under the lee of an almost vertically plunging parapet. To the left of that parapet the whole hillside was one gruel of smashed trees, split stones, and powdered soil. It might have been a rag-picker's dumpheap on a colossal scale.

Alan looked at it critically. I think he had helped to make it not long before.

"We're on the top of the hill now, and the Boches are below us", said he. "We gave them a very fair sickener lately".

"This", said Colonel, "is the front line".

There were overhead guards against hand-bombs which disposed me to believe him, but what convinced me most was a corporal urging us in whispers not talk so loud. The men were at dinner, and a good smell of food

filled the trench. This was the first smell I had encountered in my long travels uphill — a mixed, entirely wholesome flavour of stew, leather, earth, and rifle-oil.

FRONT LINE PROFESSIONALS

A proportion of men were standing to arms while others ate; but dinner-time is slack time, even among animals, and it was close on noon.

"The Boches got *their* soup a few days ago" some one whispered. I thought of the pulverised hillside, and hoped it had been hot enough.

We edged along the still trench, where the soldier stared, with justified contempt, I thought, upon the civilian who scuttled through their life for a few emotional minutes in order to make words out of their blood. Somehow it reminded me of coming

in late to a play and incommoding a long line of packed stalls. The whispered dialogue was much the same: "Pardon!" "I beg your pardon, monsieur". "To the right, monsieur". "If monsieur will lower his head". "One sees best from here, monsieur", and so on. It was their day and night long business, carried through without display or heat, or doubt or indecision. Those who worked, worked; those off duty, not five feet behind them in the dug-outs, were deep in their papers, or their meals or their letters; while death stood ready at every minute to drop down into the narrow cut from out of the narrow strip of unconcerned sky. And for the better part of a week one had skirted hundreds of miles of such a frieze!

The loopholes not in use were plugged rather like old-fashioned hives. Said the Colonel removing a plug: "Here are the Boches. Look and you'll see their sandbags". Through the jumble of riven trees and stones one saw what might have been a bit of green sacking. "They're about seven metres distant just here", the Colonel went on. That was true, too. We entered a little fortalice with a cannon in it, in an embrasure which at that moment stuck me as unnecessarily vast, even though it was partly closed by a frail packing-case lid. The Colonel sat him down in front of it, and explained the theory of this sort of redoubt. "By the way", he said to the gunner at last, "can't you find something better than that?" He twitched the lid aside. "I think it's too light. Get a log of wood or something".

HANDY TRENCH SWEEPERS

I loved that Colonel! He knew his men and he knew the Boches — had them marked down like birds. When he said they were beside dead trees or behind boulders, sure enough there they were! But, as I have said, the dinner-hour is always slack, and even when we came to a place where a section of trench had been bashed open by trench-sweepers, and it was recommended to duck and hurry, nothing much happened. The uncanny thing was the absence of movement in the Boche trenches. Sometimes one imagined that one smelt strange tobacco, or heard a rifle-bolt working after a shot. Otherwise they were as still as pig at noonday.

We held on through the maze, past trench sweepers of a handy light pattern, with their screw-tailed charge all ready; and a grave or so; and when I came on men who merely stood within easy reach of their rifles, I knew I was in the second line. When they lay frankly at ease in their dug-outs, I knew it was the third. A shot would have sprinkled all three.

"No flat plains", said Alan. "No hunting for gun positions — the hills are full of them — and the trenches close together and commanding each other. You see what a beautiful country it is".

The Colonel confirmed this, but from

another point of view. War was his business, as the still woods could testify — but his hobby was his trenches. He had tapped the mountain streams and dug out a laundry where a man could wash his shirt and go up and be killed in it, all in a morning; had drained the trenches till a muddy stretch in them was an offence; and at the bottom of the hill (it looked like a hydropathic establishment on the stage) he had created baths where half a battalion at a time could wash. He never told me how all that country had been fought over as fiercely as Ypres in the West; nor what blood had gone down the valleys before his trenches pushed over the scalped mountain top. No. He sketched out new endeavours in earth and stones and trees for the comfort of his men on that populous mountain.

And there came a priest, who was a sub-lieutenant, out of a wood of snuff brown shadows and half veiled trunks. Would it please me to look at a chapel? It was all open to the hillside, most tenderly and devoutly done in rustic work with reedings of peeled branches and panels of moss and thatch — St. Hubert's own shrine. I saw the hunters who passed before it, going to the chase on the far side of the mountain where their game lay.

A BOMBARDED TOWN


Alan carried me off to tea the same evening in a town where he seemed to know everybody. He had spent the afternoon on another mountain top, inspecting gun positions; whereby he had been shelled a little — *marmite* is the slang for it. There had been no serious *marmitage*, and he had spotted a Boche position which was *marmitable*.

"And we may get shelled now", he added, hopefully. "They shell this town whenever they think of it. Perhaps they'll shell us at tea".

It was a quaintly beautiful little place, with its mixture of French and German ideas; its old bridge and gentle-minded river, between the cultivated hills. The sand-bagged cellar doors; the ruined houses; and the holes in the pavement looked as unreal as the violences of a cinema against that soft and simple setting. The people were abroad in the streets, and the little children were playing. A big shell gives notice enough for one to get to shelter, if the shelter is near enough. That appears to be as much as any one expects in the world where one is shelled, and that world has settled down to it. People's lips are a little firmer, the modelling of the brows is a little more pronounced, and, maybe, there is a change in the expression of the eyes; but nothing that a casual afternoon caller need particularly notice.

CASES FOR HOSPITAL

The house where we took tea was the "big house" of the place, old and massive,



a treasure-house of ancient furniture. It had everything that the moderate heart of man could desire — gardens, garages, outbuildings, and the air of peace that goes with beauty in age. It stood over a high cellarge, and opposite the cellar door was a brand-new blindage of earth packed between timbers. The cellar was a hospital, with its beds and stores, and under the electric light the orderly waited ready for the cases to be carried down out of the streets.

"Yes, they are all civil cases", said he.

They come without much warning — a woman gashed by falling timber; a child with its temple crushed by a flying stone; an urgent amputation case, and so on. One never knows. Bombardment, the Boche textbooks say, "is designed to terrify the civil population so that they may put pressure on their politicians to conclude peace". In real life, men are very rarely soothed by the sight of their women being tortured.

We took tea in the hall upstairs, with a propriety and an interchange of compliments that suited the little occasion. There was no

attempt to disguise the existence of a bombardment, but it was not allowed to outweigh talk of lighter matters. I know one guest who sat through it as near as might be inarticulate with wonder. But he was English, and when Alan asked him whether he had enjoyed himself, he said: "Oh, yes. Thank you very much".

"Nice people, aren't they?" Alan went on.

"Oh, very nice. And — and such good tea".


He managed to convey a few of his matured sentiments to Alan after dinner.

"But what else could the people have done?" said he. "They are French".

VI

THE COMMON TASK

"This is the end of the line", said the Staff Officer, kindest and most patient of chaperones. It buttressed itself on a fortress among hills. Beyond that, the silence was more awful than the mixed noise of business



to the westward. In mileage on the map the line must be between four and five hundred miles; in actual trench-work many times that distance. It is too much to see at full length; the mind does not readily break away from the obsession of its entirety or the grip of its detail. One visualises the thing afterwards, as a white-hot gash; worming all across France between intolerable sounds and lights, under ceaseless blasts of whirled dirt. Nor is it any relief to lose oneself among wildernesses of piling, stoning, timbering, concreting, and wire-work, or incalculable quantities of soil thrown up raw to the light and cloaked by the changing seasons — as the unburied dead are cloaked.

Yet there are no words to give the essential simplicity of it. It is the rampart put up by Man against the Beast, precisely as in the Stone Age. If it goes, all that keeps us from the Beast goes with it. One sees this at the front as clearly as one sees the French villages behind the German lines. Sometimes people steal away from them and bring word of what they endure.

Where the rifle and the bayonet serve, men use those tools along the front. Where the knife gives better results, they go in behind the hand grenades with the naked twelve-inch knife. Each race is supposed to fight in its own way, but this war has passed beyond all the known ways. They say that the Belgians in the North settle accounts with a certain dry passion which has varied very little since their agony began. Some sections of the English line have produced a soft voiced, rather reserved type, which does its work with its mouth shut. The French carry an edge to their fighting, a precision, and a dreadful knowledge, coupled with an insensibility to shock, unlike anything one has imagined of mankind. To be sure, there has never been like provocation, for never since the Aesir went about to bind the Fenris Wolf has all the world united to bind the Beast.

The last I saw of the front was Alan Breck speeding back to his gun positions among the mountains; and I wondered what delight of what household the lad must have been in the old days.

SUPPORTS AND RESERVES

Then we had to work our way, department by department, against the tides of men behind the line — supports and their supports, reserves and reserves of reserves, as well as the masses in training. They flooded towns and villages, and when we tried short cuts we found them in every by-lane. Have you seen mounted men reading their home letters with the reins thrown on the horses' necks, moving in absorbed silence through a street which almost said "Hush!" to its dogs; or met, in a forest, a procession of perfectly new big guns, apparently taking themselves from the foundry to the front?

In spite of their love of drama, there is not much "window-dressing" in the French character. The Boche, who is the priest of the Higher Counter-jumpery, would have had half the neutral Press out in cars to advertise these vast spectacles of men and material. But the same instinct as makes their rich farmers keep to their smocks makes the French keep quiet.

"This is our affair", they argue. "Everybody concerned is taking part in it. Like the review you saw the other day, there are no spectators".

"But it might be of advantage if the world knew".

Mine was a foolish remark. There is only one world today, the world of the Allies. Each of them knows what the others are doing and — the rest doesn't matter. This is a curious but delightful fact to realise at first hand. And think what it will be later, when we shall all circulate among each other and open our hearts and talk it over in a brotherhood more intimate than the ties of blood!

I lay that night at a little French town, and was kept awake by a man, somewhere in the hot, still darkness, howling aloud from the pain of his wounds. I was glad that he was alone, for when one man gives way the others sometimes follow. Yet the single note of misery was worse than the baying and gulping of a whole ambulance. I wished that a delegation of strikers could have heard it.

That a civilian should be in the war zone at all is a fair guarantee of his good faith. It is when he is outside the zone unchaperoned that questions begin, and the permits are looked into. If these are irregular — but one doesn't care to contemplate it. If regular, there are still a few counter-checks. As the sergeant at the railway station said when he helped us out of an impasse: "You will realise that it is the most undesirable persons whose papers are of the most regular. It is their business, you see. The Commissary of Police is at the Hôtel de Ville, if you will come along for the little formality. Myself, I used to keep a shop in Paris. My God, these provincial towns are desolating!"

PARIS — AND NO FOREIGNERS

He would have loved his Paris as we found

it. Life was renewing itself in the streets, whose drawing and proportion one could never notice before. People's eyes, and the women's especially, seemed to be set to a longer range, a more comprehensive gaze. One would have said they came from the sea or the mountains, where things are few and simple, rather than from houses. Best of all, there were no foreigners — the beloved city for the first time was French throughout from end to end. It felt like coming back to an old friend's house for a quiet talk after he had got rid of a houseful of visitors. The functionaries and police had dropped their masks of official politeness, and were just friendly. At the hotels, so like school two days before the term begins, the impersonal valet, the chambermaid of the set two-franc smile, and the unbending head-waiter had given place to one's own brothers and sisters, full of one's own anxieties. "My son is an aviator, monsieur. I could have claimed Italian nationality for him at the beginning, but he would not have it"... "Both my brothers, monsieur, are at the war. One is dead already. And my fiancé, I have not heard from him since March. He is cook in a battalion"... "Here is the wine list, monsieur. Yes, both my sons and a nephew, and — I have no news of them, not a word of news. My God, we all suffer these days". And so, too, among the shops — the mere statement of the loss or the grief at the heart, but never a word of doubt, never a whimper of despair.

"Now why", asked a shopkeeper, "does not our Government, or your Government, or both our Governments, send some of the British Army to Paris? I assure you we should make them welcome".

"Perhaps", I began, "you might make them too welcome".


He laughed. "We should make them as welcome as our own army. They would enjoy themselves". I had a vision of British officers, each with ninety days' pay to his credit, and a damsel or two at home, shopping consummely.

"And also", said the shopkeeper, "the moral effect on Paris to see more of your troops would be very good".

But I saw a quite English Provost-Marshal losing himself in chase of defaulters of the New Army who knew their Paris! Still, there is something to be said for the idea — to the extent of a virtuous brigade or so. At present, the English officer in Paris is a scarce bird, and he explains at once why he is and what he is doing there. He must have good reasons. I suggested teeth to an acquaintance. "No good", he grumbled. "They've thought of that, too. Behind our lines is simply crawling with dentists now!

A PEOPLE TRANSFIGURED

If one asked after the people that gave dinners and dances last year, where every one talked so brilliantly of such vital things, one got in return the addresses of hospitals. Those pleasant hostesses and maidens



seemed to be in charge of departments or on duty in wards, or kitchen, or sculleries. Some of the hospitals were in Paris. (Their staffs might have one hour a day in which to see visitors). Others were up the line, and liable to be shelled or bombed.

I recalled one Frenchwoman in particular, because she had once explained to me the necessities of civilised life. These included a masseuse, a manicurist, and a maid to look after the lap-dogs. She is employed now, and has been for months past, on the disinfection and repair of soldiers' clothes. There was no need to ask after the men one had known. Still, there was no sense of desolation. They had gone on; the others were getting ready.

All France works outwards to the Front — precisely as an endless chain of fire-buckets works towards the conflagration. Leave the fire behind you and go back till you reach the source of supplies. You will find no break, no pause, no apparent haste, but never any slackening. Everybody has his or her bucket, little or big, and nobody disputes how they should be used. It is a people pos-

sessed of the precedent and tradition of war for existence, accustomed to hard living and hard labour, sanely economical by temperament, logical by training, and illumined and transfigured by their resolve and endurance.

You know, when supreme trial overtakes an acquaintance whom till then we conceived we knew, how the man's nature sometimes changes past knowledge or belief. He who was altogether such an one as ourselves goes forward simply, even lightly, to heights we thought unattainable. Though he is the very same comrade that lived our small life with us, yet in all things he has become great. So it is with France to-day. She has discovered the measure of her soul.

THE NEW WAR

One sees this not alone in the — it is more than contempt of death — in the godlike preoccupation of her people under arms which makes them put death out of the account, but in the equal passion and fervour with which her people throughout give them-

selves to the smallest as well as the greatest tasks that may in any way serve their sword. I might tell you something that I saw of the cleaning out of certain latrines; of the education and antecedents of the cleaners; what they said in the matter; and how perfectly the work was done. There was a little Rabelais in it, naturally, but the rest was pure devotion, rejoicing to be of use.

Similarly with stables, barricades, and barbed-wire work, the clearing and piling away of wrecked house-rubbish, the serving of meals till the service rocks on its poor tired feet, but keeps its temper; and all the unlovely, monotonous details that go with war.

The women, as I have tried to show, work stride for stride with the men, with hearts as resolute and a spirit that has little mercy for shortcomings. A woman takes her place wherever she can relieve a man - in the shop, at the posts, on the tramways, the hotels, and a thousand other businesses. She is inured to field-work, and half the harvest of France this year lies in her lap. One feels at every turn how her men trust her. She knows, for she shares everything with her world, what has befallen her sisters who are now in German hands, and her soul is the undying flame behind the men's steel.

Neither men nor women have any illusion as to miracles presently to be performed which shall 'sweep out' or 'drive back' the Boche. Since the Army is the Nation, they know much, though they are officially told little. They all recognise that the old fashioned 'victory' of the past is almost as obsolete as a rifle in a front-line trench. They all accept the new war, which means grinding down and wearing out the enemy by every means and plan and device that can be compassed. It is slow and expensive, but as deadly sure as the logic that leads them to make it their one work, their sole thought, their single preoccupation.


THE NATION'S CONFIDENCE

The same logic saves them a vast amount of energy. They knew Germany in '70, when the world would not believe in their knowledge; they knew the German mind before the war; they know what she has done (they have photographs) during this war. As I have said, they do not fall into spasms of horror and indignation over atrocities 'that cannot be mentioned', as the English papers say. They mention them in full and book them to the account. They do not discuss, nor consider, nor waste an emotion over anything that Germany says or boasts or argues or implies or intrigues after. They have the heart's ease that comes from all being at work for their country, the knowledge that the burden of work is equally distributed among all: the certainty that the women are working side by side with the men; the assurance that when one man's task is at the moment ended, another takes his place.

Out of these things is born their power of recuperation in their leisure; their reasoned calm while at work; and their superb confidence in their arms. Even if France of today stood alone against the world's enemy, it would be almost inconceivable to imagine her defeat now; wholly so to imagine

any surrender. The war will go on till the enemy is finished. The French do not know when that hour will come; they seldom speak of it; they do not amuse themselves with dreams of triumphs or terms.


Their business is war, and they do their business.



ITALY'S WAR

by

G. M. TREVELYAN



My heart goes out of the poor little families all over this great kingdom who stood the brunt and strain of the war, and gave their men gladly to make other men free, and other women and children free. These are the people, and many like them, to whom, after all, we owe the glory of this great achievement.

PRESIDENT WILSON AT ROME,

January 3, 1919

CHAPTER I

THE DAYS OF MAY

High above Rome the statue of Garibaldi lifts itself far seen against the skyline; his head is turned a little down and aside, as if he were listening for the news of the battle for liberty coming in from all quarters of the world in arms to that station on the Janiculum. In December 1870 he began this battle of ours against Prussian militarism, perceiving that as soon as Napoleon III had fallen it had become a battle not only of Republican France but of all free nations against the enslaver. The world laughed at the incorrigible old man, setting out in his dotage to fight once more against an invincible foe in the depth of the French winter. They said he had more heart than brains. So he had; yet his instinct was right in this matter, and the wise world was wrong, as it has now found to its cost. Out of the heart of the simple is sometimes ordained wisdom.

Forty-four years before the wise world found itself landed precisely where Garibaldi had foreseen, fighting for its lost liberties against Prussian despotism. Meanwhile much had been happening in Italy. Her Parliamentary Constitution, founded by Cavour on the English model, stood just as he had made it, but had not been used as he would have used it. It had given the new Italy a stable government that some older nations might envy, preventing reaction and revolution. But it lacked the breath of vital air; for the Italians, though a Liberal, are not a Parliamentary people. To them a general election is a formality, not, as in England, a creative convulsion. There had been too little real reform, and above all education had been too much neglected.

For the rest, Italy had grown richer, especially in the north; but her prosperity had been partly caused and wholly coloured by an increase of German influence, financial and commercial, rapidly becoming political and spiritual. Not only did business men go to German banks for credit to start new enterprises, but at the universities too many worshipped the well-advertised intellectual methods of the Fatherland. Italian thought began to run on lines of *Realpolitik*. Italian materialism found a philosophy ready-made for its needs in modern Germany, and mocked at Italian idealism as the superstition of an age gone by. The Triple Alliance, demanding an appearance of respect for Austria, caused officialdom to discourage the *Risorgimento* memories, in which mainly Italian idealism finds the body for its soul. In Italy officialdom can do much — but not all.

Fortunately, as was implicit in the nature of the case, only the jackals of intellect were thus denationalized. The great men — Benedetto Croce, D'Annunzio, Fogazzaro, Ferrero, Marconi — were Italians yet. But jackals are a numerous pack, and can devour. The Spaniardized black jackals destroyed Italy's soul in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries, in spite of Michael Angelo, Bruno, and Galileo. Why should not the Germanized jackals have done the same in the twentieth century? The danger was great, for no one but the methodic German bagman gave a thought to Italy's material needs. The Inglesi were playing cricket or trading across the ocean; they had ceased to know Latin and Greek, but had not learnt modern languages instead. The Americani were far away, turning out standardized goods at record paces for their own market; in all thing Europe must come to America, not America to Europe. So the Kultur disease crept on unchecked, and who knows how it would have ended for Italy and many other lands if Germany had not, in the high folly of her rules, called in the cannon to give her at once what would have been hers for waiting?

In the August of all men's fate, Italy heard



Emanuele Filiberto of Savoy, Duke of Aosta, Commander of the 3rd Army from 1915 to 1919.

the blast of the trumpets from across the Alps. That ancient sound awoke immortal memories. Half-conscious, deep-slumbering instincts stirred. Trumpets had been heard in Italy of old; but it was not to found a German Empire over the known world that Scipio and Caesar had led forth the legions, or the Carroccio stood fast amid the spears at Milan. The majestic march up the Sacred Way of Trajan's Column was challenged in its historic supremacy over the slowly-passing ages by the trumpets of this upstart Goth. Should Rome fight to make Alaric master of the world? —

*"O patria mia, vedo le mura e gli archi
E le colonne e i simulacri, e l'erme
Torri degli avi nostri."*

Those honoured stones cried out against such treason.

And then, too, there were nearer and dearer thoughts. Shall we fight against our fathers, marching to war under the accursed yellow and black? Was it for this that Cavour made us a nation? Was it to swell the pride of Austria and to add new nations to her slave-roll that the plumes of Victor Emmanuel's Bersaglieri went nodding into the battle smoke at Solferino? In many homes the old men who remember still sit at the head of the table, or were but lately borne over the threshold. Austria! Oh, they should have kept their foolish trumpets silent, and gone on with their Credit Banks and Kultur for yet another generation of men, till Mazzini and Garibaldi were forgotten, and till at least the oral tradition of the *Risorgimento* had perished out of the land.

So in that week of great and sudden decisions, taken by all men in every land, Italy unanimously and by acclamation declared her neutrality; she refused to interpret the Triple Alliance as compelling her to march to the aid of German and Austrian aggression. So far Giolitti was at one with Salandra and Sonnino. This first great decision, being made so swiftly and with such clear popular approval, saved France on the Marne by allowing her to strip her Alpine frontier.

The Triple Alliance disappeared by the act of its just interpretation, and left no speck of dishonour on Italian statecraft. It was shown that the Triple Alliance, formed for peace and self-defence, had in its latter days been wrested into an instrument of Pan-German ambition. Neither of the Teuton Powers cared what their Latin partner thought; they had not allowed Italy to attack the Dardanelles when she was at war with Turkey in 1911, but they themselves had attacked Serbia, and plunged all Europe into war, without consulting the Lepidus of the triumvirate. It is this aspect of the Alliance that Salandra so well exposed, and against which he led the rebellion.

In the Italian pamphlet controversies of 1914-15 the following sentence from the useful Bernhardt was often quoted by indignant patriots: —

"The old idea of the German Empire was revived in a federal shape by the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. The German idea, as Bismark fancied it, ruled from the North Sea to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean."

So then, said the Italians, our country is a part of the political system of Germany! *Vedremo.*

And here, again, is a characteristic anti-German argument of that period of the controversy:—

"The Triple Alliance did not contemplate but excluded the case of a war undertaken by one of the



Allied States in order to establish its own political hegemony over all Europe, including its own Allies! It is a problem created by this European war, in whose origin we have no part, now forced upon every State in Europe whose nationality is still incomplete, and whose political independence is menaced. Italy is one of these States."

In that pregnant sentence we see the transition from the argument for neutrality in 1914 to the argument for war against the Central Powers in 1915. *Italy's nationality is incomplete, and her political independence is threatened.* Therefore she must join in the common war against the Power whose victory would destroy her independence, and who has long been sapping by peaceful penetration the foundations of her "incomplete nationality."

And so we get back to the Credit Banks, and Kultur at the universities, signs of an "incomplete nationality." There were other signs besides: the latent provincial feeling underneath all the feast of the tricolour; the lack of intelligent enthusiasm for Italy as a nation among the ill-educated peasants in many districts; the possibility of such incidents as one that I heard of as occurring on September 20, 1917, just before Caporetto, when a girl was insulted in the street for wearing the national colours; the ridiculous belief, still sedulously fostered by the German agents, that Italy could never stand alone, but must "belong" either to the Germans or else to the English — all these were the signs of a racial want of self-confidence, of an "incomplete nationality."

Machine gun entrenchment on the Montello Hill.

To eradicate this weakness, officialdom and State education during the generation of the Triple Alliance had done but little, Socialism nothing, and the Church less.

Such was the disease, such the danger — sure to be fatal if Germany won the war, whether Italy remained neutral or participated in the attack on France. And, therefore, the idealists of the Peninsula, almost without an exception, became the war party, seeing in war against the Central Powers the only way to save their country's independence, their country's traditions, their country's soul. During three years of constant intimacy with Italian soldiers, my experience has been that in the Army men were enthusiastic for the war almost in proportion as they were high-minded, so long as the war was still a doubtful venture. After victory materialists and self-seekers naturally change their tune, and often become the loudest Jingoists.

The War Party (the "Interventionists," as they were still called even two years after the war had begun) was the party of idealism, of democratic and free government, and of national unity — three principles which in Italy are bound together because they were the three principles of the *Risorgimento* movement that made the State. The Neutralist Party, or "Defeatists", correspondingly contained the materialists, who could at first show a good case in favour of German vassalage as the

Ardito.

The "Arditi" were recruited from all Branches, but particularly among Infantrymen, Bersaglieri and Alpini. They wore black "flames" on the open collar of their coats, and a small laurel festoon, enclosing a dagger, on the left sleeve. These special troops were set up in the hardest days of the war, as a true expression of the impatient will of the bravest fighters in the front-line, who were eager to put an end to the distressing and humiliating stagnation of a dreary trench warfare.

method of prosperity; the political and clerical reactionaries, still at heart opposed to the Revolution of 1860-70; and the provincialists, who are less heartily sensible of national unity than of local prejudices and interests.

On these lines the great argument was debated for nine months in every household and in every bosom. The agitation for war began in August 1914, and went on with increasing volume and fervour till it achieved its end on May 24, 1915; while the counter-movement for maintaining neutrality, headed by Giolitti, the most accomplished and influential politician in the land, worked in close touch with the powerful German interests and personalities by which so many strategic points in commerce and society were occupied. The avowed German connection of the Neutralists was their strength, and also, as the event proved, their weakness.

The issue of this great political conflict was largely determined by the character of the war that the Italians were watching. The brutality of the Germans alienated the humane Italian nature, and the appalling prospect of the "Unni" as masters of the world had as much effect in Italy as it had in humanitarian and former pacifist circles in England. The treatment of the Belgians gave a turn to popular sympathy from the first. The sinking of the *Lusitania* gravely affected the final crisis in May 1915.

Deliberate cruelty is alien to the nature of the Italian. When he is cruel it is through laziness or want of imagination, never from pleasure in inflicting pain. I have seen scores of thousands of Austrian prisoners brought in straight from the lines, and I have never seen them insulted, assaulted, or ill-used. (1) The deliberate cruelty of the drilled German, his insufferable insolence to the conquered Belgians and French, was odious to the Italian as a strange and alien vice.

Above all, the Italian is fond of children. His family affections are very strong; his children are never beaten, and the mistake rather is that they are too often petted and spoilt. The kind of neglect form which the often suffer is thoughtless neglect, combined with much affection. Italians say they cannot understand why we have a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children be-



cause they cannot image any one being deliberately cruel to a child. When, therefore, the *Lusitania* was sunk, the effect in Italy was great, and the consequences were immediate, although it was not Italian children who had been drowned.

This nine months' controversy on the issue of neutrality or war was memorable, not only because of the obvious consequences in-

involved, but because it was a contest between two conceptions of the life of man and of nations — a moral and spiritual against a non-moral and material. The victory of the lower principle would have been decisive for generations to come in Italy, and probably also in the world at large, seeing that even with Italy's intervention the Allies have only just been able to hold the fort till the arrival



Above.
The action of June 22, 1918 on the Montello Hill.

Right.
A. Parducci: Cyclist Bersagliere (1915-1918).

of the Americans.

This struggle between a frankly idealist and a frankly materialist view of human affairs was not the outcome of mere passing political circumstances, but of a native dualism in the Italian character and philosophy. Some people regard the Italians as sentimental idealists, making appeal only too often to lofty motives as the basis of daily actions. (2) Others condemn them as materialists. Neither view covers the whole Italian character. Materialism and idealism are found side by side in much sharper contrast than in England, where we would fain conceal from ourselves the baseness of our worse motives, and from others the idealism of our best. Foggy like his climate, the Englishman about to act makes an indistinguishable blur of ideal and material motives for action, which often about represents the case. The Italian, on the other hand, carries the hard, clear outlines of the atmosphere and landscape of his own native land into his conduct and philosophy. He knows, or thinks, that he is guided in an action either by grovelling self-interest or by lofty ideals, and he makes no ploy about saying the one or the other.

The are, therefore, some Italians who are materialists *pur sang*: Iago's frank philosophy is theirs, though seldom his vindictiveness. Some, again, are always



idealists: Saint Francis, Mazzini, and Garibaldi are typical Italians, though above the level, just as Shakespeare and Lincoln are typical Anglo-Saxons.

But most Italians are materialists one day and idealists the next. Hence their mercurial character. Hence the changing moods of their army — San Gabriele and the Bainsizza one month, Caporetto the next, Grappa and the Piave the month after. Italian politics and war, closely interwoven in one another during the last four years, cannot be understood by foreigners unless they grasp this dual element in the Italian psychology. There has been a complicated and unceasing struggle between the good and bad, the strength and weakness of Italy herself going on all through the war. The first decisive success of the good was won in "the days of May" 1915.

During this nine months' agitation, known as the "period of neutrality", the Ministers Salandra and Sonnino, with the help of General Cadorna, and with the full approval of the King, were quietly but vigorously preparing the army for war. Like all the peaceable nations, Italy in August 1914 had been surprised in a state of unpreparedness, and could hardly then have taken the field at all for lack of material. As the spring of 1915 drew on, the worst defects had been remedied, the great Russian retreats were beginning, and the time for intervention was clearly at hand if it was not to be too late. But the actual form of the decisive crisis was dictated, not by the Interventionist Government, but by the action of the Neutralist Opposition.

It had long been said, and was still generally believed, that Giolitti, though sometimes



A. Parducci: Lance Sergeant of the 52nd
Regiment, "Cacciatori delle Alpi" Brigade
(1915-1918).

out of office, could always return to it when he wished, so powerful was his manipulation of the permanent majority in the Chamber. It was expected, not by his supporters alone, that at the ripe moment to prevent war he would replace Salandra and Sonnino, whom he had put in as caretakers, and who had forgotten their terms of tenure. It was thought that against his will they could no more stay in office than the first Pitt when he tried to govern without the Duke of Newcastle. And if the question had been left by the people to their elected representatives, such undoubtedly would have been the event. For the Italian elections represented the indifference, the caution, the local and material interests of the race, not their soul, or their higher conception of themselves as Italia. In moments of great crisis that higher conception, the poetized, almost religious anthropomorphic vision of the sad, crowned lady, mother of heroes and martyrs, would carry away a people who are only materialists part of the time. (3) But it would be the people inspiring the Parliament, not the Parliament the people.

Giolitti's move was bold and skilful. The man who carried it to the verge of success was no vulgar intriguer. And it was, presumably, his conception of how best to serve the interests of his fellow-countrymen; no doubt, too, he was a genuine lover of peace. Our difference with him is that his conception of those interests was not more elevated, and that he should have thought peace worth a vassal Europe and a vassal Italy.

His plan was to call in Germany, behind the back of the Austrian and Italian Governments, to arrange a treaty which Germany should force on Austria and he himself on Italy. This plan offered some though not large satisfaction to the Irredentists, who were, ostensibly at least, to get Trento but not Trieste — the famous *parecchio*, or "something". But even of this "something" there was to be no delivery till the war was over! Italy, remembering "scraps of paper", "liked not the security". Giolitti's plan had, however, the merit that it brought Germany into the limelight as the friend and patron of Italy coercing Austria into due concessions; now the country hated Austria, but feared to break the strong ties that bound her to Germany in seemingly helpless dependence. Indeed, Italy was to be at war with Austria more than a year before she dared even officially to break those ties by a declaration of the greater war; actually, perhaps, they were only broken by Caporetto.

Giolitti's plan had, therefore, attractions enough to ensure success but for another factor which he underestimated — the shame felt by all the best Italians, and by all the Italians at their best, at the prospect of eternal vassalage to Germany which this advantageous bargain would certainly involve. And Giolitti's method of carrying out the plan by treating with the German Ambassador Bulow behind the back of the Italian Government was in itself the loudest adver-



tisement of such shame and vassalage. It was that which fired the mine of popular resentment, and hoisted the most skilful of all engineers on his own petard.

The announcement made in the following paragraph in the *Messaggero* newspaper of May 13, 1915, was the signal for the outburst: —

"The Bülow-Giolitti Agreement. — We are in a position to announce that the definite Austro-German offer was notified, before its presentation to the responsible Ministers, to the Hon. Giolitti and his lieutenants, among whom, in the first line, is the Hon. Bertolini. So the Cav. Giovanni Giolitti treats, discusses, and pledges Italy behind the back of the King and Government. This grave news needs no comment".

In the next paragraph there follows an attack on Erzeberger, who came over ostentatiously to influence Italian Catholic opinion against the war. The Italians found that foreigners were trying to dictate a policy to them, and they rose up in sudden wrath.

The "days of May" that followed are an evermemorable event in Italian history. Salandra and Sonnino were resigning because they knew that Giolitti possessed the majority in Parliament, and that that majority would vote at his bidding for neutrality. All

A. Parducci: "Alpino" of the "Edolo" Skier Battalion, 5th Alpini Regiment (1915-1918).

seemed lost, and the advocates of war were for a few hours in despair, thinking that Italy would make her terms as the vassal of the Teutonic Powers. It was at this moment that the people interfered. In Italy the people is, when roused, much more formidable than the Parliament. In ordinary times Parliament administers the country, and divides the spoils of office. But its proceedings do not excite the constancy and passionate interest that parliamentary affairs excite in England. The Italians are not a great parliamentary nation, but they are a great democratic nation. And in times of political crisis like 1860 and 1915 the people were endowed with remarkable sense and vigour. At such moments, which form the tide in the affairs of men, the "Popolo" goes down into the streets and takes things into its own hands, supporting Cavour or Garibaldi, Salandra and Sonnino, as the occasion may require.

So now, when Giolitti took the negotiations out of Salandra's hands, and Salandra,



Above.
An Italian trench on the "Nadlogen-Opacchiasella-Sides of hill 208 North" fortified line.

Below.
Italian armoured trench in the Redipuglia area, built and manned by Infantrymen of the "Siena" Brigade (31st and 32nd Inf. Rgt.), and later by the "Savona" (15th and 16th) and "Cagliari" (63rd and 64th) Brigades, during the offensive actions of June-July 1915 (1st and 2nd Battle of the Isonzo).



having no parliamentary majority, (4) perforce resigned, the people went down into the street in every city of the land and intimated that either Giolitti must be gone or there would be a revolution. These monster demonstrations of the whole city population contained all classes — the workman, the clerk, the tradesman, the public employee. It was a union of the same burgher classes as had carried through the national deliverance sixty years before. They were now completing the work. The peasant would not have stirred himself to overthrow Giolitti, any more than he would by himself have made the *Risorgimento*. The politics of Italy since the time of Romulus have been the politics of her cities. Although the peasants form numerically a vast majority in the Peninsula, no rural class or organism has ever had the importance of the English squires or the American township, or even of Jacques Bonhomme in 1789. The cities of Italy made the war; but the peasant has had to fight it. That difficulty, more and more felt as the lengthening campaign drew out year after year, was not foreseen in the ecstasies of May 1915.

The army was quietly favourable to war, but took no part in the agitation. Soldiers do not dictate to Italy; they serve her.

It is interesting to remember that during these days of May the Italian people had no knowledge of the secret Treaty of London and its provisions.

Those who think of the Italians as a passionate, violent, gesticulating "Latin people" over against the sober English, ought to compare "the days of May" in Rome or Milan with our own anti-German riots in London of almost the same date. Even in their rioting the Italians preserved sense and dignity. It was rioting with a purpose, and achieved that purpose with the minimum of injury to property *item*, a few windows, and with no injury to life and limb. Hundreds of thousands of respectable men of all classes walked slowly through the streets of Rome and the other cities of Italy, booming out with a slow, ceaseless iteration, "Morte a Giolitti! Morte a Giolitti!" It was the masterpiece of a people whose oldest political tradition, dating from before Ciceruacchio, Rienzi, and Appius Claudius, is the "politics of the piazza". (5)

Bülow fled back "to the worst side of the Mont St. Gothard". Giolitti took train for his country seat in Piedmont. Salandra and Sonnino resumed office. The Chamber bowed to the will of the people and decreed the war with unanimity and enthusiasm. On May 24th — the "Ventiquattro Maggio" — now a date in the patriotic calendar along with Venti Settembre — the final war of the *Risorgimento* began.

It was during this agitation in May that the poet D'Annunzio came prominently forward and began to surprise those who thought he was a "decadent" — a view that his conduct in the war has made seem droll indeed. His short orations during the crisis were of classical perfection for political logic, literary art, and imaginative appeal — bet-

ter, in fact, than some of the dithyrambic utterances of his later style. They were as effective as Mark Antony's less sincere rhetoric in the same city two thousand years ago. They caused Giolitti and his friends, like Brutus and Cassius of old, "to ride like madmen through the gates of Rome".


One of the most popular sentences in D'Annunzio's orations in the last decisive days of the agitation ran as follows: —

"No, we are not, and we will not be a museum, an inn, a village summer resort, a sky painted with Prussian blue for international heneymoon couples, a delightful market for buying and selling, fraud and barter".

That sentence aroused a wild enthusiasm, for it touched people on the raw place. The omnipresent and illmannered German tourist had done much to keep before people's eyes the impression that Italy had ceased to belong to the Italians.


In a less degree, but somewhat in the same kind as the German tourist, the too common type of halfcultured English person, who goes through the Peninsula in constant in constant raptures about Giotto, but neither knows nor cares anything about the modern Italians except as keepers of the painted sepulchre of their remoter ancestors, is an offence to the age we live in and a danger to the friendship of Italy and England. The good-natured British Tommy, who has the inestimable advantage of never having heard of Giotto, who takes all the inhabitants of the earth as plain human beings like himself, has done more for the *entente* by playing with Italian children in the villages and gladdening the hearts of their parents with his few broken words of French and Italian than many more educated people who are for ever judging other nations by standards made in England. It seems to be given to the simple to understand a profound truth that is hidden from superior persons in all lands — namely, that it takes all sorts to make a world.

If the Neutralists had kept clear of the Germans in Society and politics, they would have had a much better chance of preserving peace. If Bülow and Erzeberger had never come ostentatiously across the Alps to teach the Italians their own business, the War Party would have had a more difficult task. But the German conduct all through the affair went far to prove the main thesis of the War Party, that the Germans were dominating Italy socially, economically, and politically, and that the Kaiser had "cast out his shoe" over the Peninsula. Giolitti, long the most popular statesman in the country, the established dictator, with Parliaments and Ministers in his pocket, ruined himself in a week, because he was seen to be bargaining away Italian freedom of action at the dictates of a foreign Power. Let it be a warning to any other nation and to any foreign journals who are tempted to lecture Italy overmuch on what she ought or ought not to do. We English are too fond of giving advice;



A cavern position of the Italian 3rd Army.

Eight 149mm cannons were placed in the gallery, six in a Northeastern direction and two towards the East. The cavern was dug in the rock under Cima 3, the highest peak of Mount San Michele, utilizing preexistent Austro-Hungarian works, from September 1916 to June 1917; at first, it was used as tactical headquarters of the 3rd Army. In August/September 1916, the Italian Army began to construct cavern positions with electric light and drinking water.





Hauling an artillery piece at Col Moschin.

but fortunately we give much less than the Germans. It is strange that other people should like to manage their own affairs; but they do. And this peculiarity is very strong among the Italians.

CHAPTER II

Rome in June and July 1915 — Patriotic and unpatriotic propaganda — Army chaplains — Italian views of England — The Garibaldi family — Our Unit comes out.

ROME IN JUNE AND JULY

In June and July 1915 I was to and fro between London and Rome, helping to arrange for the formation in England, and acceptance by the authorities in Italy, of a British Red Cross ambulance Unit. I remember very well my first business contact with Italian officers, so characteristic of the kindness I have received from them ever since. I sat, waiting for my first interview, in one of the antechambers of the War Office, gazed down upon somewhat sternly by official oil portraits of Cavour, Ricasoli, and the thirty-eight other Ministers of War since 1847. How would their successors regard the inevitable "Englishman with a walking stick" coming in to bother them in the middle of a bigger business than Solferino of Castelfidardo? It was still somewhat of an experiment for a foreigner to propose him-

self for the Italian front in those early weeks of the war, when it was still *nostra guerra*, not yet *fronte unico*. The forty Ministers, as portrayed by official art, looked forbidding enough: There was scarcely a twinkle even behind Cavour's spectacles, and as to Ricasoli —!

But the moment I was ushered across the passage into the presence of General Elia, the living Under-Secretary for War, how different was the atmosphere! He had in the room with him his friend of the same honourable name, Elia of the Thousand, and we talked *Viva Garibaldi* for a few minutes. Then the veteran left, and the General fell to business with me with the utmost cordiality.

There was not much doubt about his desire to have at the Italian front a representation of England, of the kind I outlined to him. These views were subsequently accepted by his chief, General Zupelli, the Minister for War, and by General Cadorna, and in a short time a written agreement for the acceptance of our service was signed between the Italian Government and my B.R.C. chiefs, Sir Courtauld Thomson and Lord Monson.

Rome in June and July was very quiet after the storms of May. The sober work of modern scientific war had begun, and further processions and shouting were felt to be out of place. The authorities were from the first anxious to discourage the idea that the methods of 1848, or even of 1860, were to be revived, though the objects and spirit of the new war were the same as the old. The soul of "quarantotto" was required, but in a new body. No red shirts, by request.

Besides, with Lemberg and Warsaw falling, the outlook was enough to damp all *feux de joie*. The determined band of patriotic

men who had run Italy up into the battle line had all along been fully aware that she was coming to the aid not of the victor but of the then weaker side. May God reward them for it! If there were those who had not realized this before, they were all sure of it in June. But, fortunately, whatever the Russians were doing, the Alpini had carried the watershed of the Trentino border, and in Friuli the enemy had fallen back on the Isonzo line. So the spectre, that had haunted some minds, of a German "knock-out blow" in the first weeks was already laid.

As an old *flâneur* of Roman streets I noticed certain changes in the popular literature exposed for sale. For one thing the anticlerical cartoons had disappeared. Since the ordinary Catholic, as distinct from the Vatican party, was patriotic, and had found a figurehead in General Cadorna himself, a truce had been called to the more inelegant pastimes of the *mangia preti*. On the other hand, the clerical cartoonists had taken the field with carplings at the national undertaking curiously similar to those of the official Socialists, and with a frank pro-Germanism. I remember one such picture representing the noble figure of Germania regretfully shaking the hand of Italia in temporary leave-taking, and saying, "It's that old fool there (Austria) who has made us quarrel".

The attitude of the Church and of Socialism to the war differed in Italy according to times, places, and persons. It is notorious that in neither institution did the official chiefs carry the whole of the faithful with them into "neutrality". But it is, I fear, equally notorious that in many villages the priest, and in many towns and some regiments the Socialists, did much disintegrat-

ing propaganda.

On a theme so large and confused as the attitude of the Church to the war I prefer to confine myself to personal experience, which in the army has been uniformly pleasant. The army chaplains were carefully chosen, and — so far as my experience goes, and I have known many of them — were invariably patriotic. The discipline under which they had been brought up made them adaptable to military duties and conditions, and the habit of busying themselves on behalf of others made them peculiarly active in looking after the material needs of the soldiers, at least in the Sanità service, where I saw most of them. Standing good-humouredly a deal of chaff on the basis of the "Ingoldsby Legends" view of the Church, whenever the light camouflage of Italian mess talk flagged for want of a less threadbare theme, but popular with their brother officers in spite of their profession, their position with the private soldiers wounded and unwounded, seemed to me due to their work and qualities and not to superstitious awe. Gallant and humble soldiers of Christ and of Italy, in the common grey-green uniform, but with the large red cross on the breast, many of them by their simple daily acts made the outworn quarrel of Church and State seem a paltry and unnatural anachronism. If they had the ordering of the matter it would not last a day.

My belief is that the Church did little direct harm to the patriotic cause in the army itself, but much in the country behind. The same cannot be said of the antiwar politicians. It is possible to select the chaplain for a regiment, but not its Socialists.

But I am wandering far from Rome in the summer of 1915. A change that then struck me in the literature of the streets was the great increase of historical appeals to the *Risorgimento*. The leading Roman cinema showed us the story of Ciceruacchio and the Rome of 1849. Old proclamations of that epoch were reprinted and posted up on the walls. The cartoons represented the Austrians always in the uniform of that bygone period, with shako and jackboot complete. The appeal in the newspapers and in conversation was constantly to these memories.

One evening I went to a *revue* in the form of a fable of animals. The old dying wolf was Austria, and the bellicose mastiff Germany. The black and yellow wolf, more horrible for being now half fangless, hobbling on a crutch shaped like a gallows, was in itself an artistic creation. We had on the stage Cavour, Rosini, and I know not whom beside. The appeal was to historic memories — what "our fathers have told us" — and it moved a vast audience far more than anything which had happened as long as sixty years ago would move a theatre of Englishmen. Austria was paying now for what she did to Italy between 1815 and 1866, and for still retaining and oppressing Italian-speaking lands.

Another night I went to another *revue* of the war and of the Italian politics that led up



to it. There was an Aristophanic political licence, Giolitti and Bülow being as important *dramatis personæ* as Cleon before them. Such uncensored freedom would, one fears, have been sadly vulgarized on the British stage, but here it was used delightfully. There was true delicacy of wit in the scene where Bülow unrolls to Giolitti and his parliamentary majority an enormous scroll, containing on one corner of it a list of the infinitesimal "concessions" that he will make on Austria's behalf. Some one suggests that they might ask the Italian Government about it. "There is no government", says Giolitti. Then the mob breaks in on the conspirators, who vanish. The scene ends with Giolitti looking round the room behind all the chairs with a match to find his "majority", but it is nowhere to be found.

ITALIAN VIEWS OF ENGLAND

As the British Ambassador was known to be present — it was a benefit night for the Blue Cross — a tableau had been specially

A. Parducci: "Alpino" on the look-out, wearing the winter high-mountain uniform (1915-1918).

put in about the British navy. A symbolic British naval officer, looking, I fear, more like a representative of the Chilean navy, read a spirited speech about England having drawn the sword for honour and Belgium. Then we all got up and clapped for the British Ambassador to the strains of "God save the King". A little later, when an "Old Garibaldino" on the stage was singing his song, the presence of Ricciotti Garibaldi was detected in one of the boxes, and we all got up and clapped for him to the strains of Garibaldi's Hymn. Thereupon Ricciotti made us a speech from his box, mentioning his father's love for England, and telling how his own horse was wounded in the campaign of 1866 in Trentino, and how it gave a shriek of pain that he would never forget, and how we should all subscribe to the Blue Cross for animals in war.

Both in Rome that summer, and in all Ita-



A. Parducci:
*Infantryman of the "Lupi di Toscana" 77th
Regiment (1915-1918).*

ly inside and outside the war zone from 1915 to 1918, the touchstone of enthusiasm for the war has been friendliness to England, and the touchstone of indifference or aversion to the war has been Anglophobia. England, more or less unconscious of the matter herself, has been a party cry, for and against, in Italy for the last four years. During the decade before the war the Germans, in far closer touch with the Italians than we, could never get themselves liked, but did their best to get us disliked. Through a thousand subterranean channels they had long been disseminating strange stories about us. And an important part of the work of the German agents during the war has been to foster that legend. How often and in what strange forms we kept coming up against the great anti-English myth let the following story illustrate.

In the spring of 1916 I was walking one day in the chestnut woods of the deep valley dividing Monte Sabotino from the village of Quisica, where we were quartered, when I came across an Italian sergeant, and we passed the time of day. A more simple and kindly soul it would be impossible to find in any land. We talked of the war. "You English are keeping it on", he said. I suggested the Austrians, waving a hand towards them on Sabotino above us. "No", he said; "it is between you English and Germans. You English want to close the sea to all others". "How so?" I asked. "For example", he replied, "you make the ships of all other nations pay you tribute when they pass through the Straits of Gibraltar". After ten minutes' effort on my part to disabuse his mind, we parted the best of friends — for he was one of the most lovable of men; but I am convinced he thought I was sent out to lie for my country, though he had far too much native courtesy to say so. Who had been at the pains, and why, to teach this simple and kindly ally of ours this extravagant myth about Gibraltar? And what efforts had we made to undeceive him and a million such as he?

But it would be as much a mistake to exaggerate the success of this propaganda as it would be to ignore its existence. The memory of the old friendship for England as the first and most disinterested champion of Italy a nation was a most potent factor. Italians often spoke to me of it, and with deep sincerity. We had not yet done reaping the harvest of gratitude sown for us by Lord John Russel and Mr. Gladstone. Then, too, the belief in England as a "serious" nation that could endure to the end and "win the last battle" nourished, as I know, the hopes of many of Italy's patriot soldiers through long months and years of gloom now passed away. Because we were Englishmen, we were received by the Italian officers at the front in the spirit of comradeship, soon ripening into friendship when they found we reciprocated their feelings. And I believe that very many of the peasant soldiers — my friend the sergeant, for example — liked us the better for being English, in spite of the views that had been successfully pumped into them by German agents. There are so



A. Parducci: Enlisted man of the 152nd Infantry Regiment, "Sassari" Brigade (1915-1918).

many pigeon-holes in every human brain, and the oddest incompatibles can be found docketed there together. That is one main reason why generalization about popular opinion, though necessary as aids to thought, are so often misleading as guides to action.

In those early days a special difficulty existed. I became aware first in Rome that Italy did not believe that England was pulling her full weight. This idea was the natural result of the diatribes we were then directing against ourselves for slackness, particularly in those British newspapers which enjoyed almost a monopoly of Italian circulation. These diatribes, long since discontinued, were held to be necessary at that time as part of an internal campaign for greater efficiency. But it was unfortunate that our mutual exhortations within our own doors could not fail to be overheard by our Allies without. Having little or no instruction as to what England's effort really amounted to, the Italians took what our own newspapers said as being, not only the truth, but the whole truth. Such self-exposure is so alien to their own customs that they could not be expected to interpret it a right. So long as our army was on the defensive and nursing its mighty strength, it was the German game in Italy

to whisper that we were fine "sailors", with an implied full stop there. This misunderstanding came to an end with the Somme offensive of July 1916.

THE GARIBALDI FAMILY

I said that a motto of the Italian War Office was, "No red shirts, by request". But the Garibaldi tradition and the Garibaldi family have played, in more senses than one, an important part in Italy's war.

His is a memory that cannot be vulgarized by an amount of appeal which would stultify any other figure. With a people who required to be keyed up to a state of idealistic enthusiasm before they can give their best, that tradition has first and last been worth more than a dozen army corps. A nation must have something to remember; that was what was wrong with the Russians, so naturally courageous and enduring, but with only their long annals of serfdom behind.



Above.
Artillery on the Isonzo River.

Below.
A. Parducci: Hengineer of the "Death Companies" (1915-1918).



All Garibaldi's six grandsons came together from the ends of the earth to fight for France in 1914. It was a fact that spoke in the agitation for war during the period of Italy's neutrality. Two out of the six were killed before their own country entered the conflict.

I knew Bruno Garibaldi well. I met him first at the Garibaldi celebrations at Sutherland House in 1907, a boy fresh from an English school, simple and sedate in manner and in thought, craving only for an outdoor career, and asking little else of life, as his grandfather and his grandmother Anita would have done had they not lived in an age when Italy called to be delivered. For a week we walked the Westmorland hills together, chiefly in the mist, as is the custom there. Then he went across the ocean, and I never saw him more. I remember with what strange feelings I read his name on a street in Udine that had been called after him; he had changed suddenly from the boy I walked with eight years before, to a hero gone before the armies, a memory to his race for ever. Who would wish it otherwise? Not he, I am sure. For I know that his deepest feeling, though he talked little about it, was to be not unworthy of the name he bore.

The success of the surviving brothers in the Italian army after 1915, especially of the eldest, General Peppino Garibaldi, is well known to all the world. Seldom has a family tradition, so hard to maintain aright in altered circumstance, been upheld with more dignity and spirit combined.

OUR UNITS COME OUT

Alike in the times of Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Milton, of Horace Wal-

pole, of Byron and of Ruskin, there was constant traffic between England and Italy in the finest goods of civilization, and, since the days of Mazzini and Cavour, in what we may call the finest goods of politics. The existence of this common ground has never ceased to be recognized, and of late years the historians of our literature and civilization have brought into ever greater prominence the ancient debts of England to Italy. But there has recently been less personal contact between the two countries, since the dying out of the generation of the English friends of the Italian patriots, of Russel and Gladstone, of Browning and Swinburne, and since the *élite* of Italy are no longer constrained to live in exile in England. At the same time there has been a diminution of mutual business connections relatively to those formed with other countries. The affection of Englishmen for Italy has not, indeed, diminished; and it has always been something more than abstract, because it is rather felt than thought. But it had in our day become less personal than in the Victorian era.

The ease with which modern travellers are wafted and ushered through a foreign country, seeing its sights but missing its inhabitants, has encouraged the Englishman's natural aloofness with strangers and slowness with strange tongues. Our ignorance of Continental Europe had reached its zenith at the moment when we found ourselves protagonists in the greatest European war of all times. We had for a generation been turning more and more, in commerce, in politics, and in all else, to the worlds beyond the ocean, or back into our own home problems, in any case away from our neigh-

bours in Europe — till we were suddenly reminded very forcibly that they were still our neighbours, brought nearer, indeed, than ever, some as our foes, some, fortunately, still our friends. All through the war we have been paying with our life-blood for our long insulation from an Italy and a Europe where the Germans, though more personally disliked than we, were much more closely connected and much better informed. Englishmen and Italians can never again afford to drift so far asunder as they have done, not from want of friendliness, but from sheer negligence.

From this point of view the experience of the British Red Cross in Italy since September 1915 is not without interest, as proof of the natural sympathy of Italians and Englishmen, and the ease with which they cooperate in work and form ties of acquaintance and friendship, when a little time and trouble are devoted to the study of the Italian language, and when an effort to break down dividing barriers is made by the Englishman as part of the day's duty.

The strong diversities of character, manner, and personality common among the inhabitants of the British islands are interesting and attractive to the Italian, whenever relations are sufficiently close and continuous for the various *tipi inglesi* to be understood and valued. It is, indeed, a familiar truth, never to be sufficiently impressed on the Englishman abroad, that curt manners and neglect of formal courtesy produce a much worse impression in Italy than at home. But cold and dull manners are also resented, and it was not the most colourless or formally correct of our number who were the most popular with our Allies. The thing that has most struck me in three years of watching Englishmen and Italians together is the quick reply of the Italian nature to what is best and most characteristic in the English nature, if an effort is made to show it in some palpable form.

Our personal experience in Italy affords, I think, proof that the contact of England and Italy might be much closer than it is, if only more of our people would set about it in the right spirit, and take the requisite pains to get into personal touch. For these results have been obtained by men who, in nine cases out of ten, spoke no Italian when they first joined us, and had not many of them been in Italy even as tourists.

The first British Red Cross Unit in Italy, which I had the honour to command, was financed and administered in London by the British Committee in aid of Italian Wounded, of which Mr. E.H. Gilpin is chairman, with the funds subscribed by the public specially for this purpose, to give practical proof of sympathy with Italy. But the Unit served under the British Red Cross, as the First Italian Unit of that Society, which gave our personnel its status, and, moreover, supplied us with half our ambulances. From the original negotiations in the summer of 1915 onwards, Sir Arthur Stanley always showed an imaginative and sympathetic grasp of the im-



portance of the B.R.C. being represented in the Italian war, in days when the doctrine of the *fronte unico* was all too little understood. At first our Unit was the humble sole representative of that vital idea at the Italian front, the only Allied uniforms to be seen among the *grigio-verde*. (6) Lord Monson, the B.R.C. Commissioner, pleased with our reception by the Italians, soon afterwards brought out the Second and Third Ambulance Units, and gradually all the various activities of the Croce Rossa Britannica grew up.

The preliminaries for acceptance on the Italian front having been arranged in Rome in July 1915, I returned to England for August, when our Unit was enrolled and organized in a camp formed in Sir George Young's grounds at Formosa, on the Thames; his son Geoffrey, the poet and Alpine climber, already distinguished for his work in Flanders, was coming with us as officer of out-stations. In the formation and preparation of the Unit we owed most to the energy and experience of Mr. P.J. Baker, the well-known Cambridge athlete, who had in 1914 formed the Friends' Ambulance Unit, and served with it in Ypres during the

A. Parducci.

Sharpshooter of the 1st Regiment Granatieri di Sardegna, "Granatieri di Sardegna" Brigade (1915-1918).

first and second battles. Several ex-members of that Unit joined us, and proved an invaluable element.

But the larger number of us were not Friends or Conscientious Objectors. (7) Many of our original drivers gradually found their way into the Flying Service or the army, and many others were incapacitated by age or physical debility. Our personnel has changed almost twice over since 1915, latterly taking on an excellent Colonial element. But the tradition and the officers have been little changed in three years. As the war went on, particularly after the passage of the Service Act, it became very difficult to retain sufficient men fit to endure the strain of driving days and nights on end under fire in time of battle, and even in ordinary times of driving without lights on crowded or shell-broken mountain roads. But when it was seen that we were doing good work, appreciated



A. Parducci: Enlisted man
of the 11th Infantry Regiment,
"Casale" Brigade (1915-1918).

Right.

A. Parducci:

Light-cavalry soldier, 15th "Cavalleggeri di Lodi" Regiment.

Below.

1918. "Guardia di Finanza" in combat uniform. This enlisted man belongs to the "arditi" unit of the Battallion, as evidenced by the special open-collar coat and special badge.

by the Italians, at the request of Sir Rennell Rodd and the Foreign Office the recruiting authorities at home treated us with consideration, and finally Lord Milner for the War Office requested us to continue the work to the end.

But I am getting ahead of August 1915. When we were nearly ready to be shipped, I rang up a friend at the Admiralty, stated our case, and asked if our twenty-six cars could get a lift across to Havre. He left me at the telephone while he went to consult his chiefs, returning in a few minutes with the answer that on August 22nd a ship would take the cars across from Southampton. And so it turned out in fact! I remember the impression this promptitude and efficiency made on me. They must tie up their bundles with *blue* tape in the Admiralty! The war was going badly on land in these days, but, thought I, if the navy and maritime transport is managed like that, our side will win yet. And now the four years' pressure of those mighty arms has done its work upon the foe, and we have heard the iron ribs cracking one by one.

We left Formosa on August 21st, shipped from Southampton next day, left Havre on the afternoon of the 23rd, drove thence in convoy across France, and arrived at Modane on the appointed evening of August 29th, with all our twenty-six cars up to time. A week of perfect weather had been granted us. Night after night we bivouacked under the stars in the pleasant land of France, under the walls of some remote château long forgotten of men, or in the hollow of some wooded hillside. South of Chartres we began to traverse districts that had seen no Allied uniform or any sign of the war to which their sons had gone. More and more, as we got deeper into the Southern hills, the passage of "Les Anglais" aroused the dreamy old villages, and the stragglers of our convoy were waylaid by crowds that had collected with flowers and kindly greetings.

At Modane we were made welcome by Italian officers sent to meet us, who put us on to a special train, cars and all. After stopping for a public reception *en route*, organized for us with great kindness at Turin, we were taken straight through to Udine on the last day of August 1915. Our extra stores, which had been shipped before to Genoa, were sent up with amazing promptitude from that sometimes encumbered port. Truly there was no lack of efficiency





Above.
A. Parducci: *Infantryman of the 154th Regiment, "Novara" Brigade, wearing an experimental suit for protection against chemical agents.*

Right.
A. Parducci: *Artilleryman (1915-1918).*



or of spontaneity in the welcome accorded us by the Italians!

From Udine we were sent up in a few days' time to begin our service with the 6th Italian Army Corps under Monte Sabotino, in the zone of Cormons and Gorizia. Our first chief, the *Direttore di Sanità* of that corps, was Colonel Morino, a strong man and just, whose outward appearance fitly portrayed the inward bigness of his nature. He looked the embodiment of that expressive Italian phrase, "*sta in gamba*." For strangers in a strange land, whose first work was to learn their surroundings and the system of which they were to be a part, no better friend and father could have been found.

In those early days we were also much indebted to Commendatore Ernesto Nathan. One of the most prominent retired politicians of Italy, formerly twice mayor of Rome in famous and controversial tenures of office,

Nathan, when war broke out, was bowed with age and weakness of the heart such as would have kept any ordinary patriot at home. But he went up into the high Alps, a volunteer *sotto-tenente*, truly the most remarkable of "subs"! When we arrived on the scene he was brought down from the mountains, attached to the Army Corps Staff at Cormons, and given, among other works, the congenial task of watching over the welfare of the *Inglesi* — one of the many bits of tactful kindness shown us by the authorities. I had known Nathan before, in his office on the Capitol; but not till I met him on this more intimate footing in Cormons did I realize at their full human worth his humour, shrewdness, and kindness, his burning patriotism for Italy, and for the freedom of the world. Too soon his heart failed, and the doctors carried him off, an unwilling captive, to Rome.

G. M. Trevelyan

Continue

NOTES

(1) I believe that in some cases, though I did not see any such myself, prisoners taken in October-November 1918 were insulted owing to the just and natural anger aroused in the Italian soldiers on that occasion by the tales of the outrages endured by the populations of Venetia and Friuli at the hands of the Austro-Hungarians during their years' servitude after Caporetto. But even under that provocation there were no outrages on prisoners.

(2) For example, Italian military and civil proclamations and official documents generally.

(3) It has been well observed by Mr. Horatio Brown, in his article on Italian Political Idealism in the *Quarterly Review* of June 1918, that the poetical female incarnations of "J'a France" and "Italia" are popular forces, as our female Britannia, with or without bulwarks, on the pennies, certainly is not. Perhaps the unbroken tradition of Madonna-workshop partly accounts for the difference. "John Bull", too, is but a humorous view of ourselves. The words that really stir our blood — "England", "Scotland" — the words our poets use when they are really moved, do not suggest a person at all, but a mass of ideas and emotions which it would be murder to dissect.

(4) Shortly before the crisis, three hundred deputies had left their cards on Giolitti — a kind of extra-parliamentary vote of confidence in the opposition leader.

(5) That is, demonstrations in the public square of the city.

(6) "Grey-green" Italian uniform.

(7) Since it has been erroneously stated in public that I am a Conscientious Objector, I take this opportunity of stating that I am not. Owing to my age and medical unfitness (Class C II. in 1916 and E in 1918), I thought I should see more of the front in B.R.C. in Italy than in the rear of the British army.




WOMEN'S MILITARY SERVICE SEEN BY PAOLA VIOLATI

Paola Violati, sculptress and descendant of an important Umbrian family, receives me in her study where the images and the words we exchange, for a deeper mutual acquaintance, stimulate, among other things, memories of childhood and adolescence.

We thus discover (I am Umbrian for about 50%) common feelings regarding a particular period and certain places — the German retreat of 1945 — which saw us as children, immersed with innocent eyes and unaware, into the tragic reality of the vicissitudes of war regarding the last World War. On the green slopes of the Umbrian countryside we recall, plunged like many long corks into the clear sky, the smoke columns of the air launched bombs.

And also, during the night flights, the unforgettable image of shelters dug in the earth and in the tufa, with women and children asleep on the ground: those women — I still have doubts — were so still that I wondered whether they were already dead.

Paola Violati is filled with enthusiasm on the wake of these memories: no matter whether good or bad. Both of us recall the bread and the bitter orange marmalade the soldiers gave us in a British camp (perhaps the same one?) and that we threw it away after the first bite.



PAOLA VIOLATI'S THOUGHTS ON THE INTRODUCTION OF WOMEN'S AUXILIARY SERVICE IN ITALY

I greatly trust military Institutions which according to me represent the basis of society which have overcome the test of time and which have resisted all «offences» and «aggressions».

At present I see them suited to guarantee peace, immunity from violence — which I so much hate — for the society in which we live; I understand, however, that to guarantee peace it may sometimes be necessary to make war, with all that this implies.

I cannot see why women should be excluded from participating in this act of guarantee: even if I hope they will be employed for tasks of «support» rather than of «combat».

Since I was a child I have been aware of being part of the same world; thus, if I were twenty years old — also because of the «creative» appeal of this novelty — I would very happily become an auxiliary. I am fully aware of all our age demands; and we women, vital elements of society, intend to respond to these demands and... participate!

The dead, the wounded, the anguish for that war have left a mark in Paola Violati as well as the need to fight all that is violence and gives rise to violence, and a reasoned love for the Institutions, the only bulwark of peace.

The spaces of the accomplishment of her pictures which speak of her youth, advancing future, material expressions mature in her capacity and urgency to put these feelings, emotions and the learnings of her first years of life into works of art.

After attending the Academy of Fine Arts and the Nude School and having overcome the «impassé» of

marriage and maternity, she finally reaches sculpture.

To understand how versed she is in absorbing the messages originated by matter and how natural is her capacity to transform and modify this message according to her personal elaboration, it is enough to look at her hands, her fingertips: strong and long the former, large and rectangular the latter.

The former to capture, own and organize the various aspects of the material under her hands; the latter to feel every asperity, like a needle on a record, to reproduce the sound, the song, the scream, the word, the





opinion....

And when Paola Violati dismembers her «busts» or takes her portraits to pieces all she does is turn her expressive research towards that very fine taste for details which can arise only from particular sensations of the touch which re-emerge from the harmonious echoes of one's "id."

A maybe too «Victorian» education may have given rise to the sexual «evidence» which often appears in her works, by means of a greater evidence given to the anatomic detail: the loving gestures of her sculptures which represent sublimated maternities in the rising movements of her compositions.

Her taste for a dialogue with inert matter, with the stone, is also surprising. It is almost as if she wanted to reach some compromise between taking away and leaving those elements which will finally make up her work. Here one could even be baffled to the point — so great is Paola Violati's ability — of attempting the definition of «virtuosism not of the hand, but of the matter».

The above, which represent the basis of the facility of expression, determine the presence of what in poetry is considered the fundamen-


tal element of the message; the «Vis poetica». This process, however, does not imply deep demarcations originated by violent lights and shades; indeed, the gradual and modular tapering of the surfaces of contract of certain works shows a romantic nature and an inner state which are proof of a total human participation, in a metaphysical key: perhaps by means of the same suggestions which lead Wildt's hand to the precious, stubborn smoothness of his alabasters, whereas, in Paola Violati's work the withered porosity of her surfaces remains intact, in the above mentioned «virtuosism of the matter».

Paola Violati's art expresses itself through many torments and goes from one contradiction to another, from wooden to marble and stone sculptures to solve, in a global sense, the representation of sentiments experienced, as Rimbaud says, "not only through facts, but also through



symbols and deep-rooted truths», which conclude the wonders of her expression.

Giampiero Linardi



Paola Violati was born in Rome where she lives and works.

Her parents, of Umbrian origin, well-rooted to the dictates of a high class of Victorian memory, forbid her to attend an art school; she thus follows classical studies.

This does not prevent the artist from making her own experiences as self-taught artist, as a child and as a teenager.

As soon as possible she attends the studio of Enzo Assenza under whose guide she learns strength and elegance of expression.

She then attends the Nude School of the Academy of Fine Arts in Rome, where Giuseppe Marzullo, of Sicilian origin, passes onto Paola Violati his great passion for stone and quickly completes her artistic training.

The sculptress' great maturity and capacity are sealed by the success of her personal exhibition held in Spoleto in 1980 during the Festival of the Two Worlds.

She then joins various exhibitions and organizes personal exhibitions in Italy and abroad where her works are present in several collections.

Enzo Assenza, Sergio Barletta, Giovanni Carandente, Franca Calzavacca, Giuseppe Positano De Vincetiis, Giuseppe Marzullo, Luigi Vincitorio, Hector and others have spoken of her works.

ENGLISH

ITALIAN

GLOSSARY



Ice-axe,
idea
tactical I.
identification

I. card (IDCARD)
I. disk

I. of a target

igniter
ignition
battery I.
coil I.

illumination
battlefield I.

direct I.
indirect I.
immediate

I. air mission
I. air support
I. fire request

piccozza
idea
supposto tattico
identificazione,
riconoscimento,
individuazione
carta d'identità
piastrina di
riconoscimento
individuazione di un
obiettivo
accenditore; innesco
accensione
accensione a batteria
accensione a
spinterogeno
illuminazione
illuminazione del campo
di battaglia
illuminazione diretta
illuminazione indiretta
immediato, diretto;
qualifica di precedenza
dei messaggi:
"Operativo Urgente!"
missione aerea
immediata
appoggio aereo
immediato
richiesta di fuoco
immediato

I. information
I. operational readiness

immunization
impact
I. angle
I. of projectiles
I. strenght
implementation
incendiary
I. cartridge
Inch

incoming
I. message
incursion
index
indication
target I.
indicator
visual tuning I.

Indirect
I. air support
I. fire
individual
I. weapon
indoctrination,

Infantry (inf.)
I. man

notizia immediata
prontezza operativa
immediata
immunizzazione
impatto, urto
angolo di impatto
impatto dei proiettili
resistenza all'urto
realizzazione
incendiario
cartuccia incendiaria
pollice (misura lineare
pari a cm. 2,54)
in arrivo
messaggio in arrivo
incursione (v. raid)
indice
indicazione, indizio
indicazione obiettivi
indicatore
indicatore ottico di
sintonia
indiretto
appoggio aereo indiretto
tiro indiretto
individuale
arma individuale
indottrinamento,
istruzione
fanteria
fante

i. unit	reparto di fanteria	administrative I. s	disposizione
infection	infezione, contagio		disposizioni
infective	infettivo, contagioso	coordinating I. s	amministrative
I. affection	malattia infettiva		disposizioni (modalità)
to infiltrate	infiltrarsi	place of I. s	per il coordinamento
infiltration	infiltrazione	planning I. s	luogo di istruzioni
infirmery	infermeria	Signal operating I. s	istruzioni sulla
temporary I.	infermeria temporanea	(SOI)	pianificazione
temporary veterinary I.	infermeria temporanea	Signal standing I. s	istruzioni sull'impiego
	quadrupedi	(SSI)	delle trasmissioni
Informal	non ufficiale, senza	Instructor	disposizioni permanenti
	formalità	I. on tactics	per le trasmissioni
I. conversation	conversazione non	Instruments	istruttore, insegnante
	ufficiale	I. flying	istruttore di tattica
I. visit	visita senza formalità	scientific I.	strumenti
	(non ufficiale)	surgical I.	volo strumentale
information	notizia, dato informativo,	Insubordination	strumenti scientifici
	informazione	Insurrection	strumenti chirurgici
channel of I.	via di informazione,	Integration	insubordinazione
	canale informativo	I. of information	insurrezione
essential elements of I.	elementi essenziali delle	Intelligence	integrazione
(EEI)	informazioni		integrazione delle notizie
immediate I.	notizia immediata		informazioni, Servizio
I. on the enemy	notizie sul nemico	basic I.	informazioni
military geographic I.	informazione geografica	combat I.	documentazione
	militare	counter I.	informativa di base
miscellaneous I.	notizie varie	current I.	servizio informazioni
order of I.	ordine di ricerca	I. agency	operativo
processing of I.	informativa	I. estimate	controinformazioni,
	elaborazione delle		controsospionaggio
public I. (PI)	notizie	I. map	informazioni correnti
up-to-date I.	informazione pubblica	I. overlay	organo informativo
	notizia (o dato	I. Service	apprezzamento
Information (INFO)	informativo) aggiornato		informativo
Informed	per conoscenza	I. warning	carta delle informazioni
to keep I.	informato, edotto	technical I.	lucido delle informazioni
Initiative	rendere edotto	Intensity	Servizio informazioni,
to have I.	iniziativa	radiation I.	Servizio Segreto
initiators	avere l'iniziativa	Interallied	informazione di allarme
injection	artifici esplosivi	I. Headquarters	informazione tecnica
self-I.	iniezione	to Intercept	intensità
Injured	autoiniezione	interceptor	intensità di radiazione
Injury	ferito, lesionato	all-weather I.	Interalleato
Injustice	lesione, ferita	intercontinental	Comando interalleato
Input	ingiustizia	I. mobility	intercettare
	potenza, energia	I. war	caccia intercettore
	assorbita, entrata,	Interdiction	caccia ogni tempo
	stimolo, informazione	air I.	intercontinentale
I. circuit	circuito di alimentazione	close I.	mobilità intercontinentale
insignia	emblema, insegne	I. fire	guerra intercontinentale
Inspection	ispezione, controllo,	long range I.	interdizione
	rassegna, rivista	Interference	interdizione aerea
formal I.	ispezione ufficiale	I. fringes	interdizione vicina
informal I.	ispezione non ufficiale	I. from enemy	fuoco di interdizione
kit-I.	ispezione al corredo	broadcasting stations	interdizione lontana
technical I.	ispezione tecnica	Interior	interferenza
Inspectorate	ispettorato	zone of I. (ZI)	frange d'interferenza
Artillery I.	Ispettorato di Artiglieria	Internal	interferenza di stazioni
Infantry I.	Ispettorato di Fanteria		emittenti nemiche
Installation	installazione, impianto		interno
military I.	installazione militare		zona degli interni,
Instruction	istruzione,		entroterra
	insegnamento,		interno

I

I. wars
interpretation
air photo I.

I. of information

interpreter
interrogation

detailed I.

PW. I. (IPW)

interruption
interval
contour-I.

time I. (TI)

inter-war
intoxication

inventory
invulnerability
irruption

guerre civili
interpretazione
interpretazione di
fotografie aeree
interpretazione di una
notizia
interprete
interrogazione,
interrogatorio
interrogatorio
particolareggiato
interrogatorio prigionieri
di guerra
interruzione
intervallo
intervallo tra curve di
livello
intervallo di articolazione
tra due guerre
intossicazione
inventario
invulnerabilità
irruzione, incursione

island
I. of resistance
issuance

to issue

to I. an order

to I. food and clothing

Institute
Higher war I.
item

combined common user
I. s

joint common user I. s

regulated I.

isola
isola di resistenza
emissione,
pubblicazione,
diramazione, rilascio,
consegna
emettere, diramare,
distribuire, pubblicare,
consegnare
diramare un ordine
distribuire viveri e
vestiario
istituto, scuola
Scuola di guerra
articolo, capo, materiale,
mezzo
materiali di uso comune
tra unità di diverse
nazioni
materiali di uso comune
(intercambiabili) tra unità
di armi diverse
materiale critico

J

jacket
field J.
jamming

electronic J.
weapon J.

jeep

to jeopardize

to J. one's life

jerrycan
jet

J. engine
J. fighter
J. plane

to join

to J. in

to J. battle
to J. forces
to J. up
joint

giacca
giacca a vento
inceppamento, disturbo
intenzionale
disturbo elettronico
inceppamento di
un'arma
(USA) jeep, autovettura
da ricognizione
arrischiare, azzardare,
mettere in pericolo
rischiare la vita
fustino prismatico
getto, reattore
motore a reazione
caccia a reazione
aviogetto, reattore, aereo
a reazione
congiungere, unire,
collegare, riunire
prendere parte,
partecipare
cominciare a combattere
unire le forze
arruolarsi (nell'Esercito)
misto, congiunto,
interforze

J. Chiefs of Staff

J. Command
J. common user items

J. forces
J. operation
J. operation centre
(JOC)
J. task force

journal

intelligence J.

unit J.

jump

J. master

high J.

long (broad) J.

pole J.

junction

railroad J.

Comitato dei Capi di
Stato Maggiore
Comando interforze
materiali di uso comune
tra unità di più armi o
servizi
interforze
operazione interforze
centro operativo misto

forza d'impegno
interforze
giornale, diario, registro,
giornale di bordo
registro delle
informazioni
diario di reparto
balzo, salto, lancio
direttore di lancio
(paracadutisti)
salto in alto
salto in lungo
salto con l'asta
congiungimento,
congiunzione,
connessione
nodo ferroviario

J

road J. (RJ) Junior	nodo stradale (incrocio) minore, inferiore, più giovane	Justice military code of J. military J.	giustizia Codice Penale Militare giustizia militare
J. officer	ufficiale inferiore		

K

to keep informed kerosene	rendere edotto kerosene, petrolio da illuminazione	to kill killed k. in action (KIA) kilocycle (kc) kiloton kit	uccidere ucciso ucciso in combattimento chilociclo chilotone corredo del soldato, equipaggiamento, attrezzatura, zaino borsa di sanità zainetto rivista al corredo equipaggiamento da sciatore borsa portautensili, cassetta attrezzi cucina cucina da campo miglio nautico
key	chiave, importante, principale		
cipher k. k. area k. party	chiave della cifra zona/tratto vitale aliquota chiave (principale) di una formazione	first aid medical k. k.-bag k. inspection skiing k.	
k. personnel	personale "chiave" per il funzionamento del Comando (in genere: personale delle trasmissioni)	tool k.	
k. point	punto importante, sensibile del terreno	kitchen field k. knot	
k. terrain	terreno (tratto) vitale		

L

label	cartellino, etichetta, contrassegno	lance L. caporal L. sergeant	pieno carico (da trasportare su aerei) lancia, lanciere soldato di 1 ^a classe caporal maggiore che svolge funzioni di sergente
L. for medical supplies	etichette per prodotti farmaceutici		terra, terreno componente terrestre di una forza
labelling	il contrassegnare con cartellino, classificare	land L. component	forze terrestri rilievo del terreno terra di nessuno atterrare, sbarcare operazione di aviosbarco atterraggio, sbarco atterraggio d'assalto
field wire L.	il contrassegnare le linee telefoniche con cartellino	L. forces L. survey no man's L.	
labour	lavoro, fatica, mano d'opera, personale di fatica	to land air landed operation	
manual L. skilled L.	lavoro manuale mano d'opera specializzata	landing assault L.	
laden	carico, caricato		
L. weight	peso di un veicolo a		

blinding I.	atterraggio alla cieca	I. of a minefield	posa di un campo minato
I. aids	ausili di atterraggio	I. of obstacles	posa di ostacoli
I. area	area di atterraggio, zona di aviosbarco	I. of wire lines	stendere linee telefoniche
I. beach	spiaggia di sbarco	scattered I.	posa di mine sparse
I. craft	mezzo da sbarco (v. landing craft)	layout	schema, traccia, tracciato, pianta
I. field	campo di atterraggio	to lead	condurre, guidare, dirigere, comandare
I. force	forza di sbarco	leader	capo, comandante (delle unità minori)
I. ship	mezzo da sbarco (v. landing ship)	platoon I.	comandante di plotone
I. time	ora di atterraggio	squad I.	comandante di squadra
short take-off and I. (STOL)	decollo e atterraggio corto	leadership	comando, direzione, guida, capacità di comando, attitudine al comando
vertical and short take-off and I. (VSTOL)	decollo e atterraggio breve e verticale	leading	direzione, guida
vertical take-off and I. (VTOL)	decollo e atterraggio verticale	leaflet	foglio volante, volantino, manifestino
landing craft	mezzo da sbarco	propaganda I.	volantino, manifestino di propaganda (guerra psicologica)
I.c.-assault (LCA)	mezzo d'assalto	leave	licenza
I.c.-infantry (LCI)	mezzo da sbarco per fanteria	absent without I. (AWOL)	assente senza permesso
I.c.-mechanized (LCM)	mezzo da sbarco meccanizzati	annual I.	licenza ordinaria
I.c.-personnel (LCP)	mezzo da sbarco personale	compassionate I.	licenza per gravi motivi di famiglia
I.c.-vehicle, personnel (LCVP)	mezzo da sbarco per veicoli e personale	I. without pay	licenza senza assegni
scout I.c.	mezzo per l'esplorazione	short I.	licenza breve
landing ship	mezzo da sbarco navale	special I.	licenza straordinaria
I.s.-infantry (LSI)	mezzo da sbarco fanteria	terminal I.	licenza preconcogo
I.s.-medium (LSM)	mezzo da sbarco medio	to be on I.	essere in licenza
I.s.-tank (LST)	mezzo da sbarco corazzati	to get a I.	ottenere una licenza
I.s.-vehicles	mezzo da sbarco veicoli	to grant a I.	concedere una licenza
landmark	punto di riferimento, contrassegno, punto base (in campi minati)	to take a I.	andare in licenza
landmine	mina terrestre (v. mine)	leapfrogging	scavalco
landscape	paesaggio, panorama	ledge	cengia
landslip	frana	length	lunghezza
lane	vicolo, passaggio, varco	I. of a column	lunghezza di una colonna in movimento
minefield I.	passaggio (varco) in campo minato	time I.	tempo di sfilamento di una colonna
latitude	latitudine	wave I.	lunghezza d'onda (radio)
to launch	lanciare	lengthening-out	allungamento
launching tube	tubo di lancio	lens	lente, obiettivo
launching pad	rampa di lancio (missili)	telescopic I.	teleobiettivo
launching platform	piattaforma di lancio	letter or commendation	Encomio
to I. an attack	lanciare un attacco	letter of censure	biasimo (rimprovero)
launcher	lanciatore	level	livello
grenade I.	lanciarbombe	I. bombing	bombardamento in quota
rocket I.	lanciarazzi	I. crossing	passaggio a livello
law	legge	I. flight	volo orizzontale
martial I.	legge marziale	I. of supplies	livello dei rifornimenti
to lay down	posare, abbandonare	sea I.	livello del mare
to I. arm	abbandonare le armi	spirit I.	livella a bolla d'aria
layer	puntatore (art.), posatore	levelling	livellazione
mine I.	posamine	I. rod (I. staff)	stadia
laying	posa, messa in opera, installazione	I. screw	vite di livello
I. of ambushes	tendere imboscate	lever	leva
		cocking I.	leva d'armamento

gear I.	leva del cambio di velocità	fire support coordination I. (FSCL)	line di coordinamento del fuoco di appoggio
liaison	collegamento	front I.	linea del fronte, 1 ^a linea
air I. officer (ALO)	ufficiale di collegamento dell'Aeronautica	isogonic I.	linea di uguale declinazione magnetica
air I. party (ALP)	nucleo di collegamento dell'Aeronautica	light I. (LL)	linea di oscuramento
air transport I. officer (ATLO)	ufficiale di collegamento per il trasporto aereo	I. of communication (L of C)	linea di comunicazione
ground I. officer (GLO)	ufficiale di collegamento dell'Esercito	I. of contact (LC)	
I. group	gruppo di collegamento	I. of departure (LD)	linea di contatto
I. officer	ufficiale di collegamento	I. of defence	linea di partenza per l'attacco
I. party	nucleo di collegamento	I. of deployment	linea difensiva
medical I. team (MTL)	gruppo (nucleo) di collegamento sanitario	I. of forward troops	linea di spiegamento
naval I. officer (NLO)	ufficiale di collegamento della Marina	I. of operations	linea raggiunta dalle truppe amiche
tactical I.	collegamento tattico	I. of prearranged fire (UK)	linea di operazioni
lieutenant (Lt)	tenente (Esercito), tenente di vascello (Marina)	I. of site	linea di arresto automatico
I. Colonel (LTCOL)	Tenente Colonnello	main I. of resistance (MLR)	linea di sito
I. Commander	Capitano di Corvetta (Marina)	no fire I. (NFL)	linea di resistenza (margine anteriore della posizione di resistenza)
I. General (LTGEN)	Generale di Corpo D'Armata	nuclear safety I. (NSL)	linea di coordinamento del fuoco di aderenza (interdizione vicina)
first I.	tenente	palled wire I.	linea di sicurezza nucleare
second I.	sottotenente	phase I. (PL)	linea telefonica volante
life	vita, durata	report I.	linea di attestamento
half-I.	tempo di dimezzamento (radiazioni)	start I.	linea di riferimento
life-belt	salvagente	underground wire I.	linea di partenza
lift	sollevamento, elevatore (USA elevator), portanza (aeronautica)	wire I.	linea telefonica interrata
air I.	aviotrasporto	liner	linea telefonica transatlantico
fork-I.	sollevatore a forcella	air-I.	aereo di linea
lifted	raccolto e trasportato per via aerea	link	collegamento
lift-off	decollo (di un aereo), partenza (di un razzo)	I. sign	connessione
limber	avantreno	telephone I.	nominativo (trasm.)
limit	limite	link-up	collegamento telefonico
I. of advance	limite di avanzata	list	congiungimento
speed I.	limite di velocità	active I.	lista, elenco, catalogo, distinta, listino
limited	limitato	black I.	ruolo degli ufficiali in servizio permanente effettivo
I. warfare	guerra locale	death I.	lista nera
line	linea	distribution I.	lista dei decessi
bomb I. (BL)	linea di bombardamento	I. of objectives	elenco di distribuzione
bomb release I. (BRL)	linea di sgancio delle bombe	load check I.	elenco degli obiettivi
border I.	linea di confine	retired I.	lista di controllo del carico
cease-fire I.	linea del "cessate il fuoco"	white I.	ruolo degli ufficiali in congedo
combat outpost I. (COPL)	linea di sicurezza	listening	lista bianca
demarcation I.	linea di demarcazione	I. post	ascolto
dose rate contour I.	linea di uguale contaminazione	litter	posto ascolto
field wire I.	linea telefonica campale	I. bearer	barella
final protective I.	linea di apertura fuoco	live	portaferiti
fire I.	linea di tiro	I. ammunition	vivo, vero
		I. firing exercise	munizioni da guerra
		I. wheels	esercitazione a fuoco
		load	ruote motrici
			carico, peso, dotazione

L

allowable cargo l. (ACL)

basic l. (1st line)

l. check list

l. manifest

l. master

outside l. cargo

pay-l.

prescribed nuclear l.

standard l.

useful l.

loader

loading

l. deck

l. plan

l. system

l./unloading operations

location

command post l.

future l.

initial l.

successive l.

lodgement

logistic (al)

l. assessment

l. base

l. coordination centre
(Log. C.C.)

carico permesso

(ammissibile)

dotazione di 1^a linea

lista di controllo del
carico

manifesto di carico

direttore di carico

carico fuori misura

carico pagante

dotazione nucleare

prescritta

carico standard

carico utile

caricatore (servente al
pezzo)

caricamento

ponte d'imbarco

piano di caricamento

sistema di caricamento

operazioni di carico e

scarico

dislocazione, posto,

ubicazione

dislocazione del Posto

Comando

dislocazione futura

dislocazione iniziale

dislocazione successiva

alloggio, alloggiamento

logistico

previsione logistica

base logistica

centro di coordinamento
logistico;

l. support

l. support battalion (Log.
sp. bn.)

l. support company
(LSC)

l. support unit

logistics

Administration and l.

l. plan

longitude

look-out

loop-hole

lorry

l. driver

tipping l.

to lose

loss

combat **losses**

l. of contact

lot

ammunition l. number

loudspeaker

lubricant

petroleum, oils and

lubricants (POL)

sostegno logistico

battaglione di sostegno
logistico

compagnia di sostegno
logistico

unità di sostegno

logistico

logistica

organizzazione logistica-
servizi (para 4

dell'ordine di operazioni)

piano di servizi logistici

longitudine

posto di osservazione, di
vedetta

feritoia

autocarro (UK) (cifr.

USA = truck)

conduttore di autocarro

autocarro con cassone

ribaltabile

perdere

perdita

perdite in combattimento

perdita del contatto

partita, lotto

numero del lotto delle

munizioni

altoparlante

lubrificante

carburanti e lubrificanti

M

machine gun (MG)

antiaircraft m.

heavy m. (HMG)

light m. (LMG)

m. nest

multiple m.

sub m.

machine-gunner

machine-pistol

machinery

magazine

spare m.

magnetic

grid m. angle

mitragliatrice

mitragliatrice contraerea

mitragliatrice pesante

mitragliatrice leggera,

fucile mitragliatore

nido di mitragliatrice

mitragliatrice a canne

multiple

mitra

mitragliere

pistola mitragliatrice

macchinario

caricatore (di un'arma),

serbatoio

caricatore di ricambio

magnetico

angolo di variazione

m. needle

m. bearing

m. compass

m. mine

m. variation

mail

air m.

main

m. attack

m. body

m. effort

Main

to maintain

magnetica

ago magnetico

rilevamento magnetico

bussola magnetica

mina magnetica

declinazione magnetica

posta

posta aerea

principale, primario, più
importante

attacco principale

grosso di una forza o di

una formazione

sforzo principale

Posto Comando

Avanzato

mantenere, sostenere

to m. a war	sostenere una guerra	forced m.	marcia forzata
to m. a contact	mantenere il contatto	m. serial	scaglione di marcia
maintenance	manutenzione,	m. unit	unità di marcia
	mantenimento,	motor m.	marcia su autoveicoli
	conservazione	rate of m.	velocità di marcia
daily m.	manutenzione giornaliera	marine	marino, marittimo,
field m.	manutenzione campale		navale, fuciliere di
line m.	manutenzione delle linee		marina
	telefoniche	m. corps (marines)	fanteria da sbarco
line m. man	guardiafilii	m. engineering	ingegneria navale
m. echelon	scaglione (grado) di	merchant m.	marina mercantile
	manutenzione	maritime	marittimo
m. team	squadra manutenzione	to mark	segnare,
preventive m.	manutenzione preventiva		contrassegnare, marcare
vehicular m.	manutenzione automezzi	mark	segno, contrassegno
major (maj)	maggiore (grado)	distinctive m.	segno distintivo
m. general	generale di divisione	land m.	punto base (campi
management	direzione, governo,		minati)
	amministrazione,	marker	segnale, segnalatore
	gestione	helipad day m.	segnaletica per zona di
interior m.	direzione interna		atterraggio elicotteri
personnel m.	governo del personale	intermediate m.	punto di congiunzione
manifest	manifesto		(campi minati)
flight m.	manifesto di volo	strip m.	punto origine (campi
load m. (cargo)	manifesto di carico		minati)
	(materiali)	marking	segnaletica,
load m. (passenger)	manifesto di carico		contrassegno
	(personale)	m. of contaminated	segnaletica zone
manoeuvre	manovra	areas	contaminate
(USA = manoeuvre)		m. of lanes through	segnaletica dei passaggi
m. of firepower	manovra del fuoco	minefields	nei campi minati
pivot of m.	perno di manovra	minefield m.	segnaletica dei campi
strategic m.	manovra strategica		minati
tactical m.	manovra tattica	target m.	il contrassegnare gli
man-of-war	nave da guerra		obiettivi
manual	manuale, trattato	marksman	tiratore scelto, puntatore
field m. (FM)	manuale campale	marksmanship	abilità nel tiro, nello
logistic m. (LM)	manuale logistico		sparare
technical m. (TM)	manuale tecnico	marshal	maresciallo (grado
map	carta topografica,		superiore a quello di
	geografica, mappa	air-m.	generale)
contour m.	carta topografica con	field m.	maresciallo dell'aria
	curve di livello	provost m.	maresciallo (generale)
intelligence m.	carta delle informazioni		capo della polizia
large scale m.	carta topografica a	marsh	militare
	grande scala	marshy	palude
m. reading	lettura della carta	m. terrain	paludoso, acquitrinoso
	topografica	martial	terreno paludoso
m. series	serie della carta	court-m.	marziale
	topografica	m. law	corte marziale
m. series name	nominativo di serie delle	m. spirit	legge marziale
	carte topografiche	mask	spirito bellicoso
radiation situation m.	carta delle zone	gas m.	maschera
	contaminate	NBC m.	maschera antigas
road m.	carta stradale	masked	maschera anti-NBC
situation m.	carta della situazione	mast	mascherato
small scale m.	carta topografica a		albero (di nave),
	piccola scala	wireless m.	supporto
march	marcia		supporto di antenna
approach m.	marcia di avvicinamento	master	(radio)
	(a contatto imminente)	beach m.	capo, direttore
day's m.	tappa		capo spiaggia (oper.
foot m.	marcia a piedi		anfibia)

drop m.	direttore di lancio (di materiale)	recoil m.	congegno di recupero
jump m.	direttore di lancio (di personale)	mechanized	meccanizzato
load m.	direttore di carico	m. artillery	artiglieria autotrainata
mastery	dominio	m. division	divisione meccanizzata
m. of the air	dominio dell'aria	m. unit	unità meccanizzata
mate	compagno	medical	medico, sanitario
team m.	compagno di squadra	m. care	assistenza medica
material	materiale	m. company	compagnia di sanità
air portable m.	materiale	m. corps	corpo sanitario, sanità
	aviotrasportabile	m. evacuation	sgombero sanitario
bridging m.	materiale da ponte	m. examination	visita medica
captured m.	materiale catturato al nemico	m. jurisprudence	medicina legale
consolidation m.	materiale di rafforzamento	m. officer	ufficiale medico
construction m.	materiale da costruzione	m. record	registro ammalati
cryptographic m.	materiale crittografico	m. record extract	cartella clinica
expendable m.	materiale di consumo	m. support	servizio sanitario
fortification m.	materiale da fortificazione	m. treatment	cure mediche
non-expendable m.	materiale non di consumo	m. ward	reparto di medicina
radioactive m.	materiale radioattivo	medicinal	medicinale
revetting m.	materiale da rivestimento interno	medicine	medicina
war m.	materiale bellico	meeting	incontro, riunione
matriculation	immatricolazione	m. combat	combattimento
mattress	materasso	(engagement)	d'incontro
pneumatic m.	materassino pneumatico	m. place	luogo di riunione,
meal	pasto		d'incontro
hot m.	pasto caldo	m. point	punto d'intersezione
mean	mezzo	megaphone	megafono
delivery m.	mezzo di lancio, mezzo di spedizione	megaton	megaton
m. s of signal	mezzi delle trasmissioni	memorandum (abbr. memo)	promemoria, appunto, nota, comunicazione di servizio
communications			agenda taccuino
passive protective m.	mezzi di protezione passiva	m. book	promemorie d'intese e accordi
measurement	misurazione, misura	m. of understanding (MOU)	Mercatore
angular m.	misura angolare.	Mercator	universale trasversale di Mercatore
measures	misure	universal transverse M. (UTM)	intonare all'ambiente, confondere
alert m.	misure d'allarme	to merge	meridiano
corrective m.	misure correttive		meridiano fondamentale (di Greenwich)
deceptive m.	misure diversive	mess	mensa
denial m.	misure d'interdizione	m. hall	sala mensa, refettorio
electronic counter m. (ECM)	contromisure elettroniche	m. orderly	inserviente alla mensa
electronic counter-counter m. (ECCM)	contro-contromisure elettroniche	m. tin	gavetta
passive m.	misure passive	NCO's m.	mensa sottufficiali
preparatory m.	misure preparatorie	officers' m.	mensa Ufficiali
preventive m.	misure preventive	message	messaggio
protective m.	misure protettive	classified m.	messaggio classificato
secrecy m.	misure di segretezza	coded m.	messaggio cifrato
security m.	misure di sicurezza	incoming m.	messaggio in arrivo
mechanician	meccanico	m. centre	centro messaggi
skilled m.	meccanico di precisione	m. format	schema del messaggio
mechanism	meccanismo, congegno	m. releasing officer	ufficiale che autorizza la trasmissione del messaggio
counter-recoil m.	recuperatore	outgoing m.	messaggio in partenza
elevating m.	congegno di elevazione	plain m.	messaggio in chiaro
firing m.	congegno di sparo	telephone m.	fonogramma
		teletype m.	messaggio telescritto
		messenger	portaordini, staffetta
		motor m.	staffetta motorizzata

messing
m. food
m. officer

mess-tin
meteorologic (al)
m. conditions

method

m. of action
m. of operations
training m.
METT (mission enemy
terrain and weather
troops available)
micro-organism
pathogen m.
microphone
microscope
midshipman

mil
milage

mile
nautical m.

square m.

mileage
milepost

milestone
militarization
military
m. authority
m. government
millimetre
mine
antipersonnel m.
antipersonnel m.
fragmentation
antitank m.
antitank m. plastic

land m.
land m. warfare
magnetic m.
m. belt
m. cluster
m. detector
m. field

m. sowing technique

m. sweeper
scattered laying
torpedo m.
trap m.
minefield

relativo alla mensa
rancio
ufficiale addetto al
vettovagliamento
gavetta, gamella
meteorologico
condizioni
meteorologiche
metodo, modo, maniera,
sistema, modalità
modalità d'azione
metodo operativo
metodo addestrativo
compito, nemico, terreno
e tempo meteorologico,
truppe a disposizione
microrganismo
microrganismo patogeno
microfono
microscopio
(UK) guardiamarina,
(USA) allievo
dell'Accademia Navale
millesimo
distanza in miglia,
indennità chilometrica
miglio (pari a km 1,609)
miglio nautico (pari a km
1,853)
miglio quadrato (pari a
kmq 2,59)
v. milage
cartello (stradale)
indicatore della distanza
pietra miliare
militarizzazione
militare
autorità militare
governo militare
millimetro
mina
mina antiuomo
mina antiuomo a frattura
prestabilita
mina anticarro
mina anticarro al
plastico
mina terrestre
guerra di mine
mina magnetica
fascia minata
grappolo di mine
cercamine
campo minato (v.
minefield)
tecnica di posa delle
mine
spazzamine
posa di mine sparse
mina subacquea
mina trappolata
campo minato

barrier m.

defensive m.

laying of a m.

m. clearing

m. forcing

m. gap

m. lane

nuisance m.

phony m.
protected m.
protective m.
minelayer
miner
minimize

minister
m. of defence
ministry
m. of defence (MOD)
misfire

misprint
to miss
missile (ballistic)
air-to-air m. (AAM)
air-to-surface m. (ASM)
antimissile m.
free m.
guided m. (GM)
intercontinental m.
intermediate range
ballistic m. (IRBM)
long range ballistic m.
(LRBM)
mid range ballistic m.
(MRBM)
reprisal m.
short range ballistic m.
(SRBM)
surface-to-air m. (SAM)
surface-to-surface m.
(SSM)
Missing
m. in action (MIA)

mission
air m.
dicing photography m.

fire m.
flying m.
immediate air m.

photographic m.

campo minato di
convogliamento
campo minato di
interdizione
posa di un campo
minato
bonifica di un campo
minato
forzamento di campi
minati
varco in un campo
minato
passaggio in un campo
minato
campo minato di
disturbo
falso campo minato
campo minato d'arresto
campo minato protettivo
(nave) posamine
minatore, guastatore
ridurre al minimo (le
trasmissioni)
ministro
ministro della difesa
ministero
ministero della difesa
scatto a vuoto (di una
arma)
errore di stampa
fallire, mancare
missile balistico
missile aria-aria
Missile aria-superficie
missile antimissile
missile libero
missile teleguidato
missile intercontinentale
missile balistico a gittata
intermedia
missile balistico a
grande gittata
missile balistico a media
gittata
missile da rappresaglia
missile balistico a corta
gittata
missile superficie-aria
missile superficie-
superficie
mancante, disperso
disperso in
comabbtimento
missione, compito
missione aerea
missione aerofotografica
a bassa quota
missione di fuoco
missione di volo
missione aerotattica
immediata
missione aerofotografica

preplanned air m.

tactical air m.

mission task**to misunderstand****mobile**

hyper m.

m. defence

m. force

m. unit

mobility

cross-country m.

intercontinental m.

mobilization

general m.

m. centre

m. plan

mode

m. of transport

modulation

amplitude m. (AM)

frequency m. (FM)

monitor**monitoring**

communications m.

radiological m.

to mop-up**mopping-up****morale**

the m. of the Army

morphine**mortar**

heavy m.

light m.

medium m.

m. vehicle mounted

motorcycle**motorized**

m. unit

to mount**to m.** an operation**to m.** guard

missione aerea

pianificata

missione aerotattica

compito, missione

fraintendere

mobile

eccezionalmente mobile

difesa mobile

forza mobile

unità mobile

mobilità

mobilità fuori strada

mobilità intercontinentale

mobilitazione

mobilitazione generale

centro di mobilitazione

piano di mobilitazione

modo, sistema

sistema di trasporto

modulazione

modulazione di

ampiezza

modulazione di

frequenza

dispositivo di controllo,

avvisatore, persona

addetta all'ascolto delle

trasmissioni radio

nemiche

controllo, intercettazione

intercettazione delle

trasmissioni

controllo della

radioattività

rastrellare

rastrellamento

morale

morale dell'Esercito

morfina

mortaio

mortaio pesante

mortaio leggero

mortaio medio

mortaio montato (per il

tiro)

motociclo

motorizzato

unità motorizzata

montare, preparare

preparare un'operazione

montare di guardia

mountain

m. artillery

m. house

m. operation

m. troops

m. warfare

movement

air m.

administrative m.

by-bounds m.

covered m.

foot m.

internal m.

motor m.

m. control

m. to contact

on the move

operational road m.

rail m.

retrograde m.

road m.

strategic m.

tactical m.

troop m.

turning m.

mulepath**munition**

atomic demolition m.

(ADM)

mustard**muster**

m. book (m. roll)

mutiny**mutual**

m. support

group of m. supporting

strongpoints

muzzle

m. loaded weapon

m. velocity

montagna

artiglieria da montagna

rifugio di montagna

operazione in montagna

truppe da montagna

guerra in montagna

movimento

movimento per via aerea

movimento

amministrativo (non di combattimento)

movimento a sbalzi

movimento al coperto

movimento a piedi

movimento interno

movimento su

autoveicoli

controllo del movimento

movimento per

raggiungere il contatto

movimento durante

movimento operativo per

via ordinaria

movimento per ferrovia

movimento retrogrado

movimento su strada

movimento strategico

movimento tattico

movimento di truppe

manovra di aggiramento

mulattiera

munizionamento,

provviste, rifornimenti

militari

mina atomica (nucleare)

iprite

adunata, appello, rivista

ruolino per l'appello

ammutinamento, rivolta

mutuo, reciproco

appoggio reciproco

gruppo di capisaldi

cooperanti

volata (di un'arma)

arma ad avancarica

velocità iniziale (di un

proiettile)

name,

code n.

nick n.

Napalm,

nome, nominativo

nominativo convenzionale

nome convenzionale

napalm

Naphtha,**Nation,**

host n.

neutral n.

nafta, petrolio grezzo

nazione

Nazione ospite

nazione neutrale

United Nations (UN)
National defence
NATO wide exercise,

Nature,
 n. of exercise
 n. of terrain
Nautical,
 n. twilight
Naval,
 n. gunfire support (NGS)

Navy,
NBC (Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical)
 NBC warfare
need,
 n. to know
needle,
 magnetic n.
nerve,
 n. gas
Nest,
 machine-gun n.
net,
 camouflage n.
 espionage n.
 field warning n.
N. Control Station
(NCS)
 radio n.
 air request n.

back-up n.
 Command n.
 fire control n.
 logistic n.
 tactical air observation
 n. (TAO)
 road n.
 wireless net (work)

neurologic,
 n. affection
neutral,
 n. nation
neutrality,
 armed n.
neutralization,
 n. fire
to neutralize,
neutron,
 N. Induced Gamma
 Activity (NIGA)
 Névé,
 nickname,
 nomenclature,
 non-commissioned

Nazioni Unite
 difesa nazionale
 esercitazione
 interessante tutta l'area
 NATO
 natura specie
 specie di esercitazione
 natura del terreno
 nautico, navale
 arco di luce nautico
 navale
 appoggio di fuoco
 navale
 Marina (da guerra)
 NBC (Nucleare,
 Batteriologico, Chimico)
 guerra NBC
 necessità
 necessità di conoscere
 ago, guglia
 ago magnetico
 nervo
 gas nervino
 nido
 nido di mitragliatrice
 maglia, rete
 rete mimetica
 rete di spionaggio
 rete di avvistamento
 capomaglia

maglia radio
 maglia delle richieste di
 concorso aereo
 maglia di supporto
 maglia del Comando
 maglia di controllo del
 fuoco
 maglia logistica
 rete di osservazione
 aerea
 rete stradale
 maglia, rete di
 collegamenti radio
 neurologico
 affezione neurologica
 neutrale
 nazione neutrale
 neutralità
 neutralità armata
 neutralizzazione
 fuoco di neutralizzazione
 neutralizzare
 neutrone
 radioattività indotta
 da neutroni
 nevaio
 nome convenzionale
 nomenclatura
 Sottufficiale

officer (NCO),
senior NCO
non-effective,
north, (N)
 grid n.
 magnetic n.
northern,
not later than (NLT)
nothing-to-report
(NTR),
notice,

advance n.
 at one hour's n.
 n. board
 without n.
not-to-all (NOTAL)
nozzle,
 discharge n.
nuclear,
 n. allocation
 n. buffer distance

n. capable howitzer
 n. conditions
 n. damage

n. delivery unit
 n. energy
 n. fission
 n. radiation
 n. reactor
 n. storage

n. strike warning

n. warfare
 n. weapon
 tactical n. weapon
nuisance,
 n. fire,
number,
 ammunition lot n.

chalk n.
 file n.
 movement n.

roster n.

serial n.

service n.
 stock n.
 target n.

Sottufficiale anziano
 inabile al servizio attivo
 Nord
 nord rete
 nord magnetico
 settentrionale
 non più tardi di
 nulla da riferire

annuncio, avviso,
 preavviso
 preavviso
 col preavviso di un'ora
 tabellone, albo
 senza preavviso
 non a tutti
 ugello
 ugello di scarico
 nuclear
 assegnazione nucleare
 margine di sicurezza
 nucleare
 obice con capacità
 nucleare
 ambiente nucleare
 danno nucleare (light,
 leggero, moderate,
 moderato, severe, grave)
 unità di lancio nucleare
 energia nucleare
 fissione nucleare
 radiazione nucleare
 reattore nucleare
 deposito materiali
 nucleari
 avviso di attacco
 nucleare
 guerra nucleare
 ordigno nucleare
 ordigno nucleare tattico
 disturbo, fastidio
 tiro di disturbo
 numero, formula
 numero di lotto delle
 munizioni
 numero di gesso (di volo)
 numero di protocollo
 formula distintiva del
 movimento
 numero d'ordine secondo
 un elenco
 numero di serie, d'ordine
 di emissione
 numero di matricola
 numero categorico
 numero assegnato ad un
 obiettivo

public information o. (PIO)	ufficiale addetto alle pubbliche informazioni	on-line,	in linea (cifatura)
quartermaster o.	foriere di alloggiamento	open,	aperto, scoperto
	Ufficiale di	in the o.	allo scoperto
	Commissariato	o. route	itinerario aperto
readiness o.	ufficiale addetto	operating instruction (commo),	istruzioni/prescrizioni per l'esercizio (trasmissioni)
recce o.	all'approntamento	operation,	operazione
regular o.	ufficiale addetto alle ricognizioni	airborne o.	operazione di aviotrasporto
reserve o.	ufficiale in servizio	air-ground o.	operazione aeroterrestre
safety o.	permanente effettivo	air-landed o.	operazione di aviosbarco
	ufficiale di Complemento	amphibious o.	operazione anfibia
	ufficiale addetto allo sgombramento poligono	arctic o.	operazione in zona artica
security control o.	ufficiale alla sicurezza	combat o.	operazione di guerra
selection o.	ufficiale selettore	combined o.	operazione combinata
o. of primary	ufficiale con	defensive o.	operazione difensiva
responsability (OPR)	responsabilità principale	desert o.	operazione in zona desertica
signal o.	ufficiale addetto alle trasmissioni	deterrent o.	operazione deterrente
Special Role O.	ufficiale del Ruolo Speciale Unico	helicopterborne o.	elisbarco
staff o.	ufficiale del Comando	helicopter transport o.	elitrasporto
staff duty o.	ufficiale di servizio al Comando	Joint o.	operazione interforze
	ufficiale subalterno	Jungle o.	operazione nella giungla
subaltern o.	ufficiale addetto ai rifornimenti	loading/unloading o.	operazioni di carico e scarico
supply o.	ufficiale addetto ai rifornimenti	mountain o.	operazione in montagna
topography o.	ufficiale topografico	offensive o.	operazione offensiva
trail o.	ufficiale di coda (di una colonna in marcia)	o. centre	centro operazioni
transportation o.	ufficiale addetto ai trasporti	o. in snow and extreme cold	operazione in zone innevate e con freddo intenso
unit enplaning o. (UEO)	ufficiale addetto al caricamento e trasporto aereo di un reparto	o. order (OPORD)	ordine di operazione
warrant o.	sottufficiale (maresciallo)	o. plan (OPLAN)	piano di operazione
Official,	ufficiale, pertinente ad un ufficio, funzionario	special o.	operazione speciale
government o.	funzionario statale	tactical air o.	operazione aerotattica
o. statement,	dichiarazione ufficiale	operational,	operativo
o. use	uso ufficiale (di materiali)	o. capacity	capacità operativa
through o. channels	per tramite gerarchico	o. command	comando operativo
OFF-line	fuori linea (cifatura)	o. conditions	ambiente operativo
ogive,	ogiva, arco ogivale	o. concept	concetto operativo
radius of o.	raggio di ogiva	o. control	controllo operativo
Oil	olio, petrolio	o. efficiency	efficienza operativa
brake o.	olio freni	o. readiness	prontezza operativa, approntamento operativo
engine o.	olio motori	o. sector	settore operativo
gear o.	olio per cambio	operative,	operativo, operatorio
hidraulic o.	olio idraulico	o. surgery	chirurgia
o.-feeder	oliatore	o. treatment	trattamento operatorio (chirurgico)
o-filter	filtro dell'olio	to become o.	entrare in vigore
o.-pan	coppa dell'olio	operator,	operatore
o.-pipeline	oleodotto	radio o.	operatore radio
o. tanker	petroliera	wireless o.	radiotelegrafista
oiler	oliatore	to oppose,	opporsi, contrastare
Ointment,	unguento, pomata	opposite,	contrapposto
protective o.	unguento protettivo	o. forces	forze contrapposte
on-call,	su richiesta	opposition,	opposizione, contrasto, resistenza

orange,
o. forces
orbit,
to put in **o.**
order,
administrative **o.**
administrative-logistic **o.**

attack **o.**
counter **o.**
exercise operation **o.**
(EXOPORD)
fire **o.**
fragmentary **o.**
march **o.**
movement **o.**
NATO travel **o.**

o. of Battle (OB)
o. of execution
o. of information

on **o.**
operation **o.** (OPORD)
operational road
movement **o.**

standing **o.**
travel **o.**
verbal **o.** (VO)
warning **o.**
orderly,

o. behaviour
o. book
o. officer

o. room

ordinate,
ordnance,

o. spare parts
organic,
o. unit
organization,

command **o.**

fire **o.**
o. of attack

o. of tactical unit
o. of defence

arancione
forze arancione
orbita
mettere in orbita
ordine, consegna
ordine amministrativo
ordine logistico-
amministrativo
ordine di attacco
contrordine
ordine di operazione per
le esercitazioni
ordine di fuoco
ordine frammentario
ordine di marcia
ordine di movimento
documento di viaggio
NATO

ordine di battaglia
ordine di esecuzione
ordine di ricerca
informatica
su ordine
ordine di operazione

ordine di movimento per
via ordinaria
ordine permanente
documento di viaggio
ordine verbale
preavviso
d'ordine, ordinanza,
ordinato, inserviente a
mensa
comportamento corretto
registro degli ordini dati
ufficiale di giornata,
ufficiale d'ordinanza
stanza del comando,
fureria

ordinata
materiale militare,
vettovagliamento,
sussistenza, servizio
tecnico
parti di ricambio
organico (in tutti i sensi)
unità organica
organizzazione,
ordinamento, organico
organizzazione del
comando
organizzazione del fuoco
organizzazione
dell'attacco
ordinamento tattico
organizzazione della
difesa

o. of ground

orientation,
originator,
other ranks, (OR)

outgoing,
o. message
outguard,

outline,

out of
o. action
o. bounds
outpost,

combat **o.**

combat **o.** line (COPL)

general **o.**

march **o.**

system of **o.** s
output,

outside,

o. vehicle
to overcome,
to o. obstacles
overhang,
to overlap,
overlapping fires

overlay,

intelligence **o.**
objectives **o.**
operation **o.**
overnight,
o. pass

to overrun,
overrunning,
o. and disrupting action

overseas (s)
o. troops
overweight,

organizzazione
(sistemazione) del
terreno
orientamento
mittente
sottufficiali e militari di
truppa
in partenza
messaggio in partenza
posto di osservazione e
allarme
profilo, lineamento,
sagoma
fuori di
fuori combattimento
fuori dei limiti
avamposto,
avanstruttura
elemento in zona di
sicurezza, posto scoglio
linea di sicurezza
(margine anteriore della
zona di sicurezza)
zona di sicurezza,
avanstrutture di
sicurezza
elemento di sicurezza di
una unità in marcia
sistema di avamposti
potenza sviluppata,
energia erogata,
produzione
fuori misura, misura
superiore alla normale
veicolo fuori misura
superare
superare ostacoli
strapiombo
sovrapporre, coincidere
fuochi sovrapposti,
incrociati, saldatura del
fuoco
lucido (da sovrapporre
alle carte topografiche)
lucido delle informazioni
lucido degli obiettivi
lucido della situazione
pernottamento
permesso di
pernottamento
invadere, investire
investimento
azione di investimento e
disarticolazione
oltremare
truppe d'oltremare
eccedenza di peso



MANDER'S MARCH ON ROME

d'A Mander



D'A. Mander: *Mander's March on Rome* (La marcia su Roma di Mander), Alan Sutton, Bristol, 1987, 150 pages.

The book starts with a description of the battle in the Western Desert, when 150th Infantry Brigade of 50th Division bore the full brunt of Rommel's attack in May 1942. This attack went on to capture Tobruk and was only halted at El Alamein at the gates of Alexandria. 150th Brigade was surrounded and after some days of hard fighting the Brigade was mopped up piecemeal and the survivors were taken captive.

After a rough time in North Africa they were taken to Italy and the author was incarcerated eventually in a prison camp not far from Milan in North Italy.

A description of life in prison camp, where Major Mander and other survivors spent some 14 months, includes accounts of escape and also of the everyday monotonous rou-

tine of a prison sentence without any term. The effect on prisoners of bad news from home, the death of wife or family, the destruction of the home by bombing, the home which was the lifebelt which kept the man afloat, and the seemingly endless term of prison sentence, which the everadvancing German and Japanese armies led the prisoners to expect.

With the allied victories at El Alamein and Stalingrad, the mood and morale in the camp changed dramatically, and finally led to the Italian Armistice. At this point all prisoners were ordered to stay in the camp and after some uncertain days only narrowly escaped being taken to Germany by the Wehrmacht. The author asks a question to which no answer has ever been given: Why was it that prisoners were not told to escape, arm themselves, form partisan groups and get ready to attack and cut the long German line of communications down Italy to the front at Salerno?

After escaping from prison camp the author and his three companions set out to march along the Apennines with the object of reaching the Allied line in the South. On arriving at Florence they were involved with the local resistance, the partisans and with other prisoners. Having been given away by an Italian, they were arrested and put on a train to Germany. The author jumped off the train and arrived back in Florence to find all his friends arrested or, having escaped arrest, scattered to the four winds. The Italians who were caught were sentenced to death, commuted to 30 years imprisonment, and the confiscation of all their property.

The author decided to continue his march along the Apennines in order to get back to the VIII Army which was fighting its way slowly northwards but with the advent of very cold wet weather, the deterioration of boots and clothing, and the impossibility of crossing the line in the snow-covered mountains, he and his companions accepted the help of the Italian Communist party to get them to Rome.

The Communists in Rome however had enough on their hands and did not want anything to do with three prisoners of war and they were given immediate notice to quit. With great good luck the author was taken to a flat where they were accommodated and fed by priests from the Vatican.

The flat however was soon raided by Germans and the prisoners were all put in prison and rapidly removed to Germany because of an alarm about an Allied landing on the coast. The author, returning from his daily foray in Rome, was arrested on arriving at the flat, but managed to escape from his guards by jumping out of a window when they were not looking.

The remainder of the book tells of the author's life in Rome, sending messages to the allies in code by wireless, including information about the main German counter-attack on the Anzio beachhead, finding out the organisation the Germans planned to leave in Rome, assisting less fortunate prisoners in the Rome area, involvement with the Vatican, Yugoslavs, Communists, Jews and the Italian resistance, living on the black market with false papers and true friends, cheek by jowl with the Germans for no less than six months.

Towards the end of the book the hunt for the author gets very hot. Many of his friends had been arrested, some had been shot and finally he was forced to go to ground and hide in order to avoid last minute arrest and probable execution as a spy.

It is a fast-moving and compelling story, as the reader gradually feels the net closing; it is also absolutely true - an extraordinary first-hand account, a vivid picture of occupied Italy, the bravery of the Resistance, the unfailing help of the Contadini, who at appalling risk to their lives assisted many prisoners on their march to freedom.





RIVISTA MILITARE

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The Energy Problems
in the World and in Italy

★ **CARLO JEAN**
General Carl von
Clausewitz'
Theory of War
and Strategic Thought

★ **RUDYARD KIPLING**
Rudyard Kipling's
Testimony on the
British Army of 1915

Bayern.



Infanterist
vom 9. Inf.-Regt. Wrede.

Infanterist und Trommler
vom 5. Inf.-Regt. Grossherzog von Hessen.

1870.

Das Bild zeigt Bayrische Infanteristen in der Feldausrüstung 1870. Im Jahre 1868 waren verschiedene Aenderungen eingeführt worden, die indessen noch nicht allgemein durchgeführt waren. So zeigt der Helm des Soldaten vom 9. Rgt. noch die alten Schuppenketten, während von den anderen bereits die Lederriemen mit Schnalle getragen werden. Der Mantel wurde im Felde theils im Kranze um den Tornister getragen, theils en bandoulière über Schulter angelegt. Als Fussbekleidung dienen theils Stiefel mit Schnallschäften, theils gewöhnliche kurze Schaftstiefel. Die Kragen und Aufschläge waren regimentorweis verschieden, die Schulterwülste dagegen durchgängig ponceauroth.



ENERGY SUPPLY
The Energy Problem
in the World and in Italy

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ
General Carl von
Clausewitz and
the Strategic Thought

WHAT FUTURE FOR THE "WESTERN ALLIANCE?"
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Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

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


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THE ENERGY PROBLEMS

IN THE WORLD AND IN ITALY

In the last forty years the world consumption of oil has increased six times and the ENI production of hydrocarbons, both in Italy and abroad, has reached that of a medium OPEC country such as Algeria, about 740,000 barrels a day. We have gone a long way, but no less important are the challenges we have to face in order to ensure, through a sufficient availability of energy, the development of our country.

I shall analyze, first of all, the word energy situation and subsequently proceed to survey the most serious problems that await a solution within the coming 10 or 15 years. To conclude, I am going to examine the most recent developments of the oil market and the possible reverberations on the economy of our country, considering, in this perspective, what ENI is planning to do in order to reduce the impact of the two great constraints that confront us: the vulnerability of supplies and the deterioration of the environment.

In 1988, the world consumed over 155 million barrels of oil equivalent a day. Which means that every day we burn, in primary energetic sources, the equivalent of the contents of a 50 cm pipeline encircling the Earth three times.

The greatest part of this energy (87 per cent) is represented by fossil fuels: oil 38%, plus 20% of gas and 29% of coal.

In burning, the fossil fuels send

into the atmosphere various pollutants: carbon monoxides (CO) sulphur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen oxides (NO_x). Last year, in the whole world, the discharges deriving from burning fossil fuels reached a total of 400 million tons. These emissions are made worse by carbon dioxide, which is not a pollutant in itself but is presumably the main cause of the greenhouse effect if it cannot be "fixed" and transformed again into oxygen and carbon by plants, through the photosynthesis process.

The effects of the polluting discharges are more and more felt, and not only in the industrialized countries, by the international political and scientific community, which has started to tackle the problem as a whole, considering the interaction between economic development and environmental impact.

Prospectively, we have recently been informed of a possible technological leap in the field of controlled nuclear fusion (the results, as far as we know, show, first of all, that we

should think about fusion also in new ways; what remains to be studied is the actual applicability of the invention and its diffusion at industrial level). Also the first big innovations in the field of superconductors at normal temperature - these too destined to bring about a radical change in the energy world - date back to no more than three years ago.

Nevertheless these innovations, promising as they may be, are still at their initial stage and I don't think we can expect them to have a significant impact on the scene of world energy for the next fifteen years.

Hence a consideration: I believe that these years will be remembered as the last years of the oil era. An era which began in the Twenties and is destined to last until the first half of the next century. In 1925, the world consumption of oil was only between 2 and 3 million barrels a day; it rose to 10 million in 1950 and reached and surpassed 60 million barrels a day in the Eighties.

PRIMARY SOURCES CONSUMPTION AND GLOBAL EMISSION

WORLD 1988 - 2000

	1988	2000	Variations (%)
Total			
Mtep	7748,90	9889,00	27,62
Mb/d	154,98	197,78	
Composition(%)			
Oil	38,5	34,4	
Natural gas	19,9	20,0	
Solid fuels	28,7	31,9	
Others	12,9	13,7	
Total fossil fuels	87,1	86,3	
Emissions			
Million tons/year	395,95	482,46	21,85

Source: ENI updating of the estimate submitted to the National Conference on Energy, February 1987
UN-The State of World Environment, April 1987

PRIMARY SOURCES CONSUMPTION AND GLOBAL EMISSIONS ITALY 1988 - 2000 (NEP basic scenario)



	1988	2000	Variations (%)
Total			
Mtep	157,50	180,00	14,29
Mb/g	3,15	3,60	
Composition(%)			
Oil	57,1	45,0	
Natural gas	21,6	28,0	
Solid fuels	9,6	16,0	
Others	11,7	11,0	
Total fossil fuels	88,3	89,0	
Global emissions			
Million tons/year	10,52		
2000 basic scenario		10,43	-0,86
2000 max target		5,50	-47,72
Dependence on imports(%)	81	76	
Trade Balance Burden			
(1988 Billion Lire)	15874		
in % del PIL	1,5		
Burden in Billion Lire deriving from \$ 1 Increase in oil price (**)	860		

(*) They include: carbon monoxide, sulphur oxides, nitrogen oxides.
(**) Lira/Dollar exchange rate: 1306; net oil imports 89.1 Mtep.

Source: ENI elaboration of Ministry of Industry data - NEP, August 1988.

The innovations which are just taking their first steps (nuclear fusion, superconductors, etc.) will enable us to have different and much cleaner technologies.

This belies the catastrophic predictions about the "physical" limits of development, but there is still the problem to manage, as best as possible, the energy system in the coming years, when we will have to burn increasing amounts of fossil fuels, which are exhaustible, polluting, produced - at least in part - in unstable countries and often in oligopolistic regimes. In the next 15 or 20 years the transition towards a not-too-distant time of cleaner and safer energy will confront us with two main problems.

First, we shall have to face the environmental problem. The consumption of fossil fuels will rise by 25% by the year 2000, due to the increases in average incomes and population, as well as to the higher growth-rate of the developing coun-

In 1988 the world consumed a quantity of oil equivalent to the contents of a 50 cm pipeline 50 circling the Earth three times.

tries: from about 155 million barrels a day to about 200 million.

If there no interventions are made, this will produce an equivalent rise in the polluting emissions due to combustion.

The second problem is the reliability of the supplies. The crude reserves are concentrated in limited areas, some of which are marked by high political instability. Suffice it to think that 76% of the world reserves are held by OPEC and that 63% are located in the Persian Gulf.

These problems concern especially our country, which has scarce

resources of its own: Italy, which uses up 3,1 million barrels a day of primary energetic sources, and imports 81% of them, faces a very high environmental risk, because it is heavily populated and highly industrialized. Therefore its policy must be hinged on three fundamental points:

- reduce its dependence, both through an energy-saving policy and diversification into resources in which our country is more abundant, developing the national resources, scarce as they may be;
- considering the degree of dependence, reduce the vulnerability of the supplies through a strategy of "diversification of purchases" by areas, acquiring its own reserves abroad in the safest possible areas;
- cut down the impact on the environment.

As a matter of fact, the ENI programmes are in harmony with these strategic guidelines. In order

to diminish dependence we are developing our national production as much as possible: at present Italy produces 340,000 barrels a day of gas and oil which should foreseeably increase to 390,000 barrels by 1995.

In order to reduce the vulnerability of our supplies from abroad, we have diversified our power supply into gas, which represents today 22% of Italy's energy consumption, and will reach 28% by the year 2000; we have improved the flexibility of the oil supply and its geopolitical distribution (we are importing oil from 23 countries); we have widened our "equity" production of hydrocarbons abroad (i. e. the production is our exclusive property) reaching 400,000 barrels a day destined to go up to 440,000 by 1995.

Our production of hydrocarbons in Italy and abroad therefore will go from the present 740,000 barrels a day to 830,000 barrels by 1995.

Finally, ENI is part of a very complex and interconnected network of

international oil and gas pipelines, which greatly lowers the risk of interruptions due to local political or military crises. The pipelines of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, capable of carrying to the Red Sea and Mediterranean ports 5 million barrels a day of oil coming from the Persian Gulf, have played a crucial role in maintaining the stability of prices during the most critical days of the Gulf war.

Considering environmental protection, we have promoted the diffusion of the least polluting fuel, natural gas, in which, moreover, our coun-

The Italian energy policy should tend to reduce the country's dependence on foreign supplies by saving energy and by developing the scarce national resources.

try is relatively rich; the current large investments in the refining sector will permit to improve the quality of the oil products (lead-free gasoline, fuel oil and diesel oil with low sulphur contents). We propose moreover the adoption of better combustion devices (catalytic converters, filters for the large heating systems).

Leaving out, for the moment, the other important themes, I should like to conclude examining the problems of the supplies' reliability, which is very much felt not only at home but also in the United States (which produces 10 million barrels of oil a day and imports 6.5 million barrels, against the 7 million barrels imported by Europe).

From the standpoint of reserves and production capability there is no risk of scarcity in a "physical" meaning. There is, on the contrary, the possibility of price crises.

Crude is produced in an oligopolistic regime, and some of

WORLD NET OIL PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS IN 1988

(million barrels a day)

	Production	Composition(%)	Net exports
WORLD TOTAL	62,8	100,00	0,0
OECD AREA	16,7	26,59	-18,8
- USA	9,8	15,61	-6,4
- Western Europe	4,1	6,53	-7,1
- Other OECD countries (Canada, Japan, Australasia)	2,8	4,46	-5,3
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	9,4	14,97	-0,6
OPEC	21,2	33,76	17,2
PEC (PLANNED ECONOMY COUNTRIES)	15,5	24,68	2,2

Source: ENI-Stuecen elaborations of PIW, OECD-IEA data.



PRODUCTION AND RESERVES ENI HYDROCARBONS 1988-2000

ENI Hydrocarbons production (Mb/d)

	1988	2000	variation (%)
Italy	0,30	0,38	26,7
Abroad	0,36	0,44	22,2
Total	0,66	0,82	24,2

ENI Oil production (Mb/d)

	1988	2000	variation (%)
Italy	0,06	0,10	66,7
Abroad	0,32	0,40	25,0
Total	0,38	0,50	31,6

ENI Natural gas production (Mb/d)

	1988	2000	variation (%)
Italy	0,25	0,28	12,0
Abroad	0,04	0,04	0,0
Total	0,29	0,32	10,3

1988 Reserves in Italy and Abroad (Mb/d)

Oil	6,97
Natural gas	6,14
Coal	6,99
Total	20,1

Years of production up to 1988

Oil	18
Natural gas	21

Source: Stuecen elaboration of AGIP Budgets.

the most important producing countries are members of a Cartel. These countries have different objectives as regards oil prices; OPEC's history is one of tensions and conflicts within the organization.

Today, despite tensions due to contingent factors, such as the recent accident at Valdez Bay (Alaska), the situation appears still structurally calm, because there are about 10 million barrels a day of unused production capability located in relatively moderate OPEC countries. Nevertheless, within a few years, the growth of the demand will create a greater tension in the market. Then there will be increased probabilities of a price shock, in a period that experts place between 1993 and 1995.

A rise in oil price cannot but have negative consequences on the inflation and the external obligations of our country: a one-dollar per barrel increase in the price of crude produces an added burden for our

Without a responsible and timely policy, the next energy crisis cannot but have potentially more serious effects for our country.

balance of payments that can be estimated, at 1988 prices, around 850 billion lire. In 1988, the weight of the energy budget on our GNP, with its 1,5 per cent, has still been very low. An increase in prices up to 17 or 18 dollars per barrel does not represent a terrible obstacle for our economy. But it must not be forgotten that for years, when the energy expenses absorbed 5% of our GNP, the Italian economy could not grow by more than 2 per cent a year in order to avoid an unbearable worsen-

ing of the deficit of our balance of payments.

We have 5 or 6 years of favourable trend before us to implement the energy policy envisaged by the National Energy Plan, a policy which, at least at its planning stage, has obtained a large assent by political, social and economic forces.

Enterprises such as ENI do their part, and are ready to assume even greater responsibilities. But we must act, and immediately: the scenario is not encouraging, because a delay in the implementation of our NEP means exposing the country to unjustified risks which are going to increase with time.

Without a responsible and timely policy, the next energy crisis cannot but have potentially more serious effects for our country. We cannot afford and must avoid this occurrence.

Franco Reviglio



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CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ'S THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGIC THOUGHT

1st Part

Royaume de Wurtemberg



The French Revolution and Napoleon brought about a real revolution also as regards warfare. They, in fact, turned it from simple play among dynasties into people's cause, which roused the active involvement and passions of the masses. The democratization of war, of which mandatory conscrip-

tion was only one aspect, potentially transformed it into a deadly struggle which staked the nations' life and future.

Clausewitz' investigation, which aims at defining a realistic theory of war, originates from this

change.

Clausewitz meditates on the nature of war just as Machiavelli pondered over the essence of politics in order to "recognize war as it is and not to take, or want to take it, for what in reality it cannot be". Clausewitz' objective coincides in substance with

Machiavelli's purpose "to go to the actual reality of a thing and not to its image". As a consequence, the theory of warfare must disregard any consideration that has no significance in the conflict. "All armed prophets won and the unarmed were ruined", independent of their prophecies. In substance Clausewitz does not ask himself whether war is good or bad, providential or demoniac, avoidable or not. He keeps to the facts in order to form a valid theory of the phenomenon. But he understands that, above, there should be "a general, political vision and, even further, a philosophical and moral vision of the reasons and ends of life and of man's becoming".

Besides, the whole issue rests at a "metastrategic" level, therefore beyond the purposes of Clausewitz' meditations. Be they just or unjust, reactionary or progressive, the essence of the wars remains the same.

Clausewitz, in the military field, embodies the merciless wisdom of the thinker without illusions just as Machiavelli did in the political field. His aim is to understand the essence of war, where mental experience and historical experience could meet, and to work out a system which could go beyond the contingent, for it would be linked to the intrinsic nature of the phenomenon. In other words, his purpose is to reduce the multiplicity of wars to their conceptual oneness, the only capable of fecundating the spirit and of guiding the thought and the action of political and military leaders.


Clausewitz' concepts had a deep influence on the politico-military thought of the 19th and 20th centuries. In particular, they are at the foundation of the Marxist theory of war, which is largely inspired by it through the interpretation given by Lenin, who was rightly considered the Prussian general's best pupil. As a matter of fact, Lenin extended the theories from the field of military struggle to that of

political war. "The whole Leninism can be reduced to the operation that translates the laws of war into the laws of politics: this is why Lenin urged his party's militants to study Clausewitz (1).

Therefore it seems extremely interesting to examine the validity of Clausewitz' theory of war and its correspondence to the characteristics typical of our times and, in particular, to the conditions brought about by the advent of

credibility.

Von Clausewitz' theories have had various interpretations, often superficial and inaccurate, where sometimes he has "taken up the function of a sign, of a myth" and where "his thought has been distorted" (2). This was much facilitated by the character itself of his treatise "On War", which remained practically in its sole draft form. There everyone can find what he wants, on condition that



nuclear weapons, by technological advances, by the strategy of deterrence as well as by ideologic and revolutionary conflicts. The main question is whether Clausewitz' rational strategic calculation, which subordinates the violence of war to the political intention — owing to which every conflict is substantially a limited conflict — is still valid today. That is, whether the practical feasibility of such calculation becomes questionable because of time acceleration and availability of arms such as strategic nuclear weapons — which have no other function but to prevent their actual employment, and nevertheless, at the same time, accomplish their role only as long as there is a possibility that they be employed, i.e. as long as they maintain their

one makes an accurate choice of citations.

To diminish the risk of this temptation we preferred to avoid examining each individual point of Clausewitz' thought, but rather to see it in its entirety, following the treatise step by step (3). Only in this way we have deemed it possible to detect the actual conception of the Prussian general about the main lines "of the close architecture, of the internal necessity of the concept of war".

The treatise consists of 8 books (I: "The Essence of War"; II: "The theory of war"; III: "On Strategy"; IV: "The Combat"; V: "The Fighting Forces"; VI: "The Defensive"; VII: "The Offensive"; VIII: "The War Plan"). It forms an extremely coherent whole with

Royaume de Bavière.
Génie etc. Cadets.

L'Armée Allemande.

Planch. 28



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continuous connections between the various parts. For clarity's sake we have considered convenient to examine first Book II, together with Books I and VII; then Book III, IV and V; lastly Book VI and VIII.

For every subject we have tried to evaluate the correspondence of Clausewitz' thought with the conditions typical of our times and the opinions expressed by eminent scholars of military matters.

THE THEORY OF WAR

Von Clausewitz does not intend to describe a new war method. He wants instead to come to a general theory, i.e. to work out a real epistemology of the phenomenon, which should take into account both the role of war in human af-

fairs and the actual conduct of military operations.

The importance of a general theory is explained by the great impact that theories have on all human phenomena. Contrary to the natural phenomena, the human ones are very much influenced by what we think and say of them. "The influence of thought on action is, in history, the most important factor" (4). Therefore it is most important to have a general theory. It is not a manifestation of intellectualism. Comprehension, first, and then control on reality and action, are founded on it. The Marxists fully understood it and this is probably one the main reasons of their success: one can say anything but surely one can't say that the time that Mao, Giap and "Che" Guevara spent to define the theoretical aspects of

war was wasted. A theory is necessary, in order to train the mind to control reality: it is the critical reflection that precedes the action. A serious theory of war is indispensable. It must be realistic in order to be a reliable point of reference. Should that not be the case, it would be of no practical use, indeed it would have a misleading effect.

It is essential, as Liddel Hart has written (4), to understand the nature of war. "If you want peace understand war" is a statement which, especially in our times, marked by incessant technological and social transformations, comes before the Roman saying "He who wants peace should prepare for war".

In substance, Clausewitz does not want to create a positive doctrine of war and strategy, i.e. to

think out principles and precepts that should be regarded as standards and guides for contingent decisions. He is essentially antidogmatic. A theory of war must not and cannot be a recipe-book phenomenon. It can exist only as meditation on the ends, means and parameters which characterize it. We can dominate war only if we understand its essence.

The only military scholar who can be compared to Clausewitz is Sun Tsu (5), whose treatise proposes to achieve the same end. Supported by the comprehension of the theory, a leader can build an effective action.

In Mao Dze Dong's words "The important thing is to know how to study. Only through meditation can one overcome empiricism and superficiality and make thought and action, objective and subjective, correspond" (6).

Within this framework, the theory of war is not a doctrine but a meditation on the essence of the phenomenon, which aims at "training the spirit of the future leader to conduct a war or, better still, to guide him in his work of self-training, with no intention of accompanying him to the field of action".

Somehow it can be said that the theory of war precedes every doctrine and explains its reasons. Doctrine is contingent, theory is general. Doctrine is dogmatic because it does not explain the reasons that originated it.

Theory must necessarily be in accordance with practice and correspond to personal and historical experience. Only in this sense can it be of use. Only in this sense can "knowledge" turn into "power", pervading the spirit and losing its objective properties, in order to become the politician's and military leader's subjective possession. Clausewitz attaches no importance to dogmatic systems, abstract and geometrical, pedantic and formalistic constructions of a theory of war, only capable of causing intellectual pettiness at all

levels, even the higher ones, and quite different from a true understanding of the essence of the phenomenon, which alone can enlighten the mind of the leader.

This concept appears to maintain its full validity and is shared by all modern scholars of military matters. By Mao Dze Dong, who compares the construction of a dogmatic theory of war to trimming a foot to adjust it to the size of the shoe. By Gen. Beaufre (7), who defines theory "a method of thought which grasps the reality of the phenomenon, which permits to adjust the action to the particular goals and situations". By R. Aron (8), who describes the theory of war as praxeology, i.e. the actual logic of action aimed at giving decisions a conscious character.

The formulation of principles, not of laws or precepts, seems possible only at lower level, especially at tactical level. Their validity consists essentially in ensuring the indispensable discipline of the intelligences. But one should realize that they entail two big risks: that of limiting the initiative and creativity of the Commanders, bureaucratizing their operational decisions, and that of reducing the exercises to erudite and empty discussions on the contents of the various rules of employment.

In particular, considering specifically the theory of the war phenomenon, Clausewitz observes that "war is struggle. The conduct of a war consists in predisposing and directing the armed struggle. The latter does not end instantly but splits up in that more or less large number of separate actions that are the battles. Two different activities spring from this: to predispose and direct the battles themselves and this is tactics; to link the battles together in order to attain the objectives of the war, and this is strategy". But the struggle is not an end in itself. It is only a means for reaching political goals. Since the means cannot be considered without taking into account the ends, theory must weigh

up the connections between the war and the politico-social complex of which war is part. War belongs neither to the arts nor to the scientific field, it belongs to the political and social life: it is a conflict of large interests ruled by blood. The thing more similar to it is commerce (9), which is also a conflict of interests between two opposed wills, inspired by systems of values, goals and standards generally differing from each other. The decision by the arms is what cash-payment is in commerce; while the threat to have recourse to arms, i.e. the possible use of their force, which occurs in all deterrent strategies, is equivalent to payment by promissory note.

Finally, the Prussian general proves that the entire "war" phenomenon is deeply influenced by spiritual, intellectual and moral factors. They animate the brute force of nature. Any theory which disregarded the impact on war of the human element, especially the moral forces, would be abstract and completely useless to real life. The moral element and the physical element are complementary and inseparable. The introduction of the human factor, in Clausewitz' theory, implies a teleologist and non-mechanistic function of the war phenomenon. Moreover, as we have seen, it causes the acknowledgement of the unreliability of all data: first of all, owing to the intervention of the intellectual and moral forces, which are inseparable and escape quantification, secondly because war consists of actions and reactions between two rival free wills, whose intentions cannot be known, which generally have asymmetrical goals and follow different standards. This unreliability poses a challenge to courage. Rational calculations become a computation of subjective probabilities. The "games" between the two adversaries do not result in a null total because the advantage of one party usually does not entail an equivalent loss by the other; the result, therefore, cannot be



measured quantitatively, nor according to mere material parameters. The moral element and the physical element are inseparable. Both can be the objective of the enemy. The moral courage of the leaders, i.e. their strength of character, and the fighting virtues of the army are essential in order to give solidity to the whole. They originate the specificity of the military function, characterized by courage, spirit of sacrifice, perseverance, inurement to risk and discipline, moral strength and physical as well as psychological resistance to fatigue and hardships. This military specificity is acknowledged also by the most "progressist" students of social and strategic problems: from Jaurès to Lenin, from Mao to "Che" Guevara. They are well aware that a soldier is not only a citizen equipped with a gun, and

that there is an actual military "ethics" which the citizen must follow when he becomes a soldier. This specificity of the military function does not seem to have changed during the transition from the "heroic" to the "professional" conception of soldiering. The leading military sociologists — Jarowitz, Feld, Van Doorn, Howard — agree on this conclusion.

The main danger for the Armed Forces of the West is perhaps that, in the attempt to lure volunteers and obtain the approval of the usual "right thinkers", they transform themselves and become completely identical to the civilian society, as regards organization, life conditions, as well as discipline (or lack of it). They are running the risk of losing all their fighting efficiency. This risk is, in our opinion, as great as that of seeing the regular military personnel

become an isolated, alienated group, who in substance scorn the society they are called to defend and meanwhile feel deeply frustrated by their separation from the remaining social body.

THE ESSENCE OF WAR AND THE WAR PLAN

In the first book the Prussian general tries to answer two questions: what is war? What are its ends and means? In the eighth book he takes up again the answers given to the two questions and shows how they are to be found in the war plan, synthesis of the political and military evaluations.

What is war: absolute war, total war, real war

War — Clausewitz maintains — is an act of violence intended to force the adversary to do our will.

As in the world of physics every action causes an equivalent reaction, likewise every increase in the offensive effort is matched by an analogous rise of the defensive effort which tends to neutralize it. The will to defeat the adversary inevitably clashes against the resistance of the latter. If one wants to overcome it, one must make a greater effort which is met by a greater resistance, and so and so on until the forces of the weaker party are all engaged. This is the decisive point: the stronger party manages to destroy the adversary. This archetype is called by Clausewitz "absolute war".

Clausewitz' absolute war is completely different from total war, for which it was mistaken by some. The first is a theoretical concept, the second is a real war which entails the engagement in the war effort of all the material and moral resources of a nation.

In a total war a country becomes simultaneously object and subject of the struggle. The total war corresponds to a Hegelian vision of the world; it is understood as a kind of supreme trial of peoples; it has the meaning of a verdict of history. To Clausewitz it is quite clear that the State cannot be in the service of war, which is simply a tool of politics.

Each actual war is therefore a limited war. Any doubt in this connection would have disappeared had Clausewitz defined as "theoretical" the absolute war. This in fact represents an exclusively abstract scheme, valid only as a point of reference, which points out the architectural lines that characterize on a logical plane the internal necessities of the concept of war. In other words, it expresses the tendency to a struggle to death intrinsic to the war phenomenon, were this free from the influences and limitations of reality. The law of the ascent to the extremes expresses an age-old trend, valid also in peacetime in the exclusively military field. If we build a weapon, the adversary does the

same; if we do not produce it, he will have an advantage over us. This paradox leads to the armaments' race and the increase of the war effort even between sensible adversaries; the military element risks to elude all rational limitations and induce to bear efforts greater than the stakes (10).

In real life things work out differently. Apart from the limitations peculiar to the human nature — fear, terror, hesitation — war is not autonomous, it is a tool of politics, the simple continuation of a policy by employing also military power but not only that.

The war's lack of autonomy and the subordination of the military objectives to the political goals curtail the war effort. Politics does not only establish the objectives of a war, related to the war's own goals which belong to a metamilitary sphere, but also the type and size of the efforts required. The war's ascent to the extremes and its original violence are checked.

As Clausewitz says, there are two kinds of war: an absolute one, which knows no boundary, which identifies with a deadly struggle, but belongs to the abstract sphere of theory, and a limited one, where the efforts are proportional to the importance of the pursued goals, where war is transformed from a theoretical concept into a sociopolitical phenomenon typical of international relations.

Clausewitz queries how it is possible to go from the absolute plan to the real plan and finds the answer in the internal mechanism of the war phenomenon, particularly in the intrinsic superiority of defence compared to attack and in the length of the conflict. Thanks to these two factors, which we shall go into later on, politics can control the ascent to the extremes, adapting the intensity of the war effort to the importance of the goals pursued.

A third parameter enters into this dialectics of ends and means: chance. This is due both to the practical impossibility to accurately

appraise the factors involved, the adversary's intentions first of all, and to the asymmetry between the importance attached by each opponent to the pursued goals and the efforts he is ready to bear to reach them. Therefore, according to Clausewitz, the essence of war is an "extraordinary trilogy where there are: the original violence, which is a blind natural impulse; the play of probabilities which makes it a free activity of the soul; its nature of instrument subordinate to politics, through which it reaches its pure intention. The first of these aspects concerns the people and the war instrument; the second, the military commands, the third, the head of the state. To this trilogy conceptually correspond, as we shall see later on, the trilogy consisting of tactics, strategy and politics; tactical victory, purpose in the war, i.e. the military objective, and purpose of the war, i.e. the political goal; material, moral and intellectual forces. We believe that only if we understand the meaning of these "trilogies" and the relations between their components, can we understand the essence of the war phenomenon and the reality of Clausewitz' conception.

End and means of war

Theoretically the war's goal is the disarmament and destruction of the adversary. Their military forces must be destroyed, their territory conquered, any possibility and will to continue the combat stamped out. This, of course, considered always on the abstract plan of absolute war. Politics intervenes fixing limited military objectives and proceeding to peace, even without attaining the war's goals. This occurs for two reasons: the improbability of success, due to the fact that the operations have not developed according to the war plan, and the excessive price that should be paid in order to impose one's will on an adversary who has proved more resolute than expected.



This limitation of the real goal in the war, however, does not contradict its original natural goal which remains as always the moral and material disarmament of the adversary. Were reason not to prevail over passion, there would be the risk of a sudden uncontrolled ascent of violence and of an engagement in efforts out of proportion to the pursued objectives.

The means of war is combat, battle. Only through combat can the goal be reached. Manoeuvres and stratagems are of no avail if combat does not give its determinant contribution. With this Clausewitz firmly opposes the strategic concepts of the 18th Century, incorporating in his theory of war the Napoleonic conception of a decisive battle of extermination which is the purpose of all manoeuvres.

Clausewitz has been reproached by some military thinkers for the importance given to battle, particularly by Liddel Hart who calls him the "Mahdi of masses and massacres". However, actually the Prussian general only appears to say that war is not a game of chess. Once started, it must be carried out implacably and with extreme determination. Napoleon had clearly demonstrated, in Clausewitz' opinion, the advantage given by determination over hesitant adversaries. In order to achieve positive results each individual tactical victory must be exploited with the greatest energy by an implacable chase. Tactical victories cannot but be the outcome of "blood", not of mere manoeuvres, as astute and brilliant as these may be. He who recoils from sacrifices should not wage a war, and accept the adversary's

orders. But if he decides to fight, he must do so with the greatest determination. War is not a pastime, nor an intellectual game; it is a serious matter of vital importance for the State.

On the other hand war, considered without its political origin, has no meaning. The destruction of the enemy forces, victory, are of no consequence in themselves, they are important only as means for attaining a strategic objective and, through it, the political goal. The latter consists in the new condition of peace that will be brought about by the war. Therefore each individual battle must be aimed at obtaining such a peace: "The political objective is always there. Its value is determined by the number of sacrifices one is willing to bear. If the sacrifices are deemed greater than the worth of the

political objective, one may as well give up”.

This confirms that it is impossible to work out in the abstract an objective theory of war. Any strategy must take into account the concrete conditions, the contingent political objectives for which combat is accepted, the efforts and sacrifices that one is ready to bear. Real war is a “chameleon” that changes its colour according to the change of circumstances. “War is the instrument of a political vision; the military is a subsystem of the sociopolitical system that expressed it” (11). Therefore, a strategy perceived in merely military terms has no meaning at all.

The war plan

Clausewitz in Book VIII of his treatise takes up again the concepts expressed in Book I about the essence of war, a phenomenon subordinate to and moulded by the political purpose. He stresses in particular the importance of the war plan, in which there is the convergence of the political end, the goals entrusted to the military operations in order to achieve that end, as well as the efforts necessary for achieving the military objective. The war plan embodies all the political and military evaluations. It presupposes a well defined military goal and the preparation of the necessary means in order to achieve it. The determination of the latter is impossible if one does not know his own purposes and the presumed intentions of the adversary, as well as the efforts which the adversary is likely to make, which are proportionate to the importance he gives to the interests at stake. In substance a military policy can be expressed only in concrete and precise terms. Failing this, there is no policy by only idle talk: the operational strategy and the preparation of forces, entrusted to contingent improvisation, “go their own way”.

The political objective can be considered the final goal of the

military objective which in turn is the final goal of the objective of each individual action. Rationality compels us to subordinate the means to the ends. But those who define the goals should also take the means in due account. The strategic option — which is embodied by the war plan — is the point where political and military considerations intersect. The dialectics between means and ends works in such a way that the goal of a subordinate activity constitutes the means of the higher one. Everything is ruled by the dialectics between ends and means.

Nevertheless the political military continuity is reversible. The strategic “grammar” cannot remedy the errors in political “logic” and during the actual military operations the tactical “grammar” cannot correct the faults in strategic “logic”. The warrior does not have a personal goal; he only has the goal pointed out to him by politics; a military leader is therefore subordinate to the politician. But, at the same time, a statesman in deciding his goals sees his freedom limited by the means available to him. In order to establish the kind of military resources needed, one must evaluate one’s own political goal and that of the enemy. Failing this, one risks to be taken by surprise by the “god of war”. What is wanted politically must be proportioned to what is wanted, or feasible, strategically. Therefore the political end must be adjusted to the nature of the means and is liable to be deeply modified by it. “Foolish” is he whose political end surpasses his strategic power; dreamer he who does not make his strategy correspond to his policy; ignoramus he who does not see the relation between the two terms; mad he who consents to make efforts greater than those reasonably proportionate to his ends” (10).

Clausewitz wisdom and teaching lie precisely in the detection of this mutual relation between the ends of a policy and the goal of a war.

The supremacy of politics is evident and necessary, but equally evident and necessary is that the leaders of a government know exactly the instruments at their disposal and the consequences deriving from their employment. The military serve the State and not vice versa. But, at the same time, if the political leaders want to dominate reality and not be carried away by the force of things, if they think they can govern the military instrument, they cannot determine the goal without considering the means and without taking into account that the latter has its own specificity which concerns simultaneously the spheres of matter and spirit, the material and the moral forces.

The final reckoning, summed up in the war plan, proves its correctness in harmonizing political goal with military capability, will with force, the Government’s projects with the plans of the General Staff.

Criticism on Clausewitz’ conception of the essence, purpose and means of war

Some thinkers such as Fuller and Liddell Hart have criticized Clausewitz for having failed to understand that the final purpose of war must be found in the peace that follows the hostilities and therefore the essence of war must be determined starting from this consideration. They contend that Clausewitz, with his conception of war as the instrument of a policy which aims at “disarming the adversary”, is the theorist of the physical destruction of the enemy, spiritual father of that strategic school which has caused the massacres of the two world wars and which has put politics in the service of war and not vice versa.

Undoubtedly the German strategic school of the post-Moltke period has given an extremist interpretation to Clausewitz’ ideas, bringing about an inversion of the concept of the primacy of politics over war. According to Gen.



Ludendorff, chief exponent of that school, "Clausewitz" expression that war is the continuation of politics with other means should be understood in the sense that war is the continuation of foreign policy with other means and should be completed as follows: on the other hand, politics as a whole must be in the service of war" (12). In the second world war Hitler took up Ludendorff's thesis and behaved in fact as if he attributed to the military factor a supremacy over the political one. The Allies, however, did the same and, with the unconditional surrender, the "victory first" and Morgenthau's doctrine of turning Germany into a "land of shepherds", brought about a situation which made all compromises impossible, causing in the end the Soviet military domination over Central Europe.

The interpretation given by Liddell Hart therefore appears somewhat arbitrary. Clausewitz makes a clear distinction between absolute war (which is an abstract concept) and real war, maintaining that it is possible to limit the ascent to the extremes. Moreover he clearly affirms that the military "grammar" must obey to the political "logical" and that it is impossible to construct a "logic" calling on the rules of "grammar". The imposition of one's will on an adversary and the preeminence that Clausewitz attributes to combat vis-a-vis manoeuvre derive essentially from the acknowledgement that the decision originates primarily from the outcome of the combat, whose most complete manifestation is represented by the Napoleonic battle of annihilation, and that with the mere manoeuvre

it is impossible to obtain decisive results. These results do not presuppose the physical destruction of the enemy and a fight to death. They only entail the nullification of the adversary's will to pursue a certain goal. In substance Clausewitz upholds short military campaigns oriented towards a decisive battle, which is a battle of annihilation and not a battle of attrition. It is the political reason that governs the violence, according to the ends it wants to achieve. The military goal must always be subordinated to the political one, to the vision of the peace which will follow the war. Victory has neither political nor strategic significance: it has only a tactical significance. Any conception that does not take this into account is completely irrational.

Moreover, according to Clausewitz, the political relations

do not stop at the outbreak of the hostilities: the moderation which restrain the ascent to the extremes and which permits an accord between the two parties before the weaker one is destroyed, implies a more or less implicit communication between the two adversaries. The ascent to the extremes is not a praxeologic imperative. It is the importance of the interests at stake which determines the intensity of the violence and the specific character of the hostilities. Even if in practice the military power can psychologically be a determining factor in the definition of the political goals, reason requires that the goal should define the means and not vice versa. And for the Prussian general, whose thought derives from a Kantian conception, man is indeed an animal, but a rational one, and politics is intelligence, not only thirst for power and domination. The need for a complete revolution of Clausewitz' real conception of war is upheld by Kissinger (13) who says that the precondition for a policy of limited war is a full reintroduction of the political element in the concept of war, the relinquishment of the notion that politics ends when war starts and that war has its own goals separate from those of politics.

Clausewitz and the Marxist-Leninist theory of war

Lenin fully accepted Clausewitz' affirmation that politics as a whole includes war, which is only a particular moment of it, and that the intensity and forms of war must vary according to the objectives pursued and to the contingent circumstances. But Lenin extends Clausewitz' concepts from the military field proper to the political struggle, modifying them with his own vision of history. Therefore he gives to the formula a completely new meaning which derives from the Marxist conception of class struggle and historical becoming.

First of all Lenin defines as

idealistic the concept expressed by Clausewitz, according to which the State has its own interests and politics is the "intelligence of the State personified". On the contrary, politics is the expression of the interests of the ruling class only. Thus the concept of war as a rational instrument of the foreign policy of sovereign States is undermined. The real war is not that between States but that between classes, between the exploited and the exploiters. Therefore, the war continues also in peacetime, without interruption.

Secondly, the laws of history would imply the inevitability of success of everything that is new in the social development, and consequently an automatic distinction between just and unjust wars: the former obey to the historical becoming and facilitate its establishment, the latter oppose it. Therefore all opportunities of a compromise between the parties become impossible: the war — which is in substance always a civil war — can end only with the destruction of the adversary. "Power, unlike military glory, is not divisible".

The extremism of this Leninist interpretation is contradicted in the reality of facts both by the actual behaviour of the leaders of the communist countries and by the conflicts that break out among them. We do not think that there is anyone so naive to think that the tensions between the Soviet Union and China originate from simple problems of "theologic" interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist message. Moreover, even though the Soviet doctrine of war is a good deal similar to the strategy of total war expressed by the German strategic school of the last century, it is quite evident that Clausewitz' theory of containment of conflicts is considered valid also in the USSR. Although Khrushchev declared: "We shall bury you", he also acknowledged that "nuclear weapons make no distinction between classes", admitting that,

despite Marshal Sokolovsky's theories (rather "sporty" in envisaging their employment), nuclear weapons cannot be considered actual instruments of the military policy of a State.

Validity of Clausewitz' conception in reference to nuclear war

According to Clausewitz, real war is limited. Who limits it? The rational moderation which presupposes an implicit agreement between the two parties, made possible by the grater intrinsic power of defence as compared to attack and by the length of the operations which permits to establish a more or less explicit communication between the opposing parties.

Is this conception still valid in a nuclear war, which does not represent the continuation of politics but rather its failure? Moreover, nuclear weapons have deprived of any significance the power ratio which in the past was the basis on which, as a rule, the strategic relations functioned. He who has at his disposal the supreme force cannot limit its offensive use anymore; the threat is no more based on the probability of victory but on the possibility of a common disaster. Nuclear war is inevitably unlimited. Strategy has been transformed into the art of "crisis management". In the past, the forces that deterred in peacetime, in wartime could either attack or defend. Now they are left with only deterrence or attack. The defensive with its inherent power superior to that of the attack has no place in a nuclear conflict (14).

Nuclear deterrence is a paradoxical gamble based on the impossibility of the possible.

In this situation, one must see whether some of the weapons such as the nuclear ones, whose employment is politically absurd, can be introduced into Clausewitz' theory of war. Should that not be the case, the theory should be formulated again, because an indispensable characteristic of any theory

Royaume de Prusse.

Partiments de Minutiers de Fusiliers et d'Artillerie de ligne.

Elle est d'Allemagne.

Planche 14.



regarding a phenomenon is that of including all the aspects in which the phenomenon appears.

In this regard there are different opinions: we shall confine ourselves to mentioning some of the ideas expressed in this connection by the main experts of military questions: the ideas go from simple refusal to consider nuclear weapons as real war instruments to be introduced into the classic theory of war, to the need to formulate the theory again on completely new bases.

One of the supporters of the first trend of thought who denies the possibilities to incorporate nuclear weapons in a logical theory of war, is Luksche (15) who maintains that the theory of war and the strategic doctrines which derive from it must confine themselves to examining war as a phenomenon having a

positive purpose. A strategy like the nuclear one aimed at avoiding war is not a real strategy but simply a form of politics. Nuclear weapons therefore should not be regarded as military means in the strict sense of the word, but only means of destruction and terror. Only the classical conflict can be a rational war and be the subject of a theory. Liddell Hart and Gen. Beaufre (16) share a more or less similar vision. The two distinguished scholars assert the need to make a clear-cut distinction between nuclear weapons, intended for deterrence, and traditional or non traditional forces designed for attack and defence. Only the latter could, in the present times, lead to a decision. Hence a complete dichotomy in the theory of war between the nuclear component, with negative — i.e. deterring — goals,

and the other components which take advantage of the freedom of action that allows the Nations to employ their military power to achieve objectives unattainable through other means. Somehow also Mao Dze Dong's strategic thought can be placed within this conception. Nuclear weapons are "paper tigers". They are of no real military value. The opposite can be said of an extended war in which defence prevails again and in which violence can be scaled and positive results can be obtained. In his theory of extended war, however, the Chinese politico-military leader refers directly to Clausewitz' conception, especially to the theory of "people's war" (17) from which, in France, at the beginning of this century, J. Jaurès drew inspiration for his classical book "L'Armée Nouvelle" (18).

Glucksmann (19) upholds a completely different conception, which denies that Clausewitz' rational conception can be applied to the present situation, in which conflicts are unlimited as regards means and goals, in which the war among Nations has become a kind of world civil war which, once started, excluded all moderation because its objective is universal domination. Contrary to what happens in a traditional war, which is limited, civil war, which is a struggle for power, presupposes a fight to the death, until the elimination of the adversary. A coherent theory which would include traditional war, nuclear war and revolutionary war, which in many ways has the characteristics of absoluteness of the second, should draw inspiration from Hegel's dialectics and not from Clausewitz' rationality. In Hegel the essence of the struggle is terror. Notions such as balance of forces, greater intrinsic power of defence, moderation, are meaningless. The nuclear bomb on the one hand the terrorist bomb on the other have given war a new dimension which can fit only in a Hegelian view of the human becoming and of history. Terror explains the essence of war and must be the basis of its theory. In Hegel's thought war has no sense as it has in Clausewitz': it has instead a historical function. Therefore, no value should be attached to the neoclausewitzian theories of the strategic schools of the United States, which, in a situation of fight to the death in which everything is at stake, insist that they can limit the stakes and deem possible a limitation in the nuclear escalation: these are behaviours inspired by the rules of Kantian rationality of the Prussian general in a world which is instead clearly Hegelian.

According to Glucksmann, the employment of the irrational's rationality is evident in the Cuban crisis. Kennedy's conduct was in fact not inspired by Clausewitz, because the American President

laid down unnegotiable stakes, tying his hands beforehand and precluding any possible way out. This happens because "in deterrence it doesn't matter if by threatening someone one threatens one's own destruction, provided that one manages to convince the adversary that the threat is serious". The advent of the nuclear weapons and the expansion of terrorism would deeply modify the principles on which both Clausewitz' theory of war and the ensuing strategic conception are founded. It is interesting to remark that Glucksmann's conception seems to have sufficient force to include the intellectual picture within which some modern terrorist movements operate, with a behaviour apparently inspired by complete folly, which has its own peculiar lucidity and traces its conceptual foundations back to Sorel's, Nietzsche's and Trotsky's theories (20). It should be noticed moreover that the Soviet military theory itself — at least abiding by Marshal Sokolovsky's (21) semi-official strategic doctrines — excludes any possibility and rationality of an escalation in the use of nuclear weapons. It presupposes instead a massive employment of these weapons once the nuclear threshold is crossed. With this, the Soviet theory seems to question the validity of the opposing strategy of a rational escalation in their use. It is our opinion that the consequences of the dissymmetry between the Western and the Soviet conceptions in this particular sector should be adequately studied. If what we say is correct, the NATO strategy of flexible response — which is in substance the application of Clausewitz' theory, according to which every decision is a feedback of the adversary's decision — would be meaningless.

The third trend of thought is represented by Raymond Aron (22), an eminent European scholar and admirer of Clausewitz, and by the US theorists of the strategy of flexible response (23). They assert

the full validity of the Prussian general's theory of war. Clausewitz never thought that war continued politics taking its place. He instead defined war as the continuation of politics with the employment of military means, but not only of those. This conception is valid also when the effect of the employable weapons surpasses all reasonable political goals. The essential question is how it can be possible to achieve a rational moderation of the ascent to the extremes in a situation where the characteristics of the means have eliminated the tactical preeminence of defence, where there has been a tremendous acceleration of times that makes a moderating dialogue between the opponents extremely difficult, and where politics, through nuclear missiles, can achieve at once its goals without the need of subsequent tactical actions. For the upholders of Clausewitz' theory of war, the problem is solved on the one hand, by adopting appropriate mechanisms of crisis management, which have replaced the traditional strategy and which substitute combat with threat; on the other, by adopting sophisticated procedures for controlling the use of nuclear weapons, NATO's strategy of flexible response — resting on the triad. strategic nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear or theatre nuclear weapons, and conventional forces — conforms to a theory of war of the latter type. It presupposes, as Aron says, a bet on the reason, on the rationality of the two opponents, which is perhaps a great illusion but is the only one that allows us to hope to avoid, in a more or less short time, the irrational outbreak of a struggle to the death.

ON STRATEGY, TACTICS AND THE WARRING FORCES

Relation between strategy, tactics and warring forces

According to Clausewitz, strategy is the art of employing



combat to achieve the goals of war. It must give to every action of war an immediate purpose which will eventually lead to the ultimate one. Strategy does not pursue a military victory but aims at determining the military conditions that will facilitate the attainment of the political objectives. The instrument of strategy is combat. In order to obtain a decisive result this takes the concrete form of the "great battle" which is the gravitational centre of the conflict and is completed by pursuit. Tactics, in its turn, aims at victory in battle and by means of the Armed Forces.

Therefore between strategy and tactics and between tactics and military instrument, there is the same hierarchy of ends and means that exists between politics and strategy. Through strategy and tactics, politics is linked with the Arm-

ed Forces and with their preparation, i.e. with planning.

In strategy there is no victory. Victory is a tactical concept, not a strategic one. The strategic success consists on the one hand in the preparation of a tactical victory and, on the other, in its exploitation. In this sense, the relation between tactics and strategy is not only one of subordination, but rather of active interaction.

If from a certain point of view strategy governs tactics, from another standpoint tactics serves strategy and depends on it; actually it must take its specificity into account. A similar relation exists between tactics and military forces. In short, the preparation of the military instrument, although governed by politics, influences the very determination of the its goals: war is won in peacetime. The plan-

ning of forces is in itself a strategic act and therefore a political one.

Clausewitz' conception is wholly accepted by all strategic schools, especially by the Chinese and the Soviet ones.

Mao says (6): "Strategy studies the laws of the overall situation of war. The task of tactics is that of studying the laws of the direction of war which regulate a particular situation. The idea that a strategic success is determined by the simple summation of tactical successes is wrong, because it does not take into account the fact that the outcome of the conflict depends above all and first of all on the correct assessment of the global situation. But the whole cannot exist independent of the parts. There is a complete interaction between strategy and tactics. Tactical grammar cannot correct the mistakes of strategic

logic: but it is equally true that strategic logic must take the requirements of tactical grammar into consideration”.

According to Marshal Sokolov-sky: “The principal purpose of the art of war is to obtain victory in a conflict, and the art of war consists, above all other things, in the preparation of a powerful military instrument”.

Direct strategy, indirect strategy and strategy of indirect approach

In Clausewitz’ opinion, the essence of strategy consists in ensuring numerical superiority at a given point at a given moment, so as to permit tactics to inflict a decisive blow to the adversary and subsequently destroy its forces with a pursuit carried out with utmost energy. Numerical superiority in the gravitational centre is obtainable only through surprise. “Surprise is a means for achieving numerical superiority; but it is also a principle in itself, for its decisive moral effects. If it succeeds, it causes disorder and discouragement to the enemy... Surprise is the bottom of all war actions, also the defensive ones... Secrecy and rapidity are the cornerstones of surprise” (24). Clausewitz is therefore a convinced upholder of Napoleon’s saying “Never do what the enemy wants, were it only for the reason that he wants it”.

From this it can be clearly seen that the Prussian general is not a supporter of ruthless and direct attacks, as many accuse him to be, and that he does not deny the importance of manoeuvre and stratagem. What Clausewitz criticizes is not the battle-oriented manoeuvre but the “strategy of manoeuvre” of the 18th Century, which did not achieve decisive results.

Numerical superiority, therefore, is not an end in itself: it is a tool in the service of the spirit. But, at the same time, manoeuvre is in the service of force, because only a battle can bring about a decision

and achieve the war goals. In Clausewitz’ view, surprise must be pursued, undoubtedly, through the rapidity of movements rather than through combinations of manoeuvre or by choosing unexpected directions. The latter, however, carry their weight, as Clausewitz’ demonstrates by saying that a direct attack strengthens the adversary’s balance and increases its ability to resist.

Therefore the criticism regarding Clausewitz’ conceptions expressed both by the supporters of the so-called indirect strategy and the supporters of an indirect approach, Liddell Hart in particular, appears completely unfounded. Some expressions used by Clausewitz concerning strike, combat and victory paid with blood, are undoubtedly excessive and can be misleading. But the conceptions that led to frontal attacks against barbed wire entanglements and machine guns in WWI and to the carpet bombings of WWII, in our opinion, have absolutely nothing to do with the thought of the Prussian general, who supports a strategy of annihilation, rapid and decisive, and not a wearing-down strategy.

As far as indirect strategy is concerned, we consider it quite arbitrary to oppose it to Clausewitz’ classical strategy. Indirect strategy should consist in “the exploitation of the limited margin of freedom of action permitted by nuclear deterrence in order to achieve military success despite the sometimes extreme scarcity of the weapons that can be employed” (25). Indirect strategy should find its practical realization in long wars and in limited conflicts (“artichoke strategy”). In our opinion, Clausewitz’ conception, which gives only a method of thought to tackle the problems brought about by conflicts, contains in its very definition the so-called indirect strategy. The rule of strategic conduct is that of obtaining the wanted result with a minimum effort. If the particular conditions created by the existence of the nuclear

weapons make it senseless to run greater risks, the conflicts will be more limited than they would be without them: eventually the recourse to the force of arms could be avoided. In our view, direct strategy and indirect strategy are much the same thing.

Similar considerations seem to be applicable also to the strategy of indirect approach. Liddell Hart (26) who is its main supporter, maintains that the purpose of strategy is not so much that of pursuing battle but rather that of creating a strategic situation so advantageous as to make a decision possible, also without having to resort to a battle. “The true power of a mobile concentration, Liddell Hart says, lies in its fluidity and in its variability, not in its density” (27). Through shrewdness and stratagem, one can upset the enemy’s balance, not only the physical but also the psychological balance, and can create the preconditions for bringing about their defeat, even without fighting but only by the potential employment of strength.

Nevertheless one could ask what is the real difference between the indirect approach and Clausewitz’ conception. If surprise is the fundamental element for achieving superiority at the wanted point and moment, in order to bring about the decision, aren’t they the same thing? Isn’t the affirmation of the superiority of the indirect approach a dogma that claims a priori to harness strategic meditation, which cannot and must not start from generic and abstract considerations, but from an in-depth analysis of the contingent situation? The distinction between the two “styles” of strategy appears therefore wholly questionable. One fades into the other. It is not a paradox to say that the best strategy is neither the direct nor the indirect one, but that which, in the contingent situation, ensures success, i.e. permits to achieve with the least effort the goal imposed by politics.



In substance, we consider Clausewitz' thought totally valid. The same cannot be said of the intellectualistic distinctions in the field of strategic theories. They appear to have the same validity as Gen. Jomini's theories, which give the impression of being scientific by an arbitrary evaluation of quantities that escape all quantification and without considering the peculiarities of every situation as well as the determinant value of the reciprocity of action of the opponents.

The strategic forces, the commander's skill, the moral forces and the material forces

The commander's skill

According to Clausewitz "the intellectual forces are of preponderant significance for him who

directs war. War is the domain of uncertainty. Three quarters of the things on which one relies in order to operate are immersed in the fog of uncertainty. Therefore one needs first of all a very acute intelligence to reach the intuition of truth through one's own reason... Moreover, war is also the field of chance... In order to be victorious the leader must have two qualities: an intelligence which, even in the middle of the intense obscurity which surrounds him, maintains an internal light capable of leading him to the truth, and the courage to follow this faint light. The first of this qualities is a quick eye, the second is resolution" (28). Resolution or courage of the spirit, which helps to overcome indecision, cannot but derive from the intelligence which produces the awareness of the need to risk and, through this,

produces the will to act".

From these statements, which may appear obvious but are a praxeological and ethical imperative for any military leader and are not easily translated into the reality of action, emerges the depth of Clausewitz' view. War is an activity of the spirit, not of brutal force. In connection with human behaviour in uncertain or conflictual situations, there is only one way of using one's head and this is the way formalized by Bayes' theory of decision and by the modern theory of games which were anticipated, a few decades and a century before, respectively, by the Prussian general. But using one's head is wholly useless if the conclusions are not transformed into action, if what is objective does not become subjective.

The conduct of military operations

is not only a system of expedients and shrewdness. It is the realization of an idea and the success of an organization carried out already in peacetime. War is the realm of uncertainty, of chance, where the contingent circumstances and the adversary's decisions take on essential importance.

Clausewitz shows the fatuity of any strategic theory conceived as a mechanical skill. As he refused the scientific sufficiency of the strategists of the geometrical school of his times, he would now mock every arbitrary schematization. He would use the results of the modern operational analyses to enlighten the knowledge and comprehension of things and would not consider them actual solutions of the strategic problems, as some tend to do, perhaps also in the more or less explicit hope of eluding their responsibilities by having recourse to "the expert".

If he were to live in our times, Clausewitz would refuse the abstruseness of the doctrines of employment which claim to be objective; the exclusive importance attached to the weapons instead of considering the deep motivations which destine them to a given conception of employment; he would refuse the Cartesian methodology which is the death of intelligence and is basically materialistic; the corporal's frame of mind prevailing among commanders and general staffs; the apodictic assertions of those who believe they are the depositories of the truth and disregard one of history's fundamental teachings: there are only two kinds of persons who never have doubts: saints and imbeciles.

The virtues of the leader in war are "equilibrium in the middle of storms, courage of his responsibilities, sense of the opportunities that come up before him and that will never come again, and a youthful spirit of initiative". Understanding and strong character are two inseparable virtues. Failing these, intellectual inertia and a remissive conformism,

afraid of direct commitments, come to prevail. They leave no alternative but "every man for himself" in the moments of danger, when one realizes, too late, that there is nothing to rely on: neither men, nor ideas, nor will.

In a leader there must be an alliance between intelligence and character, between imagination and meditation. The analysis of the feasible solutions must lead to a differentiation of what is probable, and hence provide a general scheme, which is the line of strategic action that must be followed. This is the essential precondition of the planning necessary to prepare the military instrument which should implement it.

Clausewitz' thought is wholly accepted by Mao Dze Dong. "The outcome of war is determined not only by the material or spiritual forces, but also by the subjective capability of directing the war... Action requires a deep meditation. In order to decide, it is necessary to take into consideration the relation between the goals and the means, ours and the enemy's; between a long war and a rapidly decided one; between attack and defence; between the front and the rear lines; between the main action and the supporting one; war of position and war of manoeuvre; quality and quantity; surprise and security; concentration and dispersal of forces" (6).

In the era of deep changes in which we are living, the military problems have become much more complex than in the past. The many factors of uncertainty have been joined by the technological factor, which makes an assessment of the power ratio extremely difficult.

Strategy is no more only operational, it has become "genetic" in one aspect and "dissuading" in another.

It is "genetic" in that the preparation of the forces in peacetime has acquired a determinative importance. It needs a

long-term projection of any consideration, if only for the long times required by the development and production of weapons. The technological power has joined the spiritual forces. Surprise is obtainable also in the technological field and can be decisive. Therefore, especially in our times, the preparation of the forces, material as well as spiritual, is a real strategic action.

While the genetic strategy takes a concrete form in planning, the dissuading strategy or — better said — the strategy of the potential action, uses the threat of employing the military instrument both for dissuading others from employing the force of weapons and, implicitly or explicitly, to force others to abstain from certain actions prejudicial to our interests, or to adopt decisions advantageous to us.

The essence of a deterrent strategy lies in the "crisis management", where the opposing parties should abide by the same criteria of rationality typical of operational strategy: reckoning what is possible and what is probable; imagination and sound judgment; "quick eye" and resolution.

The greater complexity of the strategic problems, the stability of deterrence, the determining influence of the technological and psychological factors as well as the more and more sophisticated instruments of operational analysis (data processing, operational research, etc.) have expanded the strategic reflection from the circles of "initiates" of the General Staffs to the Universities. To be more precise, they have expanded it everywhere except Italy. The same factors have entailed, moreover, a modification in the professional qualities required of officers (29). The officers' training, focused in the past on the operational employment of the forces, must be largely integrated by a specific training in the sectors of moral education (sociology, psychology, etc.) and material training (management,

Royaume de Prusse

L'Armée Allemande.

Général... Chef de Corps... Adjoints & Princes Royaux.

Plaque 1.



technology, economics, etc.) of the soldiers.

But prior to all this, we should study the essence of war and its sense in our times; nothing is as true as J. Jaurès assertion that the creation of the "armed nation" presupposes that of the "thinking nation". The intellectual provincialism and the irresponsibility — when it is not a matter of demagogic bad faith or other reasons — with which the military questions are handled in Italy, are, given the existing situation, wholly disheartening and unacceptable.

The moral forces

One of Clausewitz' major merits is certainly that of having considered in his theory of war the fundamental importance of moral forces and psychological factors.

Through the entire treatise there are enlightening remarks about the impact, on the reality of war, of fear and exertion, of valour and boldness, of esprit de corps and firmness of resolve.

The moral force is the necessary bridge between the material and the intellectual forces. Intelligence without resolution produces indecision, inertia, unwillingness to shoulder one's responsibilities. The material means are meaningless, are inert matter, if they are not vivified by moral force and intelligence.

Spirit, morals and means form a fundamental trilogy, similar to that between politics, strategy and tactics. The three factors must be seen as a whole: power does not originate from their sum, but from the product of the three components.

The action works simultaneously at all three levels. The objective is that of achieving victory, at the same time, over the enemy's plan of war, morale and forces. The operations concern simultaneously the three sectors, which are interdependent and complementary.

A deficiency in one sector renders success in the others unnecessary. The economic law controlling man's entire rational behaviour demands that priority be given to the action on the moral and intellectual planes. The psychological action is the decisive one.

The training for war is not only a material but also a spiritual matter. Marshal Sokolovsky attaches a significant value to the political and spiritual preparation, not only of the Armed Forces but of the whole population. Lenin maintains

that the attack must be launched only when the adversary has been psychologically disarmed.

As far as the Armed Forces are concerned, the importance of the moral forces as regards their effectiveness is a characteristic of their specificity. The qualities of a good soldier comprise certainly those of a good citizen. But something specific is required of the soldier: "military virtue", which is essential in order to avoid that the units disintegrate when faced with danger. According to Clausewitz, whose conception appears wholly valid and supported also by the latest historical experience, independent of any ideological colour, military virtue differs from simple bravery, from national enthusiasm and from resistance to fatigue, in that these are individual features. It is based instead on conscious discipline, on team spirit and on the sense of honour which exalt the individual virtues into collective virtues, the spiritual motors of the military machine. Military virtues cannot be improvised: they presuppose a long, careful, persevering and constant training. According to Jaurès, apostle of the democratic conception of the "citizen-soldier", they are at the foundation of the profitable employment of conscripts in war operations. A reflection, superficial as it may be, on military matters cannot but lead to the conclusion that whoever maintains the opposite is either a simpleton or in bad faith, or both.

The material forces

Clausewitz' considerations about the fighting forces are mostly linked to the circumstances of his time and are therefore out of date as regards details. Clausewitz, having lived in the manufacturing era, in which the development of technology proceeded at a very slow pace, prizes the importance of the number, omitting to mention that of the quality of the forces.

As a matter of fact, the Prussian

general was well aware of the importance of training, cohesion of the units etc., but was not in a position to appreciate the present supremacy of quality over number and the decisive impact that the ratio between the qualitative levels of the opposing parties has on their tactics and, through this, on their strategy and policy.

Undoubtedly, any other factor being equal, success is due to numerical superiority at the decisive moment on the decisive spot. Lanchester's equations (30), which represent in an algorithm the mechanics of a battle, clearly show that the number affects the outcome in a quadratic proportion while the quality of the forces works only in linear proportions. Nevertheless we should examine the variation of the parameter "quality of the forces" when there is a variation — apart from those in training, morale and skill of the commanders — also at the technological level. It is clear that a disarmed mass, large as it may be, is completely useless. The curve which expresses the impact, for the results of a combat of the quality ratio between two adversaries — a value which enters as a linear function in Lanchester's equations — has an hyperbolic trend. Therefore the qualitative deficiencies rapidly nullify all efficacy of quantity. If the qualitative ratio sinks below certain values, one should give up all direct defence and have recourse to a different strategy, based on the avoidance of combat, i.e. a strategy of protracted war.

The choice of such a strategy, to which one is compelled to resort in the first phase of the revolutionary wars, as Mao-Dze-Dong demonstrates, should derive from an exhaustive analysis of the factors which influence that particular politico-strategic situation and not be taken apodictically as a dogma, as it sometimes occurs. The choice of this type of strategy is made out of necessity, not by virtue, as Mao-Dze-Dong, its most prominent theorist, clearly acknowledges. In

order to obtain decisive results, guerrillas always set up a regular army as soon as possible, equipping it with weapons that could more or less compete with the adversary's. It seems absolutely senseless to give up a priori all the traditional forces in order to organize, in peacetime and without a compelling necessity, only guerrilla formations, with the intention of transforming them, during the hostilities, into the same forces that could have been ready beforehand. The identification of such formations — which are necessarily limited in number — with a "rustic popular army" belongs to the best military humour. Nor could such a "rustic" army confront sophisticated forces, because the action would end in an unnecessary massacre. In this particular case, Liddell Hart offers a poor consolation in maintaining that "nothing is more difficult than to have a new idea accepted, except the complete elimination of the influence of an old idea".

In short, in the study of any strategic problem and in the ensuing planning and definition of the human and financial resources to be allotted for the military instrument, it is certain that the dialectics between quality and quantity is of primary importance and that the type of compromise adopted between the two extreme terms acts retroactively on the line of strategic action to be followed and on the very political objectives that can be pursued.

The strategic dimensions: space and time

A conflict takes place in space and time. These two dimensions are not inert, abstract entities. They take on significance according to the use that the two contenders make of them. Time and space are instruments of the spirit, in the same way as the moral and material forces. They are employed, that is, by the politicians, the strategist and the tacti-

Royaume de Saxe
Artillerie de Campagne et à Pied.

L'Armée Allemande:

Planche 26.



cian in relation to their purposes, and at the same time affect the definition of their intentions.

Depending on the line of action chosen, both the defender and the attacker organize the space around a point, the gravitational centre, the possession of which realizes a connection between the tactical and the strategic goals, at a lower level of the direction of war, and a connection between strategic objective and political goal, at a higher level. The definition of the gravitational centre is not something that eludes the law of the polarities of the opposed wills, where every decision is a feedback of the enemy's decision and where the evaluations of the two opponents generally do not follow the same standards of value. Usually, at the beginning of the conflict, the gravitational centres of the two adversaries do not coincide.

Two remarks can be considered appropriate in this regard. First of all, the extent of strategic space depends on the strategic concept followed: in a people's war it can concern the whole territory; in forward defence it concerns only the strip along the border. Secondly, space is a factor that multiplies the power of defence as compared with that of the attack, which is undermined by space. Therefore the spatial dimensions depend also on the force ratio between the two adversaries, in a direct proportion with the difference of power between the defender and the attacker.

Time is a strategic dimension even more important than space. The attacker must achieve victory as soon as possible, because time undermines the attack, exactly like space. Sun Tzu says: "The more victory is slow in coming, the more the weapons grow rusty". Surprise,

both strategic and tactical, can only be achieved through an extreme compression of times. On the contrary, the lengthening of the operations increases the strength of the defence. "Time is the patron saint of defence": first, because it has a natural wearing effect on the attack, secondly, because the defence can react to surprise and last because the defence can thus increase its forces, which were initially inferior to the attacker's.

But time is important in the theory of war also for another consequence: it is the prerequisite for restraining a conflict; it permits to control the escalation to the extremes. The existence of time actually permits an implicit or explicit dialogue between the two adversaries and therefore a reasonable limitation of violence. If time is short, the dialogue is impossible and there is the risk of an uncon-

trolled escalation which would make the efforts logically disproportionate to the goals pursued.

Lt. Gen. Carlo Jean

NOTES

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(2) Guiscardo: «Forze Armate e democrazia» pages 22 and 23, De Donato Ed., Bari, 1974.

(3) For this essay we have consulted the complete translation of the treatise, published by Mondadori (Gli Oscar) in June 1970.

(4) Liddell Hart: «Histoire mondiale de la stratégie», Plon Ed., Paris, 1982.

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(6) Mao Dse Dong: «Problemi strategici della guerra rivoluzionaria in Cina», cited in «Various Authors: In caso di golpe», pages 33-45, Savelli Ed., Paris.

(8) R. Aron: «Paix et guerre entre les nations», Colmann-Lévy Ed., Paris, 1962, and «Il grande dibattito», Il Mulino Ed., Bologna, 1965.

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(27) Liddell Hart: «The ghost of Napoleon», Faber Ed., London, 1933.

(28) Clausewitz: «Della guerra», Mondadori Ed., 1970, pages 60-62.



nations», Plon Ed., Paris, 1960; «Il grande dibattito», Il Mulino Ed., Bologna, 1962, and «Clausewitz - Penser la guerre», Gallimard Ed., Paris, 1976.

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CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ'S THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGIC THOUGHT

WHAT FUTURE FOR THE “WESTERN ALLIANCE?”





Forty years after its foundation, the Atlantic Alliance is, more than ever, alive and well. One can say that it has become an integral part of the international system, a cornerstone of many balances, sometimes stable sometimes precarious, the point of reference of many political, economic and military relations and interests. The two other alliances, CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), born as the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization) which, together with NATO, were meant to form an immense and solid "cordon", capable of encompassing the entire world and nipping, possibly in the bud, any aggressive attempt against the West, have instead disappeared from the scene.

The picture since then has remarkably changed. NATO has undergone, through many, not always easy experiences, an important enlarging process which, at different times, has brought four new members (Greece, Turkey, Federal Republic of Germany and Spain) to the side of the twelve original members (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Holland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States). The two complementary alliances have been replaced by a system of pacts - a trilateral one, ANZUS (Australia - New Zealand - United States) and the remaining bilateral ones (US-Israel, US-Egypt, US-Saudi Arabia, US-Pakistan, US-Philippines, US-South Korea, US-Japan, etc.) - with different contents (some are real alliances, other concern the use of bases, others still are pacts of military, technological and economic cooperation, etc.), but all related, in one way or another, with the American superpower (1).

This complex politico-military sys-


Control of the sea is essential for the western Alliance. The photo shows units of NAVOCFORMED (Naval On Call Force Mediterranean), periodically activated by NATO, sailing in the Mediterranean.

The ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) is due to replace in the US Army, and probably in other NATO Armies as well, the Lance missile now in service.

tem - which has been summarily outlined here - lays on a politico-economic system, without the occurrence of a real osmotic process. The crucial points of this system, produced by a tumultuous and not always orderly evolution over many decades are represented by a North American area (United States-Canada) a European Area (EEC countries), a Near East/Middle East Area (pro-Western oil producing countries) and an Asian area (Japan-South Korea - insular Asian countries). Latin America, Africa, Continental Asia and Oceania and the Eastern Bloc itself gravitate towards this system in a complicated and difficult intermingling of relations.

This is, in a broad outline, the scheme of what could be called - with some approximation or a certain optimism, if you prefer - the Western "alliance": a bloc (supposing that it could be called so) of countries characterized by extremely different political regimes and by administrative, financial, economic and social structures equally different but kept together, more than by an exclusive ideological origin or concordant objectives, by common necessities of defence and by the need, probably even more pressing, to avoid producing too dangerous imbalances through more or less closely connected socioeconomic courses of development.

Clearly this "alliance" is built, at least in part, on precarious foundations. And this is true for both the body of its actual members, NATO countries and countries (headed by Japan) which have "Western-style" political and economic structures (2), and for the group of its friends, such as, for instance, the "moderate" Arab countries, each of which has its own cultural, constitutional and socioeconomic characteristics. And, as



a matter of fact, it is difficult to find, in the confusion of interests and requests advanced by the countries of the two groups, a common threat going beyond those requests which mostly identify with the will - necessity - convenience to preserve one's own particular political, strategic and economic balances.

Thus the link between the approaches related to such balances in most cases do not represent the fruit of coherent and agreed-upon choices but rather the outcome of cause-

effect interrelations which, fully or in part, escape the control of the nations concerned. And only with difficulty and more and more effort, can the North American Superpower - the only nation of the bloc which has planetary interests - manages to keep them within increasingly precarious limits.

Another non negligible element must be added to all this: the change atmosphere that has been felt for some years in the system of international relations. This change of cli-

The most complex strategic armaments - as the B-2 Northrop bomber - are now, in the West, an exclusive prerogative of the United States, due to the enormous financial and scientific-technologic effort required for their definition, production and operation.

mate, which has lowered the levels of tension in many areas of the world, affects also the cohesion of the Western bloc. The matter deserves a closer consideration.

On the military plane, the new Soviet trend is certainly translating into a revision of the ideas which inspire the strategy and the organizational approach of the Soviet Armed Forces. Brought about by essentially technical reasons - the impossibility to ensure, in a military organization of enormous proportions, a reasonable "generational" replacement of the equipment, together with a progressive destandardization which has remarkably reduced the strategic mobility of the air and land forces and on top of all this, the never solved and probably unsolvable problems of the wide-range employment of the naval forces - this revision certainly started long before Gorbachev became Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party, but it is equally certain that recently it has been given a considerable impulse. In what directions? And with what purposes?

One can attempt an answer to these questions only with cautious assumptions, but, anyways, starting from some certitudes. First of all from the extensive restructuring which, starting from the beginning of the current decade, the Soviet military establishment has gone through and owing to which all the land, air and naval forces - excepting presumably the nuclear strategic forces, air defence and the space forces - have been placed under three interservice Commands, whose jurisdiction covers as many "War Theatres (TV, Teatr Voinii), divided into "Military Operations Theatres (TVD, Teatr Voennykh Dejstviy) and Districts (3).

This restructuring can be seen as



a measure - imposed by the technical factors mentioned before - conceived, on the one hand, in order to "regionalize" the Soviet strategy (simultaneously reducing its scope and actually doing away with a manoeuvre by internal lines, in order to start a wide reorganization of the whole system.

As mentioned before, the guidelines along which this reorganization will be carried out can only be guessed, at least for now. Also considering how these will be influenced by some factors which deserve mention: the relations between the Communist Party, the Federal State (USSR) and the federated Republics, within the new Constitution wanted by Gorbachev; how, and if, the streamlining of a bureaucratic machinery which had reached monstrous proportions, will be carried out; the possible establishment of a new system of financial relations between the subjects (including the Armed Forces) which employ resources allotted through the Union's budget (4); the activation of new economic mechanisms to be implemented, if necessary, in connection with more or less deep reforms of agriculture, industry and services; the degree of participation, or even the integration, of the Soviet economy in the world economy.

As regards specifically the subject of this article, it must be said that

the mentioned factors - the essential aspects of which cannot be investigated thoroughly here - on the one hand will determine the amount of the appropriations for the military programmes (an amount which presumably will have to undergo a more or less substantial retrenchment) and, on the other, the possible new courses to be given to the Soviet military strategy, also within to more general framework of the country's foreign policy.

The last point deserves some further investigation. As a matter of fact many symptoms lead us to believe that a deep critical revision of the Soviet strategy has been going on for several years (and, besides, the restructuring mentioned before would make no sense if it had not been conceived as a prelude of that kind of revision). Probably the Soviet military leaders, or at least the most enlightened among them, have realized long ago the contradictions which weigh heavily on the strategic approaches, still in force to-day, that were adopted by their predecessors between the late forties and the early sixties.

On the other hand, it must be said that these contradictions stand out more and more clearly even to an outsider. We can mention some particularly significant ones: the equipment of the strategic missile forces (both for land-based ones and for



those based on submarines) consisting of weapon systems of apparently different generations, conceived in view of different and hardly compatible purposes; the difficulties of an air defence - also based on materials (airplanes, missiles and detection systems) belonging to several generations - not entirely capable of adjusting itself, precisely owing to its dimensions, to the continuous changing of a threat (the US air strategic forces) which tends to become more and more complex, varied and sophisticated; the coexistence within the land forces and the tactical air forces of modernly equipped, fully manned units (in particular those deployed in Eastern Europe and those of the strategic reserve concentrated, in a barycentric position, in the Moscow area) and units, often unmanned, equipped with old, and in some cases obsolete, materials (these units, which are the majority, are spread all over the immense territory of the Soviet Union and are subordinate to the various Districts),

which rises enormous logistic problems and drastically limits the strategic mobility of the whole organization; the impossibility to obtain, despite the mighty air and naval forces available, an effective control of the sea zones (the Soviet Navy has not been able to set up an instrument really capable of opposing the American carrier task forces); moreover, a disastrous geostrategic position considerably limits the access of its forces to the open oceans).

These eminently technical contradictions mix with other contradictions, which are political or, more precisely, of the politico-technical kind, which, like the first, can be removed, or reduced to acceptable levels, only through a radical reshaping of the entire Soviet military machinery. One in particular, which especially concerns Europe, is the technically offensive structure of the air-land deployment that the Soviet Union, with the contribution of other members of the Warsaw Pact, keeps gravitating on Western Eu-

The US military presence in all critical areas is an actual and real guarantee of strength for the western Alliance. Therefore, the American front-line forces have a high priority in the acquisition of the most modern equipment, as the M1A1 Abrams tanks. The photo shows one of them on a General Dynamics testing ground in Michigan.

rope. It is doubtful, to say the least - and the Kremlin seems to realize it - that in the present and foreseeable political and economic conditions such a deployment would still make sense: what would be the Soviet Union's advantage in a military conquest of Europe (with the inevitable destructions that it would entail), if without the assistance of Europe the USSR has absolutely no hope to open the way to a solution of its enormous socioeconomic problems?

Albeit it does not allow us to reach a certain interpretation, what we just said permits to attempt an objective assessment of the most recent Soviet behaviours, in connection with détente, East-West relations and armament control: the stipulation of an

agreement for dismantling the medium-range missiles (whose strategic use decreased progressively with the decrease of the strategic mobility of the air-land forces which they were supposed to cover with their threat, dissuading any potential adversary from possible nuclear retaliations); the decision to start a substantial retrenchment of the air-land instrument, to be carried in correlation with the withdrawal of a substantial number of forces from the critical areas of Europe and Asia; the declared willingness to destroy the chemical weapons already handed out to the units and stop any further production, giving up a factor of superiority of not negligible weight. These are meaningful pointers that the Soviets are more agreeable to constructive discussions and even to the introduction of new "rules of the game" in international relations.

These indicators, added to the ones given by the reshaping of the Command structures and the related "regionalization" of the Soviet strategy, seem to show, on the purely military plane, a tendency more defensive than today's conception which, for sure, at least in some areas (starting from the European area, as we pointed out), cannot be defined as such. Nevertheless one must be very careful in this assessment. It should be remembered that the streamlining of a war instrument, which along the years has become too burdensome and bulky, if directed along certain lines can translate into the reacquisition of the offensive capabilities which the excessive weight has, or could have, jeopardized.

Here we must pick the thread of what we mentioned before only fleetingly: the talk about the impact that the new international atmosphere and the new, more constructive, Soviet attitude can have on the cohesion of what has been called the Western "Alliance".

Everything suggests - this must be objectively acknowledged - that the new Soviet leadership is pursuing, with sincere commitment, goals of

peace, progress and coexistence among nations. But is it really an irreversible fact? The question cannot be evaded. What is the real power of a leadership which, as many signs point out, does not seem to have completely overcome the resistance of the advocates of a sterner internal and international conduct? And what could happen if tomorrow, in a more or less near future, the latter were to get the upper hand again?

The risk is serious, especially because, as we have said, the just started streamlining of the enormous Soviet military machine could lead to its reacquisition of an offensive efficiency comparable to what it was before the Soviet military organization was burdened by destandardization (5). It is a prospect that cannot be ignored, which carries in its wake political and military implications of great moment.

Therefore the West should proceed with daring and caution at the same time, granting the amplest possible trust to the present Soviet leadership, encouraging its conciliatory efforts, also in order to consolidate its internal position. Without nevertheless surrendering to the temptation - easy when the tension subsides - of making unilateral gestures which could disrupt the existing military balances. As a matter of fact, on the merely military plane, it is above all necessary to set aside all utopian views, and strive to obtain, through balanced reductions of forces, lower - and therefore less onerous - levels of balance. A thing which neither for the East nor for the West prevents the modernization and the efficient upkeep of forces and materials, with exclusively defensive purposes.

Here we must clarify an essential point. It must be stated in advance that in a short article it is absolutely impossible to envisage, for the problems mentioned before, solutions which could be called valid and satisfactory. But the most important aspects of these problems can be focalized in order to find out the most appropriated policy which the West - the whole West and not only

NATO - could follow to achieve, or to help achieve, in cooperation - competition with the East, and without jeopardizing its own security, the preconditions of a real, substantial and widespread progress.

As we have already pointed out, and as we must now repeat, the West is not an omogenous and compact bloc (and also the East is no more that). It is a multifaceted aggregate, made up of nations which follow different courses, each inspired by autonomous choices. Moreover, as we have seen, it is an aggregate whose borders are hard to define and to delimit, and towards which gravitate, for the most different reasons, countries which - as regards culture, traditions, ways of life, social organization and institutional patterns, are not at all, or very little, "western". Therefore, the primary problem, on the solution of which can depend the solution of all the others, is that of preserving the cohesion of the "real core" of the West, if we can call it that, which can result form a concordant conduct of the countries that constitute it: the North American and European members of NATO (the latter almost all members of EEC), Japan and, in Oceania, Australia and New Zealand (which have European-style institutions and political regimes and are active members of the British Commonwealth).

The cohesion of the "real core" is essentially a short-term/medium-term problem, typical of the present historical period, which is certainly a transitional phase of admittedly partial readjustment of the international relations and especially of the East-West relationship. And it is indeed on this subject that we must now drive our attention. As regards long-term prospects, there are different considerations that shall be made later on, also hinged largely on assumptions to be taken with considerable caution.

It is difficult to preserve the cohesion in the Western sphere precisely because, in a period when the threat is less felt, contradictions and reasons of dissent emerge or re-



emerge which had remained dormant for more or less long periods during the most acute and dangerous phases of the East-West conflict.

Without going into a political analysis, which is not the purpose of this writing, it is nevertheless advisable to point out the principal terms of the question:

- a **psychological** component which concerns all Western countries - some more, some less - and leads a large sector of public opinion to refuse to share all the goals of an alliance born in a moment very different from the present;
- a **socioeconomic** component, which paradoxically (although the paradox is more apparent than real), originates from the extraordinary development experienced by the countries of the Western sphere (as we said before, it is becoming less and less appropriate to talk of "blocs") and which has spurred a relentless competition among the various countries;

- an **international** component referring to a possible common attitude, or to a possible coordination of each individual attitude, that should be adopted towards the East, and particularly towards the Soviet Union, in the discussions concerning armaments and in the agreements on economic cooperation, as well as a prospective institutionalization - if one may call it that - of an organic system of relations (political, economic, military, etc.) with the friendly countries and the nonaligned countries;
- an **economic-military** component which concerns, on the one hand, the joint development and production of weapons and equipment and, on the other, the establishment of valid rules, with the intention of rationalizing in this sector, both the relations among the western countries (starting from the so called Europe-United States "two-way street") and the relations with countries outside the Europe-US agreement (especially

The AMX light tactical fighter, developed jointly by Italy and Brazil, is a significant example of effective cooperation between NATO members and countries which do not belong to the Western Alliance. The photo shows the first mass-produced aircraft, assembled by Aermacchi.

as regards the competition for armament supplies and for the exchanges based on those supplies);

- a **scientific-technological** component, of vital importance from every point of view, concerning all the military and civilian research (environment, energy sources, new materials, agricultures, food, medicine, space vehicles, particularly advanced technologies, etc). which, due to the great effort they require, cannot be carried out by individual countries.

These are, in broad outline, the terms of the global problem which the so-called "real-core" of the West has to tackle. As we said before, for reasons which are too obvious to

need explaining, it is absolutely impossible to venture solutions. It is nevertheless possible to highlight the main interrelations which connect the various aspects of the question.

First of all, it must be noted that the first component, which has been called here the **psychological** component, regards, as far as international relations and defence relations are concerned, the information policy carried out by the Western countries. Is it possible to make the policy more incisive? The Western countries are democratic nations, where there is maximum freedom of information and opinion. Therefore one must write off, absolutely, any idea of indoctrinating, or attempt at indoctrinating, public opinion: such an action, besides being against the principles of democracy, would be inevitably destined to failure. But it could be convenient to adopt measures aimed at facilitating - also through the mass media - the approach of public opinion to correct, objective and as complete as possible information on technical and economic problems and on questions concerning defence and foreign policy.

And here the considerations shift on the second component, the socioeconomic one. Not only because the costs of defence weigh, more or less heavily, on the state budgets, leading sometimes to a squeeze of other expenses, such as the social ones, considered foremost by public opinion, but also because the activities of the defence set in motion notable real flows (goods and services) and monetary flows, which affect in a not negligible manner, also for the induced effects (possibly insufficiently studied by economic experts), the requirements, productions and consumption and, more generally, the trends of development.

It must be said moreover, that, in many instances, it is indeed the technological innovation derived from the defence research - and on this aspect we shall have to go back soon - that constitutes the propulsive element which, on the one hand, activates, or helps to activate through more or less intense and substantial transfers of technologies, the development of several civilian productive sectors and, on the other hand, stimulates, or helps to stimulate, cases of relentless industrial competition both within each individual national economic system and on an international scale.

Besides, competition - and this is another point which must be emphasized - in all the developed countries (and the Western countries some a little more some a little less, all belong to his group) concerns every economic sector: from the already mentioned sector of industry to those of agriculture and zootechny, from that of the traditional services to the one called advanced tertiary or quaternary i.e. the high technology services. And here we must observe that, for the Western countries, the attainment of a reasonable balance between the governments' options concerning the social and economic policy and the market choices imposed by the demands of competition is, from many points of view, one of the most dramatic

challenges of the present historical period. A challenge that can be won without stifling competition (which, like it or not, is a mainspring of progress) only through the coordination of the monetary, financial, fiscal, industrial, etc. policies of the states concerned, and which, on the contrary, would be lost from the start, with inevitable negative consequences also in the defence sectors, if a commercial war among the principal "areas" of the industrialized West - North America, Europe and the Far East - were to break out.

The third component i.e. the one related to the **international** action of the West, has particularly delicate and complex aspects.

First of all, one should remark that the Western nations are sovereign states in the most accomplished sense of the word.

Therefore each of them, albeit aware of the existence of a common denominator, acts, and, for many reasons (traditions, geostrategic position, economic interests, etc.) must act, in view of particular objectives. This makes a coordination of the relations with the non-Western nations extremely difficult, especially outside NATO's frame of reference (which concerns exclusively the conduct of the members of this Alliance within the framework of East-West relations).

As a matter of fact, if within



France, although not a member of the military organization of NATO, cooperates closely with her Allies. Tanks to their mobility - effectively represented by the AMX 10RC armoured car - the French forces can make a remarkable contribution to the defence of the West.



NATO the attitude towards the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, in the talks for the control and reduction of armaments, can be determined jointly on essentially technical grounds, the same cannot be said for other problems which, in most cases, are tackled by the Western countries in a scattered way.

As it is the case of the Palestinian problem, for instance, which is part of the wider and more intricate Near East - Middle East problem, where, lined up on opposing fields, there are countries like Israel and the "moderate" Arab states whose friendship and cooperation (also military) is in the West's interest not to lose: the least that can be said about the matter is that the West's positions are certainly not univocal. And obviously, in order to be able to find a solution for such a problem one must act, not only with extreme discernment and common sense, but also through well-coordinated and

agreed upon initiatives. The need for closer coordination, just to give another example, is felt also in the sphere of economic and financial relations, particularly as regards the frightful indebtedness of the poor countries with the rich ones (i.e. the Western countries), which is a real drifting mine capable of producing enormous upsets if it is not disarmed in time.

The series of examples could continue for a long time, but we think that the above remarks are evidence enough. In fact, here we do not intend to make a comprehensive survey of the problems of the moment nor, as we said, do we want to propose solutions for them. Instead it is necessary to emphasize that in the West there are several "coordination centres" with more or less ample specific competence (NATO, European Community, Western European Union, Group of Five, Group of Seven, ect.) but there is no "institution" suited to coordinate, at

Modern armaments are often high-technology products - as the OTOMATIC self-propelled anti-aircraft gun developed by OTO Melara - whose development, production and operating costs can be sustained only when the industry finds sufficient outlets in the producing country (or countries).

This fact raised delicate problems within the Western Alliance.

global level, the various sectorial initiatives. And this is certainly a lack which weighs, in a not-negligible measure and in an undoubtedly negative way, on the conduct of the West.

The problem of coordination, a coordination conceived not to repress initiatives but to avoid dangerous degenerations, involves directly also the last two components, the **economic-military** one and the **scientific-technological** one, in the global action that the West is expected to carry out at world level.

Also in this case for almost too obvious reasons it is impossible to find solutions. What should be pointed

out is that, for both components, the problem regards, on the one hand, the definition of the relations inside what could be called the "European pole" of the West and, on the other hand, the global organization and the rules of the game that should be achieved and adopted both inside the Western alliance and, on the grounds of a unitary conception, within the network of the relations that the latter keeps with the rest of the world.

Within this framework the role that the European pole can play becomes particularly important. If Western Europe, in practice the European Communities as a whole, is able to devise a wide-ranging "security and defence policy" and an extensive "research policy", many things will become possible: from the rationalization of the choices in the field of armaments (with not-negligible savings) to the achievement of a true politico-economic-military partnership among Europe, the United States and Japan, from the allotment of more substantial resources to the environment policy to the harmonization of the most important economic and financial options, from the establishment of new, and more profitable (for everyone) relations with the developing countries (relations which regard both the assistance to development and the economic and military assistance as well as the pressing problem of debts) to the consolidation of those elements of cooperation which are already present in East-West relations.

What has been said up to now has helped to emphasize how important it is to the West, in the present international situation, to maintain its cohesion in the activation of really working and effective mechanisms of global coordination.

As a matter of fact, considering things from this angle, the medium term will perhaps turn out to be decisive for the future, not only of the West but of the entire world. What will happen in the long run, in the first decades of the next century (or the next millennium, if you prefer)

depends largely on how the Western alliance is able to tackle and solve, in the last years of this century, the frightful problems which face it now.

Can some prudent hypotheses be put forward as regards what could happen in the long-term, and on the new system of international relations originated from the present phase of transition? Generally speaking, the answer cannot be positive. Any kind of hypothesis could prove hasty and false. Nevertheless, starting from a number of established points which appear evident even now, we can express some auspices.

The scientific development and the technological innovation - spurred, indeed overemphasized by the research carried out for military purposes - have been producing for quite some time, and to an ever increasing extent, beneficial spin-off effects in every economic sector, and in a more general way, in every kind of man's activity. They can by now be considered as fundamental and irreplaceable driving factors in any type of development. Nevertheless like in a medal, there is also a reverse that cannot be ignored nor underestimated: both pure and applied research require real armies of scientists and researchers (with huge recruitment and training problems), enormously complicate equipment (with the relevant enormous costs) and more and more funds. Thus it is increasingly difficult for each individual nation to organize and carry out, on a purely national plane, the most demanding and important research activities.

This difficulty is felt today especially in the sectors directly or indirectly connected with defence. But it has a tendency to appear, with more and more impact, also in all other sectors. Internal cooperation becomes thus the only means, the only possible way steer science and technology towards goals of real progress. And precisely in this action the Western Alliance will be able to play a fundamental role, both in the medium and in the long term. Because the Alliance is the only real force able to put together the human

and material resources required for this undertaking, to the advantage not only of the peoples that constitute it but of the whole mankind.

Vittorio Barbati

NOTE

(1) It must be pointed out that also other NATO countries, as sovereign nations, have stipulated similar pacts with non-NATO countries. But unlike those signed by the US, which are set within a global framework, these pacts generally answer specific national needs.

(2) Countries which, although they have developed particular institutions out of respect for their national traditions, have democratic-parliamentary regimes and economic systems based, entirely or in part, on a market economy.

(3) The Western TV, with the North-western, Western and Southwestern TVDs (under this structure should operate, in case of conflict, also the Warsaw pact forces) and the associated TVDs (the character of this "association" is not very clear) of the Arctic, Atlantic, Baltic, Mediterranean and Black Sea; the Southern TV (also called Near-East TV), with the Southern TVD; and the Far-East TV, with the Far-East TVD and the "associated" TVDs of the Pacific and Indian oceans. The Districts, traditional territorial divisions (sometimes corresponding to the territories of entire republics) of the Soviet military system, have been placed within the air-land TVDs.

(4) As is known, the budget of the Soviet Union includes revenues and expenditures regarding, besides the Soviet Union itself, the Federate republics and the major economic institutions.

(5) It must be noted that within the Warsaw Pact the destandardization is mostly of the "horizontal" kind, i.e. produced by the "superposition" of weapons belonging to different generations, while within NATO it is mostly "vertical" due to the "coexistence" of different armaments of the same generation (or generations).

**WHAT FUTURE
FOR THE
"WESTERN
ALLIANCE?"**

THE ITALIA

UNTAG

HELICOPTER

UNIT



At the present time, the Italian Army employs abroad 84 officers, 118 NCOs (5 of whom from the Carabinieri), 10 Extended-Service Volunteers, 24 Carabinieri as well as 13 medium AB-205 helicopters with the relevant appropriate vehicles.

The operational activities are carried out in particular within the framework of the technical-military assistance in Morocco, Somalia and Malta, within UNTSO in Israel, at the Iran-Iraq border, on the India-Pakistan frontier, and within the UN contingents in Lebanon and Namibia.

The employment in Southern Africa, 8000 kilometres away from Italy, is the latest intervention of the Italian Army. In fact, within the range of tasks listed in the 5th Interforce Mission for Peace, since April 1, 1989 one Army helicopter company has been operating in Namibia, as Italian contribution to the UNTAG (United Nations Transition Assistance Group) contingent which the United Nations have sent there in order to assist Namibia in her gradual attainment of independence.

NAMIBIA

Historical Outline

The recent history of South West Africa begins in November 1884, when, at the Berlin conference of the nations interested in African affairs, Germany proclaims her protectorate on SWA, using as an excuse the purchase, made the previous year, of the Bay of Agra Pequena by a German explorer through a local chieftain.

The arrival of the first Reichskommissar, Dr. Goering, marks the beginning of the German colonization which will last until 1914, in correspondence with the similar activity carried out by the other European countries.

In 1915, during WWI, the South African Union occupies the territory of SWA and in 1920 obtains a fiduciary mandate from the League of Nations. After WWII, the United Nations, which had meanwhile replaced the League of Nations, reject the request of annexation of SWA, advanced by the Pretoria government. Despite this, the annexation takes place in 1949.

In September 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations formally revokes South Africa's mandate.

South West Africa, which has been given the name of Namibia by the United Nations, continued to be administered by South Africa, despite the contrary resolutions of the United Nations and a sentence of the International Court of Justice in 1971.


In 1977 the Pretoria Government appoints to the direction of the country a general Administrator, who in 1980 is replaced by a ministerial council.

In 1978 the United Nations adopt Resolution 435, which lays the foundations for free elections, a precondition of complete independence for Namibia.

In 1985 a provisional government of national unity is established and is still in power in Windhoek.

South Africa's presence has been opposed since the sixties by a considerable guerrilla activity, whose most representative element is SWAPO (South-West Africa Peo-





ple's Organization) — reinforced by Cuban troops and supported by Angola.

SWAPO, which assembles various ethnic groups, is acknowledged as "the sole, authentic representative" of the people of Namibia, considering that it is backed by the Ovambo tribe, who represent approximately 50 per cent of Namibia's population

Environment and resources

The territory of Namibia (former South-West Africa) covers about 820,000 sq km, is bordered by the

Cunene and Okavango rivers to the North, the 22nd and 20th meridians to the East, the Orange river to the South and the Atlantic Ocean to the West. The northern rivers mark the borders with Angola and, through a long and thin strip that heads east to the Zambezi River (the Caprivi strip), with Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Orange river, to the south, separates it administratively from the Cape Province (South Africa).

The interior is a very varied plateau which from the altitude of 1,789m of Windhoek, the capital, slopes down towards the Namib desert to the West and the Kalahari desert to the East.

The climate is arid in the wide desert coastal strip and temperate on the plateau, where the rainfall is nevertheless enough to nourish a meagre steppe, whose main characteristic is the kokerboom, a plant which grows only in this area.

The soil is very rich in mineral resources: diamonds, copper, zinc, vanadium, uranium, lead. Namibia is third in the world production of diamonds, after South Africa and the Soviet Union and has the largest open-cut uranium mine existing today.

Population, religion, language

Namibia's population is estimated at approximately 1,200,000, with a 1.4 density for square kilometre and is formed by numerous ethnic and racial groups, the most substantial of which are the Ovambos (578,000) and the Kavangos (110,000). There are about 78,000 whites.

Ninety per cent of the population are Christians. The official languages are English and Afrikaans, while the natives speak Bantu-derived dialects.

THE UN CONTINGENT

The need to send a UN contingent to Namibia arises in 1978, when the United Nations approve "Resolution 435", which is the precondition for ending South Africa's occupation and starting the procedures for Namibia's independence.

The Resolution, among other things, provides for the appointment of a "Special UN Representative for Namibia", charged with ensuring that free elections are held, with the assistance of a contingent called UNTAG, consisting of a civilian component and a military component.

The civilian element, formed by political experts, legal advisers and administrative officials, totalling about 1600 members, has the task to prepare and organize the elections, so as to ensure their regularity.

The military component, consisting of infantry battalions, observer officers and units for logistic and tactical support, about 7,500 elements

altogether, has the task to assist the civilian component in the fulfillment of its mandate and is equipped with exclusively defensive weapons, which are to be employed only for self-defence.

For over ten years, owing to numerous difficulties, there is no way to implement this Resolution. As a matter of fact, it is impossible to reach an agreement on which kind of electoral system to adopt and on the conditions of the cease-fire, also in connection with the withdrawal of the South African troops and the entrance of SWAPO into Namibia; everything is made even more complicated by the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

Furthermore there are economic problems as regards the financing of a contingent of more than 9,000 men, which implies continuous readjustments of both the civilian and military organizations as well as the adaptation of the agreements reached.

On December 22, 1988 South Africa, Angola and Cuba sign an agreement whose main points are:

- establishment of a three-party commission, with the inclusion of US and Soviet observers;
- application of resolution 435 of April 1, 1989;
- free elections under UN supervision on November 1, 1989.

On February 16, 1989 the United Nations approve unanimously Resolution 632, which provides for the implementation of the plan for Namibia and defines the new UNTAG constitution which is joined by 22 countries, including Italy (1).

The contingent, under the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari from Finland, consists of an electoral department, an administrative office, a military component, a police unit, a commissioners's office for refugees and a legal staff, for a total of approximately 6,000 men.

ITALY'S PARTICIPATION

The composition of the helicopter unit and the organizational ar-

rangements for its transfer to the area of employment was defined in a little over two months, and had to take into account the subsequent modifications to the initial provisions issued by the United Nations, according to the agreements progressively reached by the General Assembly after the stipulation of the agreement of December 22, 1988 between South Africa, Angola and Cuba.

The structure of the unit was fixed during the phase of its organization, on the basis of the experience acquired from the employment of the ITALIA-UNIFIL helicopter company in Lebanon, subsequently selecting the suitable personnel and the necessary vehicles and equipment. Moreover, appropriate English courses were programmed for Cadres and troops, together with juridical-administrative courses on the tasks of a peace force placed between two opponents, and courses on survival in that particular environment as well as on the hygienic and sanitary conditions.

Particular attention was given to the immunological measures, due to the very short time available.

The unit (telegraphic denomi-

tion: Helitaly) belongs to the 1st "Antares" ALE Regiment; it was established on February 15, 1989 at the heliport of the "Dante Chelotti" Barracks in Viterbo and is entirely made up of Army personnel who volunteered for the mission, totaling 79 Officers and NCOs (including 2 from the Carabinieri), mostly pilots, light aviation technicians and specialists, 10 extended-service volunteers and 6 Carabinieri.


The unit is equipped with 8 AB-205 helicopters, chosen for their reliability, high adaptability and for the little preliminary maintenance required, and 12 vehicles of various kinds.

Helitaly is attached to the UNTAG military component commanded by the Indian General Dewan Prem Chand, and is deployed at two bases, Rundu (home of the unit's headquarters) and Ondangwa, with a liaison team in Windhoek, consisting of 4 Italian officers who work within the General Staff of UNTAG.

Helitaly's tasks are:

- medical evacuation;
- search and rescue;
- liaison between UNTAG Headquarters and the subordinate units;
- transport of personnel and equip-





ment for the operational units, similarly to what is required of the helicopter company in Lebanon.

The units redeployed in Namibia between March 31 and April 14, 1989, in successive contingents transported by C-5 "Galaxy" aircraft, supplied, on behalf of the UN, by the US Military Airlift Command. The airplanes have taken off from the airport of Ciampino (Rome) and landed at the Grootfontein air base; from there the unit has reached the abovementioned bases by its own means.

The unit was the first to become wholly operational, despite the objective difficulties faced by the UNTAG Headquarters in the initial phase. It can rely on HF and Satellite radio sets, capable of ensuring the necessary links with the Army General Staff, with the UNTAG Headquarters in Windhoek, the two bases and with the helicopters in flight. This organization has permitted to establish a prompt link with the first elements in the area and has quickly achieved a high degree of efficiency, so that it was used by UNTAG itself, awaiting completion of the UN network.

All personnel is equipped with the new individual combat outfit (flying suit, field raincoat, woolen jumper, gloves, olive-green cap, combat/duty uniform, accoutrements, etc.) and with survival material (individual kit-bag and survival bag for each helicopter) for pilots in emergency situations. The helicopters carry also radio sets capable of ensuring, from the ground, a link with the bases, should the crew be forced to make an emergency landing.

The logistic support is provided the Headquarters of the 1st "Antares" ALE Regiment which employs, for the transport to Africa, the aircraft supplied, on a monthly basis, in the framework of an active cooperation, by the Italian Air Force.

The helicopter unit has hitherto (September 30, 1989) flown over 1,100 hours, carrying 3,500 men and about 100,000 kg of different materials.

CONCLUSION

The Army's mission in Namibia is a further commitment which is added to that already in progress with-

in UNIFIL and those fulfilled in the past by the Italian Contingent in Lebanon.

It is a further confirmation of the traditional role played by our country in the pursuit of peace and détente in international operations; a role which our Army is always ready to undertake with unreserved dedication, timeliness and professionalism.

Lt. Col. Franco Giannini

NOTES

(1) Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Great Britain, India, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Togo, Yugoslavia.




Lt. Col. Franco Giannini, a mechanized infantry officer and a graduate from the War College, the Military Academy and the Service Branch School, performed Command duties with the 114th "Mariago" Mechanized Battalion and at the Modena Military Academy.

He attended the 108th Higher General Staff Course and served as staff officer in the Operations Office of the Army General Staff.

At the present time, Lt. Col. Giannini is the Commander of the "Mariago" 114th mechanized Battalion.

Bayern.



Trompeter.

(Parade.)

Bombardier.

(Parade.)

Kanonier.

(Parade.)

Unterlieutenant.

(Parade zu Fuss.)

Oberst. Unterlieutenant.

(Parade z. Pferd.) (Marschanzug.)

Oberfeuerwerker.

(Marschanzug.)

Fahrende Artillerie.

1854.

Die Tafel zeigt die Uniformen der Bayrischen fahrenden Artillerie, wie solche sich gestalteten, nachdem 1848 der Waffenrock eingeführt worden war. Im Allgemeinen blieb der dargestellte Typus bis 1872 gültig. Als wesentlichste Aenderung innerhalb jenes Zeitabschnittes ist die Einführung der sogenannten Gürtelrüstung an Stelle des gekreuzten Lederzeuges — 1859—60 — zu erwähnen. Zur feldmässigen Uniform wurde von den Unteroffizierchargen und Mannschaften der Spenzer getragen, eine Jacke ohne Schösse mit Aufschlägen von der Grundfarbe. Berittene hatten 2 Knopfreihe (vergl. die Figur des Oberfeuerwerkers), Unberittene 1 Reihe. Die Beinkleider hatten bei allen Berittenen, auch bei den Offizieren hohen Reitbesatz. Zur Parade zu Fuss dagegen wurden dunkelblaue Hosen mit rothem Vorstoss, ohne Reitbesatz getragen. Die Offiziere trugen zur Parade Tuschabracken, zum Marschanzuge Sattelüberdecken von schwarzem Fell. (Nach L. Behringer: Die bayrische Armee unter König Maximilian II.).

RUDYARD KIPLING's testimony on the British Army of 1915

BRITONS



JOIN YOUR COUNTRY'S ARMY!
GOD SAVE THE KING

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9th

(SCOTTISH)

DIVISION



THE MEN AT WORK

The ore, the furnace and the hammer are all that is needed for a sword. — Native proverb.

This was a cantonment one had never seen before, and the grey haired military policeman could give no help.

"My experience", he spoke detachedly, "is that you'll find everything everywhere. Is it any particular corps you're looking for?"

"Not in the least", I said.

"Then you're all right. You can't miss getting something". He pointed generally to the North Camp. "It's like floods in a town, isn't it?"

He had hit the just word. All known marks in the place were submerged by troops. Parade-grounds to their utmost limits were crowded with them; rises and sky-lines were furred with them, and the length of the roads heaved and rippled like bicycle-chains with blocks of men on the move.

The voice of a sergeant in the torment reserved for sergeants at roll-call boomed across a bunker. He was calling over recruits to a specialist corps.

"But I've called you once!" he snapped at a man in leggings.

"But I'm Clarke Two", was the virtuous reply.

"Oh, you are, are you?" He pencilled the correction with a scornful mouth, out of one corner of which he added, "Sloppy", Clarke! You're all Clarks or Watson to-day. You don't know your own names. You don't know what corps you're in. (This was bitterly unjust, for they were squinting up at a biplane). You don't know anything".

"Mm!" said the military policeman. "The more a man has in his head, the harder it is for him to manage his carcass — at first. I'm glad I never was a sergeant. Listen to the instructors! Like rooks, ain't it?"

There was a mile of sergeants and instructors, varied by company officers, all at work on the ready material under their hands. They grunted, barked, yapped, expostulated, and, in rare cases purred, as the lines broke and formed and wheeled over the vast maidan. When companies numbered off one could hear the tone and accent of every walk in life, and maybe half the counties of England, from the deep-throated "Woon" of the north to the sharp, half-whistled Devonshire "Tu". And as the instructors laboured, so did the men, with a passion to learn as passionately as they were taught.

Presently, in the drift of the foot-traffic down the road, there came another grey-haired man, one foot in a bright slipper, which showed he was an old soldier cherishing a sore toe. He drew along-side and considered these zealous myriads.

"Good?" said I, deferentially.


"Yes, he said. "Very good" - then, half to himself: "Quite different, though". A pivot-man near us had shifted a little, instead of marking time, on the wheel. His face clouded, his lips moved. Obviously he was cursing his own clumsiness.

"That's what I meant", said the veteran "Innocent! Innocent! Mark you, they ain't doin' it to be done with it and get off. They're doin' it because — because they want to do it".

"Wake up! Wake up there, Isherwood!" This was a young subaltern's reminder flung at a back which straightened itself. That one human name coming up to out of all that maze of impersonal manœuvring stuck in the memory like wreckage on the ocean.

"An't it wasn't 'ardly even necessary to caution Mister Isherwood", my companion commented. "Prob'ly he's bitterly ashamed of 'imself".


I asked a leading question because the old soldier told me that when his




10th

(IRISH)

DIVISION





11th

(NORTHERN)

DIVISION



toe was sound, he, too, was a military policeman.

"Crime? Crime?" said he. "They don't know what crime is — that lot don't — none of 'em! He mourned over them like a benevolent old Satan looking into a busy Eden, and his last word was "Innocent!"

The car worked her way through miles of men — men route-marching, going to dig or build bridges, or wrestle with stores and transport — four of five miles of men, and every man with eager eyes. There was no music — not even drums and fifes. I heard nothing but a distant skirl of the pipes. Trust a Scot to get his national weapon as long as there is a chief in the North! Admitting that war is a serious business, specially to the man who is being fought for, and that it may be right to carry a long face and contribute to relief funds which should be laid on the National Debt, it surely could do no harm to cheer the men with a few bands. Half the money that has been spent in treating, for example...

The North in blue

There was a moor among woods


with a pond in a hollow, the centre of a world of tents whose population was North-Country. One heard it form far off.

"Yo' mun trail t'pick an' t' rifle at t' same time. Try again", said the instructor.

An isolated company tried again with set seriousness, and yet again. They were used to the pick — won their living by it, in fact — and so, favoured it more than the rifle; but miners don't carry picks at the trail by instinct, though they can twiddle their rifles as one twiddels walking-sticks.

They were clad in a blue garb that disguised all contours; yet their shoulders, backs, and loins could not altogether be disguised, and these were excellent. Another company, at physical drill in shirt and trousers, showed what superb material had offered itself to be worked upon, and how much poise and directed strenght had been added to that material in the past few months. When the New Army gets all its new uniform, it will gaze at itself like a new Narcissus. But the present kit is indescribable. That is why, English fashion, it has been made honourable by its wearers; and our world in the years to come will look back with reverence


as well as affection on those blue slops and that epileptic cap. One far-seeing commandant who had special facilities has possessed himself of brass buttons, thousands of 'em, which he has added to his men's outfit for the moral effect of (a) having something to clean, and (b) of keeping it so. It has paid. The smartest regiment in the Service could not do itself justice in such garments, but I managed to get a view of a battalion, coming in from a walk, at a distance which more or less subdued the — er — uniform, and they moved with the elastic swing and little quick ripple that means so much. A miner is not supposed to be as good a marcher as a townsman, but when he gets set to time and pace and learns due economy of effort, his developed back and shoulder muscles take him along very handsomely. Another battalion fell in for parade while I watched, again at a distance. They came to hand quietly and collectedly enough, and with only that amount of pressing which is caused by fear of being late. A platoon — or whatever they call it — was giving the whole of its attention to its signalling instructors, with the air of men resolved on getting the last flicker of the last cinema-film




12th

(EASTERN)

DIVISION






13th

(WESTERN)

DIVISION



for their money. Crime in the military sense they do not know any more than their fellow-innocents up the road. It is hopeless to pretend to be other than what one is, because one's soul in this life is as exposed as one's body. It is futile to tell civilian lies — there are no civilians to listen — and they have not yet learned to tell Service ones without being detected. It is useless to sulk at any external condition of affairs, because the rest of the world with which a man is concerned is facing those identical conditions. There is neither poverty nor riches, nor any possibility of pride, except in so far as one may do one's task a little better than one's mate.


Duties and developments

In the point of food they are extremely well looked after, quality and quantity, wet canteen and dry. Drafts come in all round the clock, and they have to be fed; late guards and sentries want something hot at odd times, and the big marquee-canteen is the world's gathering-place, where food, life's first interest

to man in hard work, is thoroughly discussed. They can get outside of a vast o'vittles. Thus, a contractor who delivers ten thousand rations a day stands, by deputy at least, in the presence of just that number of rather fit, long, deep men. They are what is called "independent" — a civilian weakness which they will learn to blush over in a few months, and to discourage among later recruits; but they are also very quick to pick up dodges and tricks that make a man more comfortable in camp life, and their domestic routine runs on wheels. It must have been hard at first for civilians to see the necessity for that continuous, apparently pernicky, house-maiding and "following-up" which is vital to the comfort of large bodies of men in confined quarters. In civil life men leave these things to their women-folk, but where women are not, officers, inspecting tents, feet, and such-like, develop a she-side to their head, and evidently make their non-commissioned officers and men develop it too. A good soldier is always a bit of an old maid. But, as I heard a private say to a sergeant in the matter of some kit chucked into a corner: "Yo' canna keep owt redd up ony proper gate on a sand-hill". To whom his superior officer: "Ah

know yo' canna', but yo' mun try, Billy.'


And Heaven knows they are trying hard enough — men, n.c.o.'s, and officers — with all the masked and undervoiced effort of our peoples when we are really at work. The stand at the very beginning of things; creating out of chaos, meeting emergencies as they arise; handicapped in every direction, and overcoming every handicap by simple goodwill, humor, self-sacrifice, common-sense, and such trumpery virtues. I watched their faces in the camp, and at lunch looked down a line of some twenty men in the mess-tent, wondering how many would survive to see the full splendour and significance of the work here so nobly begun. But they were not interested in the future beyond their next immediate job. They ate quickly and went out to it, and by the time I drove away again I was overtaking their battalions on the road. Not unrelated units lugged together for foot-slogging, but real battalions, of a spirit in themselves which defied even the blue slops — wave after wave of proper men, with undistracted eyes, who never talked a word about any war. But not a note of music — and they North-countrymen!




14th

(LIGHT)

DIVISION






15th

(SCOTTISH)

DIVISION



IRON INTO STEEL

Thanda lobä garam lobe ko marta hai
(Cold iron will cut hot iron)

At the next halt I fell into Scotland — blocks and blocks of it — a world of precise-spoken, thin-lipped men, with keen eyes. They gave me directions which led by friendly stages to the heart of another work of creation and a huge drill-shed where the miniature rifles were busy. Few things are duller than Morris-tube practice in the shed, unless it be judging triangles of error against blank-walls. I thought of the military policeman with the sore toe; for these “innocents” were visibly enjoying both games. They sighted over the sand-bags with the gravity of surveyors, while the instructors hurled knowledge at them like sling-stones.

“Man, d’ye see your error? Step here, man, and I’ll show ye’. Teacher and taught glared at each other like theologians in full debate; for this is the Scots way of giving and getting knowledge.

At the miniature targets squad after squad rose from beside their deadly-earnest instructoris, gathered up their target-cards, and whisperingly compared them, five heads together under a window.

“Aye, that was where I loosed too soon.” “I misdoubt I took too much o’ the foresight”. Not a word of hope and comfort in their achievements. Nothing but calvinistic self-criticism.

These men ran a little smaller than the North-country folk down the road, but in depth of chest, girth of fore-arm, biceps, and neck-measurement they were beautifully level and well up; and the squads at bayonet-practice had their balance, drive, and recover already. As the light failed one noticed the whites of their eyes turning towards their instructors. It reminded one that there is always a touch of the cater-an in the most docile Scot, even as the wolf persists in every dog.

“And what about crime?” I demanded.

There was none. They had not joined to play the fool. Occasionally a feu unstable souls who have mistaken their vocation try to return to civil life by way of dishonourable discharge, and think it “funny” to pile up offences. The New Army has no use for those people either, and attends to them on what may be called “democratic lines”, which is all the same as the old barrack-room court-martial. Nor does it suffer fools gladly. There is no time to instruct

them. They go to other spheres.

There was, or rather is, a man who intends to join a certain battalion. He joined it once, scraped past the local doctor, and was drafted into the corps, only to be hove out for varicose veins. He went back to his accommodating doctor, repeated the process, and was again rejected. They are waiting for him now in his third incarnation; both sides are equally determined. And there was another Scot who joined, served awhile, and left, as he might have left a pit or a factory. Somehow it occurred to him that explanations were required, so he wrote to his commanding officer from his home address and asked him what he recommended him to do. The C.O., to his infinite credit, wrote back: “Suppose you rejoin”, which the mand did, and no more said. His punishment, of course, will come to him when he realises what he has done. If he does not then perish in his self-contempt (he has a good conceit of himself) he will make one first-rate non-commissioned officer.

With illustrations


I had the luck to meet a Sergeant-




16th

(IRISH)

DIVISION






17th

(NORTHERN)

DIVISION



Major, who was the Sergeant-Major of one's dreams. He had just had sure information that the kilts for his battalion were coming in a few days, so, after three months' hard work, life smiled upon him. From kilts one naturally went on to the pipes. The battalion had its pipes — a very good set. How did it get them? Well, there was, of course, the Duke. They began with him. And there was a Scots lord concerned with the regiment. And there was a leddy of a certain clan connected with the battalion. Hence the pipes. Could anything be simpler or more logical? And when the kilts came the men would be different creatures. Were they good men, I asked. "Yes. Verra good. What's to mislead'em?" said he.

"Old soldiers", I suggested, meanly enough. "Rejoined privates of long ago".

"Ay, there might have been a few such in the beginning, but they'd be more useful in the Special Reserve Battalions. Our boys are good boys, but, ye'll understand, they've to be handled — just handled a little". Then a subaltern came in, loaded with regimental forms, and visibly leaning on the Sergeant Major, who explained, clarified, and referred

them on the proper quarters.

"Does the work come back to you?" I asked, for he had been long in pleasant civil employ.

"Ay. It does that. It just does that". And he addressed the fluttering papers, lists, and notes, with the certainty of an old golfer on a well-known green.

Squads were at bayonet practice in the square. (They like bayonet practice, especially after looking at pictures in the illustrated dailies). A new draft was being introduced to its rifles. The rest were getting ready for evening parade. They were all in khaki, so one could see how they had come on in the last ten weeks. It was a result the meekest might have been proud of, but the New Army does not cultivate useless emotions. Their officers and their instructors worked over them patiently and coldly and repeatedly, with their souls in the job: and with their soul, mind, and body in the same job the men took — soaked up — the instruction. And that seems to be the note of the New Army.

What the Army does and thinks

They have joined for good reason.

For that reason they sleep uncomplainingly double thick on barrack floors, or lie like herrings in the tents and sing hymns and other things when they are flooded out. They walk and dig half the day or all the night as required; they wear — though they will not eat — anything that is issued to them; they make themselves an organised and kindly life out of a few acres of dirt and a little canvas; they keep their edge and anneal their discipline under conditions that would depress a fox-terrier and disorganise a champion football team. They ask nothing in return save work and equipment. And being what they are, they thoroughly and unfeignedly enjoy what they are doing; and they purpose to do much more.

But they also think. They think it vile that so many unmarried young men who are not likely to be affected by Government allowances should be so shy about sharing their life. They discuss these young men and their womenfolk by name, and imagine rude punishments for them, suited to their known characters. They discuss, too, their elders who in time past warned them of the sin of soldiering. These men, who live honourably and simply under the triple vow of Obedience, Temper-



18th

(EASTERN)

DIVISION





19th

(WESTERN)

DIVISION



ance, and Poverty, recall, not without envy, the sort of life which well-kept moralists lead in the unpicketed, unsentried towns; and it galls them that such folk should continue in comfort and volubility at the expense of good men's lives, or should profit greasily at the end of it all. They stare hard, even in their blue slops, at white-collared, bowler hatted young men, who, by the way, are just learning to drop their eyes under that gaze. In the third-class railway carriages they hint that they would like explanations from the casual 'nut', and they explain to him wherein his explanations are unconvincing. And when they are home on leave, the slack-jawed son of the local shopkeeper, and the rising nephew of the big banker, and the dumb but cunning carter's lad receive instruction or encouragement suited to their needs and the nation's. The older men and the officers will tell you that if the allowances are made more liberal we shall get all the men we want. But the younger men of the New Army do not worry about allowances — or, for that matter, make'em!

There is a gulf already opening between those who have joined and those who have not; but we shall

not know the width and the depth of that gulf till the war is over. The wise youth is he who jumps it now and lands in safety among the trained and armed men.

GUNS AND SUPPLY

*Under all and after all the Wheel carries everything.
Proverb.*

One had known the place for years as a picturesque old house, standing in a peaceful park; had watched the growth of certain young oaks along a new-laid avenue, and applauded the owner's enterprise in turning a stretch of pasture to plough. There are scores of such estates in England which the motorist, through passing so often, comes to look upon almost as his own. In a single day the brackened turf between the oaks and the iron road-fence blossomed into tents, and the drives were all cut up with hoofs and wheels. A little later, one's car sweeping home of warm September nights was stopped by sentries, who asked her name and business; for the owner of that retired house and discreetly wooded park had gone elsewhere in haste, and his estate was taken over by the military.

Later still, one met men and horses arguing with each other for miles about that country-side; or the car would be flung on her brakes by artillery issuing from cross-lanes — clean batteries jingling off to their work on the Downs, and hungry ones coming back to meals. Every day brought the men and the horses and the weights behind them to a better understanding, till in a little while the car could pass a quarter of a mile of them without having to hoot more than once.

"Why are you so virtuous?" she asked of a section encountered at a blind and brambly corner. "Why do you obtrude your personality less than an average tax-cart?"

"Because", said a driver, his arm flung up to keep the untrimmed hedge from sweeping his cap off, "because those are our blessed orders. We don't do it for love".


No one accuses the Gunner of maudlin affection for anything except his beast and his weapons. He hasn't the time. He serves at least three jealous gods — his horse and all its saddlery and harness; his gun, whose least detail of efficiency is more important than men's lives; and, when these have been attended to, the never-ending mystery of his art commands him.



20th

(LIGHT)

DIVISION





21st DIVISION



It was a wettish, windy day when I visited the so-long-known house and park. Cock pheasants ducked in and out of trim rhododendron clumps, neat gates opened into sacredly preserved vegetable gardens, the many-coloured leaves of specimen trees pasted themselves stickily against sodden tent walls, and there was a mixture of circus smells from the horse-lines and the faint, civilised breath of chrysanthemums in the potting sheds. The main drive was being relaid with a foot of flint; the other approaches were churned and pitted under the gun wheels and heavy supply wagons. Great breadths of what had been well-kept turf between unbrowsed trees were blanks of slippery brown wetness, dotted with picketed horse and field-kitchens. It was a crazy mixture of stark necessity and manicured luxury, all cheek by jowl, in the indiscriminating rain.

Service conditions

The cook-houses, store-rooms, forges, and work-shops were collections of tilts, poles, rick-cloths, and odd lumber, beavered together as on

service. The officers' mess was a thin, soaked marquee.

Less than a hundred yards away were dozens of vacant, well-furnished rooms in the big brick house, of which the Staff furtively occupied one corner. There was accomodation for very many men in its stables and out-houses alone; or the whole building might have been gutted and rearranged for barracks twice over in the last three months.

Scattered among the tents were rows of half-built tin sheds, the ready-prepared lumber and the corrugated iron lying beside them, waiting to be pieced together like children's toys. But there were no workmen. I was told that they had come that morning, but had knocked off because it was wet.

"I see. And where are the batteries?" I demanded.

"Out at work, of course. They've been out since seven".

"How shocking! In this dreadful weather, too!"

"They'll be back about dinner-time if you care to wait. Here's one of our field-kitchens".

Batteries look after their own stomachs, and are not catered for by contractors. The cook-house was a wagon-tilt. The wood, being damp,

smoked a good deal. One thought of the wide, adequate kitchen ranges and the concrete passages of the service quarters in the big house just behind. One even dared to think Teutonically of the perfectly good panelling and the thick hard-wood floors that could —.

"Service conditions, you see", said my guide, as the cook inspected the baked meats and the men inside the wagon-tilt grated the carrots and prepared the onions. It was old work to them after all these months — done swiftly, with the clean economy of effort that camp life teaches.

"What are these lads when they're at home?" I inquired.

"Londoners chiefly — all sorts and conditions".

The cook in shirt sleeves made another investigation, and sniffed judicially. He might have been cooking since the Peninsular. He looked at his watch and across towards the park gates. He was responsible for one hundred and sixty rations, and a battery has the habit of saying quite all that it thinks of its food.


"How often do the batteries go out?" I continued.

"Bout five days a week. You see, we're being worked up a little".

"And have they got plenty of



22nd DIVISION





23rd DIVISION



ground to work over?"

"Oh — yes-s".

"What's the difficulty this time? Birds?"

"No; but we got orders the other day not to go over a golf-course. That rather knocks the bottom out of tactical schemes".

Perfect shamelessness, like perfect virtue, is impregnable; and, after all, the lightnings of this war, which have brought out so much resolve and self-sacrifice, must show up equally certain souls and institutions that are irredeemable.

The weather took off a little before noon. The carpenters could have put in a good half-day's work on the sheds, and even if they had been rained upon the had roofs with fires awaiting their return. The batteries had none of these things.

The Gunner at Home

They came in at last far down the park, heralded by that unmistakable half-grumble, half-grunt of guns on the move. The picketed horses heard it first, and one of them neighed long and loud, which proved that he had abandoned civilian habits. Horses in stables and mews seldom do more

than snicker, even when they are halves of separated pairs. But these gentlemen had a corporate life of their own now, and knew what "pulling together" means.

When a battery comes into camp it "parks" all six guns at the appointed place, side by side in one mathematically straight line, and the accuracy of the alignment is, like ceremonial-drill with the Foot, a fair test of its attainments. The ground was no treat for parking. Specimen trees and draining ditches had to be avoided and circumvented. The gunners, their reins, the guns, the ground, were equally wet, and the slob dropped away like gruel from the brake-shoes. And they were Londoners — clerks, mechanics, shop assistants, and delivery men — anything and everything that you please. But they were all home and at home in their saddles and seats. They said nothing; their officers said little enough to them. They came in across what had once been turf; wheeled with tight traces; halted, unhooked; the wise teams stumped off to their pickets, and, behold, the six guns were left precisely where they should have been left to the fraction of an inch. You could see the wind blowing the last few drops of wet from each leather


muzzle-cover at exactly the same angle. It was all old known evolutions, taken unconsciously in the course of their day's work by men well abreast of it.

"Our men have one advantage", said a voice. "As Territorials they were introduced to unmade horses once a year at training. So they've never been accustomed to made horses".


"And what do the horses say about it all?" I asked, remembering what I had seen on the road in the early days.


"The said a good deal at first, but our chaps could make allowances for 'em. They know now".

Allah never intended the Gunner to talk. His own arm does that for him. The batteries off-saddled in silence, though one noticed on all sides little quiet caresses between man and beast — affectionate nuzzlings and nose-slappings. Surely the Gunner's relation to his horse is more intimate even than the cavalryman's; for a lost horse only turns cavalry into infantry, but trouble in a gun team may mean death all round. And this is the Gunner's war. The young wet officers said so joyously as they passed to and fro picking up scandal about breast-straps and breechings, examining



24th DIVISION





25th DIVISION



the collars of ammunition-wagon teams, and listening to remarks on shoes. Local blacksmiths, assisted by the battery itself, do the shoeing. There are master smiths and important farriers, who have cheerfully thrown up good wages to help the game, and their horses reward them by keeping fit. A fair proportion of the horses are aged — there was never a Gunner yet satisfied with his team or its rations till he had left the battery — but they do their work as steadfastly and wholeheartedly as the men. I am persuaded the horses like being in society and working out their daily problems of draught and direction. The English, and Londoners particularly, are the kindest and most reasonable of folk with animals. If it were not our business strictly to underrate ourselves for the next few years, one would say that the Territorial batteries had already done wonders. But perhaps it is better to let it all go with the grudging admission wrung out of a wringing wet bombardier, "Well, it isn't so dam' bad — considerin'".

I left them taking their dinner in mess tins to their tents, with a strenuous afternoon's cleaning-up ahead of them. The big park held

some thousands of men. I had seen no more than a few hundreds, and had missed the howitzer-batteries after all.

A cock pheasant chaperoned me down the drive, complaining loudly that where he was used to walk with his ladies under the beech trees, some unsporting people had built a miniature landscape with tiny villages, churches, and factories, and came there daily to point cannon at it.

"Keep away from that place", said I, "or you'll find yourself in a field-kitchen".

"Not me! he crowed. "I'm as sacred as golf-courses".

Mechanism and mechanics

There was a little town a couple of miles down the road where one used to lunch in the old days, and had the hotel to oneself. Now there are six ever-changing officers in billet there, and the astonished houses quiver all day to traction engines and high-piled lorries. A unit of the Army Service Corps and some mechanical transport lived near the station, and fed the troops for twenty miles around.

"Are your people easy to find?" I asked of a wandering private, with the hands of a sweep, the head of a Christian among lions, and suicide in his eye.


"Well, the A.S.C. are in the Territorial Drill Hall for one thing; and for another you're likely to hear *us*! There's some motors come in from Bulford". He snorted and passed on, smelling of petrol.

The drill-shed was peace and comfort. The A.S.C. were getting ready there for pay-day and for a concert that evening. Outside in the wind and the occasional rain-spurts, life was different. The Bulford motors and some other corks sat on a side-road between what had been the local garage and a newly-erected workshop of creaking scaffold-poles and bellying slatting rick-cloths, where a forge glowed and general repairs were being effected. Beneath the motors men lay on their backs and called their friends to pass them spanners, or, for pity's sake, to shove another sack under their mud-wreathed heads.

A corporal, who had been nine years a fitter and seven in a city garage, briefly and briskly outlined the more virulent diseases that develop in Government rolling-stock.



26th DIVISION





30th DIVISION



(I heard quite a lot about Bulford). Hollow voices from beneath eviscerated gear-boxes confirmed him. We withdrew to the shelter of the rick-cloth workshop — that corporal; the sergeant who had been a carpenter, with a business of his own, and, incidentally, had served through the Boer War; another sergeant who was a member of the Master Builders' Association; and a private who had also been fitter, chauffeur, and a few other things. The third sergeant, who kept a poultry-farm in Surrey, had some duty elsewhere.

A man at a carpenter's bench was finishing a spoke for a newly-painted cart. He squinted along it.

"That's funny", said the master builder. "Of course in his own business he'd chuck his job sooner than do wood-work. But it's *all* funny".

"What I grudge", a sergeant struck in, "is havin' to put mechanics to loading and unloading beef. That's where modified conscription for the beauties that won't roll up 'ld be useful to *us*. We want hewers of wood, we do. And I'd hew'em!"

"I want that file". This was a private in a hurry, come from beneath an unspeakable Bulford. Some one asked him musically if he "would tell his wife in the morning who he was with tonight".

"You'll find it in the tool-chest", said the sergeant. It was his own sacred tool-chest which he had contributed to the common stock.

"And what sort of men have you got in this unit?" I asked.

"Every sort you can think of. There isn't a thing you couldn't have made here if you wanted to. But" — the corporal, who had been a fitter, spoke with fervour — "you can't expect us to make big-ends, can you? That five-ton Bulford lorry out there in the wet —"

"And she isn't the worst", said the master builder. "But it's all part of the game. *And* so funny when you come to think of it. Me painting carts, and certificated plumbers loading frozen beef!"

"What about the discipline?" I asked.

The corporal turned a fitter's eye on me. "The mechanism is the discipline", said he, with most profound truth. "Jockeyin" a sick car on the road is discipline, too. *What* about the discipline?" He turned to the sergeant with the carpenter's chest. There was one sergeant of Regulars, with twenty years' service behind him and a knowledge of human nature. He struck in.

"*You* ought to know. You've just been made corporal", said that ser-

geant of Regulars.

"Well, there's so much which everybody knows has got to be done that — that — why, we all turn in and do it", quoth the corporal. "*I* don't have any trouble with my lot".


"Yes: that's how the case stands" said the sergeant of Regulars. "Come and see our stores".

They were beautifully arranged in a shed which felt like a monastery after the windy, clashing world without; and the young private who acted as checker — he came from some railway office — had the thin, keen face of the cleric.

"We're in billets in the town", said the sergeant who had been a carpenter. "But I'm a married man. I shouldn't care to have men billeted on *us* at home, an' I don't want to inconvenience other people. So I've knocked up a bunk for myself on the premises. It's handier to the stores, too".


«The humour of it»

We entered what had been the local garage. The mechanical transport were in full possession, tinkering the gizzards of more cars. We discussed




31st DIVISION





32nd DIVISION



chewed-up gears (samples to hand), and the civil population's old-time views of the military. The corporal told a tale of a clergyman in a Midland town who, only a year ago, on the occasion of some manœuvres, preached a sermon warning his flock to guard their womenfolk against the soldiers.

"And when you think — when you *know*", said the corporal, "what life in those little towns really is!" He whistled.

"See that old landau", said he, opening the door of an ancient wreck jammed against a wall. "That's two of our chaps' dressing-room. They don't care to be billeted, so they sleep" 'tween the landau and the wall. It's handier for their work, too. Work comes in at all hours. I wish I was cavalry. There's some use in cursing a horse".

Truly, it's an awful thing to belong to a service where speech brings no alleviation.

"*You!*" A private with callipers turned from the bench by the window. "You'd die outside of a garage. But what you said about civilians and soldiers is all out of date now".

The sergeant of Regulars permitted himself a small, hidden smile. The private with the callipers had been some twelve weeks a soldier.

"I don't say it isn't", said the corporal. "I'm saying what it used to be".

"We-ell", the private screwed up the callipers, "didn't you feel a lit-

tle bit that way yourself — when you were a civilian?"

"I — I don't think I did". The corporal was taken aback. "I don't think I ever thought about it".

"Ah! *There* you are!" said the private, very drily.

Some one laughed in the shadow of the landau dressing-room. "Anyhow, we're all in it now, Private Percy", said a voice.

There must be a good many thousand conversations of this being held all over England nowadays. Our breed does not warble much about patriotism or Fatherland, but it has a wonderful sense of justice, even when its own shortcomings are concerned.

We went over to the drill-shed to see the men paid.

The first man I ran across there was a sergeant who had served in the Mounted Infantry in the South African picnic that we used to call a war. He had been a private chauffeur for some years — long enough to catch the professional look, but was joyously reverting to service type again.

The men lined up, were called out, saluted emphatically at the pay-table, and fell back with their emoluments. They smiled at each other.

An *it's all so funny*, murmured the master builder in my ear. "About a quarter — no, less than a quarter — of what one'd be making on one's own!"

"Fifty bob a week, cottage, and all found, I was. An' only two cars to look after", said a voice behind. "An' if I'd been asked — simply *asked* — to lie down in the mud all the afternoon —!" The speaker looked at his wages with awe. Some one wanted to know, *sotto voce*, if "that was union rates", and the grin spread among the uniformed experts. The joke, you will observe, lay in situations thrown up, businesses abandoned, and pleasant prospects cut short at the nod of duty. "Thank Heaven! said one of them at last, "it's too dark to work on those blessed Bulfords any more to-day. We'll get ready for the concert".

But it was not too dark, half an hour later, for my car to meet a big lorry storming back in the wind and the wet from the northern camps. She gave me London allowance — half one inch between hub and hub — swung her corner like a Brooklands professional, changed gear for the uphill with a sweet click, and charged away. For aught I knew, she was driven by and ex-"fifty-bob-a-week-a-cottage-and-all-found"-er, who next month might be dodging shells with her and thinking it *all so funny*".

Horse, Foot, even the Guns may sometimes get a little rest, but so long as men eat thrice a day there is no rest for the Army Service Corps. They carry the campaign on their all-sustaining backs.


RUDYARD KIPLING's testimony on the British Army of 1915

ITALY'S WAR

SCENES FROM

by

G. M. TREVELYAN



My heart goes out of the poor little families all over this great kingdom who stood the brunt and strain of the war, and gave their men gladly to make other men free, and other women and children free. These are the people, and many like them, to whom, after all, we owe the glory of this great achievement.

PRESIDENT WILSON AT ROME,
January 3, 1919

CHAPTER III

THE ISONZO FRONT, 1915-1916

Monte Sabotino - The Quisca road - The bad winter - Battle and cholera - The King - Mountain roads and road-making - The *genio* - Fiats and mules

The frontier of three hundred miles of high Alps, extending in an undulating line from the Stelvio, on the Swiss border, down by Lago di Garda, up again through the Carnic, and down again to the Julian Alps, had been rushed in the first days of the war. The Italians has secured for themselves good positions on the enemy side of the watershed, which gave then a sense of security behind the back of their offensive on the more practicable Isonzo front. Neither party, until the Austrians in May 1916, attempted any serious advance anywhere on the immense stretch of the higher Alps.

The southernmost Alpine giant, Monte Nero, towers high above Caporetto and Tolmino. Its capture by the Alpini in June 1915, one of the finest feats in the whole European war, aroused the almost incredulous admiration of Lord Kitchener when he saw its precipitous cliffs during his visit that November. Thence down to the sea the mountains are relatively lower. For at Tolmino the Isonzo plunges southwards into a deep gorge between wooded hills only some 2,000 feet high — that is to say, as high as the higher Lake mountains of England, and, on the average, as steep. After turning the shoulder of Monte Sabotino, the clear blue stream rushed out into the little plain, girt by fruit-bearing hills, where lies the city of Gorizia.

Behind this gorge of the Middle Isonzo the Austrians had retired, as behind a deep moat ready dug for them by nature. But where the river begins to debouch into the plain they had kept on the Italian bank two strong outposts, Monte Sabotino and the wooded Oslavia-Podgora ridge. They held them till August 1916 against a series of the fiercest attacks, and so long as they held them they could continue to occupy Gorizia. Farther to the south, while the Lower Isonzo wanders off through the great plain of Aquileia to the sea, the bare tableland of the Carso protected the more direct approaches to Trieste. Such were the scenes famous now for ever in Italian history, where hundreds of thousands of the best youth of Italy shed their blood in attacks that were not fruitless, for a cause which time has crowned with success.

Our cars, in the first days of September 1915, were sent up to be stationed, some at Quisca over against Monte Sabotino, and some at Vipulzano for the service of the Podgora fighting. In those two villages they remained quartered till they went on into Gorizia in the days of its capture.

When the Italian war broke out, Sabotino was a stronghold of nature and of art. On the side towards the Isonzo gorge, of which



CORPO DRAGONI TOSCANI "Lancieri di Firenze"

we saw much at a later date, it fell in wooded precipices straight down into the river. But on the side which in 1915 faced the Italian outposts, the mountain presented a glacis of limestone rock sloping away to east and south from its triangular summit. Athwart this immense natural glacis the Austrians had, during the months of Italian neutrality, blasted out in the limestone surface a deep trench, which the Italians called *par excellence* the *trincerone*. They had also hollowed out for themselves great chambers in the rock, where thousands of men could shelter during the preliminary bombardments of twenty-four or forty-eight hours' duration, which in those early days of the war always preceded attack. Against these previously prepared defences the Italians on the open glacis of the mountain had to push forward such trenches as they could improvise, scraping them out in the interstices of the rocks, or piling loose stones into walls like the roughest of those on our own northern moors. It was a contest on unequal terms.

These operations on the face of the mountain we used to watch from the vineyards behind our house at Quisca, two miles from Sabotino as the crow flies across a deep valley of chestnut woods. The Austrians were

always invisible, deep in their *trincerone* and its communicating passages. But we could see the Italian outposts crouching behind their stone walls, and on the occasions when anybody moved in the open — that is, on the days of Italian attack at sunset — we could see every figure with absolute distinctness till night obscured the scene.

In the other direction we looked from our perch at Quisca over as fair a view as there was in any zone of war: fruit-laden hills in the foreground falling steeply away to Cormons and the great plain; the plain itself in its vastness, broken in the distance only by the giant campanile of Aquileia and by the silver windings of the Lower Isonzo; the Carso and its puffs of shell smoke; Podgora ridge, green with waving woods in the summer when the Italians first came, but already stripped and scarred by shell fire into a brown-red hue, catching the eye from far; and the quiet Adriatic bounding the scene where so many myriads were transacting so strange a business.

Indeed, from Quisca so large a strip of the European war-line was visible at a glance that in mental vision one saw it all, from the Flanders flats to the foothills of Jura; jumping peaceful Switzerland, on again from Stelvio snows to here; and then, far to the north, the wavering, shifting line of misery rolling back and back over the infinite Russian steppes. One sat above, like Thomas Hardy over his Napoleonic puppet-show. Was this

LA CARICA "Genova Cavalleria"



soit à pied soit à cheval mon honneur est sans égal

modern war in 1915 was still in its infancy: though Sabotino was one of the most important theatres of Italian operations, the force of artillery on either side was still very small in numbers and calibre, judged by the standard of two years later. The *trincerone* suffered little from the prolonged bombardments of that winter. The Austrians in reply shelled our road, and their fire broke up most of the houses and hamlets along it, except only that half of Quisca in which we and our friends of the 4th Italian Sanità section lived, which was protected from enemy sight by a knoll.

But the wonder is that the Austrians did not contrive to do more harm to this road, then the one and only means the Italians had of feeding their battle-line against Sabotino and Oslavia. A more exposed artery of traffic it would be difficult to image. For most of the way from San Martino through Quisca to San Floriano it ran along the top of a ridge if full sight of the enemy on Sabotino, and before July 1916 there was no screening. Sometimes they stopped all passage by a few hours' steady shelling on one spot; but then, just when things were beginning to be serious for the Italian communications, they would turn their attention somewhere else, and allow the road to be mended and traffic to be resumed.


The bulk of the Italian supplies, of course,

too as purposeless as that had been? Would it leave that mere bitter memory, but vaster far, for the poets of a later age to mourn over in melodious outcries against deaf heaven and the senseless gods? Our faith was that this time it was far other. Even Hardy shared that faith with us. This time it was the Peoples warring the last great war to tame and bind the Dynasts. We had only to win! It would be no Leipzig this time, enslaving while it freed.

But winning just then was so horribly dubious, with that still shifting line on the Russian steppes and in martyred Serbia. And when Hardy's spectator cast his visionary eye over the waste Atlantic, he saw, indeed, the English guardships and the ships of England going through the wreaths of spray, but beyond, where most he strained his eye to see the shore of a mighty nation astir, was still mere rolling cloud-swathe over a hidden land. Behind that ominous, bright cloud, what was the Great Scene-shifter preparing for the fifth act of Hardy's new world-drama, "The Peoples"? The cloud lay impenetrable on Columbia's shores. The scene moved heavily back to Quisca street and the murmured talk of Italian muleteers in the night.

We were still, little as we thought it, only at the beginning of the second act. And

LA CARROZZA "Lancieri di Montebello"



Provenienza di Cavalleria (Montebello di Juss)

came up after dusk. The most difficult task which our ambulances had to perform that winter was to make their way to and for between Quisca and Cormons through the blocked mules, lorries, and infrantry, in the utter darkness and rain of the winter nights, when to show a light would be to invoke danger for all. The mountain road, constructed for peasants' carts, not for the traffic on an army, had not yet been taken in hand by the *genio* (engineers). It was in places extremely narrow, it was often from one to two feet deep in greasy mud, and it wound in sharp curves along the side of twenty - to - forty-foot drops. Those of our number who had been in Flanders the winter before said that the driving from Quisca was far more difficult and the roads much worse.

For hours every night it was impossible to get a move on at all in the one narrow street of Quisca, where the up-coming and down-going columns of lorries and mules met each other punctual as the clock every night at ten, and held each other up for hours. Night after night I used to call in our good friends the Italian officers of the 4th Sezione Sanità to help untangle the coil in which our ambulances were bound. The line thus held fast often stretched a good mile on either side of the village. Every one was extraordinarily patient and good-natured, as the Italian way is — too much so, we sometimes thought. Why the Austrians never fired at night on this helpless target I cannot conceive. They had the range of the road to a hairs-breadth.

As to road management, it is an English speciality, or obsession. The blood of the coaching days runs in our veins, and we each carry across the sea the soul of a Piccadilly policeman. "*Caelum non animum mutant*". The Italian Carabinieri — whose cocked hats are now familiar to many in our island since the famous visit of their band — have the finest tradition of any standing military police force in the world. The are men picked among their fellows — just, fearless in the presence of authority, and altogether good to deal with, as we often found. They had, in our eyes, one failing only: they did not understand road management. But that too some of them learned from the British army in 1918, and I hope the art will spread through Italy after the war.

In daylight our ambulances were among the chief users of the road, and often had to run the gauntlet. The enemy could see the red cross clearly enough, but cared no more about it on cars than on the dressing-stations and field hospitals, which they systematically destroyed along the same road. Respect for the Red Cross seems to vary with the artillery colonel, or, perhaps, with the general of division. When the enemy were on Santa Caterina and San Gabriele in 1917, our cars ran daily beyond Gorizia to Salcano at the foot of these mountains safely in open daylight, when nothing else could start with impunity before night-fall. It was not so on the Quisca road, nor always so near Gorizia. Men vary in humanity, in the Austrian army as elsewhere.



COMBATTIMENTO DELLA SFORZESCA "Piemonte Cavalleria"

A curious legend grew up this first winter among our Italian friends at Quisca. I have since been told the apocryphal story half a dozen times by different Italian officers in different zones of the war. The legend is that one of our drivers carrying Austrian wounded was shelled; that he accordingly stopped the car, and when the inmates clamoured to him in their strange tongues to go on, he lit his pipe, and told them that he would wait with them under fire for five minutes, in order that when they returned to Austria they might tell their people that the Austrian artillery really did fire on ambulances!

On October 19, 1915, the Italian preliminary bombardment began on Monte Sabotino, and till the end of November a prologed winter offensive was sustained against all the positions protecting Gorizia. It was the least successful of all the great Italian offensives; but for a display of sustained gallantry by hundreds of thousands, under heavy losses and most discouraging conditions of cholera and winter weather, it was a story of which any race could well be proud. How often in the chill October sunsets I watched from Quisca hill the Granatieri moving forward from behind their stone walls across the gla-

cis of Sabotino into the falling cloud of night and doom; then in a few hours the tide of stretchers began to arrive in the courtyard of the old eighteenth-century *Schloss* where the section worked, dressing the wounded as they came in, and loading them into our cars for Cormons. By midnight the whole place was littered with hundreds of prostrate, mangled forms, among whom the devoted surgeons, sleepless for days and nights on end, worked themselves far beyond their strength in the struggle to keep level with the insistent flood; and always towards dawn, amid the grim scene, made grimmer by the cold, returning twilight, the discouraging rumour from the front ran round — "*è andato male*". Yes, badly has it gone, my brave friends, for the time, but not vainly; 1918 shall make amends for 1915, and without your sacrifice now the final victory can never be bought.

In November, as the offensive still continued, renewed again and again, our cars worked farther along the road towards the Italian artillery centre of dressing-stations and cholera collecting centres at the front, which in the course of the month were one after the other destroyed by the enemy's fire. The cholera, derived from the enemy's trenches in this zone,(1) was at its worst, the victims dying in agony often in forty-eight or twenty-four hours, and the battle was raging all the time. The difficulty of coping with the plague in the shell-broken hamlets at the front was great; there were spa-



"NIZZA CAVALLERIA"

"Nicaea fidelis"

cious cholera hospitals provided below in the plain, but the difficulty was to get the patients down off the hills in the then state of the roads and the shortage of working ambulances which the state of the roads produced. Up at the front it was impossible to provide for the patients. I remember entering the door of a church, and finding myself alone in company with twenty men lying on the bare ground in various attitudes of despair. On looking more carefully, I saw that fifteen were dead, and the remainder just dying of cholera, too far gone even to roll an eye asking for aid. The symbols of religion looked down on this silent section of the floor of hell; it was like the scene of an allegory from Chaucer or the "Faerie Queene".

There was little of the glamour and glory of the Ventiquattro Maggio about these scenes, and I remember a cartload of stricken wretches as they arrived at one of these pest-houses crying out in bitter mockery, "Viva la guerra!" and cursing those who had drawn Italy in. It was in these nights of mud and blood up on the San Floriano ridge that I first got an insight into the undercurrent of feeling against the war among the peasant soldiers, gallantly as they were fighting and bravely as they were enduring incredible hardships. I wondered forebodingly whether they could stand it for another year. They stood it for two more years before Caporetto, and recovered again after that. It is their endurance and recovery which need "explaining" — not Caporetto. There was no such terrorism to hold the army together as held together the Austrian army. The explanation is that, in spite of a very defective political education and much side-tracking by enemy influences, the Italian peasant at bottom loves his country, and is hardy and much enduring in body and in mind.

Every one was doing his best; but for awhile the number of victims of plague and battle together outran all possible provision in that well-nigh roadless hill region. I remember a ruined farm, in full view of the enemy on Sabotino, in and around which the cholera patients used to lie in scores; one of our cars alone carried eighty-five patients from the ill-omened spot to Quisca in one long winter's night, the driver searching about with his torch to find the cases, and helping them into the car when found. On the other side of the road there stood another house, where the surgeons gallantly struggled to deal with the constant stream of arriving wounded. On November 28th the well-beloved medical Captain Perusini, one of an



"PIEMONTE CAVALLERIA"

"venustus et audax"

"SAVOIA CAVALLERIA"
"Savoie bonnes nouvelles"

Irredentist patriot family that has paid dear for love of Italy, and one of our best friends, was mortally wounded at his post, standing beside our men in the doorway of that house. A few minutes later another shell brought down half the house on the top of the wounded inside it.

I recall those weeks of winter battle as having much the same effect on my senses as Irving's staging of "Macbeth" — scene after scene of dark days, dark nights, rain, mist, mud, through which loom out and disappear shrouded figures of the dead, the wounded, and the plague-stricken, amid the smell of chemical destructives and houses freshly ruined.

Finally, in first week of December a Scotch mist — *nebbia Inglese* the Italians call it — settled down and lay immovable on the scene of strife and misery, and the Italians reluctantly admitted that Gorizia must wait till next year.

A familiar sight on the roads at the front during this arduous winter was a simple touring car crowded with six or seven Italian officers, one of whom was the King. Every one knew that Victor Emmanuel and his family and relations were doing their duty at the front. No one has ever called a member of the Casa Savoia *imboscato*, and that has negatively been a political asset of great consequence. Further, the soldiers found out that the King was a thorough democrat, both politically and humanly; that his heart was touched by their sufferings and sacrifices, a point about which they were always liable to be suspicious in the case of army commanders. About the King, at any rate, there was nothing haughty or remote. His constant perambulation of the front was his way of thanking the army. Quiet and shy, with an "English" manner which has oddly distinguished several of the makers of modern Italy, he none the less knew how to make himself respected and loved. Duty and democracy are his two watchwords, not a bad combination for a soldier king nowadays. His dislike of the theatrical and politically pretentious side of the "All Highest" business has proved, dynastically and otherwise, the safest line after all. The difference between Italian and German political ideals was perfectly represented by the difference between the heads of the two States. It is remarkable that in the course of ages the descendants of Tacitus's "free Germans" should have fallen to Byzantinism, while the descendants of those who burnt incense to the Roman emperors are as free from that



"GENOVA CAVALLERIA"
*"Soit à pied, soit à cheval
mon honneur est sans égal"*

"LANCIERI DI NOVARA"

"*albis ardua*"

particular form of political snobbery as any people in the world.

The King's interest in us during the first months of our service in his army, and his public appreciation of our efforts, was altogether like himself, and I shall never cease to be grateful for it.

When that dark winter had passed away, the spring and summer of 1916 were brighter days in every sense. In the spring great victories of Italian organization and labour bettered the lot of the soldier, and prepared the ground scientifically for the successful renewal of the offensive in August.

The first victory, though negative, was immensely important. The cholera was conquered. "We were confronted", writes Colonel Filippo de Filippi,(2) "by a triple problem". (a) We had to localize the outbreak, and prevent its diffusion among the whole army; (b) we had to prevent the epidemic from spreading to Italy; (c) we had to provide for the isolation and cure of the patients. The problem was faced and radically solved by the combined effort of the civil and military sanitary organization, whose united efforts won what was, perhaps, one of the greatest battles of the whole war". Measures of isolation and quarantine on a vast and well-organized plan produced the desired result, and the cholera was never heard of again.(3) "These measures were supplemented by a strict surveillance of drinking water, food, and hygienic conditions of the houses, barracks, etc. The supply of drinking water required special organization. Owing to the scarcity of springs on the tablelands to the north of Vicenza, by the Isonzo and on the Carso, it became necessary to organize the transport of water by lorries or by pumps and waterpipes, and by the building of reservoirs. The troops on the Asiago tableland alone required 100,000 gallons of water per day."

Henceforth, as I have seen again and again, on Podgora, Sabotino, Kuk, or on whatever hard-fought ridge or summit the Italian soldier planted his foot, in a few days a water-pipe and a *teleferica* (aerial railway) had followed him up to his new trenches on the height, and in a few weeks a good road for lorries and ambulances had reached the summit.

The *genio* (engineers) is a magnificent branch of the army. All over the world, in both hemispheres, there are Italian civil engineers of great and varied individual ability pushing their own fortunes. These men, answering their country's call when the war broke out, came back to form the military

"LANCIERI DI AOSTA"

"*Aösta d'fer*"





"LANCIERI DI MILANO"

"*Sic personat virtus*"

genio that has won so much foreign admiration. I knew several of these officers well, and it is difficult to find abler or finer men. From the spring of 1916 onwards hundreds of thousands of labourers, civil and military, were put at their disposition — the myriads who usually form the annual "emigration" of Italian labour abroad. For hard work the Italian navy has no superior, and, perhaps, no equal. Hence the miracles of road-making, light-railway laying, *baracca*-building, bridging of rivers, boring out in the solid rock of trenches and underground galleries of immense size and complexity and in infinite number, and looping up of mountain tops with a system of aerial railways, that have distinguished the war both on the Isonzo and the high Alpine fronts.

Any one who saw the transformation scene wrought on the vast Italian war front in 1916, schemed, organized, and carried through entirely by Italian brains and hands, without any German bottle-holder, as in the case of the Austrian army, will certainly never believe the foolish and timid cry of a certain section of Italians that Italy could never stand by herself, but must needs depend on Germany. It was not for want of skill in native brains and hands that Italy just failed in 1917 to crush the Austrian armies, but simply from the want of moral self-confidence, which these whimperers had themselves engendered. Italy may look back with pride on her own material achievement in the war zone, and say with regard to her own future in peace, "Not Germany, nor another. *Italia farà da se.*" If she can say that with her heart she has an immense future before her. Her birth-rate is higher, her common people more diligent than those of other nations. She is the land of many children. They play in a group round every farm door. There are no "small families" here. And they are a study brood when they grow to manhood. All they need is native leadership; and after what I have seen of the *genio* in war time I have hopes that they can get it.

Of all miracles of the *genio*, the roads naturally concerned us most. In January 1916 they were so bad that one day we went out from Quisca and ourselves mended a small stretch where our ambulances could not pass for the slough, by the simple process of putting a neighbouring wall bodily into the mud. (4) But in the spring the great work was taken in hand, and in an incredibly short space of time the Italian front had better roads, some remade and some new, than any front in the war — far better than the



"LANCIERI DI MONTEBELLO"

"*impetu hostem perterreo*"



"LANCIERI DI FIRENZE"

*"con l'animo che vince"
ogni battaglia"*

Austrian roads, as we found to our cost when we advanced on to the Bainsizza. The other armies of the world might have learnt much from the Italian road-makers. The work was rendered the easier by the presence of rock or gravel near the surface all through the hills and plains on the Italian war front. There were numbers of steam rollers employed, with the result that the surface as well as the engineering of these war roads was excellent. Before the war Italian roads, though well engineered, were far from smooth, as the steam roller was then rare.

It was a glorious country for those who, like us, were constantly moving along this magnificent network of new roads, over fruit-laden hills round Gorizia, or along high limestone ridges, cloven by the deep gorge of the blue rushing Isonzo, often with the wide prospect of plain and sea, and even the Istrian mountains beyond Trieste visible over the top of the distant Carso.

Our fellow-wayfarers on these wonderful roads, besides the slow-moving, patient infantry, and the flitting staff-cars, were Fiat lorry driver and muleteers.

The Italian Fiat driver is skilful. In the exuberance of the early years of the war he sometimes trusted too much to his skill, and was given to causing surprises round corners. The fact that the rule of the road — right or left — differs in different provinces and cities of Italy sometimes caused accidents, until it became impressed on the general imagination that in the war zone one kept to the right. But the skill, endurance, and courage of the Italian Fiat driver I have seen put to the proof again and again. As a mechanic, too, he is handily and quick to learn. The Italians take more naturally to the care and conduct of machines than ever they did to animals, and that is one reason why I believe Italy has a great future before her in the industrial age.

Of the wonders of the Turin Fiat works in war time, and their ninety camions turned out daily, all the world has heard. But only those who have seen the long string of these lorries at their unending war task on the mountain sides can judge what the Fiat has meant to Italy. What the bullock was to the old Balkan wars, the Fiat and the mule have been to the Italian war. As a hill climber the Fiat is unequalled. Neither Talbot nor Buick — the latter, in our experience, the best hill climber, year in year out, among British and American ambulances — can equal the Fiat for the daily grind up steep ascents of many



"CAVALLEGGERI DI SALUZZO"

"quo fata vocant"

thousand feet. Up to all the incredible places whither the *genio* led their spiral roads, the Fiats brought the heaviest stores of war; and in the critical moments of the summer battles of 1916, 1917, and 1918 they whisked the infantry by hundreds of thousands between the Trentino, Asiago, and Isonzo fronts as occasion required, so enabling the Italian command to avail itself to the full of its solitary geographical advantage over the enemy — the inner line of communications.

The carrying of the wounded by the Italian regular army ambulances was also done by Fiats, and nobly did the men and cars stand up to the work. But the Fiat, perfect as a mountain lorry, has a fault as an ambulance. Though it takes the hills splendidly, it vibrates too much for the comfort of the patients inside, and it is difficult to drive it slow — an important part of the art when bad cases are on board. I also think that our British ambulances had better bodies than the Italians; our system of stretcher racks makes it possible to load the bus in two or three minutes, while the elaborate Italian system of slings often takes a quarter of an hour or more loading. For work under fire, or whenever speed of evacuation is desirable, quick loading is very important. On the other hand, their big bodies took six stretchers to our four. But again the passage down the middle of our bodies enabled us to carry sitting cases with the stretchers. Anyhow it was a friendly rivalry.

I have said that the Italian drives and manages motors better than animals. But much praise is due to the patient Italian muleteers, whom I have so often met at night, on screened and silent roads and slippery mountain paths up Santo, Kuk, or Gabriele, going and coming along the shelled mule track on their comfortless, dangerous, wearisome mission, unthanked. No change has been more marked in Italy since I first knew it twenty years ago than the improved treatment of horses and mules. But the war has quickened the pace of that reform, for the need for "war economy" of beasts of draught or burden by means of proper grooming and feeding was from the first understood by the military authorities, and soon became a habit with the muleteers and drivers which they will doubtless carry back with them to their farms when the war is over.

The Italian cavalry officer's mounts, many of them bought in Ireland, were splendid animals, and their riders were often magnificent performers, known in European competitions. But, to go forward a little, I recall with pride the genuine pleasure of our Italian Allies at their first sight of the broad-bottomed, glossy-coated cart-horses of the British army, and its longhaired giant mules. A friend of mine, then a medical Major, used in 1918 to run downhill from his quarters

every day to admire the passage of a convoy of English carts, and embrace the horses' heads. It was he, by the way, who told me that he had one day, to his great amusement, seen a British Tommy, going home on leave, try to buy a cocked hat from a carabinieri on duty, to take home as a trophy. The sum he finally ran up to in his offers was fabulous, but he did not get the hat!

When I first knew this young Major Spelta three years before, he was a captain surgeon in the 4th Sanità at Quisca. It was at Quisca mess that I first learnt what very good company Italian officers could be. How wonderfully the conversational ball was kept rolling, mostly about good-natured nothings, but never flagging, never dull! Of the many good things said, I remember only one transferable from its human context. A soldier with a great and misshapen nose had come in with a message; when he had gone, one of our surgeons said to his brethren, "Quel naso fa torto alla chirurgia Italiana" ("That nose is a disgrace to Italian surgery"). When, at due intervals, the conversation fell on politics, history, and war, it struck me that not less good sense and much more historical knowledge than is the portion of the educated Englishman, were common among Italian officers. On rarer occasions a loud-voiced controversy arose like a sudden tornado between two combatants, till both were finally stalking about the room and shouting together in a manner highly diverting but quite inaudible to the spectators. Then suddenly down they would sit; the tornado had passed.

Oh, we were never dull in the Quarta

Sezione Sanità at Quisca! Geoffrey Young and I will always be grateful to that gay company for taking us strangers so completely to its heart. And least of all shall we forget its President, Major (now Colonel) Celio Nota, of Torino, whose humour, warmth of heart, good sense, and absolute devotion to the service of the wounded enabled him to fill to perfection the difficult post of medical chief at Quisca in that first terrible winter.

G.M. Trevelyan

Continue

NOTES

(1) The Austrians had also brought cholera with them into Serbia during their unsuccessful invasion in the autumn of 1914. Fortunately it did not spread among the Serbians — almost the only plague that did not that winter. But in December 1914, at Shabatz on the Danube, I saw houses recently evacuated by the Austrians marked in German as reserved for cholera.

(2) "On some Special Problems of the Italian Medical War Services". Reprinted from the *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine*, 1918, vol. xi.

(3) There had been 14,000 cases in the Italian army, of whom 46 per cent died. It was worst in our Gorizia zone.

(4) That day's work made me for the first time in my life understand the temptation and half forgive the vandalism of General Wade, who made the western part of the road from Newcastle to Carlisle passable by putting down into it the Roman Wall!



IL CAVALLO

THE GUARD OF HONOUR AT THE



QUIRINALE PALACE



It ensures the Honour Service and contributes to the Security Services in the Palace of the President of the Republic.

It is normally provided daily by units of the three Services and is commanded by a Captain.

Also taking part in this service, once a year, are the Military Academies, as well as the Army, Navy, Air Force and "Guardia di Finanza" NCO Schools.

The changing of the Guard takes place daily with a suggestive ceremony.

This brochure concerns the Army units stationed in the Capital — represented with their Coat of Arms and their historical uniforms — which carry out the service with more frequency.





CORAZZIERI



The Carabinieri of the President of the Republic, better known as "Corazzieri" for the cuirass they wear, are selected specifically for their outstanding physical appearance as well as for their qualities and marked military aptitude. They have the prerogative of serving as honour guards and escorts to the President, and carry out security and ceremonial duties inside the Quirinale.

Their origins date back to the second half of the 16th century and are connected with the history of the Guards, selected as Escort of Honour to royal cortèges and royal families. Presently, they are the oldest branch of the Carabinieri, the first Arm of the Italian Army.

The Corps, which has the responsibility of guarding the Presidential Standard, is the only unit of Carabinieri with its own "Bandiera Colonnella" and Coat of Arms.

The present uniforms derive mostly from those of 1876 and hold a place of primary importance in the history of uniforms of the Italian Armed Forces.





GRANATIERI DI SARDEGNA



The "Granatieri di Sardegna" are the oldest branch of the Infantry.

Their origins date back to 1659. On April 18 of that year, Duke Carlo Emanuele II, in Turin, disbanded with an edict the mercenary militias and founded the "Regiments of Ordinance": the first to be established was the "Regiment of the Guards", so called because it was formed by men selected for bravery and physical fitness: the "Granatieri", soldiers trained to launch a sort of hand bomb, known at the time as "granata", who were entrusted with specific tasks of honour and prestige in war and in peacetime.

In September 1943, the "Granatieri", deployed south of Rome, distinguished themselves for their great valour in the operations for the defence of the Capital.

The War Flags of the "Granatieri" - who since November 1, 1976 have been organized in three Battalions of the "Granatieri di Sardegna" mechanized Brigade - have been awarded one Cross of "Knight of the Military Order of Italy", 4 Gold Medals for Military Valour, 6 Silver Medals for Military Valour and 2 Bronze Medals for Military Valour, for the military actions performed during their long history.





LANCIERI DI MONTEBELLO



The "Lancieri di Montebello" mechanized Squadron assumed its present denomination on July 1, 1979. It derives its origins from the Regiment bearing the same name, which was established on September 16, 1859 and took the name of the village of Montebello, where a Cavalry Brigade, consisting of the "Novara", "Aosta", and "Monferrato" Light Cavalry Regiments, repeatedly charged the Austrians on May 20, 1859 at the beginning of the Second War of Independence.

The Standard of the "Montebello" has been awarded a Silver Medal for Military Valour for the actions performed for the defence of Rome in September 1943.



ENGLISH - ITALIAN

GLOSSARY

P

pace
broken **p.**
p. setter

pack

p. artillery
p. saddle
p. transport
pallet
palletized

p. material
panel
control **p.**
parachute
automatic **p.**

dropping **p.** supplies

emergency **p.**

free fall **p.**

p. flare

p. tray
parachutist
parade

velocità, andatura, passo
passo di strada
ufficiale con l'incarico di
regolare la velocità di
una colonna in marcia
(ufficiale di testa)
zaino, pacco, fardello,
soma
artiglieria someggiata
basto
salmeria
paletta di caricamento
palettizzato, posto in
contenitori
materiale palettizzato
pannello, quadro
quadro di comando
paracadute
paracadute ad apertura
automatica
paracadute per
aviofornitori
paracadute di
emergenza
paracadute con apertura
a comando
razzo illuminante con
paracadute
custodia per paracadute
paracadutista
parata, rassegna, rivista

paraffin

paragraph
sub-**p.**
parameter
parasite
paratroopers
park
artillery **p.**
motor **p.**
ordnance and signal
mobile **p.** (depot)
tanks **p.**
parking
no-**p.**
p.-area
part
ordnance spare **p.s**
p. time
particles
alpha **p.**
beta **p.**
neutrons
partisan
party

advance **p.**

air liaison **p.** (ALP)

paraffina, petrolio
comune
paragrafo
sottoparagrafo
parametro
parassita
truppe paracadutiste
parco
parco d'artiglieria
parco automezzi
parco mobile

parco di carri armati
parcheggio
divieto di parcheggio
zona di parcheggio
parte, pezzo
parti (pezzi) di ricambio
orario ridotto (di lavoro)
particelle
particelle alfa
particelle beta
neutroni
partigiano
gruppo, nucleo,
distaccamento, aliquota
aliquota avanzata (di
una formazione), gruppo
forieri
gruppo di collegamento
dell'Aeronautica

automobile and medical wrecker p.	nucleo di soccorso stradale	reconnaissance p.	pattuglia di esplorazione (esplorante)
beach p.	reparto di spiaggia	reconnoitring p.	pattuglia di ricognizione
key p.	aliquota chiave (principale) di una formazione	security p.	pattuglia di sicurezza
		patrolling	pattugliamento
		deterrente p.	pattugliamento deterrente
liaison p.	gruppo di collegamento	pattern	campione, modello, esempio, sistema, rosa di tiro (d'arma da fuoco)
quartering p.	nucleo forieri di alloggio	fallout p.	carta delle linee di isointensità radioattiva
reconnaissance p. (RECCE p.)	gruppo ricognizioni	organization p.	tipo di organizzazione
roped p.	cordata (nelle ascensioni)	p. bombing	bombardamento (aereo)
search and rescue p.	squadra di ricerca e soccorso	p. of combat	a tappeto
pass	1) passo, gola, valico	standard p.	tipo di combattimento
	2) permesso, lasciapassare, salvacondotto	pay	modello standard
mountain p.	passo montano	back-p.	paga, soldo, stipendio, remunerazione
overnight p.	permesso di pernottamento	extra-p.	arretrati
ramp p.	permesso di accesso alle rampe di caricamento	p.-day	gratifica
	scavalcare	p.-load (aeron.)	giorno di paga
to pass through	passaggio	p. envelope	carico pagante
passage	passaggio di ostacoli	stoppage of p.	busta paga
p. of obstacles	passaggero, viaggiatore	paymaster	sospensione del soldo
passenger (PAX)	manifesto di carico (personale)	peace	ufficiale pagatore
load manifest (passenger)	difesa passiva	p. time	pace
passive defence	parola d'ordine	pencil	tempo di pace
password	parola d'ordine e controparola	grease p.	matita
challenge and p.	sentiero, viottolo (aereo) ricognitore, esploratore	penetration	matita dermatografica
path	gruppo di esplorazione	percentage	penetrazione
pathfinder	patogeno	percussion	percentuale
p. team	microrganismo patogeno	p. fuze	percussione
pathogen	malattia, malato, infermo	p. lock	spoletta a percussione
p. micro-organism	paziente, barellato	performance	congegno di percussione
patient	paziente affetto da malattia neuropsichica	period	esecuzione, adempimento, assolvimento (di un dovere)
litter p.	paziente in grado di camminare	p. of tension	periodo
neuropsychiatric p.	pattuglia	sensitive p.	periodo di tensione
walking p.	pattuglia su mezzi protetti	study p.	periodo critico
patrol	pattuglia da combattimento	perishable	periodo di studio
carrier p.	pattuglia di sicurezza sui fianchi	p. goods	deteriorabile, deperibile
combat p.	pattuglia di collegamento	persistent	merci deperibili
flank p.	pattuglia di rastrellamento	moderately p. agent	persistente, durevole
liaison p.	pattuglia in zona di sicurezza	non-p. agent	aggressivo
mopping-up p.	piano generale di pattugliamento	p. agent	semipersistente
outpost p.		person	aggressivo fugace
overall p. plan		displaced p.	aggressivo persistente
		Very Important Person (VIP)	persona, individuo
		personnel	espatriato, profugo, perseguitato politico
		assigned p.	personaggio molto importante
		attached p.	personale
		civilian p.	personale assegnato
		detached p.	personale in rinforzo (distaccato da altri reparti)
			personale civile
			personale distaccato ad altri reparti

filler p.	personale di riserva (per sostituzioni improvvise)	p. site	che questo atterri)
key p.	personale preposto ai punti chiave di un Comando (specie personale delle trasmissioni)	piece	luogo di recupero, di raccolta, di prelievo
regular p.	personale in spe	artillery p.	pezzo
retired p.	personale in pensione	plecemeal	pezzo di artiglieria
qualified p.	personale qualificato	p. destruction	graduale
reassigned p.	personale trasferito	plercing	distruzione graduale
petrol	benzina (cfr. USA = gasoline)	armour p. (AP) cartridge	perforante
petroleum	petrolio, carburante	armour p. incendiary	cartuccia perforante
p. oils and lubricants (POL)	carburanti e lubrificanti	(API) cartridge	
pharmacy	farmacia	plle	cartuccia perforante incendiaria
field p.	farmacia campale	atomic p.	pila
phase	fase	to pile-up	pila atomica
assault p.	fase assalto	pillbox	ammassare, accatastare
deployment p.	fase spiegamento	pilot	fortino, postazione in calcestruzzo
deterrent p.	fase deterrente	automatic p.	pilota
employment p.	fase impiego	co-p.	pilota automatico
redeployment p.	fase rientro da una operazione (o esercitazione); fase rischieramento	test p.	secondo pilota
	linea di attestamento	pin	pilota collaudatore
p. line	fonetico	firing p.	spillo, punta
phonetic	alfabeto fonetico	fixed firing p.	punta del percussore
p. alphabet	simboli fonetici		percussore fisso (da mortaio)
p. signs	finto, falso	p.-point target	bersaglio piccolo, difficile
phony	falso (finto) campo minato	split-p.	coppiglia
p. minefield	fosforo	pioneer	pioniere
Phosphorus	fosforo bianco	p. platoon	plotone pionieri
plasticized white p. (PWP)	plastificato	p. unit	unità pionieri
white p. (WP)	fosforo bianco	pipe	tubo, condotto
photograph (photo)	fotografia	exhaust p.	tubo di scappamento
air p.	fotografia aerea	pipeline	conduttura, tubazione
air p. interpretation	interpretazione di fotografie aeree	oil p.	oleodotto
air p. reconnaissance	ricognizione	pistol	pistola
	aerofotografica	machine-p.	pistola mitragliatrice
dicing p.	fotografia a bassa quota	Very p.	pistola Very (da segnalazione)
p. interpreter (PI)	fotointerprete		buca, fosso
vertical air p.	fotografia aerea verticale	pit	buca, piazzola per armi
photographic	fotografico	weapon p.	chiodo (per alpinismo)
p. mission	missione aerofotografica	piton	perno
physical	fisico	pivot	perno di manovra
p. efficiency	efficienza fisica	p. of manoeuvre	posto, luogo, zona
p. exercise	esercizio fisico	place	luogo di assunzione di una formazione
p. fitness	idoneità fisica	forming-up p.	tappa
p. training	educazione fisica, ginnastica	halting p.	luogo di riunione, punto d'incontro
picket	picchetto	meeting p.	luogo di istruzioni
to pick-up	prendere, prelevare, raccogliere		luogo di istruzioni
pick-up	recupero, raccolta, prelievo (es. recupero di una capsula), prelievo di personale o materiale a mezzo elicottero (senza	p. of instructions	1) chiaro, evidente
		plain	2) piano, pianura
		p. message	messaggio in chiaro
		p. sector	settore di pianura
		plan	piano, progetto, disegno
		administrative p.	piano logistico
		air loading p.	amministrativo
		air movement p.	piano di caricamento
		alternate p.	aereo
			piano di trasporto aereo
			piano alternativo

ammunition dumping p.	piano di ammassamento munizioni	platform	piattaforma, piano
attack p.	piano di attacco	launching p.	piattaforma di lancio
barrage p.	piano di sbarramento	loading p.	piano caricatore
barrier p.	piano ostacoli	platoon (pl)	plotone
casualty evacuation p.	piano di sgombero feriti e ammalati	antitank p.	plotone controcarri
contingency p.	piano di contingenza	machine-gun p.	plotone mitraglieri
coordinated fire p.	piano di coordinamento del fuoco	mortar p.	plotone mortai
counterattack p.	piano di contrattacco	pioneer p.	plotone pionieri
counterpreparation p.	piano di simulazione	rifle p.	plotone fucilieri
deception p.	piano d'inganno	scout p.	plotone esploratori
defence p.	piano di difesa	signal communications p.	plotone trasmissioni
dispersal p.	piano di diradamento	support p.	plotone di rincalzo
embarkation p.	piano d'imbarco	tank p.	plotone carri
exercise p.	piano di esercitazione	weapons p.	plotone armi
fire p.	piano dei fuochi	plotting	localizzazione, determinazione
fire support p.	piano del fuoco d'appoggio	p. of a target	determinazione di un obiettivo
flight p.	piano di volo	p.-scale	scala di riferimento
general defence p. (GDP)	piano difesa d'emergenza	plug	spina, tappo, candela
information collection p.	piano di ricerca informativa	base p.	tappo di fondello (di bossolo)
intelligence collection p.	piano generale delle informazioni	connecting p.	spina di contatto
loading p.	piano di caricamento	contact p.	morsetto d'attacco
logistic p.	piano dei servizi logistici	fusible p.	fusibile a tappo
manoeuvre p.	piano di manovra	sparkling p.	candela d'accensione
mobilization p.	piano di mobilitazione	point	punto, posto, punta
movement p.	piano di movimento	ambulance p.	posto avanzato di raccolta e sgombero (sanitario)
nuclear strike p. (NSP)	piano di attacco nucleare	ammunition distributing p.	posto distribuzione munizioni
operation p. (OPLAN)	piano di operazione	ammunition supply p. (ASP)	posto munizioni
outline p.	piano preliminare	check p.	posto di controllo del traffico, punto di inquadramento
overall patrol p.	piano generale di pattugliamento	contact p.	punto di contatto
preliminary p.	piano preventivo	control p.	punto di controllo, posto di riconoscimento
preparation fire p.	piano di preparazione	coordinating p.	punto di contatto e coordinamento
signal communications p.	piano delle trasmissioni	critical p.	punto critico
strategical concentration transportation p.	piano trasporti di radunata	delivery p. (DP)	posto di distribuzione temporaneo
surveillance p.	piano di sorveglianza	detrucking p.	punto di scarico automezzi
tentative p. of employment	ipotesi di impiego	distributing p.	posto di distribuzione
transportation p.	piano dei trasporti	entry p.	punto di entrata
plane (abbr. of airplane)	aeroplano, aereo, apparecchio	entrucking p.	posto di caricamento automezzi
cargo p.	aereo da carico	exit p.	punto di uscita
four-engined p.	quadrimotore	grid intersection p. (GIP)	punto d'intersezione del reticolo
passenger p.	aereo passeggeri	initial p. (IP)	punto di incolonnamento principale
planned	pianificato	interlinking p.	punto di saldatura
planner	pianificatore	key p.	punto chiave (sensibile)
planning	pianificazione	limiting p.	punto limite
fire p.	pianificazione del fuoco	litter relay p.	posto sosta feriti
general p.	pianificazione generale	loading p.	posto di caricamento
p. instructions	istruzioni sulla pianificazione		
plate	targa		

overlap p.	punto di saldatura dei fuochi	defensive p.	posizione difensiva
p. of impact	punto d'impatto	delaying p.	posizione ritardatrice
prisoner of war		dummy p.	posizione simulata
collecting p.		final defence p.	posizione di contenimento
reference p.	posto di raccolta dei prigionieri di guerra	firing p.	base di fuoco, centro di fuoco
refuelling p.	punto di riferimento	fortified p.	posizione fortificata
release p. (RP)	posto carburanti	gun p.	linea pezzi (art.)
rendez-vous p.	punto di deflusso	hostile p.	posizione nemica
	punto d'incontro, di congiungimento	Key p.	posizione chiave (vitale, importante)
start p.	punto di partenza	organized p.	posizione organizzata
straggler collecting p.	punto di raccolta sbandati (dispersi)	strategic p.	posizione strategica
strong p.	caposaldo	supplementary p.	posizione integrativa, sussidiaria
supply p. (SP)	posto di rifornimento	temporary blocking p.	posizione di arresto temporaneo
trig p.	punto trigonometrico	unoccupied p.	posizione non occupata (predisposta)
vantage p.	punto dominante	weakly organized p.	posizione mediamente organizzata
water p. (WP)	punto acqua		sistemato
water supply p. (WSP)	posto di rifornimento acqua	positioned	possibile
point of advance guard	punta di avanguardia	possible	al più presto possibile
p. of contact	punto di contatto	as soon as p. (ASAP)	posta
p. paper	appunto	post	posta militare
poison	veleno, tossico	military p.	posto
blood p.	tossico del sangue	post	posto di controllo aereo
poisoning	avvelenamento, intossicazione	air control p. (ACP)	posto comando
polar	polare	command p. (CP)	
p. circle	circolo polare	control and reporting p. (CPR)	posto di controllo e riporto
p. coordinates	coordinate polari	ground observation p. (COP)	posto di avvistamento ottico
p. distance	distanza polare	listening p.	posto ascolto
pole	polo	observation p. (OP)	posto osservazione, osservatorio
magnetic p.	polo magnetico	out p.	avamposto, avanzatura, elemento in zona di sicurezza
North p.	polo Nord	regulating p.	posto di regolazione del traffico
p. star	stella polare	staging p.	posto sosta
positive (negative) p.	polo positivo (negativo)	tactical command p. (TAC)	posto comando tattico
police	polizia	traffic control p.	posto di controllo del traffico, posto di segnalazione (stradale)
Military p. (MP)	Polizia Militare	posted	appostato, sistemato
policy	politica, linea di condotta, tattica	poster	manifesto
Commander p.	linea di condotta (tattica) del Comandante	mobilization p.	manifesto di mobilitazione
logistic policy and guidance	guida logistica	post-exchange (PX)	spaccio militare (USA), rivendita di generi vari
pollution	inquinamento, contaminazione	potential	potenziale
water p.	inquinamento dell'acqua	p. enemy	nemico potenziale
pontoon	pontone, chiatte	pouch	borsa, sacchetto
p. bridge	ponte di chiatte	cartridge p.	giberna
port	porto	first aid p.	borsa per pacchetto medicazione
disembarkation p.	porto di sbarco		
portable	portatile		
p. radio communications (PRC)	apparato radio portatile		
p. steel bridge	ponte metallico scomponibile		
posltion	posizione		
alternate p.	posizione alternativa		
assault p.	distanza d'assalto		
attack p.	base di partenza per l'attacco		
battle p.	posizione di resistenza		

pound (lb)	1) libbra (pari a 454 grammi circa, 2) sterlina, lira sterlina	p. channel	canale di frequenza
p. s per square inch (psi)	libbre per pollice quadrato	press	predisposto
power	potenza, energia, capacità	p. information	stampa
allied p. s	potenze alleate	p. warrant	informazione stampa
combat p.	capacità combattiva	pressure	autorizzazione a stampare
explosive p.	potenza esplosiva	atmospheric p.	pressione
fire p.	potenza di fuoco	pressurized	pressione atmosferica
p. plant	apparato motore	to prevent	pressurizzato
p. source	fonte di energia, alimentatore di un apparato	to p. the enemy movement	prevenire
powerful	potente, forte	preventive	prevenire il movimento del nemico
practise	pratica, esercizio, esercitazione, scuola di tiro	p. measures	preventivo
field p.	tattica militare	pride	misure preventive
service p.	esercitazione a fuoco dell'artiglieria	military p.	orgoglio, fiera
target p.	esercitazione di tiro al bersaglio	to prime	orgoglio militare
to practise	esercitare, esercitarsi	primer	innescare
practicability	praticabilità	electric p.	innesco, cannello
p. of the ground	percorribilità	ignition p.	innesco elettrico
prearranged	predisposto	percussion p.	innesco ad accensione
p. fire	fuoco predisposto	percussion electric p.	innesco (cannello) a percussione
prearrangement	predisposizione	priority	innesco elettrico a percussione
mobilization p.	predisposizioni di mobilitazione	deployment p.	priorità
precedence	precedenza	mission p.	priorità di spiegamento
message p.	qualifica di precedenza dei messaggi, (routine (R) = ordinario, priority (P) = priorità, operational immediate (O) = operativo urgente, flash (Z) = lampo, deferred = differito)	movement p.	priorità di missione
predictor	calcolatore	"Priority" (P)	priorità di movimento
prefix	prefisso	p. of fires	priorità (qualifica di precedenza dei messaggi);
preliminary	preliminare	p. of works	priorità di fuoco
p. plan	piano preliminare	prisoner	priorità dei lavori
preparation	preparazione, preparativo	p. of war (PW)	prigioniero
counter-p.	contropreparazione	private (pvt)	prigioniero di guerra
p. fire	fuoco di preparazione	p. first class (pfc)	soldato semplice
p. of war	preparativi di guerra	probability	soldato scelto
preplanned	pianificato (in precedenza)	p. of damage	probabilità
p. air mission	missione aerea pianificata	probe	probabilità di danno
p. air support	appoggio aereo	mine p.	sondare
p. fire request	pianificato	procedure	asta di sondaggio
preponderance	richiesta di fuoco	ammunition supply p.	procedura, procedimento
prescription	pianificata	radiotelegraph p.	procedura, per il rifornimento munizioni
preset	preponderanza	radiotelephone p.	procedura radiotelegrafica
	prescrizione, ricetta medica	standing operating p. (SOP)	procedura radiotelefonica
	predisposto	target grid p.	disposizioni permanenti
		process	sistema di
		intelligence p.	aggiustamento a mezzo reticolato
		processing	processo
		p. of information	processo informativo
		procurement	elaborazione
		local p.	elaborazione delle notizie
			approvvigionamento, incetta
			approvvigionamento locale


P

product fission p. program military assistance p. (MAP) project projectile impact of p. projecton projector slide p. promotion proof bomb- p. splinter- p. water- p. propaganda black p. grey p. p. leaflets white p. propellant liquid p. solid p. propeller lifting p. p. blades to protect to p. an exposed flank protected warned- p. protection local p. protective final p. fires (FPF)	prodotto prodotto di fissione programma programma di assistenza militare. progetto proietto, proiettile impatto del proiettile proiezione proiettore proiettore di diapositive promozione prova a prova di bomba a prova di schegge impermeabile propaganda propaganda nera propaganda grigia manifestini di propaganda propaganda bianca propellente, carica esplosiva, carica di lancio propellente liquido propellente solido propulsore, elica elica portante pale d'elica proteggere, difendere proteggere un fianco esposto protetto preavvisato e protetto protezione, difesa, sicurezza protezione locale protettivo linea di arresto	p. clothing p. measures p. minefield p. obstacle protozoan protractor circular p. provisions provost p. corps p. marshall (PM) psychological p. effect p. warfare publication allied communications p. (ACP) to punish punishment purchasing local p. purification water p. purpose to pursue pursuit to push to p. forward to provide to put out pyrotechnics	automatico indumento protettivo misure protettive campo minato protettivo ostacolo protettivo protozoo rapportatore millesimale rapportatore a nonio. vettovaglie, alimenti preposto, capo, sovrintendente corpo di polizia militare capo della Polizia militare psicologico effetto psicologico guerra psicologica (tactical = tattica, strategic = strategica, consolidation = di consolidamento) pubblicazione pubblicazioni sulle trasmissioni alleate punire punizione acquisto acquisto locale depurazione depurazione dell'acqua scopo inseguire inseguimento spingere, premere premere sul nemico, avanzare provvedere, approntare pubblicare materiali (artifici) pirotecnici
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Q

Qualification q. form to qualify quartered quarters head q. military q. quartering	qualificazione, qualifica (del personale) documentazione psicotechnica abilitare, qualificare alloggiato, accantonato quartiere quartiere generale, comando quartieri militari accantonamento, alloggiamento	q. officer q. party quartermaster (QM) q. corps (QMC) questlon quick q. reaction	foriere di alloggiamento gruppo forieri di alloggiamento ufficiale di Commissariato, addetto ai rifornimenti ed alle infrastrutture, intendenza corpo, servizio di commissariato domanda pronto, rapido, veloce pronta reazione
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Bayern.



Ulanen
in Parade.

Offizier,
feldmarschmässig.

Offiziere
in Parade.

Bayrische Ulanen. 1865.

Die Truppengattung der Ulanen, die in Bayern 1822 eingegangen war, wurde 1863 in der Stärke von drei Regimentern wieder errichtet und zwar als 1. Ulanen-Rgt. Grossfürst Thronfolger v. Russland, 2. Ulanen-Rgt. König und 3. Ulanen-Rgt. Alle 3 Regimenter hatten karmoisinrothe Abzeichen und weisse Knöpfe. Am 29. April 1867 wurde das 3. Ulanen-Rgt. aufgelöst. Es blieben die heute noch bestehenden beiden Ulanen-Regimenter übrig, die seit 1873 sich durch die Farbe der Knöpfe unterscheiden, indem damals das 1. Regiment gelbe Knöpfe erhielt. Wenn auch die Farben der Uniform die gleichen blieben, so unterlag dieselbe, besonders sei auf die Form der Czapka hingewiesen, manchen Veränderungen.



RIVISTA MILITARE

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★ **CARLO JEAN**

General Carl von Clausewitz'
Theory of War
and Strategic Thought

★ **GAETANO BONICELLI**

Christian Conscience and
Ethics of Defence

★ **RUDYARD KIPLING**

Rudyard Kipling's Testimony
on the British Army of 1915



Italia, 1943. Marina, soldato della compagnia da sbarco della costa ligure.



Italia, 1980. Tenente dei carristi in uniforme da combattimento.



Italia, 1866. Ussaro di Piacenza.



Italia, 1964. Marina, Capitano di Corvetta in uniforme estiva di servizio.



Italia, 1984. Brigadiere dei Carabinieri in tenuta invernale, nucleo radiomobile.

Collezione presentata alla mostra «Militaria in Europa».



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Numero 3/1990

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Unfortunately war has not been uprooted. And as long as there is the risk of war and there is no international authority concerned, supplied with efficacious forces, once that all the possibilities of a peaceful settlement have been tried, it won't be possible to deny the governments the right to self-defence.

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
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Augusto Mastrolini

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


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CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ'S THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGIC THOUGHT

2nd Part



KÖNIG UNG. HONVED-ARMEE

Uhlanen

Uhlanen

mit Rock u. Mütze

Marschadjut.

Offiziere

Parade

Ober-Arzt

Auditor

Parade

Parade mit Mantel

THE DEFENSIVE AND THE OFFENSIVE

Characteristics of the defensive and of the offensive

Military operations take place not because of the attacker's initiative, but for the defender's will,


which does not submit to the adversary's impositions. This observation made by Clausewitz was considered extremely penetrating by Lenin. Nobody wages war for war's sake, but in order to achieve a political goal. Therefore

a conqueror does not employ the force of weapons if he manages to reach his ends by other means, for instance by threatening their employment or by convincing the opponent that he conquers him for his good. The initiator of the war is therefore the defender, not the attacker. Similarly, war stops when

We defend ourselves when we are in conditions of inferiority of forces. A distinctive feature of defence is waiting, that of the attack is initiative. The defence, in fact, must last for the attack to wear out and reach what Clausewitz calls "the culminating point of victory". At this point the attack, having exhausted its offensive drive, worn out and depleted, has lost its initial superiority and can be subjected to the defender's offensive reaction. The "culminating point" is not only a space concept, but also a time and moral one. The expansion of the lines of communication, the need to ensure their security, the attrition following the penetration into a hostile country, wear out the attack. From its part, time wears out its initial "charge" and undermines the morale both of the Armed Forces and of the population, who do not see the end of the conflict. Once the culminating point of victory is passed, the initial proportion of forces overturns and the defender can "take up the flaming sword of revenge" and destroy the attacker.

Defence and attack cannot be viewed separately. The dialectic between the two terms expresses the reciprocity of action of a battle developing in time and space. It should also be noted that at the three levels of combat — political, strategic and tactical — there is not

Clausewitz is a staunch supporter of the concept that there is an inherent dissymmetry between the two forms of combat — defence and attack — in favour of defence. His thesis is confirmed first of all by the fact that it is normal that the weaker party should defend himself, while the strong one should be the attacker; second-



3



of any *raison d'être*, except when the assailed does not accept the settlement because he believes it goes against his interests and carries on the combat in space and time, in order to attract the enemy towards the culminating point of victory and therefore bring about his self-destruction.

The question is whether this conception could be valid also in a nuclear war and if it is accepted by all the modern strategic schools.

The employment of nuclear weapons would enormously accelerate the pace of the operations, and therefore the defence would be prevented from employing time as a factor for wearing down the attack. Even awaiting for the force ratio to reverse would be meaningless, because one would risk be-

ing destroyed by the adversary weapons. Also space as a multiplying factor of the defence's power is almost irrelevant as regards the intercontinental missiles, except in the sense that it permits the dispersal of forces, in order to save them from extensive destructions. Besides, the defence can now abundantly exploit the space beyond the contact line to wear down the enemy's attack system with its logistic support and, above all, to undermine the opposer's morale by attacks, not on the enemy military forces but on his inhabited and industrial centres.

Clausewitz' concept of defence appears deeply modified. Every possibility depends on the survival of one's own nuclear weapons after a sudden attack. Ballistic missiles

and nuclear weapons have produced a new reality which upsets the traditional relationship between defence and attack. Does this necessitate a revision of the theoretical model? We cannot give this question a convincing answer. Nevertheless, we believe that a solution to this problem should be found, because it could influence the political and strategic decisions that would be adopted in the event of a nuclear conflict.

In the second place, it must be remarked that the Soviet strategic school has not accepted Clausewitz' conception of the intrinsic security of the defensive on the strategic plane. Marshal Sokolovsky asserts, on the contrary, the clear superiority of the offensive. Such statement can be

explained by both the particular military situation of the Soviet Union and by the Marxist outlook as regards the historical becoming. The USSR enjoys, in peacetime, a definite superiority over NATO in Europe, that could be nullified if the West mobilized its greater human, industrial and technological resources. Therefore it is essential for the Soviet Union to settle a possible conflict as quickly as possible: if the conflict were to be protracted, the USSR would risk finding itself in a state of inferiority. In case of conflict, the force of circumstances would compel it to take on a decidedly offensive attitude. It is therefore understandable that also to boost the Armed Forces and the population's morale, the official strategic theory should uphold the intrinsic superiority of the form of combat it has decided to adopt. Secondly, the thesis of the strategic superiority of the offensive has an ideological justification: capitalism's inevitable disappearance. According to the Soviet military theory, Clausewitz upheld the superiority of the defensive because, in his idealistic conception of politics, he considered the State as a socially homogeneous body, not divided into classes with clashing interests. The penetration of the progressive forces into a country, on the contrary, would not be met with opposition by the invaded population, but with active support, nullifying the attrition caused by space and time and maintaining intact the superiority that the attack derives from operational initiative and surprise. This conception is therefore hinged on a metastrategic assessment, whose validity has not been proved yet. It is nevertheless interesting to note that the Soviet military science introduces another force — ideology — side by side with the intellectual, moral and material components considered by Clausewitz. It is difficult to say how meaningful this is. At any rate, the perplexities in this regard are justified also by the

fact that in order to resist Hitler's aggression, Stalin mobilized the Russian people not so much by appealing to ideology, but by calling on the national sentiments and love of the native land.

The people's war

Undoubtedly Clausewitz must be credited with having introduced a new element in the theory of war: the people's war which, with Mao Dze Dong, was to acquire a central place in the strategic thought. Clausewitz defines the essence of guerrilla warfare very clearly: strategic defensive and tactical offensive, progressive diffusion of the struggle on the territory (space) with a view of dividing the enemy forces, weakening and wearying them, thus creating the conditions for attacking them locally with success; protracted actions, in order to progressively undermine the moral and material forces of the occupant; first priority to the preservation of one's own forces; ties between guerrillas and population; organization made by highly specialized personnel coming from the regular forces or professional guerrillas.

Anyway there is a great difference, of an extra-military kind, between Clausewitz' "franc-tireur" and the revolutionary guerrilla of our times. The first fights against a foreign enemy, within a framework of a politically defensive war. The second serves a political cause: he is first of all a party militant rather than a soldier; he operates within the framework of a politically offensive war — albeit defensive at the beginning — with a tendency to turn into offensive through the sprouting from among the guerrilla forces of a mobile attack force, i.e. of a regular army designed to destroy the enemy.

Clausewitz' conception of a people's war, organized and supported by groups of regular military forces, was adopted in full by the Soviet Union in WWII (1), was

ardently supported by Jaurès and is at the foundations of the organizations for the territorial war adopted by some West European countries. Liddell Hart (2) criticizes it, arguing that, generally, this form of combat is not effective, from the military point of view, for it offsets the damages that it causes, both in the short term and directly, due to the retaliations that a determined invader would be sure to make on a broad scale, and in the long term and indirectly, owing to the habit to violence and unlawfulness that would grow among the people. Civil non-violent resistance would instead have — according to the English scholar — a greater efficacy at a lower cost.

In our opinion, any line of action has its advantages and drawbacks, it must be studied in relation to the contingent situation and the particular goals that should be achieved and cannot be defined in the abstract. It should be noticed moreover — always in support of Clausewitz' thesis — that a people's war, besides its direct military value, has a value of perhaps equal significance: it bears witness to the will to stand up to oppression and continue the fight without surrendering. In the history of a nation it can therefore serve as a basis for the reconstruction of a new political legitimacy. It is what the various movements of resistance born during the second world conflict represent for many European countries. This "testimonial" character, certainly, does not have the same importance in the actions of non-violent resistance. Often they can be a simple and convenient alibi to disguise the lack of the moral force necessary to fight. Anyway they have an extremely limited deterrent power as compared to that of armed resistance: Czechoslovakia was invaded, Yugoslavia was not. Those who have at heart the freedom and independence of our people cannot sympathize very much with the Czechoslovak behaviour. The un-



willingness to make a concrete commitment for one's own defence has been an invitation for the invader.

Conclusions on the defensive and on the offensive

In Clausewitz' view, the substance of military operations does not change according to the defensive and offensive character of the war. Defence turns into attack and vice versa. The defensive or offensive character of a conflict can be different depending on the political, strategical or tactical levels that are taken into consideration.

This polarity between defence and attack clearly demonstrates on the one side the substantial

sophism of the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons; on the other, it evidences the impossibility to base the defence on a solely passive attitude. Moreover, it shows that the very word "defence", a modern substitute for the old term "war", is of scarce inherent significance from the military point of view. According to a witty French scholar, the substitution of the two terms actually occurred during the first world war as a propaganda trick to promote the purchase of the Treasury bonds issued to support the war effort: since, for many, war was wicked in itself, while the defence of one's native land was a just and sacred thing, they could refuse to finance a war but not to underwrite the Treasury bonds for

the defence... Since then the habit has remained, and in our opinion it has helped a great deal to increase the confusion of ideas as regards the essence of war and the meaning of the military function.

The inseparable polarity between defence and attack should instead be constantly kept in mind. In particular, the defence presupposes the attack, the counteroffensive, when there has been a reversal of the initial proportion of forces. "A defence which is only passive, although based on the firepower of the modern guided precision weapons, is a dangerous illusion... The new technologies are not decisive but confine themselves to increasing the cost of the attack and can, at best, control it only for some time... In order to obtain a

real defensive and deterrent capability it is necessary to always consider, both in the war plans and in the preparation of the forces, the two options: defensive and offensive" (3).

Consequently, Clausewitz' global conception and the ensuing principle of the inherent superiority of the dual concept "defence-attack", placed by Mao Dze Dong at the very foundation of his strategic thought, apparently continue to have, in our opinion, a full validity. A well thought-over strategy cannot but take into account the absolute need to consider both forms of action, no matter how peace-loving and defensive is the military policy that inspires it.

CONSIDERATIONS

At the end of this "journey" (longer than we had expected at the beginning) into Clausewitz' thought — for the length of which we wish to apologize to the reader who has kindly followed us in our wandering — it seems logical to draw some conclusions.

The Prussian general's thought on the essence of the war phenomenon, on its essential characteristics and on the parameters that influence it, retains, in our view, a substantial validity.

Undoubtedly it has some shadow spots. In particular we think that insufficient importance is attached to the impact of naval power and of technology: to the close link existing between domestic politics and foreign policy and to the influence of the social and ideological factors which had a considerable weight, both in the military victories of the French Revolution and, afterwards, in the victories of Napoleon's Empire. Referring to the abovementioned argumentations, their incorporation within Clausewitz' conception seems possible to us, without substantial modifications to his theory of war.

Including the nuclear factor could present instead some difficul-


ty. In fact, this changes the reciprocal relationship between tactics, strategy and politics on the one side, and from the defensive and the offensive on the other, as well as the significance of time and space as incremental factors of the defensive power. That is, it jeopardizes the practical possibility to control the violence of war. Nevertheless also the mass-destruction weapons could be included in Clausewitz' theory, if war were to be considered always as a rational and controllable instrument, as a simple means, sometimes shield sometimes sword, of reasonable political designs. If, that is, the instrumental conception of war were not to be replaced by the opposite view, the Hegelian one, where war is not a means but fulfills an historical function. In this case Clausewitz' theory on war should be deeply revised, starting from the notion of terror-ratio, as Glucksmann contends, instead of force-ratio.

The questions remains open on this point. Nevertheless this does not impair the substantial validity of Clausewitz' remaining statements. In particular those concerning the following points: impossibility to consider war as a mere military phenomenon; hierarchy of ends and means; reciprocal relationship between politics, strategy and tactics, and between intellectual, moral and material forces, necessity of interpenetration between politics and strategy and between strategy and tactics; impossibility to define a positive theory of war containing norms and rules valid for every circumstance; specificity of every individual situation and of every decision, owing to the unreliability of all the parameters of the phenomenon and the impossibility to know precisely the intentions and goals of the enemy; importance of the cultural preparation, of the "eye" and resolution of the military leaders; need to have a reliable theory of war which should permit to state, as the Prussian

general said, "I ignore what will happen, but in everything that happens I shall distinguish the glares of strategic reason and the passionate ghosts which cause its sleep".

To conclude, in our opinion, Clausewitz' theory, albeit within the limits we have mentioned before, concerning the validity of the "stakes on reason", still retain their entire meaning and freshness despite the changed circumstances. In the past century war could be considered a primary tool, or at least a normal one, in the international relations of a country. In our times, instead, the power of weapons is so much higher that the employment of military force requires greater precautions. Moreover, unlike what occurred in the past, today foreign politics is becoming in many ways similar to domestic politics. A lot of questions cannot be solved within a merely national framework: for instance, the monetary problems, the energy and technological problems. Moreover, the Nations now can avail themselves with other very powerful means to impose their will, such as the economic and propagandistic means. It ensues that at the bottom of every strategic problem there is always the urgent need to define the usefulness of military force in that particular situation, and the limits within which it can be exerted.

Such evaluations lie outside the theory of war proper, and concern an undoubtedly metastrategic sphere, and perhaps also a metapolitical one. But when one believes that the military instrument could perform a positive function — deterrence, defence, attack — within the Nation's general policy and therefore one implicitly assumes the possibility to employ the force of weapons, one must refer to the Prussian general's theories in order to acquire a conscious knowledge of the matter in hand and of the influencing parameters and consequences of one's actions.



RELATIONS BETWEEN WAR AND POLITICS

War is a complex and multiform social phenomenon. Its nature must be analyzed within the framework of the evolution of societies and international relations.

That is, war must not be observed independent of its causes and

consequences and of the different roles that the military component has had in the course of history. The study of the relations existing between war and politics constitutes the core of the theory of war. The nature and goals of the latter in fact can be defined only by taking into account the connections existing between the military component and the politico-social



system that expresses it and to which it belongs.

Only considering them within this picture can one understand the internal mechanisms of conflicts and the parameters that characterize and influence them.

The problem is an essential one. The human phenomena are directly influenced — as it happens with the political, social and military events — by what is thought of them, i.e. by the theories that are formulated about them. Theories are indispensable. They are in fact the critical reflection which, more or less explicitly, precedes decisions and actions.

The theory of the relations between politics and war precedes the definition of the aims and goals that the military organization must pursue, and influences both the strategy and the preparation of the military instrument as well as the determination of the spheres of responsibility of the Head of State and of the military commander.

The theory of the relations between politics and war is explained and, at the same time, influenced by Clausewitz' thought. Therefore we shall start our study of the problem from there.

CLAUSEWITZ' THEORY ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICS AND WAR

In the words of the Prussian general, war is an act of violence designed to force the adversary to submit to our will.

War consists in the employment of force or, more in general, of coercive military means in the relations between nations. Just as in the physical world every action causes a similar and contrary reaction, in war an offensive effort causes an analogous defensive effort which aims at neutralizing it. In order to overcome the resistance, the attacker must make a greater effort matched by a greater resistance from the defender, and so on, in a race towards the extremes of violence, until all the forces of the

weaker party are engaged.

At this point, the continuation of the attack brings about the decision and the attacker destroys the defender. The pattern described points out the natural internal mechanisms of a conflict. It expresses the tendency to escalate to the extremes of violence, which is intrinsic to every conflict.

It illustrates what would happen of the conflictual element operated free from all influence and limitation. It is the cornerstone of the modern "escalation theory" which assumes moreover to be able to rationally govern the climb of violence.

But war, Clausewitz remarks, is not an end in itself.

It is a means for achieving political goals.

A means cannot be considered without taking the goals into account. Therefore, the theory of war must not consider only the internal mechanisms of the phenomenon, but also its connections with the politico-social system and how this system influences it.

Within this framework the political aim becomes the aim of the political objective. Rationality compels to subordinate the means to the end. A military victory has no meaning in itself, it acquires one only if linked with the political objectives that it permits to achieve. Clearly, in deciding the goal, one must take into account the means at one's disposal. What is wanted politically must be proportionate to what is possible militarily. The political target must be adapted to the strategic power. Hence the subordination of the military commander to the Head of State and of war to politics, as well as the necessity to conceive war as the instrument of a political conception and to study the military organization not as something independent, but as a part of the socio-political system that expresses it.

Clausewitz says: "War is not only an act of politics but a proper tool of politics, a sequel of the political procedure, its continuation with

other means. What remains characteristic of war is only the particular nature of its means. The art of war, as a rule, could require that the aims and designs of politics not be contradictory to such means and the Commander-in-Chief must demand it in any case.

But whatever its relation with the political designs, war cannot go beyond a simple modification of them, because the political design is the aim, while war is the means and a means without an end cannot be conceived".

War's lack of independence and the subordination of the military objective to the political goals limit the war effort.

The escalation to the extremes is checked. Clausewitz actually contends that there are two types of war: a major war of extermination and a war with limited objectives. The importance of the political ends pursued and the existing proportion of forces with the adver-

sary's are the factors that determine the choice of the type of war to resort to. Anyway, also in the first instance, that of the war of extermination which approaches the theoretical model of absolute war, it is the political goal that determines the military objective.


Irrational violence is checked and becomes rational.

The degree of the effort is proportioned to the importance of the political aims pursued. The superiority of defence vis-à-vis the attack and the impact of space and time, essential strategic dimensions, enable politics — still according to Clausewitz — to control the climb to the extremes, scaling the intensity of the war effort according to the importance of the goals. Political rationality, which employs war as a tool, controls the original violence. Politics, understood as intelligence of the personified State, which through war pursues the interests of the entire Nation, modifies the war's tendency to climb to the extremes. The model of "war as rational tool of politics" is set against that of "absolute war".

Besides the original violence and the rationality of politics, according to the Prussian General, also a third element belongs to the nature of war: "chance". This expresses the opponents' practical impossibility to avail themselves of all the necessary information, to completely assess all the factors called into play and to control them effectively, due both to the intervention of irrational parameters in the decisive process and to the inertia of the mechanisms peculiar to the ascent to the extremes.

Clausewitz' thought on the nature of war cannot be understood completely without taking into account these three factors at the same time.

Moreover, the interpretation of Clausewitz' thought cannot be correct without keeping in mind his conception of politics, of the international system and of the meaning and role of war and, in a broad





sense, of military power.

Clausewitz' believed that war constituted a normal and totally legitimate instrument of the foreign policy of nations; that the military factors predominated in the international system, that internal politics had very little influence on war, and that an enlightened political leadership would, despite the disturbance of chance, control the escalation of the violence of war, maintaining, if not a complete control, at least a reasonable proportionality between efforts and objectives.

There have been various interpretations of the thought of the Prussian general. It is interesting to examine them because they intend to adapt the theory of war to the particular conditions of our era.

THE INTERPRETATIONS OF CLAUSEWITZ' THOUGHT ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WAR AND POLITICS

The "Militarist" School

The concept that war is a normal instrument of the foreign policy of nations derives from Clausewitz. As the objectives can be unlimited, also war can be unlimited, i.e. total. When such a situation occurs, the essential task of politics is to prepare total war. Politics, as maintained by Ludendorff, must then be subordinated to the preparation and conduct of the war.

Clausewitz' formula on the relations between war and politics in which the latter is given the priori-

ty, is practically reversed. It is not war which is at the service of politics, but politics is at the service of war.

Others contend that, once started, war becomes politically ungovernable and therefore must be guided by exclusively military considerations.

During the conflict the military command, up to then subordinate to the political direction, must have an almost total autonomy. Upon completion of the operations, the political direction will resume its supremacy. The success of the "militarist" trend of thought has been also due to the fading of the distinction between peace and war, which occurred after the second world conflict.

Various factors have influenced

this phenomenon: the polarization of the international system into two opposing blocs; the greater importance given to the threat of the use of force rather than to its actual employment, the greater versatility of the indirect forms of confrontations; the increased correlation between the nations' internal and foreign policies; the incorporation of classical military strategy into a global strategy, where the economic and ideological factors operate at the same level of the traditional military factors. With the theories of deterrence, cold war or hot peace, and crisis management, the traditional distinction between strategy and politics has become permanent and its intrinsic demands have had a determining influence on the decision of a policy.

The school of the so-called "political realism".

According to this school, foreign policy is closely connected with the power of each state, it is a power policy.

The conduct of the state consists precisely in the increase of defence and in the employment of power. Peace is maintained through the balance of forces, which enables each state to pursue its interests with other means and different methods, but always in a way proportionate to the power at its disposal. Between peace and war there is a clear distinction.

In this context, war is a means to create a new equilibrium when the old one has vanished and there is no way of bringing about a change with other means. It is therefore a deliberate and conscious action of politics, based in conclusion on the comparative evaluation of the advantages, costs and risks that every military initiative entails, be it offensive or defensive. This deprives war of any significance, if it is considered outside its political context. The destruction of the enemy forces and military victory are of no im-

portance per se, but only because they are means for achieving a political aim. This is embodied by the new war. War is the instrument of a political outlook. The political goal is always present and predominant. A strategy conceived only in military terms has no meaning. It is the political reason that must govern the war's violence. The supremacy of politics continues also during the conflict. The strategic objective must be constantly adjusted to the political objectives.

The latter in their turn must be promptly modified according to the course of the war operations and the reactions of the international sphere. Each modification acts directly on the strategy to be followed. In substance the militarization of politics is confronted by the politicization of war. This doctrine is realistic but it can be accepted only to the point where the "political" conduct of operations does not go against the military necessities proper. A well-balanced interpretation is necessary between political conduct and military conduct, between political considerations and technical considerations.

Otherwise, contradictions arise, opposed to those deriving from the militarist theory, but equally determinant in preventing the achievement of political goals through a military initiative.

The Marxist-Leninist school

The starting point of the Marxist-Leninist thought on war is similar to Clausewitz': war is a social phenomenon and represents a continuation and a tool of politics.

But the latter does not consist in the relations among nations, as the Prussian general believes, but is deeply influenced by the struggle of the social classes.

Every society is formed by classes with contrasting interests. The relations among the classes affect the political activity. This is

aimed at pursuing the particular interests of each class, in particular the domination of one class over the others. Internal policy and foreign policy are closely connected. They are not unitary. Both pursue the interests of the ruling class. The states have no univocal interests that can be considered by all citizens as their own. The decision to begin a war reflects neither a national will nor a national interest, in the struggle between the ruling classes and the dominated ones, whose interest is to upset the existing socio-economic relations. When the class struggle disappears, also war will disappear.

Moreover, according to the Marxist-Leninist thought, the political goals for which it is fought determine the progressive or reactionary, right or wrong, character of the war itself and permit to foresee the outcome and explain its significance in the context of the historical becoming.

Within this framework, there is a close subordination of the strategic goals to the political ones. Every strategic decision must be related to the political circumstances.

Nevertheless, a policy must be adjusted to the capabilities and limitations of the military instrument available. In this setting, after the outbreak of the hostilities, the strategic decisions influence in a most determinant way the political choices. In short, the Marxist-Leninist school stresses the subordination of war to politics: the aims of war are nothing but the continuation of the goals of peace, even if pursued with different methods.

This difference of methods characterizes the distinction between peace and war.

The school of "research on peace"

The school of "research on peace" is in many ways similar to that of political realism, with a big difference: it refuses to consider war as a necessary mechanism



regulating the international relations of sovereign states. War is a pathological phenomenon, which must be and can be eliminated.

There is a substantial discontinuity between war and politics which can be controlled both by acting on the decision-making mechanisms, in order to permit to manage the crisis and to settle the differences peacefully and on the deep-lying causes of the conflicts, which can be redressed in time.

An effective peace management should modify the principles that up to now have governed the system of international relations of disarmament. This solution is made possible by the decreased usefulness of military force in the international system, deriving both from the huge destructive power of the new weapons and from the greater interdependence of the

various nations, as well as from the replacement of military conquest by trade conquest: therefore weapons are of lesser importance for the pursuit of the nations' interests. The school of "research on peace" inspires many of the "crisis management" doctrines, aimed at avoiding the outbreak of conflicts or, at least, to keep them under control if they were to start. It is undoubtedly a step forward, compared to the various pacifist theories, in order to tackle with rationality and rigour the problem posed by the dangerousness of the war phenomenon in our days.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE THEORY OF WAR

The Marxist-Leninist school contends that the advent of nuclear weapons has not changed the

theory of war as continuation and tool of politics. In the West, instead, nuclear weapons find it hard to be included in the theory of war, at least in an organic form.

For some, in fact, nuclear weapons have had no substantial impact on the nature of war and their employment can be scaled in a controlled way. These are the guiding principles of the US President's Directive 59 and all doctrines that with various nuances assert the nuclear forces' flexibility.

Thus the nuclear armament is ranked together with the other weapons and nuclear war remains a tool of politics.

According to others, instead, the advent of nuclear missiles has caused a real discontinuity with the past.

War is no more controllable, because a nuclear missile does not

allow the time and space necessary to exercise a political control over the military operations.

The balance of power has been replaced by the balance of terror, which is not based on the capability to win but on the capability to punish the aggressor.

The traditional quantity-quality ratio of the respective forces has been replaced by the more sophisticated concepts of flexibility and credibility of deterrence.

In short, war cannot be conceived as a tool or as a continuation of politics.

This current of thought is at the root of many theories on deterrence and of the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD).

If the instrumentality of war vis-à-vis politics were to disappear, Clausewitz' theory would be meaningless. The means is no more instrumental: the part is no more part of a whole; the military process has ceased to be subordinate to the political process.

From this fact some have tried to distinguish the traditional theory of war — in which the escalation to the extremes is governable by politics, and the validity of which is confined to minor conflicts — from a theory of deterrence which instead is applicable to nuclear conflicts.

In my opinion, the theory of deterrence cannot be separated from the theory of war.

As a matter of fact, deterrence is based on the ability to employ nuclear weapons and on the credibility of the willingness to do so if necessary. It is undoubtedly a paradox, like the many paradoxes that however exist in life, that the purpose of the military instruments should be that of getting ready for war with the aim of never actually fighting it.

But this does not mean that the absence of direct war has modified the instrumental significance of war as regards politics.

A further reflection on Clausewitz' thought on the nature of war can perhaps illustrate this

aspect and permit to provide a sufficiently wide interpretation, to include the nuclear reality.

ABSOLUTE WAR AND WAR AS A TOOL OF POLITICS

It is generally believed that the theoretical model of war is represented by what is called by Clausewitz "absolute war", while the real model is war as a tool of politics.

As a political instrument, war would always be limited and the amount of violence would always depend on the importance of the political objectives at stake. The subordination of war to politics would be total.

In practice, however, the two conditions that would make war completely subordinate to politics do not come about: i.e. that the decision to start a war is ensuing from a rigorously rational evaluation and that the operations are governed by political goals.

As we mentioned before, in the outbreak of a war irrational and emotional factors come into play, together with lack of information and misjudgment.

The result of this that rarely the outcome of a war can be predetermined, not even in a very general way, and that the decision to enter a war can be based on a rational and rigorous comparison between gains, risks and costs.

Moreover, also in the past, before the arrival of nuclear weapons, very seldom were operations completely controlled and guided by politics. And this for two reasons.

First: politics must consider the specificity of the means it uses. Political "logic" cannot ignore the rules of military "grammar".

Second: the development of the operations influences politics.

The internal logic of military operations entails an escalation of violence which tends to become uncontrollable.

The losses of course produce a psychological stiffening and made

any compromise difficult. The moral mobilization necessary to support the struggle induces to demonize the adversary and encourages to pursue unlimited political goals.

In substance, during a conflict, the extreme political goals are indeed those that frequently characterize the situation, and not vice versa.

Suffice it to think of Roosevelt's doctrine of "victory first" in WWII. The escalation of violence goes side by side with that of the goals.

In sum, Clausewitz' formula of war as a tool of politics constitutes an extreme model, like that of absolute war.

Such extreme model represents the form that war would take if it were a mere tool of politics, completely determinable and rationally controllable.

Political war and absolute war are the two limits within which real war can range.

They are meaningless if they are not considered together because they are the extreme confines which delimit the scope within which war can occur.

War as continuation of politics is a theoretical archetype like that of absolute war.

Clausewitz' formula is meaningless in itself; it acquires a meaning only because it is opposed to "absolute war".

Real war is something located between the two extremes; it is a possible combination with various degrees of intensity, between armed violence and political activity.

The combination of the two models seems therefore capable of supplying a frame of reference and analysis sufficiently wide to include in the theory of war also the mass-destruction weapons, whose deliberate employment obviously has nothing to do with the pursuit of reasonable political objectives.


CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

Clausewitz' theory of war, with the clarifications mentioned above,

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Planche 33.



seems capable of explaining the nature of this phenomenon and, particularly, to consider synthetically the contradictory aspects that always coexist in reality.

The picture outlined by theory seems to permit a satisfactory explanation of how the preeminence of politics over war operates in reality and, on the contrary, how the strategic imperatives influence politics.

If politics loses its ability to be a harmonious determination of target and means, or if it violates the essence of war, it frustrates the achievement of the objectives it has envisaged.

A determinant factor in permitting the transition from the theory of war to the real conflicts is what Clausewitz calls "chance".

It is chance that decides, within

the unlimited range of possible conflicts, that particular type of conflict.

Some may be unsatisfied with the breadth and therefore the vagueness of the concepts of the theory as regards the phenomenon "war". But theory is neither a repository nor a formulary.

Clearness and choices are, within the framework of the given political objectives, the tasks of the contingent strategic doctrine and of the operational procedures.

The above interpretation of Clausewitz' theory is in fact sufficient to provide a justification for the extreme forms in which war can take place: from an unlimited nuclear war to an extremely prudent and limited — or only virtual — employment of military force, aimed at progressively undermin-

ing the adversary' power and convince him to accept our conditions.

Gen. Carlo Jean

NOTES

(1) Galay: «The partisan forces» in Liddell Hart (ed.) «The Red Army», Harcourt Ed., New York, 1956, pages 153-171. It must be noted, on the other hand, that the USSR has been very careful not to extend this organization also to the satellite countries; this explains the lack of resistance in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

(2) Liddell Hart: «Lessons from Resistance movements - Guerrilla and non-violent», in A. Roberts (ed.) «Civilian Resistance and national defence», Penguin Books, London, 1969, pages 228-246.

(3) S. Amiel: «Deterrence by conventional forces» in IISS Survival, no. 3 and no. 4/1978.



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CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE AND ETHICS OF DEFENCE



Royaume de
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It is clear that, although I know that this matter has been discussed many times already, my position is that of a Christian, or better of a Catholic bishop, who finds, in the Church's teaching, the safest reference points and the most obvious terms of his professional responsibility.

According to the teaching of the Scholastic philosophers, it is always useful to premise a brief 'declaratio terminorum'.

Conscience is an almost generic term referred to the conscious or aware being, who has the biological and psychological component allowing him to understand reality and to take a position when facing it.

On this elementary anthropology takes root the moral conscience that we want to discuss on this occasion. It can have at least two determinations: moral conscience as sense and attention to the moral needs, that is those values inspiring life; moral conscience as subjective responsibility in the practical behaviour. Both meanings are valid and in a certain way also complementary. In the outlook according to which life grounds man's dignity on the design of God, conscience is the deepest core, it is the man's sanctuary, where he is alone with God, whose voice re-echoes in one's depth (GS 16). In the language of the Bible, conscience is equivalent to heart. God goes beyond the appearances, He looks at man's heart (1 Sam. 16,7). Any human being, leaving his race, culture, belief and social status out of consideration, has the right to the respect and safeguard of this personal richness when this is not openly conflicting with the general interest.

It is peculiar to conscience to dis-

tinguish between good and evil. It is not easy. That's why beside the moral law written in the bottom of one's heart, there are also the moral principles that enlighten and support the discernment of the individual.

In fact if conscience is the foundation of the value of each person, it cannot be confused with a position of wild individualism. Conscience - according to the meaning of the word "conscientia" - is not the truth but refers to truth, that is to an objective dimension that transcends it. A human being who does not look for the truth, avoiding any judgement about his intellectual level, is already out of the moral order.

Using, once more, an expression of the Scholastic philosophers, there can be a wrong conscience that must be respected and listened to, but only when the effort to clear up one's mind was not missing. So, the duty to form conscience, that is to supply each man with real elements of judgement, becomes a top priority.

CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE

Now we can agree on what Christian conscience means. Conscience is one for everybody; it is conscience and that's all. But conscience can take into account and measure itself on the values introduced by Christianity. And if by conscience we always and first of all mean an individual judgement and behaviour, it is also true that by this term it is possible to mean a collective dimension, that is a system of the values of a community or of a historical period.

As a consequence of this there are at least two levels in which it is possible to recognize a Christian con-

science: the one of those who in founding their judgement relate directly and expressly to the Gospel, and the one of a larger number who feel tributary of the influx Christianity had on culture and society.

Benedetto Croce disserted on the matter: "why we cannot say we are not Christians". According to this, we can legitimately wonder which, among the conventional values, generally accepted as expression of the Western civilization, have no Christian root.

If we refer to this meaning, bound to the Christian, and therefore religious outlook of life, it is useful to ask ourselves how much autonomy, and therefore freedom and responsibility, remains to the personal conscience, when it accepts, together with the Gospel message also the interpretations authoritatively proposed by the Church. In other words, where does conscience end for a good Catholic?

In this field, the mistake would be to think that when a principle is enunciated, everything is mathematically deducible. This would be the negation of conscience. The mediation between the unrenounceable principles and concrete situations peculiar to conscience. The personal and collective experiences are part of the store necessary to conscience. The difficulty for conscience is to make the best choice among all the possible ones. The clearer is the horizon of principles, the more demanding the judgement on the situations becomes. And this is the reason why in the faithfulness to their conscience "the Christians join all other men in the search for truth and to solve, according to truth, numerous moral problems both in the private and social life (GS 16).

ETHICS AND MORALS

Do not expect a philosophic or theological lesson. These are just personal reflections, pronounced aloud and in a scattered order, as if I wanted to verify their harmony with what the others think and say, so that they can turn more easily into a spur to go ahead.

Now the matter can be better defined. Any human being must act according to his conscience. Conscience needs a series of principles to inspire its choice. The reference picture is precisely ethics or morals.

From the etymologic point of view the two words, the former deriving from Greek and the latter from Latin, are equivalent. "Ethos" and "mos" mean usage, custom, what must be done in order not to leave the tracks of life. A more careful consideration leads us to see ethics, according to Aristotle's theory, as a specific philosophical discipline reflecting and proposing a global picture of reference, rationally founded, by which the actions of men should be inspired.

If we accept this conception of ethics, we could even call it collective conscience that does not prejudice, but helps and orientates that responsible and definitive judgement that the individual conscience has to deliver.

This universe of values is not important only to the individuals but also to the collectivity. Law is not the same as ethics, because while ethics appeals directly to conscience, and so acts only by conviction, law operates also by constraint and with external sanctions. It is not up to law to judge convictions, but just to verify the correspondence of actions to the positive law.

The great temptations of the various historical periods are to reduce the sphere of personal autonomy in the name of omnicomprehensive ethical and juridical systems, or to privilege so much the subjective judgement to destroy any objective ethical basis. It is not possible to act as free men without a moral conscience; but it is not possible to leave morals to the free will of individuals. An only subjective morals, cannot exist, because it would be diluted in individual convictions unable to produce rules of behaviour valid for everybody. In other words, how is it possible to know what is good and what is not, if there is no objective reference point, valid for everyone?

It's easy to understand that this risk is not theoretic. The present time is living the temptation of radicalism, that is to give each opinion the value of regulation. But in this manner there is no way out when two



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Public opinion becomes more and more aware of the absurdity of war to solve controversies.

personal positions are clashing. So, it is necessary to become aware that without common ethics any social life is impossible.

If ethics is a part of philosophy, so that it is called moral philosophy, its foundation lies on anthropology. "Tell me what kind of man you are, and I'll tell you which ethics you want". There are insurmountable limits for each person of common sense. History, experience, the reflections of wise persons, the tradition of a community help to create or improve the "ethos".

Of course ethics must not be confused or reduced to what is possible to do and is immediately effective. This would mean its destruction. Chemistry can produce mortal substances. Genetic engineering can modify man. From the merely scientific point of view these are

conquests. But is it good or bad for man and the whole humanity? If like Lenin or Hitler we say that what supports the cause of proletariat or race is good, we soon realize we are running into an impasse we have unfortunately and long experienced.

There are therefore categorical imperatives that act as support of ethics and in defence of human dignity. But where do they find their strength? This is not the occasion to go over the stages of evolution of modern culture from de Groot to Kant to the philosophers of this time.

An essential dimension for the radication of ethics is faith and religion. There are two possibilities, either religion does not exist, or it must necessarily have a direct impact also on ethics. If ethics can be consid-



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ered as moral philosophy, any religion leads to a systematic reflection on human actions, called moral theology. So it would be better to distinguish between faith and religion, which is the logical consequence of faith, but that sometimes may exist even without faith. In fact it is not unusual to find people having no faith any more, but who accept the moral consequences of a certain religious conception.

Surely Christianity, that is a faith, has morals coming from the consideration of man proposed by rational ethics or moral philosophy, but moreover founded on the Revelation that represents its core. It is not necessary to go over the process of clarification about those problems concerning the statute of ethics and moral theology, a process that has not finished yet at least in that part concerning social life (G. Colombo, Social Teaching of the Church and Theology, Review of the Italian Clergy, 12/1988). As to the Christian, or better Catholic, culture, there is a point of convergence called

"social teachings of the Church". According to the *Mater et Magistra* (1961) it was only a specification of the natural ethics, even if in a Christian vein. Today, after the *Sollicitudo rei socialis* (1987), without rejecting its rational and therefore open foundation, the Christian social doctrine takes into account the theological needs, which are of course elaborated through a critic reflection on society and with the resort to analytic sciences, such as sociology and psychology.

We can end here this long but maybe useful digression. We can consider the matter of defence in the frame of a general ethics. Here we would like to consider the ethics finding its culmination in a religious outlook of life, that is in the morals that derives its light and its strenght from Christianity.

THE ORGANIZATION OF DEFENCE

If ethics is made up by a series of

rational principles, made even stronger by a well-defined moral position, and that postulate a consequent behaviour for man and society, that sector that today we call the organization of the defence of a State and of the international life cannot be left out of consideration. Also in this case, there are two levels to be considered: the individual one and the collective one. It seems right and proper to me to start from the latter.

In order to better understand the ethical aspects, it would be necessary to make an obvious statement: today also the language has changed. No one speaks about Ministry of War any more — it would be a disastrous mistake from the political point of view — but about Ministry, General Staff, Organization of Defence. That this is not just a cover-up is inferable from what lapidarily stated by art. 11 of the Constitution: "Italy rejects war as an instrument of offence to the freedom of other peoples and as a means of solution of international controversies".

We realise that it represents a very important ethical step forward, matured in the civil conscience just after the catastrophe of World War II. Of course also the Christian conscience had its part in encouraging this step. It would be enough to remind the courageous and lucid appeals of Pius XII. His Christmas radio-messages were for my generation a real provocation to go beyond the official culture of the war-mongering mentality. And that was the only loud voice in those terrible years.

There had been many incomprehensions and misunderstandings along Christian history. In order to better understand today's position towards the problems of defence, it won't be bad to describe briefly the main stages of evolution of the Christian philosophy and consequently of the Christian ethics about war, military structure, and the use of armed force in the relation among peoples.

It is sure that during the first three



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centuries, even if persecuted and refused, the Christians and the Church did not take a close position. There were of course conscientious objectors and thinkers who theorized the incompatibility between Christian militancy and military state. Suffice it to think of **Tertullian**, in the West, during his Donatist, i.e. heretical phase; let's remember **Origen**, in the East, with his original theory trying to reach a compromise between the need of the military commitment and the exemption of the Christians from service. It's fashionable today to go back to those centuries to look for a virginity that Christianity would have lost. But it is neither serious nor scientific to force history.

The second phase starts with Constantine and that has its first theorists in St. Augustine and St. Ambrose, with enrichments and applications bound to the development of international life, lasts until our century. It can be said that for 1500 years the Christian conscience in the Latin world pivoted around the ethics of war.

As long as man is that weak, inconstant and even wicked being sometimes he shows to be, defensive armaments will unfortunately be necessary.

Clearly, it is within the limits of a religious reflection that the theory of the "right war" takes shape. People speak a lot about it, but often superficially and without considering the judgements that still today are very important in moral reflections. For example, **St. Augustine**, according to his nature and the experience of his time, underlined the limits of human nature, which is not completely corrupt as Luther will say, but certainly weakened. This way the individual selfishness moves to society with the consequent recurring disputes. On the contrary, **St. Ambrose** starting from the primary precept of love for one's neighbour, maintains the Christians' duty to intervene, even by force, to defend a

victim from an unjust aggressor. "The force that defends the homeland against the Barbarians — he writes in the *De Officiis* (I, 27) — is absolutely in line with justice, protecting the weak and the thieves' friends". So, the Army, to use a modern language, must be considered as necessary as the Police.

It is **St. Thomas Aquinas** who, with his lucid and synthetic style, logically arranges the whole matter in the *Summa Theologica* (IIa IIae, q. 40). "A war is allowed and right when it contributes to strengthen peace, becoming an expression of love for one's neighbour without which there can't be Christian morality". His theology laid down three legitimate reasons to resort to

arms: the recovery of a territory, the vindication of the violation of a right, the defence against an unjust aggressor. We also know the conditions of legitimacy to start a war: failure of peaceful attempts, formal declaration by the authority concerned, proportion between damage received and reaction, hope in a good result, respect of the rules. Beside the respect of an ethics for the "jus ad bellum", it came also the reflection, with precise indications about the "jus in bello". Even when war is allowed or advisable, not everything is permitted. In Christian times it is the Church that will introduce some correctives such as chivalry, God's truces, the right of sanctuary. Only at the end of the 19th century the first international conventions about international war law will be signed. These are attempts to humanize war as much as possible.

THE RIGHT TO WAR

As time goes by, the right to war becomes an unquestionable faculty of the national States that do not recognize any papal or imperial protection anymore. This breaks down that protective grille that, even if was not able to avoid wars, in a way kept them under control and reduced their consequences. We can say that, as far as the matter we are discussing is concerned, this is the original sin that spread the germs of a progressive worsening of the international relations. When history is written more carefully, many things will have a very different meaning with respect to that given by many books still used in our schools.

It's not up to me, developing this matter, to describe the merely rational development of the war law within the international law after **de Groot**. Instead, concerning the Christian position, I would like to make three statements.

The first refers to the developments of the theory of the right war in the great thinkers of the XVII

century: **Roberto Bellarmino**, **Francisco de Vitoria**, **Bartolomé Las Casas**, **Francisco Suarez**. They lived in a climate of pluralism, that was unknown before. The colonial law had still to be discovered. They couldn't either ignore the national States, or justify all their interventions. Suarez started invoking a supreme will.

The second observation is about an Italian thinker of the last century, **Luigi Taparelli d'Azeoglio**. In his "Theoretical essay of natural law supported by fact", he questions the ethics of nationalism and invokes not only an international society (ethnarchy), but he wants it equipped with military means able to prevail over those who want to jeopardize peace. There is a deep gap between his positions and those, a bit later, of **Iehring** and **Jellinek** according to which a sovereign State would cease to be being sovereign if accepted a superior authority.

The third statement leads to a bitter consideration: all Christians have too often to endure the situations and the culture supporting them. The identification of patriotism with the ideas of power and domination was so strong in the XIX century that very few denounced this way of thinking. The dominating individualist philosophy did not allow to look at the international society as an organic body in which the States, even if independent, were living cells. As concerns us more directly, it would be very interesting to know that during the Vatican Council I, abruptly interrupted in 1870 by the capture of Rome, they would discuss a very articulated plan, submitted by a group of Catholics and Protestants, urging all Christians to aim their action at an effective internationalization of social life, in order to reduce disputes and wars.

Every stage of cultural transformation is understandably long and one must not be surprised if only after many decades the Christian conscience, i.e. the average Christian culture, understood the meaning of the change that influenced also the

ethics of war and peace. If we think that still in 1792 Pope Pius VI invoked war against the impiety of the French revolutionaries, we can understand why when Pius IX in 1849 refused to take part in any coalition against Austria or any other State, because all human beings were his children, this was considered a great novelty.

It is impossible to list here all the stages. The one that can represent the watershed between the traditional ethics of the right war and that defined as legitimacy of defence, is the pontificate of **Benedict XV**. In 1915 he composed a classic but contested "prayer for peace". On August 1, 1917 he sent the belligerent Countries a note asking to put an end to that useless slaughter that was for Europe a real suicide. He was not understood, not even by the Catholics. Very popular reviews such as "Etudes" or "Stimmen der Zeit" disregarded him completely. But the foundations of a new Christian outlook were laid.

The terrible massacre of World War I that did not solve any of the contrasts among the great powers, and that is today almost officially considered at the same level of a dispute to gain economic superiority, contradicts the centuries-old theory of the right war. But something new was coming about. The most important attempt was to propose and to collaborate to a new framework of international law, in which it was possible to solve in advance also the problems of war. But in this case we have a double evolution line. The consequent laws remain on the old positions. Art. 12 of the Treaty of Versailles maintains the principle that any war is part of the undisputable rights of a State. Fortunately the conscience of many clergymen, statesmen and men of culture goes ahead. If war is incompatible with the dignity of human society, only defensive war can now be legitimated.

Even in the Catholic field, as already said, a certain stickiness to the past was present. Nationalism and patriotism seem still synonyms, sup-

ported by the regime, projecting outwards the internal difficulties. It was necessary the jolt of World War II to start a new way. It is interesting to note that many times these certitudes had been jeopardized. I refer, for example, to the writings of the military Chaplains, generally in the form of war diaries. They do not question the loyalty of their service, but sometimes harshly criticize the system, in the name of their experience and of a more demanding ethical outlook.



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Arde de Camp Général, Arde de Camp en Prince Electoral

Now we can wonder whether the principles supporting the theory of the right war are still valid. According to logic, yes, but the reality of modern war frustrates them: more and more involvement of civilians, ideologic rather than juridical reasons, atomic or conventional arm systems out of proportion, less and less possibilities of control and therefore easy crossing into total war.

Today the Christian reflection involves a wide spectrum of responsible persons, simple witness or interested parties from the Pope to bodies of the Holy Seat ("Justitia et Pax" in particular), to the Council of Churches of Geneva and to the St. Synod of Moscow; from the Catholic Episcopal Conferences and similar evangelical, orthodox or Anglican associations, to theologians, sociologists and Christian economists; from pacifist movements to conscientious objectors. It is not easy to follow and set in order all voices, also because the noisiest may not be the most balanced. In any case it seems possible to get a line expressing the contemporary Christian conscience, taking for granted some points, which are not easily acceptable and in any case not binding.

The first point is categorical: war is unacceptable. It is not just a reaction to the atrocities we already know, but the result of a consensus on Christian anthropology, which sees in the natural community the appeal to accomplish a brotherhood

Unfortunately war has not been eradicated from mankind. And as long as there is the risk of war and no international authority with efficient forces, once that all the possibilities of a peaceful settlement have been tried, it is not possible to deny the governments their right to self-defence.

that becomes a body of norms (the "first fact", as Taparelli said) to realize. Paul VI will talk about the "fundamental dogma of human brotherhood" (1971).

As a consequence, war cannot be theorized as an unavoidable fatality. "Public opinion realizes more and more the absurdity of war as a mean to solve controversies". This was said by John Paul II at Drogheda (Sept. 29, 1979), but is also stated in our Constitution (art. II).

Another consequence not shared by many political leaders of today and yesterday and also by some jurists, but repeated since the

pontificate of Pius IX, is that force does not lead to any right and that violence is unworthy of man. Moreover, experience shows that the international problems are not solved by wars anymore. With a war, even a local one, people think they can solve a controversy quickly. But very often the solution is only postponed.

Also the second point to remember is very important, and establishes the right to self-defence. In someone's opinion, considering the developments of modern war, not even this justification should be valid any more. But the teaching of the Church is precise and does not allow



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misunderstandings. Not only it speaks of right, but sometimes also of duty.

Let's recall just some important statements. **Pius XII** is the first who supported that only a defensive war can be ethically legitimate (Christmas 1948). But the "A pax Christi" (Sept. 13, 1952) says that the right can turn into a duty. And this is repeated many times. Also the condemnation of NBC warfare does not touch the principle of self-defence, in fact "it may be compulsory to drive out the invader by force" (Easter 1954) because "to act as mere spectators in a behaviour of impossible neutrality is forbidden by the solidarity of peoples (To Jurists, Oct. 3, 1953). The conscience of man's dignity cannot leave space to criminals without conscience jeopardizing "the existence of the peoples and their most precious goods" (To Doctors, Oct. 19, 1953). In fact no State "can quietly accept slavery and economic ruin" (A pax Christi).

Pope John XXIII went down in

history for his goodness, but also for the lucid analysis and proposal contained in the Encyclical "Pacem in terris" (1963). Times have changed and it is necessary to look at the war/peace problem with different eyes. Pope John's theories are present, together with those of **Pius XII**, in the long paragraph that the pastoral Constitution "Gaudium et Spes" devotes to the matter of international relationships. It is not just a repetition of theses, but a synthesis that gives birth to the ethical position of the Christians. The starting point is not philosophical but historical, and appeals to the "sense of reality" that earlier had been considered by the "Pacem in terris". The text of the Council says: "Unfortunately war has not been uprooted from the human condition. And as long as there is the risk of war and there is no international authority armed with efficient forces, once that all the possibilities of a peaceful settlement have been tried, it will

not be possible to deny the governments the right to self-defence". (GS 79)

These few lines contain the best of the Christian reflection since **Father Taparelli**. War is absurd, as is selfishness, both personal and among peoples. But it does exist. It is not enough to exorcize it, this would be just moralistic. Of course it is necessary to avoid it through a consistent education and legislation. But it is also necessary to oppose it with a supernatural strong authority supplied with adequate means to oppose the unruly. This is the dynamism that introduces the ethical principle into history. Also the national defence has much to gain from this serious, if not easy, approach to the problem. Once more our Constitution is in line, when it states that Italy is willing to accept balanced renunciations of sovereignty to achieve this goal.

There are endless writings about the legitimacy, or even the duty to resort to armed defence. Some Christians say: the precept of forgiveness and of "turning the other cheek" is valid both for individuals and for peoples. But the Gospel speaks also clearly about the responsibility towards the others, above all the smallest and the most defenceless. And who has the task of common good cannot hide behind a disengagement formula. This would be the negation of the first Christian precept, love for God and one's neighbour. In the above-mentioned chapter, the Council says: "The heads of State and those who share the responsibility of the common good have the duty to defend the safety of the peoples entrusted to them, treating such important things with a deep sense of responsibility" (GS 79).

Pope Paul VI in his speech at the UN, after repeating the appeal "no more war", and aware of the realism of the human condition, added: "as long as man is the weak, inconstant and even wicked being sometimes he shows to be, defensive armaments will be unfortunately necessary".

John Paul II courageously has a new ethical view. "The road of arms is not the road of Christ", he says, as it is not the road of man, but "there may be some cases when the armed fight is an unavoidable evil that not even the Christians can avoid". The context of this very clear expression is the "Katholichentag" of Vienna (Sep, 11, 1983). Ecumenism and respect for others must not let us forget that where certain values have been defeated, also civilization has been destroyed. It would be enough to think of the millenary decay of Africa, that once was in the vanguard of social and religious progress. Let's just suppose what Europe would be if first Belgrade (1486) and then Vienna (1583) had collapsed.

Pope Wojtyla, again speaking to the Italian Chaplains says: "it is impossible to make the cause of peace to advance, denying the possibility or the duty to defend it" (March 10, 1986)

The third point could be enounced in this way: not everything is allowed in war. It is an updated version of the Scholastic theory of "jus in bello".

Pius XII, whose open and lucid mind we have already mentioned, has no doubt about this. Talking to the military physicians in 1953 he said: "When the damages caused by a defensive war are out of proportion to the injustice endured, there could be the duty to suffer the injustice". The principle of proportionality is a classic one in the Catholic moral doctrine, but today there are new specifications about massive destructions (even before the atom bomb, in military language they were called "carpet bombings") and retaliations that "turn war into a slaughter worth of the Barbarians" (Taparelli, *ibidem*, par. 1450).

The problem of armaments reduction is taking on great importance in the ethical reflection. There are Christians who support the moral need of a process of unilateral disarmament. This is not the position of the Catholic and papal teachings nor that of the episcopal Confer-



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Under the present conditions a deterrence based on balance, certainly not a goal in itself, but just a stage on the way to progressive disarmament, can still be considered morally acceptable.

ences that expressed their opinion about this matter. It is also interesting here the deep ethical examination deriving from principles but also from experience. In 1906 Pius X could evagelically bless those who supported the destruction of arms. Later, in the light of the problems coming from voids of power (1938), the theories became more prudent. But they did not lose their prophetic character, if we think of the more and more topical scandal: the waste, in the name of a hypothetical war, of the means that would allow the development of the poor Countries of the whole world.

The great discussion about the morality or not of the atom bomb

can be introduced here. It is generally said that it is thanks to the bomb if World War III did not break out. But is a stable equilibrium of terror a viable hypothesis?

We know the main Catholic theses of the last few years. How is it possible to own a weapon whose use would be immoral because of its catastrophic consequences? And if it is not right to use it, according to what ethical principle can it be produced?

In this context we find the "vexata quaestio" about deterrence or atomic dissuasion. It is not just a variant of the classical forms of armament. The position of the Church,

of its papal teaching and of the main episcopal Conferences, is clear even if it did not solve all problems. It is possible to make an abstract discussion, and then the radical condemnation of the armaments race is more than justified. But does not the present situation of economic and political competitiveness between the East and the West, aiming at changing not only the way of living, but also of thinking, at changing on's faith and civilization, justify the maximum level of prudence and therefore a deterrence policy?

So, on one side there is the threat of the dissolution of mankind, and on the other that of the loss of identity of whole continents. The strongest text for its ethical content remains that of **John Paul II** in his message at the second special session of the United Nations on disarmament (June 6, 1982): "under the present conditions a deterrence based on balance, that must not be considered as a goal, but just as a stage on the way of progressive disarmament, can be still considered as morally acceptable". The Pope also added that this situation must be considered as "a challenge to conscience" (Jan. 18, 1984, to Diplomats), requiring attention to avoid the blackmail the armaments race can imply. According to the moralists' classical language, between two evils it is already good to choose the lesser one, even if this is not enough to make it good.

There are also opinions, expressed in the name of one's own Christian faith, that can give rise to misunderstandings. In an ethical outlook of defence, it is necessary to take them into consideration, without generalizations. The fact that a bishop, a priest or a group of faithful, support, even noisily, their opinions, must not be considered wrong; besides asserting the respect of the freedom of others, it compels people to ask themselves useful questions in a field where nothing can be taken for granted.

By logical connection, we could remind at least two fields which are closely connected: conscientious objection and pacifism.

Conscientious objection to the military service is not the subject of ethical conflicts in Italy anymore, since it was accepted and regulated by law. There can be no question that this law must be improved, and it couldn't be otherwise after an experience of 17 years. But there is some tension just in those Catholic milieus according to which the preferential choice for a Christian should be "no" to military service. It is not surprising if someone says so, but if he maintains this in the name of the Christian conscience, interpreted and enlightened by the teachings of the Church, this it is undoubtedly incorrect. The positions about this matter are clear. It is known that conscientious objection for religious reasons concerns above all, in modern times, the Protestant circles. With their free examination, they attached less importance to the reason of the authority. Still in the '50s, Catholic theologians categorically refused the conscientious objections as an element of desolidarization. In his Christmas speech of 1956, **Pius XII** spoke about the risks of the breaks in the national community that certainly would not help pacification.

The Vatican Council II takes a discrete position. In the "*Gaudium et Spes*", at no. 79, it is said: "It seems in conformity with equity that laws consider humanely the case of those who, for conscientious reasons, refuse the use of arms, but accept some other form of service to the human community". Few lines before it had also spoken of those, and among these the objectors, "refusing violence in claiming their rights, resort to those means of defence which are accessible even to the weakest and that it could be possible to act in this way without jeopardizing the rights and duties of the others or of the community" (no. 78). It is certainly not possible to take the claim to objection, as an unquestionable subjective right, from the Catholic doctrine.

Still twenty years since the Council the ethical basis has not changed. **John Paul II** in his programmatic

speech in Assisi during the 2nd Ecumenical Congress (April 24, 1985) exhorted the Christian communities to be close to the young "both those who loyally do their duty to serve their Country, and those who, for conscientious reasons, choose an alternative civilian service". Someone used these words in a unilateral way, as if the Pope had shown some preference for the conscientious objection. One year later, receiving the Italian military Chaplains (March, 10, 1986) he confirmed his opinion and stressed that the legitimate alternative choices "cannot be considered as exclusive or preferential".

The word "pacifism" is often used to include many realities that we cannot even try to summarize on this occasion. Let's just limit ourselves to a brief judgement. If by pacifism we mean the conviction to aim at peace, no Christian can be indifferent to this. "Blessed are the peace-makers", is written in the fundamental Chart of the Christian message (Mt 5,9). We can admit that the Christians were not consistent enough during the course of history. Now that peace, as mass-media say, has broken out, and everyone wants peace, all Christians cannot but rejoice. But one cannot just stop at the declamation of ideals, even if they are necessary. Of course also in Italy there is a sort of pacifism that A. Monticone called fideistic (Jesus 1/89). We could even call it fundamentalist or not paying enough attention to the impoverished nature of man.

Of course man can overcome the decline of nature, above all if he is guided by the Christian ideal and spurred on by grace. Slowly man defeated slavery; why couldn't he proceed also on the way of peace?

But to rush on means to circumvent the difficult way towards a future of peace. "Even if it can be considered a paradox, he who really wants peace refuses the kind of pacifism implying disengagement or the mere preservation of tranquillity" (1984). In this connection it seems to me that a double quotation from the English poet Eliot, from

the "Choruses of the Rock", is very pertinent: "without a Temple there are no abodes". Also the most generous ideal impulse must consider the "original sin" that is a mysterious reality but, in a certain way, is also the most "verifiable" of all human realities.


A second passage says "(All) try to avoid the internal and external darkness by dreaming of systems so perfect that make it useless for man to be good".

It is necessary to dream: but we cannot run the risk of not being able to dream anymore.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In conclusion, one can and must speak about ethics, but avoiding geometric or mathematical formulas. Even if we preferred, due to our Christian conscience, the sensitivity towards the ethical problems of defence, it is true that, according to its own nature, any action is moral if it involves the individual moral conscience. What can be criticized about some conscientious objectors, is that they want to establish, from the outside, the behaviour of the individual. The ideal ethical behaviour is not one choice or another, but a responsible examination of objective data, able to enlighten and morally support a personal choice. The Christian cannot have any doubt about this. To educate to faith, i.e. to listen to God, means to educate to freedom.

Concerning our matter, there are two final considerations. A passage, taken from the Vatican Council II, about laics i.e. those Christians engaged in the building of a theorem-city, says: "it's up to their conscience, already properly formed, to inscribe Divine Law in the life of the earthly city... They must not think that their pastors are always so expert as to have a concrete solution for each new problem, even the most serious one, they have rather to take their responsibility according to Christian wisdom and pay attention to the doctrine. (...) Then if the so-



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lutions proposed by one side or the other are easily connected by many with the evangelic message, in the case they must remember that no one has the right to claim, exclusively in favour of his own opinion, the authority of the Church". There is room for everybody, we could say with a well-known sentence, when there is intelligence, respect and good will.

So, it is necessary to urge greater and greater attention by the military to the problems of ethics and public opinion. In fact they too are subject to the of law values and of ethical needs. Military life is not an independent variable within the moral life of a nation or the world. Just for this reason, the professional experience facing the great and im-

mutable principles becomes a necessary component in a concrete ethical judgement. This is the foundation of the ethics of responsibility.

Rather than with other theoretic citations, I would like to close with an exceptional statement, made with the simplicity typical of genuine people. With the very meaningful title "I am a moral man", Admiral **James D. Watring**, when he was Chief of Operations of the U.S. Navy, wrote: "During the course of human history, all Churches of all confessions, said and taught that war and the participation to a war, under particular circumstances, can be justified. If such circumstances occur — and the defence against an external aggression is one of these — a nation can legitimately engage itself in what

both philosophers and theologians define as a "right war". It was also accepted the fact that, confronting a clear and evident threat of military aggression, a nation has the right — and its leaders also the moral duty — to keep the Country's military force at a level being sufficient and necessary to discourage and avoid war. Under these circumstances, to own a military force, provided that it is not used for aggressive purposes, is not an evil thing, but is rather positive.

Those who are reading these words know very well that, even if to study ethics is very difficult, it is a great deal easier to study ethics than to apply it. In the same way, it is easier to read something about a microcircuit than to build one, and it is easier to study aviation techniques than to pilot an airplane. And, at a more human level, it is easier to dream of a love affair than to live a married life. All these different human efforts have at least two elements in common: they require of us, both men and women, to have a series of useful and practical principles according to which we behave and lead us, and ask, to apply these principles to the particular case that from time to time concerns us.

But it is precisely this component of the total equation, i.e. the application of the principles, the one that so often makes it so difficult for us to decide.

I would like to make a basic statement that, according to what I hope and sincerely believe, is valid and can be applied to me as Chief of Operations of the U.S. Navy and to all my colleagues, both military and civilian, entrusted with the everyday's running of the naval and military forces of our Country: "I am a moral man". I find myself constantly, making choices every day of my life; choices between good and evil. In the large number of decisions that I have to take, sometimes I have to choose between a "good" and another "good", between a "greater good" and a "lesser good" and maybe also between two apparent evils. But of course this is part

of life. All of us do this every day; all who have been given a soul and a conscience by God — therefore, all of us — are forced to make these choices.

It seems clear that legal ethics and moral ethics are not necessarily the same thing. In fact they are often quite different, depending on the particular circumstances of the specific cases. Therefore, while all of us are forced to respect the law, I, as a moral person, to do so must have deep-rooted moral principles. As a moral man, I must constantly ask myself: what do I believe about the meaning of life? What values do I believe in? What is most important for me? What did I learn at school, at home, in the Church, and what did I learn from my fellow-men?

In other words, I fully realize that all choices I make are exclusively mine, and I have to take all decisions by myself. So, I have to be subject to the consequences of my choices, without fear.

And it is at this point that I, as Chief of Naval Operations, as a human being, but above all as a moral man, humbly put myself before God. After doing so, I try to do my best in taking my decisions.

How does a moral person behave when he has to face a threat to the common good, above all when he holds a responsible position and has therefore the responsibility to defend that common good? The answer is that the choices he has to make are those in the interest of the common good. According to this firm opinion, we chose, for our Country, to discourage and prevent war. We chose military strength, rather than military weakness; we made this choice not for the sake of military power in itself — which can be either good or bad depending on the use of it — but in order to avert and prevent war, a purpose that I hope and think is shared by all moral persons and considered as a positive fact.

The Church I was educated in and whose commandments I believe, does not order pacifism. As other

moral people of different faiths, beliefs and personal convictions — but who share and accept the same moral philosophy, the same ethical code, the same opinions about what is "good" and what is "evil" — I hope, pray and work for a peaceful world.

But — it is worthwhile to repeat it — that world is not the world we live in today. And that's why we cannot, as moral human beings, ask the lamb to lie with the lion. And we cannot use our swords to make ploughshares, when the others are doing exactly the opposite.


I would like it were easier to take these decisions and that the answers were clearer. But it is not so. This is the reasons why I gathered around me the best brains available. Together we resort, or try to resort, to the best research, the best intelligences, the best plans. And also to prayer.

Each of us, as a human being, has to make decisions in his private life. What we are discussing about is part of our life. God gave an intelligence to all of us and assigned us the task of taking care of a particular part of his world. The problems that all of us have to face are similar: what reference point do we have, to find the answers to the ethical problems we have to face? And, also important, what kind of example shall we be for others, close to us, who are looking for a special guide which could help them to sift their personal ethical problems?

I think we already have these answers inside. They are rooted in our religious beliefs and in our conscience. They have strengthened and improved through the many personal and national crises we have faced, both as individuals and as a nation. It is for this reason that we have to look for the answers inside ourselves. And we have to pray: in order to be able to understand and to do well what we have decided to do" ("Bonus Miles Christi", 1983/4).

Msgr. Gaetano Bonicelli

PEACE-KEEPING AND CONTROL

An aerial photograph of a city skyline, likely New York City, featuring numerous skyscrapers and a body of water in the foreground. The image is used as a background for the title and text.

The keeping of restoration of peace in the various parts of the world, together with order and security, is the main goal of the activities of the «United Nations» and of other international organizations carried out at regional and sub-regional level. In fact this goal represents the basis of all other goals that the communities of States pursue through political, economic and social cooperation, and which aim at increasing the prosperity and welfare of nations.

OF REGIONAL CRISES



THE UNITED NATION AND THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES



We can say that all questions concerning peace and security pivot on two fundamental problems: the control of armaments and the control of regional crises.

By focusing attention above all on the second problem, the purpose of this article is to have a rapid look at all those instruments the international community supplied itself with and used during the last forty years to achieve the goal of peace-keeping.

Therefore, we will consider the «peace-keeping» operations of the United Nations and of the multinational forces and the characteristic aspects of the rapid deployment forces, against the background of the variegated international geostrategic picture.

THE INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC PICTURE

Today the strategic scenery is characterized by a substantial political/military bipolarism, arbiter of world peace, and by a multipolarism with political, economic, commercial, technologic and scientific factors which makes international relationships very complex and variform.

The forecasts about a progressive transformation of the above mentioned bipolarism towards a tripolar or pentapolar form, due to the closing of Europe, China and Japan to the United States and the Soviet Union as world protagonists, forecasts which were reliable up to some years ago, never became true.

Japan, even if playing a leading part in the economic and financial field (the Japanese economy produces 13.4% of all world goods) didn't become an overall political pole because of its decreased military power (the Defence budget is still 1% of its GDP).

Equally China, in spite of its heavy geopolitical and geostrategic weight, was never able to play the part of a superpower.

And then Western Europe, even if holder of important records and considerable economic, financial,

commercial, technological and military capacity, could never direct the course of the world relationships, because of its persisting political fragmentation.

In conclusion, yet considering the well-known phenomenon of «power diffusion» that considerably increased the political role of small and medium regional powers in different areas, the United States and the Soviet Union are the only two superpowers that nowadays rely - and it will be so still for many years - on the economic resources and military forces necessary to develop planetary strategies.

This statement is confirmed by the way the main problem of disarmament and strategic armaments control has been tackled up to now, problem that concerns one of the main constitutional engagements of the United Nations Organization.


Negotiations about strategic armaments have never involved any responsibility of the world Organization, since they have developed and have been run only and directly between the two superpowers: the USA and the USSR.

This is confirmed by the progress of START negotiations and by recent agreement about ground-based intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), defined «double zero option» in order to indicate that it concerns the elimination of all intermediate nuclear weapons (LRINF and SRINF) having a range between 500 and 5.500 km.

This agreement was welcomed as a «milestone» in the process under course even if it concerns, from a strictly quantitative point of view, only 4% of the nuclear arsenal belonging to each of the two superpowers.

The elimination of euromissiles in the two fronts, although did not completely change the situation from a military point of view, started the development of political changes having a previously unknown importance.

In fact, the East-West detente started in the late '80s is qualitatively different from the one which took place previously, since the Soviet



Union seems to be inclined to go on not only on the way of armaments control, but also on the way of the control of regional conflicts.

This will cause positive repercussions on the field of the North-South confrontation that has been added to the East-West one to depict the world strategic scenery and that fosters the problem of the «out of area» conflicts, whose definition and analysis is as difficult as topical.

The North-South confrontation displays itself essentially in the activism of the two superpowers towards the Third World, the peripheric conflict areas of Central Africa, of the Middle East, of South-West Asia, of America and of South-East Asia, that is the trouble spots of the world: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Lebanon, Israel, Afghanistan, Iran, Ethiopia, Sudan, Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, the Philippines.

In these trouble spots there is an intersection among the conflicts and influence of many groups of States mainly belonging to three political-economic poles represented by the OECD Countries, by those associated in the COMECON and by the Developing Countries, forming the «Group of 77», the so-called eco-



economic Third World, that only in part coincides with the political Third World, that only in part coincides with the political Third World.

In this articulated picture there is also who thinks that the problems of the North-South antagonism and of the «out of area» conflicts may become in the future more important in the international relationships than the East-West dialectics.

Those who support this idea emphasize above all two aspects of the situation: the growing dangerousness of the «out of area» conflicts as a consequence of the armaments race of many countries of the Third World and the relentless increase in foreign debts on numerous Developing Countries.

Concerning the first aspect, according to the CIA director, Mr. W. Webster, within one decade many countries of the Third World will be able to produce autonomously long-range ballistic missiles, chemical and biological arms (India comes first, followed by Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, North and South Korea, Egypt and the ASEAN Countries) and will rely on the whole range of armaments «as superpowers», nuclear weapons included. This will change in an unforeseeable way the world strategic equation and

the pre-existing balances in many peripheral areas.

In particular in the middle-eastern trouble spot, which represents the «out of area» place at the door of Italy, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, speeding up the acquisition of offensive armaments, in particular of missiles, the search for a long-lasting strategic stability in the region will become more and more difficult, notwithstanding the progress of the East-West agreements.

Other crises of difficult solution will persist in Central America where the United States will be engaged in avoiding the regimes of Nicaragua and Cuba to spread outside the region inserting into the North-South dialectics, that concerns all Countries of the continent from Mexico to Colombia and to the whole Latin America, with disruptive effects.

Dangerous intesections of tension will persist in South-East Asia, where the ambitions of expansion of the Soviet-Vietnamese Alliance will be faced by the ASEAN Countries and opposed by the strategic interests of China, Japan and the United States.

As concerns the second aspect of the situation, the progressive increase in foreign debts of many Developing Countries represents the crucial point of the North-South dispute.

Generally the problem about the debts of the Third World exploded in 1982 when Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and the Philippines simultaneously announced they couldn't stand anymore their involvement in debts that implied the payment of interests higher than the total amount.

In other words, the problem of their involvement in debts had turned into an upside-down «Marshall Plan», from the South to the North, becoming a real obstacle to the economic growth of the debtor Countries.

Besides all reasons which caused this involvement in debts, reasons that are quite different among the

various Countries of Latin America and Afro-Asiatic Countries, and besides the factors that caused the present crisis (it was estimated that from 20 to 30% of the foreign debt of the Third World is due to arm imports), the real problem that these Countries have to solve today is to obtain more credits from the international financial system, which are indispensable to start the economic growth, that should produce the means necessary to repay the debts themselves.

A zero growth rate not only does not produce resources to eliminate debts, but, like in a sort of vicious circle, causes a decrease of the per capita income, an increase of the inflation and unemployment rates, a fall of real salaries, progressively depressing all parameters of the quality of life.

So the paradox is that in order to pay their debts these Countries need more credits.

The interlacement of the tension coming from the dramatic problem of debts, in which Latin America is particularly involved, with the rivalry and antagonism connected with the strategic situation of Central and Caribbean America, gives an idea of the permeation of the conflicts between North-South and East-West in the American Mediterranean. The United States fear the creation of an area under the Soviet influence in Central America through Cuba and Nicaragua; the States of Latin America fear for their economic and so political survival and worry that the East-West tension could in many oppose the solution of their problem.

But because of that interdependence, on a world scale, existing today in the international relationships, what happens in the American Mediterranean directly involves the industrialized Countries of the European Community since they are bound to Latin America by indissoluble historical, political, commercial and cultural relationships.

On the other hand the crossed conflicts present in the American Mediterranean are the same, but



with greater risks, as in the European Mediterranean, real crossroads of tension and melting-pot of numerous factors of crisis such as: the permanent situation of conflict in Lebanon, the progressive deterioration of the economic situation of the Countries of the Southern shore and of the Horn of Africa, the Islamic integralism in the Arab world, the rearmament race of the North-Africa and Middle-Eastern Countries.

Above we have mentioned that the North-South confrontation is essentially the result of the policy of the two superpowers in the Third World. Now we can specify that this policy is periodically subject to turbulent reactions from the Southern Countries, which express themselves in two different ways: the anti-Americanism often assumes the virulent, not to say, explosive forms of anti imperialism and anti-colonialism; the anti-Sovietism, instead, often remains at the surface and never assumes the aspects of nationalistic passion.

In the light of this situation, the Soviet policy seems to be more paying than the American policy since, even if it resorts to a more and more devalued and losing model of economic development (that is the centrally planned economy), it is able to convey the protest of the world economic order, coming from the South, mainly against the West.

The fact is that the Soviet Union grants, more easily, above all armaments to the Countries of the Third World and to the various liberation movements having an anti-American attitude. This causes a sort of militarization of the policy of the Third World which greatly explains the perpetuity of regional conflicts and the worsening of the problems concerning the economic development, that feed the continuous North-South tension in an anti-Western vein.

An example is represented by Syria whose military activism is supported by the large availability of Soviet armaments and makes it very difficult the establishment in that region of any kind of «super partes» peace.

Similar example are represented by Nicaragua as concerns Central America, and by Vietnam for Indochina and South-East Asia.

By fostering tension in the Third World, Moscow keeps the North-South conflicts alive, imposing on the West and the United States the investment of considerable economic resources to control regional crises. Otherwise these resources could be used for aids to the Developing Countries, and if they were used this way, would re-evaluate the picture of the Western democratic societies, limiting drastically the Soviet Union's range of action.

The UNO has always tried to con-

tain the North-South tension but was scarcely successful, also because of the nature of the internal regimes of many Third World Countries which are more influential owing to their economic capacity and geopolitical position.

From 1945 until today scholars calculated 135 wars of different intensity fought in the Third World, which involved 85 Countries and caused a higher number of total losses than those caused by the World War II.

One third of the Developing Countries are seriously backward. In 1985 the UNO enumerated 36 of them among which Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Gibuti, Yemen, the Central Africa Republic, Countries that indirectly urge on the European Mediterranean area and contribute to increase hidden conflicts.

Besides these poor Countries there are the raw material-producing Countries, rich in economic capacity yet unable to carry out a unitary action since they are divided by phenomena of micronationalism, religious rivalry and endemic conflicts. It is the case of the 13 OPEC Countries which form a group characterized by differences rather than homogeneity.

In 1985 the OPEC owned almost 70% of the world oil reserve, of which nearly 44% was concentrated in oil wells of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq, Countries which have quite different conditions with respect to Venezuela, Nigeria and Indochina, seriously oppressed by heavy debts.

On the other side the world oil market and the game of the energy demand and offer suffered and is still undergoing big changes in the relationships between oil-exporting and oil-consumer Countries. In the next decade scholars estimate that the total oil demand from the producing Countries and the Developing Countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa will overcome that of the industrialized countries.

According to these estimates it will be a very important historical



upset that will re-orientate the world oil trade from the area of the OECD Countries to that of the Third World. Moreover the old antagonism about prices that set the OPEC against the industrialized Countries is decreasing because of a growing economic dependence between the two parties that will require cooperation and harmonization rather than contrasts. In other words the traditional role of oil in the North South conflicts will change and will have important repercussions on the strategic relationships of the East-West picture.

THE UNITED NATIONS «PEACE KEEPING» OPERATIONS


Let's leave the present strategic scenario out of consideration for a while and let's have a look at the international system coming from the World War II. On this background, the regulations of the United Nations put the Security Council in a central position.

Art. 24 of Statute states that «all Members confer on the Security Council, the main responsibility for the keeping of peace and of international security and recognize that the Security Council performing its duties concerning such responsibility, acts on their behalf».

In order to perform these duties, the Statute regulations state that it can resort to three different kinds of action, to be developed with different intensity according to circumstances.

First of all the Council can try to provide the conditions necessary to the development of negotiations, mediations or arbitrations, or to allow the appeal of those States involved in the controversy to the International Court of Justice. Articles 34 and 36 of the Statute provide for different ways to carry out these peaceful measures.

In case the crisis situation threatens to jeopardize international peace, the Council is authorized to adopt



more efficacious measures, such as the sanctions. Art. 41 of the Statute indicates as possible action «the total or partly breaking of economic relationships and of the sea, air, mail, radiotelegraphic communications and the breaking of diplomatic relations».

In the end, in order to restore peace and security, in case they have been compromised, articles 43 and 45 of the Statute state that the Council can undertake a real international coercive action through its armed forces.

Concerning this third form of action, we must say that the resort to force and to coercive means was never carried out completely. The General Staff Committee (formed by the Heads of the General Staff of the permanent member countries of the Security Council), a body that should support the Security Council in the employment and command of the United Nations forces, was never able to come to an agreement about the composition and organization of these forces.

Taking retrospectively the political/military and strategic picture of the period 1946/1947 into account, it is easy to understand why this agreement failed to be reached.

The fact is that at that time, also because of the existence of an ade-

quate international force able to be entrusted with the security of system of the United Nations, the political and military blocks of the NATO (1949) and of the Warsaw Pact (in 1955, replacing the pre-existing multilateral defence system) began to take shape and were assigned the task of keeping the world political and strategic balance.

The balance of forces that came out of this, certainly avoided a general breaking of peace from the second post-war time on, but was unable to prevent to outburst of tension, controversies and regional conflicts in the Third World.

Anyway, in the case of serious international questions the United Nations Organization was able to exert its authority. It means that, whereas the international community perceived serious dangers and unacceptable risks for the breaking of peace, the United Nations intervened developing the so-called «peace-keeping operations», resorting to the «blue-helmets».

According to the various circumstances, the UNO forces assumed different characters: they acted as interpositions forces among the opponents; as garrison in armistice zones; as groups of military observers; as forces of international policy and performed different tasks according to the goals to achieve and the general and military conditions of the moment.

In any case, the «peace-keeping operations» always start from instructions of the Security Council or of the General Assembly and follow under the operative responsibilities of the Secretary General.

The first coercive operation was undertaken by the United Nations in 1950 to solve the well-known Korean questions. On that occasion the fighting units were supplied by 16 States, while five more States (among which Italy that at that time was not a UNO member yet) supplied sanitary units. The operations, started in 1950, ended three years later with an armistice. In Korea the troops of the multinational contin-


gent, that were put at disposal of a unified Command under the authority of the United States, wore their national uniform and waved their own flag.

The birth of the «blue-helmets», that is the formation of the first units temporarily employed in the UNO Armed Forces, took place in the operation carried out to solve the Middle-Eastern question in 1956, that had started with the nationalization of the Suez Canal from Egypt. The General Assembly, in accordance with a resolution legitimating its decision (called "Peace-keeping Unions"), ordered the cease-fire and with the consent of all the Countries concerned, tried to establish an International Emergency Force (UNEF), whose task was to assure and control the cessation of hostilities.

The UNEF was under the United Nations command, appointed by the General Assembly. The contingents came from ten different Countries, from which the Members of the Security Council were excluded. The interposition activity ended in 1967 when the United Arab Republic withdrew its consent to the keeping of the multinational force on its territory (as we know a second UNEF was sent to Sinai after the Kippur war in 1973, and stayed there until the Camp David agreements of 1979).

Both interventions in Korea and in Egypt, even if different by nature, goals and forms, concerned a typical international question, that is a conflict between two different subjects of international law: between North and South Korea in the first case, among Great Britain, France and Israel on one side and the UAR on the other in the second case. In the next question, concerning Congo, the UNO confronted for the first time a crisis in which the internal elements prevailed. In fact Congo asked the United Nations a military and civilian aid to face also the risk of the secession of a great part of the national territory, Katanga. In July 1960 the UNO started the United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC) which lasted until 1964.

During the same year a new contingent of the UNO was formed with the



task of keeping peace in Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish populations. The composition and the effectiveness of this force of interposition (UNFICYP) were established by the Secretary General, together with the Cypriot, Turkish, British and Greek governments. It started operations in 1964 and since then its presence in the island has always been prolonged (today 8 Countries take part in it with 2,150 men).

Another UNO contingent acting as interposition force (UNIFIL) has been operating since 1978 in Lebanon, where it was sent after the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon (among the nine participating Countries there is also Italy).

In the interventions in Korea, Suez, Congo, Cyprus and Lebanon the military forces acted and have been mainly acting as police and/or interposition forces. In the «peace-keeping» operations under the UNO guidance also the observation missions were and are still very important.

Many missions of this kind were carried out starting from 1949 in Indonesia, Kashmir, Palestine, Syria, New Guinea, Yemen, India and Pakistan. Those in Palestine and Kashmir (UNTSO and UNMOGIP, respectively), in which also Italy participates, and in Syria (UNDOF) are still under course. Since August 1988 a new observers' group (UNIIMOG), among which many are Italian, has



been engaged on the borders between Iran and Irak to control the respect of the armistice established with resolution No. 598, after a long and bloody war that caused heavy losses on both sides.

The last mission in order of time became operative in April 1989 in accordance with resolution No. 435 of the United Nations Security Council. The multinational contingent (UNTAG), in which also Italy participates with twentyone more States, is stationed in Namibia and its duty is to guarantee the independence of the State, after more than 70 years of South-African administration, and to control the respect of the truce between Angola and South Africa.

After what we mentioned above, we can say that the consultive balance of the United Nations activities in the last forty years for keeping of restoration of peace is generally positive. In fact in 1988 the "blue-helmets" were awarded the Nobel Prize for peace, since they were considered a very important technical, political and moral instrument in the service of detente and of the solution of international controversies.

Of course there are also many gaps in the Organizations due to various unsolved problems concerning for example: the precise definition of the tasks of the Security Council on one side and of the General Assembly on the other; the clear limits in the tasks of the UNO forces, in order to avoid confused pragmatic solutions; the financing of peace operations that is too often voluntarily supplied.

But, more important, there are many signals showing a progressive relaunch and strengtening of the role and efficiency of the UNO.

Proposals in this direction have been recently made by the Soviet leadership. Some of these seem quite instrumental and propagandistic, but other seem more concrete and likely to be carried out, such as the proposal to concentrate the cooperation to fight international terrorism within the world organization.

Among all proposals one distinguishes itself and concerns the forma-

tion of the UNO Military Committee. Such body has never been activated until now because of the ambiguous Soviet position about this matter. Today's consent is much more meaningful since it infers the will to support the carrying out of future peace operations under the direction of this important statutory body.

Besides the consent to the «peace-keeping» operations, there is also Gorbachev's intention to pay all debts accumulated by the Soviet Union towards the United Nations, contributing this way to balance the organization's budget that finds itself in serious economic difficulties. Other positive signals of the changed Soviet attitude towards the international organizations, in general, are represented by the starting of permanent contacts with the International Monetary Fund and with the World Bank as a premiss to a possible joining in the two financial organism, and in view of the already made proposal about the intention to ask the admission to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

But what helps to re-evaluate the United Nations and the activities of the "blue-helmets" is not only Gorbachev's new policy. Many initiatives in this direction were made from other States, such as five Countries of Central America that asked for the intervention of the UNO forces in the region, to control the agreements concerning pacification in Nicaragua. Moreover the inter-Arab and American diplomatic agreement, aiming at getting the Security Council interested in trying to encourage the difficult process of pacification in the Middle East, is strengtening more and more.

THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES OPERATING OUTSIDE THE UNO

Other operations for the keeping or restoration of peace, promoted within alliance or regional groups and different from the «peace-keeping operations» of the United Nations, have been carried out since the '60s, and

more frequently during the '70s and '80s.

A multinational operation of this kind is that carried out by the Organization of the American States (OAS) in 1965 concerning the well-known Dominican question, when it was formed an inter-American peace force under the Brazilian command.

Also the Organization for the Unity of Africa (OUA) operated on many occasions for the solution or prevention of conflicts with interventions in the controversies between Algeria and Morocco, Somalia and Ethiopia and between Ghana and Upper Volta.


The Arab League itself carried out a good peace operation organizing in 1961 the temporary standing of some of its forces in Kuwait and now is trying to put an end to the civil war in the tormented Lebanese capital.

Italy, as we know, took part in multinational operations with the MNF in Beirut, and since march 1982 has been engaged with the MFO in the Gulf of Aqaba to guarantee the application of the Camp David agreements.

A comparative analysis between this kind of operations and those carried out under the United Nations' guidance is not very easy, because there are highly specific actions carried out in political-military scenarios which are hardly comparable.

Anyway it is possible to get some interesting elements by comparing the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) with the MNF (Multinational Force) in Beirut, second version.

Let's just briefly remind the missions assigned to the two contingents. The UNIFIL was formed in 1978 with the task of supervising the «cease-fire» and the demilitarization of South Lebanon after the occupation of Israel. The MNF2 was formed after the Lebanese request for help to the United States, France, Italy and Great Britain, to face the dramatic domestic situation after the murder of the President of the Republic and the massacre in the refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila. Its task was to encourage the restoration of the Government's



authority in Beirut and to guarantee the security of the civilians.

As concerns our goals, the most meaningful differences characterizing the forces composing the two instruments regard their identity and behaviour, that is the way they faced the local political-diplomatic and military situation.

The impartiality of a multinational peace contingent, that is at the basis of its successful action, derives from the identity of the forces forming it. Well, in the case of the **UNIFIL** they were **blue-helmets** who waving the UNO flag, symbol of moral rather than military power, were easily accepted by local populations and inspired feelings of trust and were reliable.

Instead, the **MNF 2** was formed by units of four NATO powers supported by numerous naval and air forces, of that it gave the impression of being an intervention rather than pacification force and of being an instrument whose employment might not be completely disinterested and neutral.

Concerning the way faced the situation in the operation areas, we have to point out that the **UNIFIL** did never insert among the opposing factions, playing the part of protagonist in the political-diplomatic process for the restoration of peace. It always kept a rigorously neutral position, never yielding to provocations, aiming at not

influencing the result of the fight for power in Lebanon at all. This way it managed not to be involved in actions of civil war and in the problem concerning the legitimacy of the Government in Beirut.

Viceversa the **MNF2** showed from the beginning to be party involved in the fight among the forces, on the side of the weak government. Later, this force that acted without a political coordination, without an integrated command and with a different attitude of the Italian, French, British and American forces towards operations such as: protection of the population, support to the Lebanese government, and defence in a pro-Western way of the stability in the Middle East, ended up to be considered by many Moslem groups as a pawn of the United States in the region.

The **UNIFIL** engaging itself in humanitarian actions and sanitary aids and in the assistance to the local population in order to assure the re-establishment of regular life conditions, managed to create a climate of trust and security around itself.

Viceversa the **MNF2** - also because of the more difficult situation in Beirut, a densely populated area and with the presence of fragmented ethnic groups and numerous armed factions - was unable to avoid the escalation of religious feuds and provocations and fell into the spiral

of retaliations on a large scale characterized also by the tragic attacks to the French and American headquarters that caused the disastrous withdrawal of the multinational contingent.

Only the Italian units that had assured protection and assistance to the civilian population and had been able to create an intermediation net of links among the fighting factions and to establish with them relations of relative trust and fairness, got out of Beirut tragedy with increased prestige.

In few words - besides all considerations that would come out of a deeper comparative analysis - we can say that the operations carried out by the **UNIFIL** and the **MNF2** had opposite results - the former was a success, the latter a failure (while the **MNF1** successfully concluded its mission lasted few weeks) - since the considerations concerning the identity and behaviour of the two contingents are substantially opposite.

All this means that a peace operation under the UNO aegis, above all if it is not short-lasting, has generally more possibilities of being successful.

So, the peace forces operating outside the United Nations should be assigned only a temporary task, that is they should intervene only when the Countries involved in the conflict do not allow the intervention of



the **blue-helmets**, or when the UNO is unable to intervene with the necessary timeliness and promptness to perform its institutional duties.

Leaving out of consideration all juridical and political judgements concerning the substitution of the **blue-helmets** with multinational forces, this trend does exist and remarkably affects the international relationships. Then, some other more recent multinational operations had a character that can be hardly defined as «peace-keeping». For example the mine-sweeping and drainage operation of the Red Sea and the sending of naval forces to the Persian Gulf because of the IRAN-IRAK war cannot be «tout court» considered as actions aiming exclusively at keeping peace.

In fact, even if these operations aimed protecting a general right, that is free navigation in international waters, they started in order to foster specific national interests. We could at least mistrust their character as multinational forces, since their intervention did not follow precise previous agreements of the governments concerned.

Indeed the United Nations being unable to take the responsibility for the activities in the Gulf of that great number of forces (almost one hundred ships from seven Countries among which Italy) missed an important occasion to assert their super-national authority; yet, in the end, they got a better result in that region, by imposing the cease-fire between IRAN and IRAK through resolution No. 598.

THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES

The rapid deployment forces due their formation to the problems of the «out of area» and to the threats coming from the East-West and North-South blocks.

They can be considered as the result of the continuous changes in the world geostrategic scenery that took place from the beginning of the '70s. In fact

it is since then that the major Countries of the Atlantic Community have realized that serious threats to their security may come from the trouble spots of the world which do not take part in the alliance.

So, they represent a sort of reaction to the phenomenon of «power diffusion» that, implying a big increase in the military capacity of various Countries of the Third World, awoke the international context also to the decision of medium and small powers, causing the proliferation of conditions of instability and conflict in peripheric areas and so, increasing the need for security and control of regional crises.

What we said above takes on a particular meaning if we consider that while to face those threats coming from the East-West confrontation, in the area covered by the NATO, the Alliance has established adequate defence plans, for those threats coming from the «out of area», concerning the North-South conflict, the West and Europe in particular, can not rely on similar defence plans.

Moreover the Countries of the Atlantic Community do not have the same attitude towards those threats coming from the South because of different perceptions about their dangerousness and different ideas about the interests to defend.

In conclusion, in order to carry out defensive actions in areas geographically outside the national borders but strategically important, the most important Countries, from the military point of view, supplied themselves with rapid deployment forces.

They are formed by land, air and naval forces characterized by a marked flexibility, movability and operative promptness which, without being expedition corps, are qualified to intervene outside the national territory in relative logistic autonomy, under integrated and inter-allied commands.

These specialistic forces allow the Countries they belong to, to face a medium - and low - intensity dangers

coming from «out of area» bounded threats. The low - and medium - intensity conflicts, once called bounded wars, are typical of the Third World. According to the current doctrine they include various kinds of military operations such as: counter-guerrilla warfare, active defence against terrorism, prevention and control of civil war, border battles. The conflicts under course in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Lebanon, Central America, Ethiopia and Sudan are of this kind.

The escalation of one of these conflicts from low to higher intensity always represents a moment of danger for the international community, because it can start «dominio» effects between the crisis area and the operative zones strategically involved.

This scenery seems to be concretely large considering the southern part of the NATO and the fact that the tension coming from the differences in the geopolitical and geostrategic capacity of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Countries are reflected on this area.

The rapid deployment forces represent the military instrument of the West aimed at defending itself from these risks and at extending all initiatives aiming at assuring the control and the solution of regional crises, outside the NATO area.

Which are the characteristics of the rapid deployment forces with respect to the forces engaged in the «peace-keeping operation» we dealt with up to here?

Leaving out political-diplomatic considerations concerning the goals and ways of action (some notes about it will be given in the conclusion of this article) from, a strictly point of view we can say that there is no difference between the rapid deployment and the multinational forces, since the latter may be formed by putting under a single command units of the former and belonging to different Countries.

Instead the UNO contingents are completely different since they are generally formed by non-combat units mainly belonging to the ordi-

nary support of field Armies. It is possible to have an idea of these differences by reminding the characteristics of the MFN and of the UNIFIL once more.

Let's briefly examine the characteristic aspects of the rapid deployment forces of some Countries, starting from the United States. In 1979 the United States of America formed the «Rapid Deployment Joint task Force» (RDJTF), a powerful instrument that can reach a force of 400,000 men under the orders of a Central Command (USCENTCOM) responsible for a region comprising the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The tasks assigned to the RDJTF, contained in official documents, are to protect the moderate Arab Countries of the Gulf and the sea communications lines used to ship the oil destined to western Europe and to Japan, assuring the stability of the political-economic structure of the region. According to these tasks, we can presume that the expansion of the Iran-Irak war to the neighbouring States would cause the intervention of the RDJTF.

The rapid deployment forces of the Soviet Union are different from the American ones both in the conception and in the operative characteristics. On the other hand, the tasks assigned are understandably different since they are influenced by the particular geostrategic and geohistorical situation of the Soviet Union. They are formed by highly movable units such as the airborne division, the air assault divisions, the infantry brigades and the Spetsnaz units.

The last ones are formed by special parachute troops (Commandos) which are expressly trained to carry out «desant» operations at many levels behind the enemy front or inside territories controlled by the guerrilla warfare, for the conquest or destruction of important targets such as structures and hearts of the C3I systems, air and missile based, ammunition depots and industrial plants. The initials Spetsnaz of these units, which are directly under a Secret

Services's orders and can be used in many kinds of conflicts - an example was in Afghanistan - mean special employments.

The overall projection capacity of these forces beyond the borders is lower than that of the homologous forces of the United States. But it is necessary to consider that only few thousand kilometers separate the borders of the Soviet Union from very strategic regions such as USCENTCOM and the Mediterranean sea.

The French rapid deployment force has the task of keeping stability in the North-African region and in this sense its role is similar to that of the RDJTF of the United States in South-West Asia.

The French «Force d'actions Rapide» (FAR) was formed in 1983 on the basis of five Big Units (totally almost 50,000 men) with a double task: to defend the interests of the African Countries, linked to France by special relations of collaboration and military assistance, eventually menaced, and to establish an instrument able to allow the French forces' rapid rejoining of the NATO system for the advance defence of Central Europe (on the island of Elba).

No instrument similar to the FAR exists beyond the Channel.

In fact Great Britain, notwithstanding its worldwide colonial history, does not have at present a group of forces under a single interforces command (the United Kingdom Mobile Force UKFM does not fall into the category of rapid deployment forces since it is destined to operate as a NATO force in the Danish and Baltic region). Anyway its capacity of projection far from the national borders was successfully proved during the victorious Falklands war, led from a distance of more than 15,000 kilometers. However it is necessary to remind that quite half of the British Armed Forces is permanently stationed outside the national territory to make up the British Army on Rhine.

And what about Italy? It is well-known that our Country, after the experience in Lebanon faced the

problem of the «out of area» in the White Book of Defence 1985 and organized its own Rapid Deployment Force (FIR). The specific task of this force is defined within the 4th and 5th interforces mission which respectively establish the defence of the national territory, the North-West front excluded, and the participation in peace and international security missions.

The employments of the FIR include the possibility to contribute to the formation of a plurinational peace contingent, to put a the UNO's disposal, essentially for missions of interposition, of protection and evacuation of Italian communities living abroad and menaced by conflicts unable to be controlled by the local government.


So, the tasks assigned to the FIR are much more different than those of the American and French Rapid deployment forces. Also their structure is different. In fact the FIR comprises an interforce «Command» module which represents the only new element, and three «land forces», «naval-amphibious forces», and «air transport» modules centred on the pre-existing units and supports.

Consistently it is part of the Italian Model of Defence which takes into account, on one side, the fact that the East-West detente does not imply an automatic decrease of low intensity conflicts in the area of intermediate challenges, and on the other that even a partial re-orientation of the threat from East to South implies for Italy an increase of its role and responsibilities, as NATO flank and as southern front of the Alliance.

In few words the FIR meets the present needs of the Italian foreign policy since, even with scarce projection capacity, allows to develop, outside the NATO area, initiatives aiming at the solution of regional conflicts.

CONCLUSIONS

Today the world strategic scenery



looks a complex system of international relations characterized by a growing number of protagonists at regional and sub-regional level.

The consequent increase of policies strategies on one side, and the broader use of indirect strategies in the inter-state relations on the other, encouraged the arising of new political, economic, military and social tensions. This way, endemic hotbeds of instability, able to cause serious risks and dangers to the international community, have developed in some peripheric areas.

Moreover this system shows the signs of a new phase of detente between the superpowers in the field of armaments control and of a progressive relaunch of those activities aiming at the keeping or re-establishment of peace, that will be more and more frequently coordinated withing the United Nations Organization, avoiding autonomous initiatives.

But meanwhile, the big and medium superpowers, engaged in defending their own vital interests even outside alliance systems, are aware that in the field of low intensity con-

flicts the use of force does not loses importance.

For this reason some of them realized it was indispensable to supply themselves with special instruments supporting the ordinary military ones and the usual financial, economic and technological means, in order to increase their contractual weight in the regional relations; instruments and means that during the employment do not exclude reciprocally each other, but give rise to important synergic effects.

The trend of the major western superpowers and of the Soviet Union to increase the defensive and deterring capacity of the rapid deployment focercs, is a logical consequence of this.

These are conventional forces qualified to operate whereas the deterrent of the nuclear strategy does not take any effect, in order to guarantee, even whithin multinational interventions, a sufficient stability in those critical areas which the United Nations cannot easily control, since their initiatives are still often stopped by the veto of one of


the permanent members of the Security Council.

All those instruments the community supplied itself with from 1950 up today to achieve the goal of keeping or restoration of peace in the Third World were generally successful. Among these instruments the rapid deployment forces must be considered as the last reply to all conflicts under course in very important strategical regional and sub-regional areas.

Thanks to their typical characteristics such as movability, flexibility, autonomy and rapid deployment they increase the intervention possibilities of a State very much and allow more decisional autonomy to the political Authorities in the running of crises.


So, all things considered, in the present international system, they can be judged as a positive means of peace-keeping, at least until the institutional mechanisms of the United Nations will be able to replace them in their functions and possibilities.

Col. Domenico Tria



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RUDYARD KIPLING's **testimony on the** **British Army of 1915**

BRITONS



JOIN YOUR COUNTRY'S ARMY!
GOD SAVE THE KING

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CANADIANS IN CAMP

Before you hit the buffalo, find out where the rest of the herd is. — Proverb.

This particular fold of downs behind Salisbury might have been a hump of prairie near Winnipeg. The team that came over the rise, widely spaced between pole bar and whiffle trees, were certainly children of the prairie. They shied at the car. Their driver asked them dispassionately what they thought they were doing, anyway. They put their wise heads together, and did nothing at all. Yes. Oh, yes! said the driver. They were Western horses. They weighed better than twelve hundred apiece. He himself was from Edmonton way. The Camp? Why, the camp was right ahead along up this road. No change to miss it, 'Sa-ay! Look out for our lorries!'

A fleet of them hove in sight going at the rate of knots, and keeping their left with a conscientiousness only learned when you come out of a country where nearly all the Provinces (except British Columbia) keep to the right. Every line of them, from steering wheel to brake shoes, proclaimed their nationality. Three perfectly efficient young men who were sprinkling a golf-green with sifted earth ceased their duties to stare at them. Two riding-boys (also efficient) on racehorses, their knees under their chins and their saddles between their horses' ears, cantered past on the turf. The rattle of the motors upset their cats-meat, so one could compare their style of riding with that of an officer loping along to overtake a string of buck-wagons that were trotting towards the horizon. The riding boys have to endure sore hardship nowadays. One gentleman has already complained that his 'private gallops' are being cut by gun-wheels and "irremediably ruined".

Then more lorries, contractors' wagons, and increasing vileness of the battered road bed, till one slid through a rude gate into a new world, of canvas as far as the eye could reach, and beyond that outly-

ing clouds of tents. It is not a contingent that Canada has sent, but an army — horse, foot, guns, engineers, and all details, fully equipped. Taking that army's strength at thirty-three thousand, and the Dominions's population at eight million, the camp is Canada on the scale of one to two

Artist unknown
Step Into your place, 1915
PRC poster no 104
Lithograph 50.5 x 75.8 cms
IWM: PST: 5904



hundred and forty — an entire nation unrolled across a few square miles of turf and tents and huts.

Here I could study at close hand 'a Colony' yearning to shake off 'the British yoke' For, beyond question, they yearned — the rank and file unreservedly, the officers with more restraint but equal fervour — and the things they said about the Yoke were simply lamentable.

From Nova Scotia to Victoria, and every city, township, distributing-centre, and divisional point between; from sub tropical White River and sultry Jackfish to the ultimate north that lies up beside Alaska; from Kootenay, and Nelson of the fruit farms, to Prince Edwards island, where motors are not allowed; they yearned to shake it off, with the dust of England from their feet, at once and some time before

that.'

I had been warned that when Armageddon came the "Colonies" would 'revolt against the Mother Country as one man'; but I had no notion I should ever see the dread spectacle with my own eyes — or the 'one man' so tall!

Joking apart, the Canadian Army wants to get to work. It admits that London is 'some city', but says it did not take the trip to visit London only. Armageddon, which so many people in Europe knew was bound

to come, has struck Canada out of the blue, like a noonday murder in a small town. How will they feel when they actually view some of the destruction in France, these men who are used to making and owing their homes? And what effect will it have on their land's outlook and development for the next few generations? Older countries may possibly slip back into some sort of toleration. New peoples, in their first serious war, like girls in their first real love affair, neither forget nor forgive. That is why it pays to keep friends with the young.

And such young! They ran inches above all normal standards, not in a few companies or battalions, but through the whole corps; and it was not easy to pick out foolish or even dull faces among them. Details going about their business thorough the

THE SCRAP OF PAPER

Prussia's Perfidy—Britain's Bond.

The Treaty of 1839 (which the German Chancellor tore up, remarking that it was only "a scrap of paper") said:

"BELGIUM... SHALL FORM AN INDEPENDENT AND PERPETUALLY NEUTRAL STATE. IT SHALL BE BOUND TO OBSERVE SUCH NEUTRALITY TOWARDS ALL OTHER STATES."



Now we see the British and German signatures of the Treaty of 1839. The German Chancellor tore up the paper (which was only a scrap of paper) and said:

GREAT BRITAIN - Prussia
BELGIUM - Prussia
AUSTRIA - Prussia
FRANCE - Prussia
GERMANY - Prussia
RUSSIA - Prussia

Germany has trampled on the Treaty she signed.

CAN BRITONS STAND BY WHILE GERMANY CRUSHES AN INNOCENT PEOPLE?

ENLIST TO-DAY

The Scrap of Paper, 1914.

PRC poster no 7

Type 76.3 x 50.6cms

IWM:PST:5083

camp's much mud; defaulters on fatigue; orderlies, foot and mounted; the procession of lorry drivers; companies falling in for inspection; battalions parading; brigades moving off for manoeuvres; batteries clanking in from the ranges; they were all supple, free, and intelligent; and moved with a lift and drive that made one sing for joy.

CAMP GOSSIP

Only a few months ago that the entire collection poured into Valcartier camp in pink shirts and straw hats, desperately afraid they might not be in time. Since then have been taught several things. Notably, that the more independent the individual soldier, the more does he need forethought and endless care when he is in bulk.

"Just because we were all used to looking after ourselves in civil life", said an officer, "we used to send parties out without rations. And the parties used to go, too! And we expected the boys to look after their own feet. But we're wiser now".

"The're learning the same thing in the New Army", I said. "Company officers have to be taught to be

mothers and housekeepers and sanitary inspectors. Were do your men come from?"

"Tell me some place that they don't come from", said he, and I could not. The men had rolled up from everywhere between the Arctic circle and the border, and I was told that those who could not get into the first contingent were moving heaven and earth and local politicians to get into the second.

"There's some use in politics now", that officer reflected. "But it's going to thin the voting lists at home".

A good many of the old South African crowd (the rest are coming) were present and awfully correct. Men last met as privates between De Aar and Belmont were captains and majors now, while one lad who, to the best of his ability, had painted Cape Town pink in those fresh years, was a grim non commissioned officer worth his disciplined weight in dollars.

"I didn't remind Dan of old times when he turned up at Valcartier disguised as a respectable citizen", said my informant. "I just roped him in for my crowd. He's father to 'em. He knows".

"And have you many cheery souls coming on?" I asked.

"Not many; but it's always the same with a first contingent. You

REMEMBER BELGIUM



Remember Belgium, 1915.

PRC poster no 16

Lithograph 100.4 x 74cms

IWM:PST:5075

take everything that offers and weed the bravoes out later".

"We don't weed", said an officer of artillery. "Any one who has had his passage paid for by the Canadian Government stays with us till he eats out of our hand. And he does. They make the best men in the long run", he added. I thought of a friend of mine who is now disabusing two or three "old soldiers" in a Service corps of the idea that they can run the battalion, and I laughed. The Gunner was right. "Old soldiers", after a little loving care, become valuable and virtuous.

A company of Foot was drawn up under the lee of a fir plantation behind us. They were a miniature of their army as their army was of their people, and one could feel the impact of strong personality almost like a blow.

"If you'd believe it", said a cavalryman, "we're forbidden to cut into that little wood lot, yonder! Not one stick of it may we have! We could make shelters for our horses in a day out of that stuff".

"But it's timber"! I gasped. "Sacred, tame trees!"

"Oh, we know what wood is! They issue it to us by the pound. Wood to burn — by the pound!

MEN OF BRITAIN! WILL YOU STAND THIS?



At a Warship Street, SCARBOROUGH after the German raid on the night of 15th and 16th April 1915. Men, Women and Children were killed and 228 Women & Children were wounded by the German Raiders

ENLIST NOW

Men of Britain! 1915.

PRC poster no 51

Lithograph 125.1 x 76cms

IWM:PST:5119

What's wood for, anyway?"

"And when do you think we shall be allowed to go?" some one asked, not for the first time.

"By and by", said I. "And then you'll have to detail half your army to see that your equipment isn't stolen from you".

"What!" cried an old Strathcona Horse. He looked anxiously towards the horse lines.

"I was thinking of your mechanical transport and your travelling workshops and a few other things that you've got".

I got away from those large men on their windy hill top, and slid thorough mud and past mechanical transport and troops untold towards Lark Hill. On the way I passed three fresh-cut pine sticks, laid and notched one atop of the other to shore up a caving bank. Trust a Canadian or a beaver within gunshot of standing timber!

ENGINEERS AND APPLIANCES

Lark Hill is where the Canadian Engineers live, in the midst of a profligate abundance of tools and carts, pontoon wagons, field telephones, and other mouth watering gear. Hundreds of tin huts are being built there, but quite leisurely, by contract. I noticed three workmen, at eleven o'clock of that Monday forenoon, as drunk as Davy's sow, reeling and shouting across the landscape. So far as I could ascertain, the workmen do not work extra shifts, nor even, but I hope this is incorrect, on Saturday afternoons, and I think they take their full hour at noon these short days.

Every camp throws up men one has met at the other end of the earth; so, of course, the Engineer C.O. was an ex-South African Canadian.

"Some of our boys are digging a trench over yonder", he said. "I'd like you to look at 'em".

The boys seemed to average five feet ten inches, with thirty seven inch chests. The soil was unaccommodating chalk.

"What are you?" I asked of the

first pickaxe.

"Yes, but 'Private' before that?"

McGill (University understood). Nineteen twelve".

"And that boy with the shovel?"

"Queen's, I think. No; he's Toronto".

And thus the class in applied ge-

Artist unknown
We're both needed to serve the Guns!, 1915
PRC poster no 85c
Lithograph 50.1 x 74.5 cms



ology went on half up the trench, under supervision of a Corporal Bachelor of Science with a most scientific biceps. They were young; they were beautifully fit, and they were all truly thankful that they lived in these high days.

Sappers, like sergeants, take care to make themselves comfortable. The corps were dealing with all sorts of little domestic matters in the way of arrangements for baths, which are cruelly needed, and an apparatus for depopulating shirts, which is even more wanted. Healthy but unwashed men sleeping on the ground are bound to develop certain things which at first disgust them, but later are accepted as an unlovely part of the game. It would be quite easy to make bakehouses and super heated steam fittings to deal with the trou-

ble. The huts themselves stand on brick piers, from one to three feet above ground. The board floors are not grooved or tongued, so there is ample ventilation from beneath; but they have installed decent cooking ranges and gas, and the men have already made themselves all sorts of handy little labour saving gadgets. They would do this if they were in the real desert. Incidentally, I came across a delightful bit of racial instinct. A man had been told to knock up a desk out of broken packing cases. There is only one type of desk in Canada — the roller top, with

three shelves each side the knee-hole, characteristic sloping sides, raised back, and long shelf in front of the writer. He reproduced it faithfully, barring, of course, the roller-top; and the thing leaped to the eye out of its English office surroundings. The Engineers do not suffer for lack of talents. Their senior officers appear to have been the heads, and their juniors the assistants, in big concerns that wrestle with unharnessed nature. (There is a tale of the building of a bridge in Valcartier Camp which is not bad hearing). The rank and file include miners; road, trestle, and bridge men; iron construction men who, among other things, are steeplejacks; whole castes of such as deal in high explosives for a living; loco-drivers, superintendents, too, for aught I know, and a

solid packing of selected machinists, mechanics and electricians. Unluckily, they were all a foot or so too tall for me to tell them that, even if their equipment escaped at the front, they would infallibly be raided for their men.

AN UNRELATED DETACHMENT

I left McGill, Queen's, and Toronto still digging in their trench, which another undergraduate, mounted and leading a horse, went out of his way to jump standing. My last glimpse was of a little detachment, with five or six South African ribbons among them, who were being looked over by an officer. No one thought it strange that they should have embodied themselves and crossed the salt seas independently as "So and So's Horse". (It is best to travel with a title these days). Once arrived, they were not at all particular, except that they meant to join the Army, and the lonely batch was stating its qualifications as Engineers.

"They get over any way and every way", said my companion.

"Swimming, I believe".

"But who was the So and So that they were christened after?" I asked.

"I guess he was the man who financed 'em or grub-staked 'em while they were waiting. He may be one of 'em in that crowd now; or he may be a provincial magnate at home getting another bunch together".

THE VANGUARD OF A NATION

Then I went back to the main camp for a last look at that wonderful army, where the tin roofed meses take French conversation lessons with the keen faced French Canadian officers, and where one sees esprit de corps in the making. Nowhere is local sentiment stronger than in Canada. East and West, lake and maritime provinces, prairie and mountain, fruit district and timber lands — they each thrill to it. The West keeps one cold blue open-air eye on the townful East. Winnipeg sits between, posing alternately as sophisticated metropolis and simple prairie. Alberta, of the thousand horses, looks down from their high peaked saddle on all who walk on their feet; and British Columbia thanks God for an equable climate, and that she is not like Ottawa, full of politicians and frozen sludge. Quebec, unassailable in her years and experience, smiles tolerantly on the Nova Scotian, for he has a history too, and asks Montreal if any good thing can come out of Brandon, Moose Jaw, or Regina. They discuss each other outrageously, as they know each other intimately, over four thousand miles of longitude — their fathers, their families, and all the connections. Which is useful when it comes to sizing up the merits of a newly promoted non-commissioned officer or the capacities of a quarter-master.

As their Army does and suffers, and its record begins to blaze, fierce pride of regiment will be added to local love and the national pride that backs and envelops all. But that pride is held in very severe check now; for they are fighting in the War

of Liberty. They permit themselves to hope that the physique of their next contingent will not be worse than that of the present. They believe that their country can send forward a certain number of men and a certain number behind that, all equipped to a certain scale. Of discomforts endured, of the long learning and relearning and waiting on, they say nothing. They do not hint what they will do when their hour strikes, though they more than hint their longing for that hour. In all their talk I caught no phrase that could be twisted into the shadow of a boast or any claim to superiority, even in respect to their kit and outfit; no word or implication of self-praise for any sacrifice made or intended. It was their rigid humility that impressed one as most significant — and, perhaps, most menacing for such as may have to deal with this vanguard of an armed Nation.

INDIAN TROOPS

Larai men laddu nahin battle (War is not sugar plums). — Hindi Proverb.

Working from the East to the

Designer: Lord Baden Powell
(1857-1941)
Are you in this? 1915.
PRC poster no 112
Lithograph 75.5 x 49.5cms
IWM:PST:2712



Are YOU in this?

Designer: Savile Lumley
Daddy, what did YOU do in the Great War?
PRC poster no 79
Lithograph 74.6 x 49.2cms
IWM:PST:311



Daddy, what did YOU do in the Great War?

West of England, through a countryside alive with troops of all arms, the car came at dusk into a cathedral town entirely inhabited by one type of regiment. The telegraph office was an orderly jam of solid, large, made men, with years of discipline behind them and the tan of Indian suns on their faces — Englishmen still so fresh from the troopships that one of them asked me, "What's the day o' the month?" The were advising friends of their arrival in England, or when they might be expected on short leave at the week's end; and the fresh faced telegraph girls behind the grilles worked with six pairs of hands apiece and all the goodwill and patience in the world to back them. That same young woman who, with nothing to do, makes you wait ten minutes for a penny stamp while she finishes a talk with a lady friend, will, at a crisis, go on till she drops, and keep her temper throughout. "Well, *if* that's her village", I heard one of the girls say to an anxious soul, "I tell *you* that that will be her telegraph office. You leave it to me. *She'll* get it all right".

He backed out, and a dozen more quietly took his place. Their regiments hailed from all the old known stations of the East and beyond that into the Far East again. They cursed their cool barrack accommodation; they rejoiced in the keen autumn smells, and paraded the long street all filled with "Europe shops"; while their officers and their officers' wives, and, I think, mothers who had come down to snatch a glimpse of their boys, crowded the hotels, and the little unastonished Anglo-Indian children circulated round the knees of big friends they had made aboardship and asked, "Where are you going now?"

One caught scraps of our old gipsy talk — names of boarding houses, agents' addresses: "Milly stays with mother, of course". "I'm taking Jack down to school tomorrow. It's past halfterm, but that doesn't matter nowadays"; and cheery farewells between men and calm-eyed women. Except for the frocks, it might have

been an evening assembly at any station bandstand in India.

Outside, on the surging pavements, a small boy cried: "Paper! Evenin' paper!" Then seductively: "Kargus!"

"What?" I said, thinking my ears had cheated me.

"Dekko! Kargus!" said he. ("Look here! Paper!")

"Why on earth d'you say that?"

"Because the men like it" he replied, and slapped an evening paper (no change for a penny) into the hand of a man in a helmet.


Who shall say that the English are not adaptable?

The car swam bonnet-deep through a mile of troops; and mile up the road one could hear the deep hum of all those crowded streets that the cathedral bells were chiming over. It was only one small block of Anglo India getting ready to take its place in the all-devouring Line.

SCREW GUNS

An hour later — (Shall we ever be able to name people and places out-

Designer: Baron Low
Everyone should do his bit.
PRC poster no 121
Lithograph 75 x 49.6cms
IWM:PST:5060



FORWARD!




Designer: Lucy Kemp-Welch (1869-1958)
Forward! 1915.
PRC poster no 133
Lithograph 75.4 x 49cms

right again?) the wind brought up one whiff — one unmistakable whiff — of *ghi*. Somewhere among the English pines that, for the moment, pretend to be the lower slopes of the Dun, there were native troops. A mule squealed in the dark and set off half a dozen others. It was screw guns — batteries of them, waiting their turn also at the game. Morning showed them in their immaculate lines as though they had just marched in from Jutogh — little, low guns with their ammunitions; very big English gunners in disengaged attitudes which, nevertheless, did not encourage stray civilians to poke and peer into things; and the native drivers all busied over their charges. True, the wind was bitter, and many of the drivers had tied up their heads, but so one does at Quetta in the cold weather — not to mention Peshawur — and, said a naick of divers: "it is not the cold for which we have no liking. It is the wet. The English air is good, but water falls at all seasons. Yet notwithstanding, we of this battery (and, oh, the pride men can throw into a mere number!) have not lost one mule. Neither at sea nor on land have we *one* lost. That can be shown, sahib".

Then one heard the deep racking tobacco-cough in the lee of a tent where four or five men — Kangra folk by the look of them — were drinking tobacco out of a cow's horn. Their own country's tobacco, be sure, for English tobacco... But there was no need to explain. Who would have dreamed to smell bazar tobacco on a south country golf links?

A large proportion of the men are, of course, Sikhs, to whom tobacco is forbidden; the Havildar Major himself was a Sikh of the Sikhs. He spoke, of all things in this strange world, of the late Mr. M. McAuliffe's monumental book on the Sikh religion, saying, not without warrant, that McAuliffe Sahib had translated into English much of the Holy Book — the great Grunth Sahib that lives at Amritsar. He enlarged, too, on the ancient prophecy among the Sikhs — that a hatted race should some day come out of the sea and lead them to victory all the earth over. So spoke Bir Singh, erect and enormous beneath the grey English skies. He hailed from a certain place called Banalu, near Patiala, where many years ago two Sikh soldiers executed a striking but perfectly just vengeance on certain villagers who had oppressed their young brother, a cultivator. They had gone to the extreme limits of abasement and conciliation. This failing, they took leave for a week end and slew the whole tribe of their enemies. The story is buried in old Government reports, but when Bir Singh implied that he and his folk were orthodox I had no doubt of it. And behind him stood another giant, who knew, for his village was but a few miles up the Shalimar road, every foot of Lahore city. He brought word that there had been great floods at home, so that the risen Ravi river had touched the very walls of Runjit Singh's Fort. And that was only last rains — and, behold! — here he was now in England waiting orders to go to this fight which, he understood, was not at all a small fight, but a fight of fights, in which all the world and "our Raj" was engaged. The trouble in India was that



all the young men — the mere *jivans* — wanted to come out at once, which, he said, was manifestly unjust to older men, who had waited so long. However, merit and patience had secured their reward, and the battery was here, and it would do the hot *jivans* no harm to stay at home, and be zealous at drill until orders came for them in their turn. "Young men think that everything good in this world is theirs by right, sahib".

Then came the big, still English gunners, who are trained to play with the little guns. They took one such gun and melted it into trifling pieces of not more than a hundred and fifty pounds each, and reassembled it, and explained its innermost heart till even a layman could understand. There is a lot to understand about screw guns — specially the new kind. But the gunner of today, like his ancestor, does not talk much, except in his own time and place, when he is as multitudinously amazing as the Blu Marine.

THE MULE LINES

We went over to see the mule lines. I detest the whole generation of these parrot mouthed hybrids,



American, Egyptian, Andalusian, or up-country: so it gave me particular pleasure to hear a Pathan telling one chestnut beast who objected to having its mane hogged any more, what sort of lady-horse his mamma had been. But *qua* animals, they were a lovely lot, and had long since given up blowing and finicking over English fodder.

"Is there any sickness? Why is yonder mule lying down?" I demanded, as though all the lines could not see I was a shuddering amateur.

"There is no sickness, sahib. That mule lies down for his own pleasure. Also, to get out of the wind. He is very clever. He is from Hindustan", said the man with the horse clippers.

"And thou?"

"I am a Pathan", said he with impudent grin and true border cock of the turban, and he did me the honour to let me infer.

The lines were full of talk as the men went over their animals. They were not worrying themselves over this new country of Belait. It was the regular gossip of food and water and firewood, and where So-and-so had

hid the curry comb.

Talking of cookery, the orthodox men have been rather put out by English visitors who come to the cook houses and stare directly at the food while it is being prepared. Sensible men do not object to this, because they know that these Englishmen have no evil intention nor any evil eye; but sometimes a narrow souled purist (toothache or liver makes a man painfully religious) will "spy strangers", and insist on the strict letter of the law, and then every one who wishes to be orthodox must agree with him — on an empty stomach, too — and wait till a fresh mess has been cooked. This is *taklif* — a burden — for where the intention is good and war is afoot much can and should be overlooked. Moreover, this war is not like any other war. It is a war of *our Raj* — "everybody's war", as they say in the bazaars. And that is another reason why it does not matter if an Englishman stares at one's food. This I gathered in small pieces after watering time when the mules had filed up to the troughs in the twilight, hundreds of them, and the drivers grew discursive on the way to the lines.

The last I saw of them they were

in the early cold morning, all in marching order, jinking and jingling down a road through woods.

"Where are you going?"

"God knows!"

THE INN OF GOOD-BYES

It might have been for exercise merely, or it might be down to the sea and away to the front for the battle of "Our Raj". The quiet hotel where people sit together and talk in earnest strained pairs is well used to such departures. The officers of a whole Division — the raw cuts of their tent circles lie still unhealed on the links — dined there by scores; mothers and relatives came down from the uttermost parts of Scotland for a last look at their boys, and found beds goodness knows where: very quiet little weddings, too, set out from its doors to the church opposite. The Division went away a century of weeks ago by the road that the mule battery took. Many of the civilians who pocket the wills signed and witnessed in the smoking room are full-blown executors now; some of the brides are widows.

And it is not nice to remember that when the hotel was so filled that not even another pleading mother could be given a place in which to lie down and have her cry out — not at all nice to remember that it never occurred to any of the comfortable people in the large but sparsely inhabited houses around that they might have offered a night's lodging even to an unIntroduced stranger.

GREATHEART AND CHRISTIANA

There were hospitals up the road preparing and being prepared for the Indian wounded. In one of these lay a man of, say, a Biluch regiment, sorely hit. Word had come from his colonel in France to the colonel's wife in England that she should seek till she found that very man and got news from his very mouth — news to send to his family and village. She found him at last, and he was very

bewildered to see her there, because he had left her and her child on the verandah of the bungalow, long and long ago, when he and his colonel and the regiment went down to take ship for the war. How had she come? Who had guarded her during her train journey of so many days? And, above all, how had the baba endured that sea which caused strong men to collapse? Not till all these matters had been cleared up in fullest detail did Greatheart on his cot permit his colonel's wife to waste one word on his own insignificant concerns. And that she should have wept filled him with real trouble. Truly, this is the war of "Our Raj!"

TERRITORIAL BATTALIONS

To excuse oneself is human: but to excuse oneself to one's children is Hell. — Arabic Proverb.


Billeted troops are difficult to get at. There are thousands of them in a little old town by the side of an even older park up the London Road, but to find a particular battalion is like ferreting unstopped borrows.

An appeal to you, 1915.
PRC poster no 88
Lithograph 97.6 x 61.8cms
IWM:PST:5166



Who's absent? 1915.
PRC poster no 125
Lithograph 74.2 x 50cms
IWM:PST:5251





"The Umpty-Umph, were you looking for?" said a private in charge of a side car. "We're the Eenty-Eenth. "Only came in last week. I've never seen this place before. It's pretty. Hold on! There's a postman. He'll know".

He, too, was in khaki, bowed between mailbags, and his accent was of a far and coaly country.

"I'm none too sure", said he, "but i think I saw —"

Here a third man cut in.

"Yon's t'battalion, marchin' into t'park now. Roon! Happen tha'll catch 'em".

They turned out to be Territorial with a history behind them; but that I didn't know till later; and their band anc cyclists. Very polite were those rear rank cyclists — who pushed their loaded machines with one vast hand apiece.

They were strangers, they said. They had only come here a few days ago. But they knew the South well. They had been in Gloucestershire, which was a very nice southern place.

Then their battallion, I hazarded, was of northern extraction?

They admitted that I might go as far as that; their speech betraying their native town at every rich word.

"Huddersfield, of course?" I said, to make them out with it.

"Bolton", said one at last. Being in uniform the pitman could not destroy the impertinent civilian.

"Ah, Bolton!" I returned "All cotton, aren't you?"

"Some coal", he answered gravely. There is notorious rivalry "twixt coal and cotton in Bolton, but I wanted to see him practise the self control that the Army is always teaching.


As I have said, he and his companion were most polite, but the total of their information, boiled and peeled, was that they had just come from Bolton way; might at any moment be sent somewhere else, and they liked Gloucestershire in the south. A spy could not have learned much less.

The battalion halted, and moved off by companies for further evolutions. One could see they were more that used to drill and arms; a hardened, thick necked, thin flanked, deep chested lot, dealt with quite faithfully by their sergeants, and altogether abreast of their work. Why, then, this reticence? What had they to be ashamed of, these big Bolton folk without an address? Where was their orderly room?

There were many orderly rooms in the little old town, most of them in bye-lanes less than one car wide. I found what I wanted, and — this was north country all over — a private who volunteered to steer me to headquarters through the tricky southern streets. He was communicative, and told me a good deal about typhoid inoculation and musketry practice, which accounted for only six companies being on parade. But surely they could not have been ashamed ot *that*.

GUARDING A RAILWAY

I unearthed their skeleton at last in a peaceful, gracious five hundred year old house that looked on to lawns and cut hedges bounded by age old red brick walls — such a perfumed and dreaming place as one



would choose for the setting of some even-pulsed English love tale of the days before the war.

Officers were billeted in the low ceiled, shiny floored rooms full of books and fowers.

"And now", I asked, when I had told the tale of the uncommunicative cyclist, "what is the matter with your battalion?"

They laughed cruelly at me. "Matter!" said they. "We're just off three months of guarding railways. After *that* a man wouldn't trust his own mother. You don't mean to say our cyclists let you know where we've come from last?"

"No, they did'nt", I replied. "That was what worried me. I assumed you'd all committed murders, and had been sent here to live it down".

Then they told me what guarding a line really means. How men wake and walk, with only express troop trains to keep them company, all the night long on windy embankments or under still more windy bridges; how they sleep behind three sleepers up ended or a bit of tin, or, if they are lucky, in a platelayer's hut; how their food comes to them sloping across the square headed ties that lie in want to twist a man's an-


kle after dark; how they stand in blown coal-dust of goods yards trying to watch five lines of trucks at once; how fools of all classes pester the lonely pickets, whose orders are to hold up motors for inquiry, and then write silly letters to the War Office about it. How nothing ever happens through the long weeks but infallibly would if the patrols were taken off. And they had one refreshing story of a workman who at six in the morning, which is no auspicious hour to jest with Lancashire, took a short cut to his work by ducking under some goods-wagons, and when challenged by the sentry replied, posturing on all fours, "Boo, I'm a German!" Whereat the upright sentry fired, unfortunately missed him, and then gave him the butt across his ass's head, so that his humor, and very nearly his life, terminated.

After which the sentry was seldom seen to smile, but frequently heard to murmur "Ah should hev slipped t'baggonet into him".

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

"So you see", said the officers in conclusion, "You mustn't be surprised that our men wouldn't tell you much".

Designer: Arthur Wardle
The Empire needs men/1915.
PRC poster no 58
Lithograph 74.9 x 50.2cms
IWM:PST:352



"I begin to see", I said. "How many of you are coal and how many cotton?"

"Two-thirds coal and one third cotton, roughly. It keeps the men deadly keen. An operative isn't going to give up while a pitman goes on; and very much *vice versa*".

"That's class prejudice", said I. "It's most useful", said they. The officers themselves seemed to be interested in coal or cotton, and had known their men intimately on the civil side. If your orderly room sergeant, or your quartermaster has been your trusted head clerk or foreman for ten or twelve years, and if eight out of a dozen sergeants have controlled pitmen and machinists, above and below ground, and eighty per cent of these pitmen and machinists are privates in the companies, your regiment works with something of the precision of a big business.

It was all new talk to me, for I had not yet met a Northern Territorial battalion with the strong pride of its strong town behind it. Where were they when the war came? How had they equipped themselves? I wanted to hear the tale. It was worth listening to as told with North Country joy of life and the doing of things in that soft down-country house of the untroubled centuries. Like every one else, they were expecting anything but war. "Hadn't even begun their annual camp. Then the thing came, and Bolton rose as one man and woman to fit out its battallion. There was a lady who wanted a fairly large sum of money for the men's extra footgear. She set aside a morning to collect it, and inside the hour came home with nearly twice her needs, and spent the rest of the time trying to make people take back fivers, at lest, out of tenners. And the big hauling firms flung horsed and transport at them and at the Government, often refusing any price, or, when it was paid, turning it into the war funds. What the battalion wanted it had but to ask for. Once it was short of, say, towels. An officer approached the head of a big firm, with no particular idea he

would get more than a few dozen from that quarter.

"And how many towels d'you want?" said the head of the firm. The officer suggested a globular thousand.


"I think you'll do better with twelve hundred", was the curt answer. "The're ready out yonder. Get'em".

And in this style Bolton turned out her battalion. Then the authorities took it and strung it by threes and fives along several score miles or railway track: and it had only just been reassembled, and it had been inoculated for typhoid. Consequently, they said (but all officers are like mothers and motor car owners), it wasn't up to what it would be in a little time. In spite of the cyclist, I had had a good look at the deep chested battalion in the park, and after getting their musketry figures, (1) it seemed to me that very soon it might be worth looking at by more prejuduced persons than myself.

The next day I read that this battalion's regular battalion in the field had distinguished itself by a piece of work which, in other wars, would have been judged heroic. Bolton will read it, not without remarks, and

Line up, boys/1915.
PRC poster no 54
Lithograph 75 x 49.8cms
IWM:PST:5122





other towns who love Bolton, more or less, will say that if all the truth could come out their regiments had done as well. Anyway, the result will be more men — pitmen, mill hands, clerks, checkers, weighers, winders, and hundreds of those sleek, well groomed business chaps whom one used to meet in the big Midland hotels, protesting that war was out of date. These latter develop surprisingly in the camp atmosphere. I recall one raging in his army shirt sleeves at a comrade who had derided his principles. "I *am* a blanky pacifist", he hissed", and I'm proud of it, and — and I'm going to make *you* one before I've finished with you!"


THE SECRET OF THE SERVICES

Pride of city, calling, class, and creed imposes standards and obligations which hold men above themselves at a pinch, and steady them thorough long strain. One meets it in the New Army at every turn, from the picked Territorial who slipped across Channel last night to the six week old Service battalion maturing itself in mud. It is balanced by the ineradicable English instinct to understate, detrect, and decry — to

mask the thing done by loudly drawing attention to the things undone. The more one sees of the camps the more one is filled with facts and figures of joyous significance, which will become clearer as the days lengthen; and the less one hears of the endurance, decency, self sacrifice, and utter devotion which have made, and are hourly making, this wonderful new world. The camps take this for granted — else why should any man be there at all? He might have gone on with his business, or — watched "socer". But having chosen to do his bit, he does it, and talks as much about his motive as he would of his religion or his love affairs. He is eloquent over the shortcomings of the authorities, more pessimistic as to the future of his next neighbour battalion than would be safe to print, and lyric on his personal needs — baths and drying rooms for choice. But when the grousing gets beyond a certain point — say at three a.m., in steady wet, with the tent pegs drawing like false teeth — the nephew of the insurance agent asks the cousin of the baronet to inquire of the son of the fried fish vendor what the stevedore's brother and the tutor of the public school joined the Army *for*. Then they sing "Somewhere the Sun is Shining" till the Sergeant Ironmonger's assistant cautions them to drown in silence or the Lieutenant Telephone-appliances manufacturer will speak to them in the morning.

The New armies have not yet evolved their typical private, n.c.o., and officer, though one can see them shaping. They are humorous because, for all our long faces, we are the only genuinely humorous race on earth; but they all know for true that there are no excuses in the Service. "If there *were*", said a three-month old under gardener private to me, "what" 'ud become of Discipline?"

They are already setting standards for the coming millions, and have sown little sprouts of regimental tradition which may grow into age-old trees. In one corps, for example, though no dubbin is issued a man loses his name for parading with




dirty boots. He looks down scornfully on the next battalion where they are not expected to achieve the impossible. In another — an ex Guards sergeant brought'em up by hand — the drill is rather high class. In a third they fuss about records for route-marching, and men who fall out have to explain themselves to their sweating companions. This is entirely right. They are all now in the Year One, and the meanest of them may be an ancestor of whom regimental posterity will say: "There were giants in those days!"

THE REAL QUESTION

This much we can realise, even though we are so close to it. The old safe instinct saves us from triumph and exultation. But what will be the position in years to come of the young man who has deliberately elected to outcaste himself from this all embracing brotherhood? What of is family, and, above all, what of his descendants, when the books have been closed and the last balance struck of sacrifice and sorrow in every hamlet, village, parish, suburb, city, shire, district, province, and Dominion throughout the Empire?

Bayern.



Knötel.

GALLARD, pp.

Hartschiere im Dienst.

Wachtmeister, Hartschier, Hartschier in Gala. (Hauptmann). aussordienstli ch.

Leibgarde der Hartschiere.

1835.

Herzog Wilhelm IV. erhielt von Kaiser Karl V. eine Kompanie Spanischer Arkebuser, welche mit den Trabanten, deren Ursprung sich tief im Mittelalter verliert, die Leibwache der Bayernfürsten bildete.

Die Hartschiergarde selbst wurde von Ferdinand Maria am 13. April 1669 aus jenen Arkebusern errichtet. Anfänglich begleitete diese Garde den Fürsten mit ins Feld und nahm thätigen Antheil an den Kriegereignissen. Später wurde sie eine Palastgarde, als welche sie heute noch besteht. Bis 1799 war die Truppe beritten. Die Uniform, wie sie hier dargestellt ist, wurde bis 1852 getragen. Durch das ganze vorige Jahrhundert zeigte die Uniform dieselbe Farbenzusammenstellung wie oben; der Schnitt wechselte natürlich nach dem Zeitgeschmacke. Der Zopf blieb den Hartschieren bis zum 4. Mai 1825. (Für die Armee schon 1805 abgeschafft!) Zur Gala trugen die Hartschiere über dem Rock eine sogenannte Casaque, dazu Kniehosen, Strümpfe und Schnallenschuhe, als Waffen Degen und Couse.

Knötel, Uniformenkunde. Band III. No. 20.


Verlag von Max Babenzien in Rathenow.

ITALY'S WAR

SCENES FROM

by

G. M. TREVELYAN



My heart goes out the poor little families all over this great kingdom who stood the brunt and strain of the war, and gave their men gladly to make other men free, and other women and children free. These are the people, and many like them, to whom, after all, we owe the glory of this great achievement.

PRESIDENT WILSON AT ROME
January 1919

CHAPTER IV

THE ISONZO FRONT, 1916

Plava bottom — The Carso gas attack — Alpini, Bersaglieri, Arditi — Granatieri — The taking of Gorizia, Aug. 1916.

I mentioned above that when the war began in May 1915 the Austrians retired behind the Isonzo gorge, on the course of the river above Monte Sabotino. Such remained for two years the general position, the Italians occupying the western bank of the gorge, the ridge of Monte Planina and Monte Corada. But they had secured for themselves a precarious bridgehead across the Isonzo at Plava. By desperate gallantry and terrible losses in June 1915, with very little support from artillery, they had forced their way across the river, seized the village and railway station of Plava at the bottom of the gorge, and established themselves on the *quota*, or Hill of Plava, on the far side. They had extended this bridgehead to include the hamlet of Zagora a mile down stream, on the lower slopes of Monte Kuk.

This position, untenable by all the rules of war, was held by the Italians from June 1915 till it became their base for the conquest of Kuk in May 1917. There was constant fighting, but neither side was able to dislodge the other, although the Austrians had their trenches only a few yards above the Italians on the almost precipitous sides of Kuk. In the hamlet of Zagora, a mere heap of stones, there was the semblance of part of one house left, occupied as a strong post in the Italian line. From its loopholes one saw the Austrian ruin ten yards away; there was only room for one set of barbed wire on No Man's Land, to serve the purpose of both sides. They lived like that for one year and eleven months.

A further weakness of the Italian bridgehead position lay in the fact that only one narrow road ran down from Verhovlje pass to Plava bottom; and it was overlooked at the distance of a kilometre by the Austrian artillery and machine gunners on Monte Kuk, across the Isonzo. Yet everything that the mules could not bring down to Plava through the forest tracks had to come down the exposed road. This bad line of communications largely accounted for the failure to capture Kuk in August 1916, when Sabotino and Gorizia fell. Kuk and the Bainsizza beyond it fell in 1917 because General Badoglio had then made a second and more sheltered road down to Plava bottom from a point farther north on Monte Corada.

In the spring of 1916 we took over a service previously done by the Italians, and sent an ambulance every night from Verhovlje to Plava bottom by what was then the only road. As it was an ambulance, the Carabinieri always allowed it to go first, at the head of the column of Fiat lorries that started down at a fixed hour after fall of dusk; similarly, it led the way back when the midnight column, having discharged its load

of shells, timber, and barbed wire in the crowded space above the river bank at Plava, was marshalled to start back uphill. The road was too narrow for cars to meet and pass, and was as yet too much exposed for the *genio* to broaden it.

It was a romantic ride, especially on nights of any activity, with the star shells and rival searchlights revealing with their shifting rays masses of scarred mountain side; the gloomy gorge lay sheer below as we coasted down into its gulf, and the noising waters of many torrents mingled with the sounds of battle. In spite of the utmost effort of two great armies, nature was still big enough to be lord and master of the Plava scene, by night or by day. In such eternal presences the long war itself was but the play of boys for an hour upon the mountain side. Twenty thousand years hence, as twenty thousand years ago, Kuk and Planina, under whatever names or none, shall still look down on the rushing Isonzo whitening the bones of men.

I remember once, when a particularly heavy bombardment was being directed at the convoy waiting at Verhovlje in the gloaming for the order to start down into the gorge, the jolly young Fiat drivers amusing themselves by falling on the ground in paroxysms of affected terror every time a shell burst, and then catching hold of each other, and rolling over and over in sheer animal spirits. They were fine lads; the pace they drove round the curves of that dark and narrow road did credit at least to their nerve and skill.

At Plava bottom, when we first went down there in April 1916, the wounded were still being collected near the railway station, in the only house still in use that was in full view of the Austrians, being protected by the Red Cross. However, the officer in charge told me they had had sixty shells aimed at them that day, some successfully, so they were thinking of moving. They soon afterwards transferred the dressing-station across the Isonzo to the enemy side of the river, where they could find shelter by huddling close up under the foot of Plava Hill. Thence the wounded were carried across the pontoon footbridge to our cars.

Everything that the Italian used in their positions beyond the river had to be carried by hand or by mule across that one pontoon bridge. The enemy had the range of it, and hit it again and again; but at least it was not actually visible to them, as was every other point on the Isonzo stream until the Italians captured Kuk in May 1917. Till then, for two years, this was perforce the only bridge for feeding the Plava-Zagora position!

The Austrian machine gunner on Monte Kuk, who had so long tried in vain to render the road down to Plava impassable, was captured when the mountain fell, and had friendly conversations, laughingly comparing experiences with the Italian Fiat drivers, at whom he had taken so many shots across the river in the two years gone by.

Sabotino raised its head and shoulders bare above the hills around it. But from


Quisca downwards wave after wave of fruit and vine-laden hills rippled down to the great plain. For two springs we saw these hills shimmering all round us with the white glory of the fruit blossom, and for three autumns we watched the vine leaves on the same hills turn red and gold, the vineyards the while overgrown more thickly each year by a jungle of lovely weeds, which the returning husbandman has found, together with wrecked houses and new, broad, smooth roads for his produce.

The peasants had been removed from Quisca; but behind, from S. Martino downwards, they continued their ordinary life, occasionally suffering casualties, but getting entirely accustomed to the shells. I have heard a peasant woman, near Vipulzano, when the earth from the geyser thrown up by an Austrian 305 sprinkled her as she stood watching it, exclaim angrily, as she shook the mud off her dress, "O! la brutta cosa!" ("Nasty stuff!")

The peasants in the hamlets of the hills were mostly Slovene; in the plain and larger village mostly Italian. The Slovenes were neither specially hostile nor specially favourable. There were certainly spies left in the hill villages in sight of the Austrian lines, who signalled to the enemy in many ingenious ways, as, for instance, a woman shaking the crumbs off her white tablecloth outside the door of her inn. The Italians treated the inhabitants, Italian and Slovene, well, and if, anything, erred in want of strictness and in letting them live on, as they wished to do, in places where the civil population would have been cleared out by other armies.

While the Italians were bending all their thoughts and energies to scientific preparation for a renewed offensive against Gorizia and Trieste, the enemy in May 1916 gave them a nasty surprise where they least expected anything. The line of high Alps, three hundred miles long, which they thought they had safely closed behind the back of their Isonzo operations, was forced at an ill-guarded point. The Austrian advance on to the Asiago plateau and down the Astico valley gave Italy some bad weeks, for it bade fair to compel an evacuation of Friuli and Venetia by the great army of the Isonzo, whose rear was now threatened. But Cadorna used to the full his one great advantage of the inner line of communications, slinging troops across from the Isonzo to the Trentino in the Fiat lorries. On May 22nd our friends of the 4th Sanità section went off to the Trentino at twelve hours' notice.

The greatest danger at the end of May was in the Astico valley where the enemy had taken the rock summits of Pria Fora and Cimone, and were pouring through the town of Arsiero down the valley itself, actually in the level of the great plain. The Italians, who had been driven back far behind their prepared lines, had then no trenches in that region nor fastnesses hollowed out in the rocks, but met the invader hand to hand, and thrust him back by desperate fighting over the precipices of Pria Fora. In the valley below,



one of the farthest point reached by the enemy was Fogazzaro's country villa, built in a good modern style amid beautiful woods and meadows below Arsiero. It is now a mass of ruins in a world of war. These actions saved Italy in the early days of June 1916.

In the latter of June the recovery of further ground on the Asiago plateau, coinciding with the announcement of the amazing Russian victories marked by the capture or desertion of two or three hundred thousand Austrians, removed the last element of danger in the Trentino. It was a happy period for all Italians. Intense relief from national peril, joy that they had saved themselves by their own exertions and by political unity and calmness at the bad moment, were combined with legitimate pride that the drawing off of the Austrian artillery and forces to the Trentino had rendered the Russian victories possible. At the same time the great British offensive on the Somme gave the Italians the sense that the advantage was passing to the side of the Allies, and a new-born confidence in the might of Britain as something more than a naval power.

Under these happy auspices the men and guns began to pour back to the Isonzo front. The preparations for the great attack on Gorizia were resumed. In July, for the first time they screened our Quisca road for coming events.

But first the Austrians made another nearly successful attempt to throw out the plans for the offensive. The Italians were already established on the edge of the Carso

"CAVALLEGGERI DI LODI"
"Lodi s'immola"

tableland; but to take and hold Gorizia, still more to advance on Trieste, they would have to push along the Carso much farther. If the enemy could now prevent them by a surprise attack, thrusting them off the edge of the Carso down into the plain of Aquileia, Cadorna's whole plan would be ruined in advance.

This scheme the Austrians almost carried to success by the unexpected use of poison gas on a large scale. Hitherto that weapon had played no part on the Italian front, where the story of the Ypres gas attack was merely as a tale that is told. The Italians had served out masks, but they fitted too close; the troops complained of suffocation, and either neglected to carry them or threw them away in the hour of need. Hence the surprise by gas on June 29, 1916, caused a frightful massacre in the Italian trenches, and drove whole regiments, staggering and dying as they went, off the edge of the Carso. If the Austrian infantry had all come on as they should, the disaster would have been irreparable. But some of them remained inactive, and the situation was saved by Colonel Gandolfi, who gathered round him half a dozen men in gas masks, and made shift to hold a trench until reinforcements came up. For this splendid service he was

awarded the gold medal *al valore*. Till then the gold medal had been reserved for those who had been killed, but has since then gradually assumed a position more or less analogous to that of our V.C. (1)

The Third British Red Cross Unit, commanded by Mr. F. Alexander, was then serving the Italians on the Carso; but the victims of the gas attack were so numerous that our Unit was called on to send aid thither outside its ordinary sphere. I spent the night of June 29th-30th in the dressing-station of Sagrado at the foot of the Carso, while the cars of our two Units were coming and going, transferring load after load of poisoned wretches to the field hospitals in the plain. The courtyard and large garden beyond it were filled with tortured men, falling down under our eyes and dying in agony by hundreds together. The Italians, to whom this form of warfare was new and shocking, as it had been to our men at Ypres in April 1915, were furious at the perpetrators, and everywhere we heard them exclaiming against the "barbarism and treachery" of the Austrians. But I noticed with pleasure that even in that terrible scene, when, if ever, vindictive passion would be let loose, the wounded prisoners were medicated and placed on our ambulances with the same tender care as on every other occasion, and in due rotation with the Italian victims of the gas.

Several thousand Italians died, and several thousand recovered. But the lesson was not lost. After that every soldier carried an effective gas mask of Italian make in a tin box. Finally, after the arrival of the British army, our allies in 1918 adopted the *maschera inglese*, as they called it, such as our own troops wear.

The same spring and summer of 1916 saw the gradual adoption of the shrapnel helmet. The first helmets — I remember the curiosity with which they were handed round at Quisca — were French, with "R.F." stamped on them. These became the model for the helmets which the Italians then manufactured for their whole army. The appearance of the ordinary infantry regiments was greatly improved by the change, for the squashy Italian *beretto* is a poor affair. The helmet gave them the appearance of Roman soldiers. Only the Bersaglieri and Alpini stood to lose in distinction by the exchange of their own traditional headgear. The Bersaglieri generally contented themselves with attaching a feather to their helmets in memory of the magnificent plumage that was theirs by ancient right. The Alpini tended to eschew the helmet, and so often as possible still appeared in their handsome felt hats, shaped like that in which Louis XI kept his leaden images.

The Bersaglieri were founded by General La Marmora in the forties of the last century, and soon became the crack regiment of the little Piedmontese army that played so great a part in the making of Italy. They won their English and French allies, and in the wars that freed their country from Austrians and Papalists in 1848 — 49, 1859-60, 1866, and 1870. Their nod-


ding plumes and springing step, and the blare of trumpets behind which they ran into the battle, became the symbol of the Italian army to all Europe.

They still take pride in their trumpets. In one Bersagliere regiment eighty privates were trained during the war as a band of trumpeters, without the men foregoing their other military duties. I shall never forget standing on a windy mountain top over the Isonzo gorge, to hear at a few yards' distance their brazen clangour musically salute the Alps at dawn, while Colonel Gotti apologized for a mere eighty when he hoped soon to have a hundred.

But the famous Bersagliere-trot has been discarded as a method of marching, partly on medical grounds. We see its substitute in the numerous battalions of "Bersaglieri ciclisti" which have played so important a part in the war. Hurrying up on their "push-bikes", these gallant troops are flung in wherever the fight is hottest and the call for quick reinforcement greatest. How often I have seen them coming at the hour of need! Many of these cyclist battalions have been killed off and re-formed again and again.

The first time that I came across the Bersaglieri intimately was in May 1916, when our Unit played a football match against the 9th Bersaglieri ciclisti. They had a good team, and we won none too easily. They played what we call a very "clean" game, and it was a most friendly and pleasant occasion. After the match we were entertained by the officers of the battalion. The Major might have been forty, but the rest, including the captains, were young fellows of twenty of thereabouts. The Major told me that he was the fifth commandant of the battalion since the war began a year before, and the only one of the original officers who had not been killed or wounded. They were going up to the trenches again on the Carso in a few days, and there would soon be a sixth commandant. He was quite cheerful and gay, but confided to me that it was his task to turn these young men coming straight from home and college into ready-made Bersaglieri. It lay with him to give them the traditions and feelings of Bersaglieri, which, he said, had generally to be acquired by years of life in the corps. But these youngsters had to get it in a few months from him alone. After dinner they sat round and sang the special Bersaglieri songs in fine loud chorus, while the Major strummed for them on a guitar. It was a "family" party. I have seldom liked any company of strangers better, or been more touched by the occasion. That was as long ago as May 1916, when the most prolonged and bitter fighting on the Isonzo front was still to come. How many of them are left now?

As to rank and file of the Bersaglieri, they contained many of the noblest Italian types. I select the word carefully, for there is a strain of refinement or "nobility" of manner found in the best of the Italian common people which is not usual north of the Alps, though sterling qualities may be more universal. I have seen faces among the privates of the Ber-



"CAVALLEGGERI GUIDE" "alla vittoria e all'onor son guida"

saglieri as strong and yet refined as you would see in any society in the world. Their wounded never complained, and I remember how, after a bloody repulse in which certainly "some one had blundered", the returning Bersaglieri merely said to us "è andato male" with quiet dignity, when every one else was loud-mouthed in oburgation. The discipline of the Bersaglieri is the best in the Italian army.

Discipline is not the special point of the Arditi. Their merit is fierce and reckless courage, and a gaiety of boyish spirits that is infectious to the rest of the army, and has done much to keep up its fluctuating *moral* in these last two years of the war, when principally the Arditi have been in evidence. The are "Sturm Truppen", men "full of daring", as their name implies, selected by voluntary enlistment from the more active spirits in the ordinary regiments. They are specially trained, kept in the rear outside the life of the trenches till the day of battle, and then hurried up in the Fiat lorries and sent in to carry the enemy positions. This system was gradually developed in the course of the present war, and reached its full proportions only in the last year, when the Arditi, in their loose, opennecked jackets, with the crest of the dagger and palms on the sleeve, became

a sight familiar to all. Some battalions of them are given a special physical and athletic training, and to see the *fiamme nere*, as these are called on account of their black nightcaps, march past singing, stripped to the waist, is to see the physical side of man at its best. Skill in flame-throwing, bomb-throwing, and the dagger at close quarters are their favourite arts; holding the trenches by rifle fire after their capture is left to the ordinary regiments of infantry.

Indeed, the Arditi lives in an atmosphere of bombs and flame. To get into the favoured corps from a line regiment, the aspirant has to satisfy the authorities in a pass examination which consists of running through a machine-gun barrage, at which a certain percentage of examinees are actually wounded. At reviews, when the Arditi oblige with an exhibition of their flame-throwing and bombing tactics, it is frequent for the "joyous and gentle passage of arms" to end in a few casualties. The Arditi have the reputation of throwing bombs at each other or at passers-by out of sheer high spirits. They are the ringleaders of the army in the constant bickering with the Carabinieri, who carry out so faithfully and, as I believe, justly the disagreeable duties of Military Police. They call the Carabinieri "aerplanes", on account of their wide-winged hats. An army order was issued forbidding any one to call a Carabinieri an "aeroplane, in senso di disordine" ("in a disorderly sense"). A Carabinieri was once found lying bound on a mountain road I knew, with a label at-



tached to him, *Aeroplano nemico abbattuto dagli arditi* ("enemy aeroplane brought down by the Arditi"). In this standing quarrel my sympathies are all with the Carabinieri. But the reckless high spirits of the Arditi were a wholesome tonic to the *moral* of the army in the latter days.

The Alpini, in origin and character, are neither so modern and impressionist as the Arditi, nor so dignified and early Victorian as the Bersaglieri. They date from the period immediately following the *Risorgimento*, when the new kingdom of Italy had acquired a mountain frontier marching with Austria. Raised mostly among the Alpine populations and a few from the Abruzzi, they were a splendid body of men when the war broke out. The taking of Monte Nero in June 1915 was a fine feat of arms and mountaineering combined as stands on record in history. I remember, when we were carrying some Alpini who had been wounded near Tolmino in the September of that year, thinking that I had never seen finer men. But on the Alpini, as on the Bersaglieri, the heavy, long-drawn weight of the war fell and rested; the original Alpini were annihilated. Their successors were, indeed, not unworthy; but they were not all recruited from the mountain districts, and they disclaimed, with a true modesty that did them no injury in our eyes, to be equals of those who had fallen in the first two years of the war.

Of this second generation, so to speak, of Alpini we saw much in 1918, when some of our cars were working for them at the foot of

"CAVALLEGGERI DI TREVISO"

"in certamine audaces"

the *teleferiche*, below the precipices of Pasubio. It struck me that the officers were more in touch with the thoughts, needs, and daily lives of the men than in the line regiments. Officers and men locked up together for months in the snow, as much away from the world as sailors on a voyage, naturally get to understand each other's needs. Willingness and smartness prevailed among all ranks.

Indeed, in many respects it is a special service, this Alpine warfare, distinct like that of the navy or the air. It requires men born and bred in the mountains, and then trained to mountain warfare. The British and French troops fought splendidly in the high-raised Asiago plateau and its hills of pine; but, except the French Alpini, they could not have been put on Pasubio or any similar rock citadel for six months of snow-bound life, with *teleferiche* for their only communications. They would have been only a little less out of their element than if they had been at sea. It was the Alpini who guarded the hundreds of miles of higher Alps between one valley and the next, quartered in the snowbound *arêtes* and gullies for three livelong winters of actual warfare, under conditions that would have killed other

troops less skilled in snowcraft, less hardy and less patient by inherited instinct to outface all that the high hills can do to drive man down from their summits.

Besides bersaglieri, Alpini, and Arditi, mention should be made of yet another *corps d'élite*, the Granatieri, selected for their height. We came across them in the winter of 1915, in the fighting on Sabotino and Oslavia, where they lost very heavily. Transferred subsequently to the Duke of Aosta's Third Army, they went again and again into the desperate fighting on Carso and Hermada, and after the retreat took a leading part in the successful defence of the Lower Piave. Their reputation stands very high, and has been dearly bought.

On the Isonzo front in the late summer of 1916 the preparations were ripe at length for the great offensive against Gorizia. The object of the enlarged 6th Army Corps, under General Capello, was to carry the bulwarks of the city on the Italian side of the Isonzo — Sabotino, Oslavia, and Podgora hills — and then, after entering the city, to carry the heights beyond the river — San Gabriele and Monte Santo. If a corresponding advance was made on the north side of the Carso by the Third Army, under the Duke of Aosta, Gorizia could be safely occupied, and a starting-off place secured for the ultimate turning of the farther part of the Carso that covered Trieste. The objectives were, in fact, the same as those of the long, unhappy offensive of the previous winter, but the means and methods were very different. The spirit of Badoglio, Capello's chief of staff, had now first made itself felt in the Italian war. The work of the *genio* for six months past had supplied the network of roads, the gun emplacements, and warlike provision of every kind in the zone of Gorizia. But, unfortunately, General Capello's command did not yet include the Plava bottom and the approaches to Monte Kuk, as it did in the following year.

The change since the last winter was audible in the first minutes of the battle, when, at six o'clock on August 6, 1916, the quiet summer Sunday morning was startled and deafened by a very different kind of bombardment from any before heard on the Italian front. Early the same afternoon all Monte Sabotino was in Italian hands. The terrific barrage on the *trincerone* kept the Austrians paralyzed in their rock chambers, whence they should have issued to hold the great trench against the Italian assault. The assailants, coming up the steepest way from the bottom of the valley on the south-west, crossed the broken defences without meeting resistance, and occupied the two entrances to the great dug-out while the inmates were still inside. Sabotino and its defenders, after defying Italy for fifteen months, had been captured almost without loss a few hours after the bombardment began. Here was scientific war at last. It was Badoglio's first great triumph.

Prior to the year 1918 the Italian campaign was distinguished from the campaign in

Flanders by the large numbers of prisoners taken on both sides. One reason was the readiness to surrender of many of the subject populations of Austria-Hungary; but another was the character of the ground. The hard limestone of the Sabotino and Kuk district enable both sides, by blasting operations and machine drills, to bore out chambers in which thousands of men could be safely housed with a sense, highly attractive to the inmates, of complete security so long as they refrained from coming out. In the muddy soil of Flanders such large, safe dug-outs could not easily be constructed. But when an important system of dug-outs was captured on the Italian front, it disgorged prisoners by thousands at a time. Centuries hence, while the blue rushing Isonzo, noising far below, still sings its ancient song, the hill-wandering shepherd will marvel to discover subterranean labyrinths and palatial caverns hollowed out by the giants of old beneath the deserts of his thin mountain pastures, and will weave strange legends of their first purpose, none stranger, surely, than the truth.

On the evening of August 6th and the following days the prisoners began to pour down the roads in columns of a thousand at a time, gladdening the hearts of the up-coming Italian regiments. They were happy meetings, full of kindly human nature, and encouraging to the hopes of future democratic peace. The prisoners were frankly glad that their warfare was accomplished, and the Italians, while rejoicing to see these signs of victory, sympathized with the evident relief of their late enemies at being individually out of the war. One touch of nature quickly makes the Italian peasant-soldier akin with all the world. The Italians were now mostly in shrapnel helmets, but their captives were still in slouchy, dishevelled forage caps. Only in the next year's battles did the heavy Boche helmet gradually make its appearance in the Austrian ranks.

Though high, bare Sabotino had been won so quickly and at so cheap a price there were three day's fierce fighting for the lower, wooded heights of Oslavia and Podgora. Wooded, indeed, they no longer were, for twelve months of seldom-intermittent local warfare, in which systems of trenches had changed hands and ground been shifted again and again, had reduced both Oslavia and Podgora ridges to a rubbish heap worthy of the most chosen spots on the Western front. Unworn nature, who waits for no public funds to commence her work of reconstruction, has already in two years covered up the ravages with coarse grass; but houses, vineyards, and terraces are as though they had never been, lying mixed together under the grass with the bones of heroes. Man looks on helpless at the ruin he has made, and it may well long ere the peasant lives there again and tills new fields.

The fight was specially fierce for Podgora ridge top, scientifically armed, trenched, and caverned. It was turned at both ends, and surrounded for some considerable time before it surrendered. The Italians plunged



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
across the Isonzo to occupy the town. The foremost man was Sub-lieutenant Aurelio Baruzzi, aged nineteen; his preliminary feat was, with three followers, to capture several hundred Austrians crowded in the famous railway tunnel between Podgora height and river, where he held them captive for a long time till reinforcements came (2). He then led a small party across the bridge, entered Gorizia, and raised the Italian flag that he always carried in his pocket on the roof of the passenger station, as a signal to his compatriots to follow the daring patrol across the river. He was given the very rare distinction of the gold medal for his day's work, and found himself suddenly famous. But he was still the same simple and modest sub-lieutenant when, some months later, two of our drivers met him and made friends with him on the Liga heights.

Not many yards to the north of Baruzzi's railway tunnel, at the southern entrance of Podgora factory town, the industrial suburb of Gorizia on the western bank of the Isonzo, stands a high garden wall displaying to the road a mural monument. It commemorates an Austrian Count who, in 1809, led fifty men out of Gorizia across the river, and surprised and held a trench fort on the

summit of Podgora ridge. For more than a year, during the first occupation of Gorizia by the Italians, I used to pass the monument on the average once a day, the Italian guns barking over its head from the neighbouring garden. It seemed at the time a satirical comment on a hundred years of modern progress in a circle. But now we have good reason to hope that the opening of the twenty-first century, when it comes, may see Latin and Teuton better engaged than in crossing and re-crossing the Isonzo stream, and killing each other on Podgora height.

Just the other side of the railway tunnel, to the south, below the broken railway viaduct, an iron bridge spanned the Isonzo. The bridge, shot through again and again, was practically impassable for any save foot-passengers till the *genio* had repaired it. However, on the night of August 9th-10th, Geoffrey Young took four of our cars across in a jam with the artillery and horsecarts, and fetched out wounded from the town. They were certainly the first ambulances, and, I believe, the first automobiles, to cross the river and enter Gorizia. The holes were the principal feature of the bridge at the time, but Young guided the cars one after another, inch by painful inch, over these perilous chasms all night. At dawn the Austrian shooting had rendered the bridge utterly impassable, and nothing more was allowed across till next nightfall. Meanwhile the *genio* laboured all day repairing the bridge under a heavy fire.

That day (August 10th) I crossed by a



footbridge higher up the river into Salcano village north of Gorizia, at the foot of San Gabriele, where the Italians were already fighting hard for the lower slopes of that now famous mountain that completely dominates Gorizia. Near the footbridge I found General Venturi, commanding the norther division that we were supposed to serve from Quisca, and agreed with him that the British cars should cross the river farther south by the only possible way, the iron bridge used by Young the night before, that they should come up north again through Gorizia into Salcano, and carry off his wounded thence. I then made my way round to the iron bridge and talked to the *genio* officers working on it as to the likelihood of its being reopened for traffic that night in time for the fulfillment of this new plan.

As I was turning back from the end of the bridge, a figure in an English correspondent's khaki uniform jumped on to the road beside me. As I was wondering who my fellow-countryman would be, for clearly he was not my friend Mr. M'Clure, I suddenly saw behind him the thin, aquiline form of Mr. Wickham Steed, the evil genius of the House of Hapsburg, and the avenging angel of the races oppressed by the Dual Monarchy. He had come to the right place at an historic hour. Then it dawned upon me by inference that his companion must be Lord Northcliffe. Their arrival at Gorizia at the moment of its fall was of ultimate importance to the long-deferred unity of front, and to the understanding of Italian needs and

CAVALLERIA

anti-Austrian opportunity by the generals, statesmen, and peoples of the Entente.

That night, accordign to the arrangement with General Venturi, the British cars were brought round from Quisca and Vipulzano by the southern route over the iron bridge, now repaired, through Gorizia streets lit by burning houses, and out along the northern road into Salcano village, whence we carried back wounded by the same route. Next day (August 11th) British and Italian ambulances both worked over this ground by daytime. The dressing-station of the 45th Section was moved twice that day, each time farther back towards Gorizia along the Salcano road, as the houses in which it had been established were one by one broken up by shells. The Italian orderlies and stretcher-bearers worked well in trying conditions, under our friend, the energetic medical Major Bocchia, who was always to the front, and ended by being captured beyond Monfalcone in the following May.

During this and the following days roads, bridges and houses on the east side of Podgora ridge were kept under a heavy Austrian bombardment, with little reply. For a time the tables were turned in the matter of ar-

tillery. The battle had begun on August 6th with an Italian predominance against Sabotino and Podgora; but now the Italian guns were in process of being moved up, and till they got into their new positions it was a bad time for the troops round Gorizia and Salcano and at the foot of San Gabriele, that terrible mountain that was never completely taken till it fell unfought for in November 1918. The Italian infantry who had crossed the river also suffered from shortage of rifle ammunition, for even the foot-bridges were few, and were constantly broken by the Austrian shell fire.

And so by August 15th the Italian advance reached its limit for the year. Half the objectives of General Capello's army corps had been attained, and the Third Army had correspondingly pushed forward on the Carso, capturing San Michele and the heights on both sides the Vallone, and thereby making Gorizia safe to the south. But nothing could have enabled the Gorizia army corps to complete its work by the capture of San Gabriele and Monte Santo at the first rush, except a simultaneous attack on Monte Kuk from the Plava bottom. This attack, however, was only delivered after the Gorizia army corps had been fought to a standstill, and after the Austrians had had time to bring their reserves back from the San Gabriele region successfully to defend Monte Kuk.

General Capello and his chief of staff had won their laurels as the conquerors of Gorizia, and if the Plava attack had been mistimed it was not their fault, for it was not in their zone that year. The Plava sector ought always to have been under the same command as the Gorizia zone, because Kuk, Monte Santo, and San Gabriele were all one geographical and military system. This mistake was fully realized and remedied in 1917.

The personality of General Capello was remarkable. A short, stout figure, with a face suggesting at first sight *bonhomie* and nothing more, there was, as one soon found, a fire of zeal and energy underneath. Shortly before the taking of Gorizia he had been driving through a village street where a mad soldier was flourishing about with a bayonet. The bystanders were afraid to tackle him. The General leapt from his touring car, and himself disarmed the madman.

G.M. Trevelyan

(continue)

NOTES

(1) Below the gold are the silver and bronze medals *al valore*, and below them again the *croce al merito di guerra* (croix de guerre) instituted in 1918.

(2) One end of the tunnel had been solidly blocked up by the Austrians, who were, therefore, trapped in it. The Italians opened the tunnel again so as to use the road through Podgora village.

Hessen-Kassel.



Offizier.

Dragonier.

Leib-Dräger-Regiment.

1832—1845.

1832 wurden die beiden damals bestehenden Husaren-Regimenter zu einem Dräger-Regimente vereinigt, welches aber 1845 wieder getheilt wurde und zwar abermals in zwei Husaren-Regimenter, die im October 1866 als Husaren-Regimenter No. 13 und 14 in die preussische Armee übergingen.

Die Uniform der Dräger (Leib-Dräger-Regiment) war sehr ähnlich derjenigen der preussischen Garde-Dräger, doch trugen die Mannschaften weisse Garde-Litzen (Offiziere goldene — nach der Farbe der Knöpfe). Als Kopfbedeckung ein Helm nach dem damaligen Modell für preussische Kürassiere. Auf der Kartusche ein gelbmetallener Stern. Die ganze Erscheinung hatte grosse Aehnlichkeit mit den damaligen Mecklenburg-Schwerinschen Chevaulegers (VII. Band, No. 23).

IMAGES OF WAR IN ITALY

THE RECORD MADE BY THE BRITISH ARMY FILM AND
PHOTOGRAPHIC UNIT IN EMILIA ROMAGNA, 1944 - 1945

THERE IS STILL
A PLACE IN THE LINE

FOR

YOU

THIS
SPACE
IS
RESERVED
FOR
A
FIT
MAN



*Will you
fill it?*

from the Imperial
War Museum Review

The British advance through Emilia Romagna



The first obstacle outside Ravenna - the blown bridge over the Fiume Uniti, 5 December 1944.

The appearance in recent years of hundreds of books and articles, not to mention considerable local press interest, is a measure of the extraordinary interest which persists to this day in events in Emilia Romagna during the Second World War. Enthusiasm for the subject is stronger perhaps than that for the wartime history of any other region in Italy, a testimony, in my view, to the closely-woven political and social fabric of the region which has kept alive the memory of the civilian population's active involvement with the partisan struggle alongside the 'official' war of the fighting forces.

It is indeed difficult to separate the 'real war' from that fought by the Resistance: for the Allied armies and the Partisan brigades in Emilia, but even more so in Romagna, the war was very much a shared experience. Unlike elsewhere in Italy, the Allies did not disarm the partisans, but allowed them to form their own unit, the 1,800-strong 28th Garibaldi Brigade 'Mario Gordini' commanded by the partisan leader Bulow. Placed under the command of the British Army's V Corps on 12 January 1945 as an 'autonomous fighting unit', the unit later passed under the 2nd Commando Brigade's command, and was finally demobilised on 20 May 1945. As a result the battles fought by the British in Romagna were closely involved with

those fought by the Resistance, especially during the closing months of 1944, when the partisans of Southern Romagna joined up with Popski's Private Army and with the various Allied missions parachuted into the hilly districts near Forlì and Ravenna.

Following the collapse of German resistance on the Gothic Line, the British Army crossed the River Metauro into Emilia Romagna in September 1944. The terrain here was very different from that through which the troops had passed in Umbria and Tuscany. The province occupies the southern part of Italy's northern plain, and its landscape has a distinctive character. A narrow strip of coastline, some twenty miles across, runs the length of the region: gently sloping dunes are bordered in some places by pinewoods, elsewhere the flat, fertile land is cultivated, watered by irrigation channels. Inland numerous rivers intersect the plateau which rises to meet the foothills of the Apennines. Much of the region's land has been reclaimed, and a prominent feature are the so-called 'larghe', flatlands originally submerged in water which stretch from Cervia to Alfonsine and Bondeno at the northern edge of the province. It was this last region which most often formed the backdrop for the British cameramen - plains dominated by endless horizon broken only

by banks some three to ten metres high. These banks, built to prevent the rivers and canals flooding the surrounding countryside, have always had great tactical significance, and the British cameramen managed to convey in their film how German and Allied armies alike made tactical use of these earthworks during the six months of fighting in the region.

The films taken by the AFPU (1) show how the British maintained their advance, building hundreds of Bailey bridges across the rivers and impassable low-lying roads, drowned in the winter mud. The region's valleys posed problems too, in particular the vast expanse of the Comacchio Lagoon and the marshland of the Ravenna region where even Fantails and other amphibious vehicles got bogged down. In these conditions the local knowledge of the partisans from the 'Bassa' (the part of Romagna between the foot of the Apennines and the sea) with their light, flat-bottomed boats was a decisive factor both in the wintery skirmishes and later in the battles of the spring.

When I began this research in 1980, a number of the photographs taken by the Allies in Emilia Romagna were already known in Italy, but only two very brief sequences of British film of the region had been screened. Some short sequences

Gunner Strange of Lambeth filling in his greetings card to the people back home, 18 November 1944.



Notices that speak for themselves are placed at the entrances to Ravenna', 7 December 1944.



covering the investiture of the partisan commander Bulow (now Senator Arrigo Boldrini) in Ravenna in February 1945, and some clips showing partisans of the 28th Garibaldi Brigade in the winter of 1944/45 had appeared in two film documentaries: *Lotta Partigiana* (Partisan Struggle) (1975) by Paolo Gobetti and Giuseppe Risso, and *Resistenza: Una Nazione che Risorge* (Resistance: A Nation which Rises Again) (1975) by Ansano Giannarelli. Starting from these few clues, and in the certainty that there was more material in London, I began a systematic search for photographs, films and other documents about the Second World War in Emilia Romagna.

My researches, carried out in 1982 and 1983, led to the discovery at the Imperial War Museum of more than 4,000 photographs and 127 reels of mute film (30,000 feet) covering the work of the AFPU cameramen and photographers in the province from November 1944 to April 1945. A further useful research tool came to light at the Public Record Office in the form of the War Diaries for this period of the 5th and 8th Armies.

For the purposes of this essay I have divided the subject matter of the film coverage into four sections: the British and Allied Armies, liberation and devastation, the new Italian Army, and the Italian partisans. I was interested to see how at-

tention was divided between each of these areas. Approximately four-fifths of the coverage relates to the activity of the British Army and its allies: the remaining fifth shows Italian military, civilian and partisan subjects.

The British Army in Action


Watching the film,, the most immediately striking images are those which show the panorama of desolation wrought by the war on the towns and countryside of Emilia Romagna. The power of the advancing army is suggested by a close-up of a destroyed German tank, once the pride of the Nazi armies but now an abandoned wreck at the side of a road along which pass an unending line of troop transports, Sherman tanks, ambulances, jeeps, and bulldozers on transporters; all this against the bleak November backdrop of flooded land (the German had blown the banks of the rivers). The camera dwells on the remains of the bridges destroyed by the retreating Germans and other trappings of war: antitank 'dragons teeth', minefields and noticeboards left behind by the Germans bearing a skull and the inscription 'Achtung Minen'. And so the images continue: half-sunk boats in the canal port of Cervia, abandoned German gun positions in the middle

of pine woods, barbed-wire and anti-tank obstacles which cut the landscape - beach, forests, fields and roads - in two. All these obstacles are rapidly overcome by the Allied war machine. The bulldozers raise earth ramps for crossing anti-tank devices; Sherman flail tanks detonate mines on the roads; Bailey bridges take the place of bridges destroyed by the Germans.

And thus the 'great Allied circus' continues its march, pausing only to remove obstructions; what remain are the desolation and injuries to a land, Romagna, which will take years to heal. But the cameraman also focuses his lens on the inhabitants of this region, symbolised by the family with their few possessions loaded on a horse-drawn cart, the only treasures salvaged from the fury of war and the demands of requisitioning; trudging along the road against the path of the Allied columns, they seem to embody the hard fate and suffering which has always been, and which will remain, their lot in life.

The cameramen and photographers of the AFPU took pictures of every variety of subject, often of scenes far removed from the accepted notions of war: soldiers feeling homesick, thinking of Christmas: the High Command who have had the forethought five weeks before the festivities to have designed and pintoed Christmas airgraph greetings

The plain south of Ravenna, flooded after the Germans blew the banks of the River Savio, 16 November 1944.



One of the many German tanks knocked out during the advance towards Ravenna, 9 November 1944.



cards bearing a picture of St. George, patron saint of the Eighth Army, leaving the soldier only to sign and address the card. A stern-looking sergeant turned Father Christmas distributes the cards to the gunners of the 58th Medium Regiment of Royal Artillery as they busily pile up shells beside their guns.

But the ordinary soldiers are not the only players in this drama: the scene changes to the generals who command this great army and who are shown at work, studying a battle plan, on a day like any other. The impression comes over that the generals too have faces. In this case it is the Eighth Army commander, Lieutenant-General McCreery, and the commander of V Corps, Lieutenant-General Keightley, visiting 46 Division HQ, where they are seen in a caravan with Major-General Weir examining a map on a table; the rest of the sequence is shot outside: the Army commander emerges from the caravan, salutes his officers, gets into his jeep and departs. The sequence leaves one with the impression that McCreery and his colleagues are not very good actors, but of course the sergeant cameraman would not have been able to film the generals' private discussions.

Continuing in his capacity as director, the AFPU cameraman, on

this occasion Sergeant French who shot much of the Ravenna material, stages some action by the 1st Battalion, Kings Royal Rifle Corps. The exercise is set in a farmhouse courtyard, four kilometres from the occupied town of Alfonsine, where some soldiers have constructed mortar positions from sand bags and bundles of wood. The sequences show, with monotonous repetition, the laying of the mortar, the passing of the shells, the gunner firing, and then again passing the ammunition, reloading and firing. A simple exercise filmed from different angles. What is interesting though is the curiously unreal, almost illogical setting in which the event takes place: the farmer's house to the right, the barn to the left and fields beyond; hens running across the threshing-floor as the mortar fires. Near the house, some chicks flutter beneath an upturned basket, while by the porchway, thinking perhaps that he is not in frame, the farmer stands leaning against a shovel. One is left wondering which is out of place in this film, the farmyard in which the action takes place or the presence of the 1st Battalion of the Kings Royal Rifle Corps in these strange surroundings?

The cameramen also recorded actual fighting, an example being the action on 2 March 1945 when the Cremona Division launched an at-

tack to clear the Germans from their positions on the south-eastern shore of the Laguna di Comacchio and in the pine woods south of the River Reno. Even though Sergeants Herbert and French filmed the artillery rather than the infantry in the front line the feeling of 'real battle' is just as strong. The film of the guns repeatedly opening up in sequence down the line of the battery, conveys a sense of live action, which is heightened as the camera pans across the enemy lines. It is plain that these are true images of war, not effects achieved by editing. The same can be said of the shots taken on the wharf of the Marina at Ravenna where French, from his vantage point in the ruins of the light-house, filmed the 70th Artillery Regiment's guns in action, their shells bursting beyond the mouth of the River Reno.

Liberation and Destruction

The film goes on to show the first pictures of Allied liberation - the entry into Ravenna on 5 December 1944. The main obstacle separating the Eighth Army from this large town was, yet again, water, in this case the *Fiumi Uniti*, which channel the Montone and the Ronco down to the coast. The destroyed bridge was no hindrance to the South African sappers, who built a Bailey

Lt General Sir R L McCreery talking over the battle situation with Brigadier S Shoosmith (centre) and Colonel W Liardet (left) at 10th Infantry Brigade HQ, 24 November 1944.



A lone civilian stands among the wreckage of the railway station which was once so busy, 7 December 1944.



bridge on the remains of the stone one blown up by the Germans, at the same time operating a ferry service for the jeeps and other vehicles of the 27th Lancers to cross to the other side. Once across, the cameraman accompanies the column of vehicles through the deserted suburb of Portanuova, where a few people emerge timidly at their doorsteps or windows. The scene moves to the main square, renamed the Piazza del Popolo; the camera frames the Town Hall, its balcony draped with the Allied and Italian flags. A group of twelve German prisoners comes marching across the piazza, guarded by four armed and wretchedly clothed partisans: members of the 28th Garibaldi Brigade, they have been fighting for two days to liberate the town. Among them is a South African pilot shot down by the Germans a month before. Sergeant French does some close-ups of the pilot who like his companions in arms is somewhat strangely attired. These pictures lack the wild enthusiasm which greets the liberators on other occasions, as we shall see later; all we see here are desolation and sadness.

Moving around the city, the cameraman records successive scenes of devastation: the destroyed railway station, the bomb-wrecked avenue and piazza, the toppled monument to Luigi Carlo Farini (2), the uproot-

ed railway tracks, the water tank for supplying railway engines which has been ripped open and the wreckage of overturned goods wagons. Ironically still intact is the signboard "Ravenna" hanging under the station's roof: the station will stay out of use for another year. the panorama shifts to the port. The docking quays blown up by the Germans, the Customs House, the harbour master's office and the Callegari and Montecatini factories - the now mere skeletons of buildings; in the water lurks the wreckage of ships and barges sunk to prevent the Allies entering the port.

Back in the town the camera picks out signs in English indicating the danger of mines and warning against looting the wrecked homes of people who have fled north: 'Do not loot, the streets of the town are being watched', or 'All vehicles subject to anti-looting inspection. You have been warned!'

The New Italian Army

On 14 January 1945 the Cremona Combat Group, one of the four Italian Combat Groups (the other were 'Friuli', 'Legnano' and 'Folgore'), reached the front line in the Ravenna-Alfonsine Sector and lined up on the left of the 2nd Canadian Brigade along the River Reno.

Sergeant Frost's film of the

Italians patrolling the forward areas, from the pine woods to the mouth of the River Reno towards Casalborg-setti and the sea, was taken a few days later. The men advancing along the road which borders the canal in Destra Reno and crossing the pine woods and beach towards the north backed up by Churchill tanks, are Italian soldiers. Italian too are the soldiers manoeuvring their 17 and 25-pounder guns into position beside a haystack, and more are seen under the banks of the Reno in the neighbourhood of Sant'Alberto, aiming and firing mortars, while their officers survey the river with binoculars. From trenches on the top of the embankment the expanse of the Comacchio Valley is regularly 'swept' by the Bren guns of Italian infantry.

Public ceremonies were staged by the Allies as a means to gain the support of their Italian co-belligerents and that of the civilian population. Thus the film records General Keightley, accompanied by the commander of the 'Friuli' Group, General Scattini, inspecting the newly equipped Italian troops at Forlì on 4 February 1945, and making a short speech, which is translated by an Italian officer. Then follows a marchpast by Italian soldiers who, a few days later, will join the 2nd Polish Corps in the front line in the Senio Valley. The film follows a

Canal north of Cervia, 9 November 1944.



Sherman passing 'an interested audience of Italian children, north west of Forlì', 11 November 1944.



much-used formula: the arrival by car of high-ranking officers, inspection, speech, marchpast, parade, and departure. the whole scene is a local public relations exercise, from the close-ups of the columns of soldiers and the faces of the British and Italian generals to the panning shots of the troops and the cheering crowds. Judging by the film coverage, apart from the brief episode of the battle of Torre di Primaro, the Allies viewed the Italian troops more as a show army than as a fighting force. In any event, none of these films appeared in the British newsreels.

The Italian Partisans

The partisan base of the *Distaccamento* 'Garavini' (2) of the 28th Garibaldi Brigade, hidden in pine trees along the coast, was filmed in some detail. The house, the home of the forest keeper, is a low building of one storey, around which men and women of the unit are busily engaged in what might best be described as logistical tasks. Women with revolvers in their belts are doing the laundry and kneading dough for baking in a wood-fired oven; men are chopping wood for the fire; sheets and clothes are spread out to dry under the pale November sun; and in the distance

armed figures can be seen standing guard over the base. In the following sequence an instructor drills a group of men in the use of a mortar. Another detachment returns and a close-up shows a group of people among whom is Major Peniakoff. Popski (4) of 'Popski's Private Army', wearing a white duffle-coat and black beret. The partisans peer at a map, then one presents the Major with a double-barrelled shotgun which he studies with interest while those around him stand laughing.

By the time the next reel was taken, Ravenna had already been liberated and the partisans appear as a fighting unit alongside the Allies. In fields adjoining the banks of the Reno, shielded by undergrowth, they train with rifles and a Bren gun, under the watchful eye of their commander. 'Major Bulow'. From the banks, a partisan gives sharp bursts of covering machine-gun fire across the rivers, as a small boat makes its way against the strong current of the Reno, bringing two partisans back from a patrol.

The following reels record the investiture of the commander of the 28th Garibaldi Brigade. It was unusual, to say the least, for an Italian soldier (Boldrini was a Lieutenant in the Army), to receive Italy's highest award for bravery, the *Medaglia d'Oro*, not from a compatriot - in this


case it would have been General Clemente Primieri - but from the commander of the British Eighth Army, General McCreery. The ceremony was just one of several such well-publicised gestures and is evidence of the Allies' policy to appease and thereby control the partisan movement, which was thought to be a volatile force in the province, particularly in Romagna where there was a strong communist following.

Summary

As has been seen, partisan activity and the role of the Italian Army is documented in some detail in these reels of record film, but it is likely that this interest was due less to any political calculation than to the mere fact that the Allied armies ended up stranded on the banks of the Senio and Reno rivers in a winter standstill during which many thousands of feet of film and several thousand photographs were taken.

The results are certainly not exceptional and reflect what the campaign in Northern Italy essentially was: a secondary front where practically nothing was ever risked, where the generals only moved when all their reinforcements were securely in place and the enemy's collapse certain. But the long drawn out war effort in Italy had still to be record-

Bailey Bridge 'almost completed after eighteen hours' hard work by South African Engineers', 7 December 1944.



Statue of Luigi Carlo Farini outside Ravenna railway station, 12 December 1944.



ed by the sergeants of the Army Film and Photographic Unit, even after Allied public interest, and the cameramen of the commercial news-reel companies had been switched to the campaign in North West Europe.

But if the formal activities of the 8th Army (official visits and ceremonies) and their military operations take place according to a routine formula, it is the cameramen's absorption with the scenery, and their curiosity in the Italian people which brings a spontaneity and vividness to this journey up the peninsula, whose great variety of observed situations brings to mind the anthological quality of Rossellini's *Paisà* (5). In particular the attention given to the landscape throws the seasons into sharp relief, lending a structure to this day by day narrative, so that viewed as a whole the record acquires an almost epic quality.

In November 1944 the south of Romagna had already been liberated by the Allied armies and the offensive which would finally bring an end to operations in Italy was flagging. The pictures show columns of vehicles, tanks and men advancing along the roads of Romagna. Despite the technology and the power of the forces displayed, these pictures do not convey an atmosphere of war. There are no direct engagements nor indication of the huge

losses suffered by both sides in the struggle. (Casualties in the Gothic Line had numbered over 123,000 on the German and nearly 160,000 on the Allied side.) The enemy appears here only in the role of defeated, never as a combatant, which is why the images seem weak and sanitised versions of those cruder and more dramatically violent images of the war shown elsewhere. On the other hand this practice of taking pictures of everything which happened (or did not happen) in the armies' lines of communication allows us to grasp more vividly the atmosphere of the territory where the war was being fought. In these autumn months the floods deluged the Ravenna Plain, causing the heavy mechanised vehicles to become bogged down, and this, together with torrential rain, forced the powerful and well-organised Allied machine of war to halt for the whole winter in Romagna.

The months of this halt are characterised by detailed scenes of preparations for the final advance, but also as a pause in which the soldiers had time for recreation and for contact with the people of the region. For the military they are straightforward records, but records which frequently cover, as well as the great parades, the folklore, ceremonies and reality of the atmosphere of the Romagna, and it is

this which makes the film's visual record so precious.

When the offensive recommences in the spring, the record quickens pace; little time is spent on the background - instead the camera recounts successive entries into liberated towns. Unlike the earlier bleak scenes, these final pictures, taken in the spring, capture the landscape of a countryside in flower, and of towns which, though scarred by bombing, are bursting with wild joy at the end of the war and its nightmares. Happiness is captured for all time on the faces and in the gestures of the men and women of our country who have just appeared in this cinema epic in which the British soldier is the lead performer and the Italian soldiers and partisans are the bit-players. It is a great film which will not appear in any cinema, but which will remain a unique document of a people and a place at a precise time, preserved in the archives of the Imperial War Museum.

Gianfranco Casadio

NOTES

- (1) AFPU sergeant cameramen and photographers operated in pairs and thereby ensured that British military operations were usually recorded simultaneously in still and cine form.
- (2) Luigi Carlo Farini (1812-1866), born in Russi, close to Ravenna, was an Italian patriot active in the struggle for independence.
- (3) Settimio Garavini was a partisan from Ravenna who was killed at the hands of the Germans, and whose name was adopted by the partisan unit operating in the pine woods of Glasse, near Ravenna.
- (4) Wladimir Peniakoff, or 'Popski', who founded and commanded Popski's Private Army, a British raiding force which operated behind enemy lines in North Africa and Italy. Popski's activities in Romagna gained valuable information for the Eighth Army Command. Among other feats, he succeeded, with the help of a small number of local partisans, in saving the Basilica at Classe from destruction.
- (5) *Paisà* (1946) directed by Roberto Rossellini is a six-part dramatised journal depicting incidents in the Battle for Italy from 1943 to 1945.

Soldiers of 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, Cremona Division, shelter behind Churchill tanks firing on German forces, 22 January 1945.



Colligite fragmenta ne pereant

Collecting is a highly cultural and civil pursuit, a coordinated action of researching finding, cataloguing and studying objects and memorabilia.

Italy is a latecomer in this field if compared to the other European countries, and yet the Italian military tradition is centuries-old.

This wealth of ours, constantly attacked, eroded and destroyed because of both indifference and indolence, must be defended and brought out through the collectors' initiatives.



The culture of our military past, and also that of our present and future, must sink its roots in the traditions that are mostly kept alive by collectors.

Italy is the only country that lacks a national military museum: a serious deficiency which has a very negative influence on the Italian military tradition.

Not only do we lack a national museum for the Army, but also a national museum of old arms, although Italy in the past manufactured the finest and most technically advanced weapons, which are now gathering dust in forgotten basements.

On the contrary, military collecting should be credited in our country, with having saved a great number of objects that were otherwise destined to destruction.

Military traditions are, always, the backbone of an army.




I am interested in the following collections, please send me the relevant illustrative material:

- | | | |
|--|--|---|
| ☐ Miniature soldiers | ☐ Military postcards | ☐ Arms |
| ☐ Military publications | ☐ Medals and Badges | ☐ Helmets and Headgear |
| ☐ Uniforms | ☐ Books and Manuscripts | ☐ Research and Studies |
| ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

For the above mentioned collections I should like you to notify my name to European collectors, in order to:

- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| ☐ Exchange collections | ☐ Buy collections | ☐ Sell collections |
|---|--|---|



Invitation to «Military in Europe» 1990 Exhibition

«Militaria in Europa» 1989 was a remarkable success, both as regards the attendance and the number and level of the exhibitors.

In view of the coming 4th of November, Armed Forces Day, «Rivista Militare» wishes to repeat the event.

Therefore we invite the European collectors to send in their applications. If, as we hope, the entries are no less than last year's, we shall be able to organize in Rome the second exhibition.

☐ I wish to exhibit the following collection:

.....
.....
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.....

☐ I wish to present my collection in the Exhibition's Catalogue and I undertake to send text and slides by June 30, 1990

Surname

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Address

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Signature



RIVISTA MILITARE

Via di S. Marco, 8

00186 ROMA
(ITALY)

ENGLISH - ITALIAN

GLOSSARY

R

race
downhill **r.**
long distance **r.**
patrol **r.**
rack,
racket,
snow **r.**
radar,
identification friend or
foe **r. (IFF)**

RADIAC (Radioactivity,
detection, identification
and computation)

radiation,
initial nuclear **r.**

nuclear **r.**
prompt **r.**
r. dose rate

r. intensity
r. sickness
r. situation map

residual **r.**
thermal **r.**
radiator,
radio,
amplitude modulated **r.**
(AM radio)

gara, competizione
gara di discesa (con sci)
gara di fondo
gara di pattuglie
rastrelleria
racchetta
racchetta da neve
radar
radar per
l'identificazione di aerei
amici o nemici
rilevamento delle
radiazioni

radiazione
radiazione nucleare
iniziale
radiazione nucleare
radiazione immediata
intensità di dose
radioattiva
intensità di radiazione
male da raggi
carta delle zone
contaminate
radiazione residua
radiazione termica
radiatore
radio
radio a modulazione di
ampiezza

frequency modulated **r.**
(FM radio)
portable **r.**
r. broadcasting
r. communications

r. detection and ranging
r. net
r. set

r. teletype set
r. van
radioactive,
r. decay
r. dust
r. material
radioactivity,
inducer **r.**
neutron induced gamma
activity NIGA
residual **r.**
residual **r.**
radio communications,

radiological,
r. operations
radio set (radio
communications)
auxiliary receiver set

radio a modulazione di
frequenza
radio portatile
radiodiffusione
Trasmissioni radio (v.
radio set)
radiolocalizzazione
maglia radio (v. net);
apparato radio (v. radio
set)
radiotelescrivente
autoradio
radioattivo
decadimento radioattivo
polvere radioattiva
materiale radioattivo
radioattività
radioattività indotta
radioattività indotta da
neutroni
radioattività residua
radioattività residua
trasmissioni radio (v.
radio set)
radiologico
guerra radiologica
apparato radio

apparato ricevente
ausiliario

portable radio
communications (PRC)
radioteletype set

receiver set
receiver-transmitter set
repeater set
transmitter set
vehicular radio
communications (VRC)

Radioteletype,
radius,
r. of action
r. of damage
r. of effect
r. of safety
r. of vulnerability
r. of vector
raft,
landing r.
raid,

air r.
amphibious r.
railroad,
r. worker unit
railway,
underground r.
rain,
r. coat
r. out
ramp,
r. pass

range,

effective r. of weapon

firing r.
long r.
long r.
operating r.

r. estimate
r. finder
r. taker
talking r.

visibility r.
ranger (USA)
ranging,

radio detection and r.
rank,
field r.
insignia of r.
other r. (OR)

rate

attrition r.
available supply r.

apparato radio portatile

apparato
radiotelescrivente
apparato ricevente
apparato ricetrasmittente
apparato ripetitore
apparato trasmettente
apparato radio veicolare

radiotelescrivente
raggio
raggio d'azione
raggio del danno
raggio d'efficacia
raggio di sicurezza
raggio di vulnerabilità
raggio vettore
zattera
zattera da sbarco
incursione, colpo di
mano
incursione aerea
colpo di mano anfibi
strada ferrata, ferrovia
unità del genio ferrovieri
ferrovia
ferrovia sotterranea
pioggia
impermeabile
pioggia radioattiva
rampa di caricamento
permesso di accesso
alle rampe
portata, gittata, distanza,
poligono
gittata efficace di
un'arma
poligono di tiro
grande gittata
gittata massima
portata di un apparato
radio
stima delle distanze
telemetro
telemetrista
portata di una linea
telefonica
raggio di visibilità
incursore
telemetria, misura delle
distanze
radiolocalizzazione
grado, linea, schiera
ufficiale superiore
insegna del grado
sottufficiali e militari di
truppa
tasso, indice,
percentuale, ritmo,
velocità media, cadenza
tasso di usura
tasso di rifornimento

combat r.
consumption r.
POL consumption r.

radiation dose r.

r. of advance
r. of fire
r. of march
required supply r.

rater,

rating,

evaluation r.

ratification,
to ratify,
ratio

ration,
combat r. ("C" ration)

fresh r.
pack r.

standard r.
rationale,

rays,
cosmic r.
gamma r.
heat-r.
infra-red r.
"X" r.
Reaction
chain r.
quick r. alert (QRA)

r. force
reactor.

nuclear r.
Readiness

operational r.
r. alert

r. conditions
r. officer

state of r.
reading,
aerial photograph r.

map r.

autorizzato
tasso di combattimento
tasso di consumo
tasso di consumo
carburanti e lubrificanti
intensità di dose
radioattiva; tasso di
assorbimento
velocità di movimento
velocità di tiro
velocità di marcia
tasso di rifornimento
necessario
compilatore di note o
rapporti personali
stima, valutazione,
classificazione, valore
dare valore ad una
notizia; indice di
valutazione
ratifica, sanzione
ratificare, sanzionare
rapporto, proporzione,
percentuale
razione viveri
razione viveri da
combattimento
razione di generi freschi
razione di viveri
confezionata in scatola o
pacco
razione standard
giustificazione,
spiegazione
raggi
raggi cosmici
raggi temici
raggi termici
raggi infrarossi
raggi "X"
reazione
reazione a catena
allarme, aereo di pronta
reazione
forza di reazione
reattore, pila automatica;
(elettr.) reattanza
reattore nucleare
prontezza
approntamento
prontezza operativa
stato di allarme aereo al
suolo di pronto
intervento
stato di approntamento
ufficiale addetto
all'approntamento
stato di prontezza
lettura
lettura di fotografie
aeree
lettura della carta
topografica

Ready "ready"	pronto	to reconnoitre reconnoiter (USA) reconnoitring patrol to r. the enemy positions	fare una ricognizione, esplorare, perlustrare pattuglia da ricognizione riconoscere le posizioni nemiche
r. for combat	posizione di "pronti" (del fucile, prima di puntarlo)		riconquistare
rear	pronto per il combattimento	to reconquer, reconquest, record,	riconquista
"REAR"	retro, tergo, di dietro fronte di gola posto Comando		registro, documento, memoria, nota verbale memoria storica
r. admiral	Arretrato	historical r.	registro ammalati
r. area	contrammiraglio	medical r.	cartella clinica
r. area defence	zona delle retrovie	medical r. extract	scheda personale
r. guard	difesa delle retrovie	personal r.	
r. rank	retroguardia	prisoner of war personal r.	scheda dei prigionieri di guerra
r. security	ultima fila		registro dei dati di tiro
r. sight	sicurezza a tergo	r. of firing data	registrazione
rearguard	alzo (d'arma da fuoco)	recording,	registrazione delle notizie
to reassign	retroguardia	information r.	registrazione dei campi minati
reassigned,	riassegnare, trasferire riassegnamento, trasferito	minefield r.	registrazione obiettivi
r. personnel	personale trasferito	target r.	ricuperare
rebel,	ribelle, rivoltoso	to recover,	ricupero
rebellion,	ribellione, rivolta	recovery,	recupero delle forze
recall,	richiamo, ritirata (in caserma)	r. of one's strength	carro recuperi
r. to arms	richiamo alle armi	r. truck	ricreativo
receipt,	ricevuta, ricezione	Recreational,	attrezzature sportive
to acknowledge r.	accusare ricevuta	r. facilities	mezzi ricreativi
receiver	ricevente, ricevitore	r. supplies	recluta
r. set	apparato ricevente	recruit	reclutare, arruolare
auxiliary r. set	apparato ricevente	to recruit	reclutamento,
r.-transmitter set	apparato ricetrasmittente	recruitment, (recruiting)	coscrizione
telephone r.	ricevitore telefonico		rientro da un'azione o da una esercitazione, rischieramento
reception, ricezione		redeployment,	ridotta
recognition,	riconoscimento	redoubt,	riduzione
recoil,	rinculo, ricupero	reduction,	retrocessione del grado
the r. of a gun	il rinculo di un cannone (d'un fucile)	r. in rank	bobina, rotolo, tamburo
r. mechanism	congegno di recupero	reel	tamburo per filo
recoilless,	senza rinculo	e. equipment	telefonico
r. gun (rifle)	cannone senza rinculo	re-embarkation,	reimbarco
r. type weapon	arma del tipo senza rinculo	re-employment,	reimpiego
recommendation,	consiglio, proposta, raccomandazione	re-engagement,	nuovo impiego, rafferma
reconnaissance	ricognizione,	re-enlisted	raffermato
(RECCE)	esplorazione	r. man	militare raffermato
air r.	ricognizione	reference	referimento
armed r.	aerofotografica	grid r.	referimento alla rete
close r.	ricognizione armata	map r.	topografica coordinate
r. aircraft	esplorazione ravvicinata	message (or letter) r.	referimento cartografico
	aereo da ricognizione,	number	numero di riferimento di un messaggio (o lettera)
r. in force	ricognitore	r. point	punto di riferimento
r. party (RECCE party)	ricognizione in forze	r. to a letter	referimento ad una lettera
r. patrol	gruppo ricognizioni	refrigerator,	refrigeratore, frigorifero
strategic r.	pattuglia esplorante	r. van	autofrigorifero
tactical r.	esplorazione strategica	to refuel,	risornire di carburante
tactical air r.	esplorazione tattica	refuelling,	risornimento carburanti
visual r. (VR)	esplorazione aerotattica		
Reconnoitrer,	ricognizione a vista		
	ricognitore		

r. point
refugee,
 r. camp
regiment,
 alpine r.
 artillery r.
 engineers r.
 infantry r.
 mining r.
 railway r.
 tank r.
regimental,
 r. adjutant
Region,
Registration,

burials and graves r.
 (GRREG)
 r. fire
regular,

r. officer
regulation,
 military road traffic r.

rehabilitation
 r. of roads
rehearsal,
 counterattack r.
 exercise r.
 full scale r.
reimbursement,
 r. in cash
 r. in kind
to reinforce,
reinforced,
 r. concrete
reinforcement,
reinforcing,
 r. unit
relay,

directional r.
 radio r.
 r. centre
 r. station
to relay,

release,

bomb r. line (BRL)

r. point
reliability,
reliability of a source,

posto carburanti
 profugo, rifugiato
 campo profughi
 reggimento
 reggimento alpini
 reggimento di artiglieria
 reggimento genio
 reggimento di fanteria
 reggimento minatori
 reggimento ferrovieri
 reggimento carri
 regimental

aiutante maggiore in 1°.
 regione

registrazione,
 immatricolazione,
 iscrizione

registrazione tombe e
 sepolture

tiro di inquadramento
 regolare, fisso, soldato
 dell'esercito regolare
 ufficiale in s.p.e.

regolamento
 regolamento sulla
 circolazione stradale
 militare

ripristino, riabilitazione
 ripristino di strade

prova
 prova del contrattacco
 prova dell'esercitazione
 prova completa

rimborso, restituzione
 rimborso in contanti
 restituzione in natura

rinforzare
 rinforzato

cemento armato
 rinforzo, rafforzamento
 in rinforzo

unità in rinforzo
 relè, collegamento,

ritrasmissione
 relè direzionale

ponte radio
 centro di ritrasmissione
 stazione che ritrasmette
 trasmettere con relè,
 ritrasmettere, comandare

un circuito a mezzo relè
 rilascio, liberazione,
 sganciamento di bombe
 (aeron.)

linea di sgancio delle
 bombe

punto di deflusso
 attendibilità
 attendibilità di una fonte
 informativa

A) Completely reliable

B) usually reliable

C) fairly reliable

D) non usually reliable

E) unreliable

F) reliability cannot be
 judged

Reliance,

self r.

relief,

r. in place

r. of sentry,

r. party

to relieve,

to r. a unit

remark,

remote,

r. control

removal

r. of obstacles

r. of an officer

Rendez-vous,

r. point

reorganization,

repair,

under r.

to repeat,

"REPEAT"

repeater,

r. set

to repel,

replacement,

replenishment,

daily r.

to report,

to r. sick

Report,

bombing r. (BOMREP)

build-up status r. (actual
 or forecast)

completamente

attendibile

normalmente attendibile

abbastanza attendibile

di solito non attendibile

non attendibile

non si è in grado di
 valutare l'attendibilità

affidamento, fiducia

fiducia in se stesso

cambio, sostituzione,
 soccorso

sostituzione in posto

cambio di una sentinella

colonna di soccorso,

truppe di ricambio

sostituire, dare il

cambio, alleggerire

sostituire un reparto

nota, osservazione,

commento

remoto, a distanza

comando a distanza,

telecomando

rimozione

rimozione di ostacoli

destituzione di un

ufficiale

luogo di adunata,

appuntamento,

convegno,

congiungimento

punto di congiungimento

(di appuntamento)

riorganizzazione,

riordinamento

riparazione, ripristino

in riparazione

ripetere

ordine: "Stessi dati,

fuoco!"

ripetitore, amplificatore,

arma da fuoco a

ripetizione

apparato ripetitore

respingere un assalto

sostituzione,

restituzione, complimenti

riifornimento, reintegro

riifornimento (reintegro)

giornaliero

referire, riportare

chiedere visita medica

rapporto, relazione,

cronaca

rapporto sui

bombardamenti aerei

rapporto sullo stato di

approntamento di un

reparto (presente o

previsto)

captured material r.,

celerity intelligence r.
(CELINTREP)
complementary technical
r. (COMTECHREP)
daily strength r.,

detailed technical r.
(DETECHREP)
efficiency r.

emergency burial r.

flash r.
hot photo r.
(HOTPHOTOREP)
immediate photo
interpretation r. (IPIR)
in flight r.
intelligence r. (INTREP)
medical r.
mission r. (MISREP)

mortar bombing r.
(MORTREP)
nuclear damage r.
(NUCREP)
operational situation r.

patrol r.
periodic intelligence r.
(PERINTREP)
post exercise report

preliminary technical r.
(PRETECHREP)

reconnaissance r.
(RECCEREP)
shelling r. (SITREP)
standardized r. for
reporting Nuclear,
Chemical, Biological
attacks (NBC report)
supplementary
intelligence r.
(SUPINTREP)
tactical interrogation r.
toxic r. (TOXREP)

reporting,

control and r. post
(CRP)

representative,
national military r.
(NMR)

reprisand,
reprisal,
request,
air r.

rapporto sul materiale
catturato al nemico
rapporto informativo
accelerato
rapporto tecnico
complementare
rapporto giornaliero della
forza
rapporto tecnico
particolareggiato
scheda valutativa (del
personale)
rapporto di sepoltura
d'emergenza
rapporto lampo
rapporto lampo di
fotointerpretazione
rapporto immediato di
fotointerpretazione
rapporto in volo
rapporto informativo
rapporto sanitario
rapporto di missione
aerea
rapporto sul fuoco di
mortai e razzi
rapporto sui danni
nucleari
rapporto sulla situazione
operativa
rapporto di pattuglia
rapporto informativo
periodico
relazione di fine
esercitazione

rapporto tecnico
preliminare

rapporto di cognizione
rapporto situazione
rapporto unificato sugli
attacchi NBC

rapporto supplementare
d'informazione

rapporto di interrogatorio
rapporto sull'impiego di
aggressivi chimici
cronaca, rapporto,
informazione
posto di controllo e
riporto
rappresentante
rappresentante militare
nazionale
rimprovero
rappresaglia
richiesta, domanda
richiesta di concorso
aereo

fire r.
immediate fire r.

preplanned fire r.

**required operational
capability (ROC)**

**required supply rate
(ammo)**

requirement,

NATO basic military r.
(NBMR)

daily r.
intelligence r.
military r.
requisition,
rescue,

air search and r. (SAR)
r. coordination centre
(RCC)
research,

operational r.
r. of contact
reserve,
r. stocks
war r.
reserved circuit,
reserved route,
reservist,

residual,
r. nuclear radiation

to resist,
resistance,
centre of r.
discontinuous r.
organized r.
r. in place
temporary r.
resource,
local r.
respiratory,
r. affection

responsibility,
administrative r.

official r.
rest,
at r.
r. day
without r.
restless,
restricted,

NATO r.
r. area
restriction,

richiesta di fuoco
richiesta di fuoco
immediata
richiesta di fuoco
pianificata
capacità operativa
richiesta
tasso di rifornimento
necessario (munizioni)
esigenza, fabbisogno,
necessità
esigenze militari di base
della NATO
fabbisogno giornaliero
necessità informativa
necessità militare
requisizione
soccorso, aiuto,
salvataggio
ricerca e soccorso aereo
centro di coordinamento
del soccorso
ricerca, indagine,
inchiesta
ricerca operativa
ricerca del contatto
riserva
riserve di materiali
scorte di guerra
circuiti riservati
itinerario riservato
riservista, soldato della
riserva
residuo
radiazione nucleare
residua
resistere
resistenza
centro di resistenza
resistenza discontinua
resistenza organizzata
resistenza ad oltranza
resistenza temporanea
risorsa
risorsa locale
respiratorio
affezione alle vie
respiratorie
responsabilità
responsabilità
amministrativa
responsabilità d'ufficio
riposo, sosta, posa
in riposo
giorno di riposo
senza posa
senza riposo
riservato (classifica di
segretezza)
NATO riservato
area riservata
restrizione, limitazione

movement r.	limitazione di movimento	all-weather r. (class x)	itinerario tipo x (ogni tempo)
result,	risultato, esito	all-weather r. but with variable roadability (class y)	itinerario tipo y (ogni tempo a rendimento variabile)
mission r.	esito di una missione	cross-r.	strada trasversale, incrocio
r.s desired	risultati desiderati		strada a doppia corrente
resupply,	riifornimento successivo di materiali e mezzi		strada maestra
retaliation,	ritorsione	double-flow r.	itinerario tipo z (solo bel tempo)
retransmission,	ritrasmissione	high r.	strada a semplice corrente
automatic r.	ritrasmissione automatica	only fine weather r. (class z)	sbarramento stradale, posto di sbarramento
retreat,	ritirata	single-flow r.	capacità stradale (in veicoli) (VPH = Vehicles per hour = veicoli all'ora)
r. movement	movimento retrogrado		centro nodale
revellie,	sveglia	r. blow	incrocio stradale, nodo stradale
to sound the r.	suonare la sveglia	r. capacity	carta stradale
reverse,	inverso, opposto, contrario		lunghezza di un itinerario, profondità di una formazione in movimento
r. slope	pendio inverso	r. intersection	rendimento di una rotabile
r. slope defence	difesa su pendio inverso	r.-junction (RJ)	roccia
revetment,	rivestimento interno di una postazione o di un ricovero	r. map	roccia rotta
revision,	revisione	r. space	roccia vetrata
r. of documents	revisione di documenti		roccia vetrata
revolver,	rivoltella	roadability,	roccia buona
reward,	ricompensa, premio	rock,	arrampicata su roccia
ribbon,	nastrino	broken r.	tecnica dell'arrampicata
ricochet,	rimbalzo (di proiettile)	glazed r.	addestramento
rider,	cavaliere, viaggiatore	rotten r.	alpinistico
dispatch r.	porta ordini	sound r.	rocciatore
ridge	cresta, cima, linea di displuvio, dorsale	r. climbing	razzo
r. approach	movimento di avvicinamento in cresta (su dorsale)	r.-climbing technique	razzo libero
rifle,	fucile, cannone rigato	r.-climbing training	razzo teleguidato
automatic r.	fucile automatico	rock-climber,	razzo ad alto esplosivo
recoilless r. (gun)	cannone senza rinculo	rocket (rkt),	lanciarazzi
r. company	compagnia fucilieri	free r.	razzo fumogeno (nebbiogeno)
r. grenade	bomba da tromboncino	guided r.	bacchetta, asta
r. platoon	plotone fucilieri	high explosive r.	bacchetta nettatoia
self-loading r.	fucile semiautomatico	r. launcher	stadia
sniper's r.	fucile per tiratore scelto	smoke r.	roentgen (unità di misura di dose radioattiva)
spotting r.	fuciliere, tiratore	rod,	ruolo, parte
rifleman,	rigatura (di un'arma da fuoco).	cleaning r.	ruolo primario
rifling,	insurrezione, rivolta, sommossa	levelling r.	ruolo secondario
riot,	rischio	roentgen,	lista, ruolo
risk,	rischio nucleare	role,	lista di leva
nuclear r.	rischio nucleare	primary r.	ruolino
nuclear emergency r.	rischio nucleare d'emergenza	secondary r.	ruolino per l'appello
nuclear moderate r.	rischio nucleare moderato	roll,	stanza, camera, sala
nuclear negligible r.	rischio nucleare trascurabile	r. of enlisted men	sala rapporto
river,	fiume	r.-book	corpo di guardia
r. bank	argine di un fiume	muster r.	sala operatoria, sala chirurgica
r. basin	bacino fluviale	room,	
r. bed	alveo fluviale	briefing r.	
r. crossing	attraversamento di un fiume	guard r.	
road,	strada, rotabile, via	operating r.	

operating r. on trailer

operation r.

rope,

double r.

double r. descent

tow-r.

roster,

promotion r.

r. number

rotating band,

round, (rd)

adjusting r.

blank r.

complete r.

live r.

unfuzed r.

route,

air r.

alternate r.

controlled r.

evacuation r.

main supply r. (MSR)

regulated r.

reserved r.

r. of advance

r. of approach

sala operatoria su

rimorchio

sala operativa

corda

corda doppia

discesa a doppia corda

cavo per rimorchio

elenco, lista, ruolino

ruolo di promozione

numero d'ordine

secondo un elenco

corona di forzamento (di un proietto)

colpo (d'arma da fuoco)

colpo d'aggiustamento

colpo a salve

colpo completo

colpo con proiettile da guerra

proietto non spolettato

itinerario, percorso,

strada, via, asse

rotta aerea

itinerario di deviazione

itinerario vincolato

itinerario (asse) di

sgombero

asse principale dei

rifornimenti

itinerario regolato

itinerario riservato

itinerario di movimento

(di avanzata)

itinerario di

r. of communication

r. of withdrawal

r. where guides are

provided

signed r.

supervised r.

routine,

"ROUTINE",

r. duties

row,

mine r.

rudder,

vertical r.

rule,

r. for adjustment

r. for engaging targets

universal r.

rules of engagement

(ROE),

rumor,

runway,

r. alert

ruthless,

avvicinamento

via di comunicazione

itinerario di ripiegamento

itinerario con indicanti

itinerario con frecce

direzionali

itinerario sorvegliato

abitudine, consuetudine

ordinario (qualifica di

messaggi)

doveri (compiti) abituali

riga, fila

riga di grappoli di mine

timone

timone di direzione

(aeron.)

norma, regola

norme per

l'aggiustamento del tiro

norme per la condotta

del fuoco

regola generale, norma

generale

norme di ingaggio,

regole di

comportamento,

modalità d'azione

vociferazione, notizia

incontrollata


pista di atterraggio o di

involo

allarme aereo al suolo


senza pietà.





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DECORAZIONI



Napoli, Ordine di Francesco I, Croce Coronata in oro.



Guerra d'Africa, Medaglia della Campagna con le barre per le battaglie di Saati, Dogali, Cheren, Asmara.



Firenze, Leopoldo II, Ai combattenti del 1848.



Combattenti in terra di Francia, II Corpo d'Armata, 1917-18, Croce smaltata.



Napoli, Ordine Costantiniano di San Giorgio, Croce da Commendatore.

Collezione presentata alla mostra «Militaria in Europa».

DECORAZIONI



Firenze, Leopoldo II, Croce al Merito Civile.



Guerra di Crimea, Medaglia per la Campagna.



Guerra di Spagna, Medaglia d'Argento al Valor Militare concessa al capitano Alfredo Fanzini.



Parma, Ordine Costantiniano di San Giorgio, Croce Coronata.



Napoli, Ordine di San Gennaro, Croce.



Oriente balcanico, 1914-19, Croce smaltata.

Collezione presentata alla mostra «Militaria in Europa».


I SOLDATI DEL PRIMO TRICOLORE ITALIANO



Oltre 170 figurini, decine di illustrazioni, numerosi documenti dell'epoca arricchiscono il testo che, per la prima volta, descrive compiutamente le truppe delle Repubbliche cisalpina e ligure italiana nel periodo dal 1796 al 1804. Non c'è dubbio che i soldati cisalpini, i primi a seguire la bandiera dai tre fatidici colori verde, bianco e rosso, sono gli iniziatori del grande movimento risorgimentale italiano.

L'opera - realizzata su carta speciale e rilegata in tutta tela con sovracoperta a colori e con anello - racconta la loro storia così densa di eventi notevoli e tuttavia poco noti e si inquadra nell'ambito delle celebrazioni del bicentenario della rivoluzione francese.

RIVISTA MILITARE



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May 1917



*Carabinier fédéral
Genève 1828.*



*Carabinier 1851
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Numero 4/1990

Luglio-Agosto

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
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L'IMPORTANZA MILITARE
DELLO SPAZIO

Difesa e politica spaziale nazionale

CENTRO MILITARE DI STUDI STRATEGICI

**RIVISTA
MILITARE**

MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF SPACE

DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SPACE POLICY



The space perspective offers new openings also for the fulfilment of operational requirements for national Defence and security.

Particularly interesting are the space systems which ensure: telecommunications, electronic surveillance, telesurvey, navigations, presence of man in space.

The space national capability, research and industrial production, developed and by now established through national and international programs, are in a position to effectively answer the possible requirements for security and Defence.

ASI (Italian Space Agency), created to rationalize the management of the "civil space" and a suitably centered industrial structure represent the qualified counterparts to emphasize the national investments already made, also for A.D. (Defence Administration) purposes.



Experimental Aircraft Programme (EAP)



European Fighter Aircraft (EFA)

In particular, Industry, while appreciating the opportunity of participating to the French project HELIOS, is waiting for a decision on the further stages of Defence telecommunication satellite project-SICRAL, and on the study for a military observation satellite-SAMO.

The development of space activities for A.D. implies that it can operate with the necessary autonomy, both with specific financial allocations, and with own structures to handle planning and management.

Since the space obligations by A.D. are becoming more and more substantial, increasingly important becomes the fact of conferring the co-ordination of the strategic planning of all national space activities to a Body at inter-Ministry level, co-ordinated by the Prime Minister Cabinet.

INTRODUCTION

The Italian space activity in the civil sector has greatly developed during its 25 years of lifetime with an increase in involvement, in programs and capabilities. The implementation of the PSN (National Space Plan) has addressed research and industrial production to qualified scientific and technological developments and to more and more prestigious international cooperation.

The importance of the national situation is proved by the annual spending of around 800 billion, with

almost 4000 people employed in the industry; by the role in ESA (third place after France and Germany); by the technological diversification as well as by the obtained industrial structure.

The interest of A.D. to the space utilization is emphasized by an experimental launching project (ALPHA), by a continuity of programs for the S. MARCO launching-ground and launchings, by the definition of satellite SICRAL, by the participation to the French satellite HELIOS, by the preliminary study for a telesurvey satellite SAMO.

The present research confirms the attention devoted by A.D. to the potentials of space technology. It is meant to show, with regard of possible military requirements: the reply capabilities of research and industrial production; the internal organization requirements of A.D. and the cross-links with the other State Bodies; the possible inter-action between civil and military space production.

The research is structured and developed according to the "detailed plan" as per Encl. 1.


THE PRESENT SITUATION OF THE NATIONAL SPACE POLICY

The national space activity has always developed on two directions: national projects and international projects.

Among the former, the S. MARCO carried out by the Rome University together with the C.R.A. (Airspace Research Center) and with the co-operation of A.D.; SIRIO, undertaken by C.N.R. (National Council for Research) launched in 1977 and operational for a decade; the experimental launcher ALPHA of A.D. in the mid-'60s.

In 1979 CIPE decided on the first PSN (National Space Plan), entrusted to CNR, several times update and progressively reinforced (with a strong impulse since 1983). One must admit that this plan, although with many management problems, served the purpose of playing the role of support and incitement to the development of industrial capabilities and to their international qualification with the projects ITALSAT, IRIS, LAGEOS 2, TETHERED, SAX, etc.

Among the international projects, directly co-ordinated by the Ministry of Scientific and Technological Research Co-ordination (MRST) are: the participation to E.S.A. (European Space Agency), revamped in 1975 (after the events ELDO and ESRO) with the launcher ARIANE, the telecommunication, weather and scientific satellites, the SPACELAB. The Italian attendance has become more and more substantial and qualified up to the latest projects OLIMBUS (telecommunication), HIPPARCOS (astronomic satellite), ERS-1



Military Aircraft family



Tornado IDS and ADV

(telesurvey) and to the ongoing big projects: ARIANE 5, COLUMBUS, HERMES, DATA RELAY SATELLITE (DRS).

THE CO-OPERATION WITH THE U.S.

TETHERED, LAGEOS 2, the launch of IRIS from the SHUTTLE.

The management of the two activity lines in the civil sector has been lately consolidated into A.S.I. (Italian Space Agency) form which are expected: the overcoming of the financial and operational problems experienced by PSN; the unitary and organic establishment of the national and international activity.

Other interested Bodies are: the Post and Telecommunications Ministry (satellites for Radio/Tv broadcasting) and the Civil Welfare Ministry, the Environment Ministry and the Industry Ministry.

The amount of the space spending (1987) puts Italy at the sixth place worldwide and at the third in Europe (half of the French one, equal to the German, double of the English).

The allotment between national and international projects is at balance-point since 1984; it is on line with the German one, while France

keeps favouring the national projects with 60% of the civil space spending.

CHECK OF THE CAPABILITIES ACQUIRED BY THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE INDUSTRY IN THE SPACE SECTOR

The Italian space industry has by now overcome the development stage; it has showed to be able to carry autonomus, wide-range programs and to co-operate in a qualified way to the most important European projects and to some bilateral ones with the U.S.

In the commercial field, too, there are important achievements in the sale of sub-systems and apparatus. A good level of consolidation and rationalization has been achieved with the establishment of SELENIA-SPAZIO and of the GRUPPO SISTEMI SPAZIALI DI AERITALIA (1983), regarding respectively telecommunication and transportation systems, orbit infrastructures, scientific satellites; with the SNIA-BDP-Defence and Space Division, which carried out a key role in the space propulsion systems.

The three firms have consolidated into CISI (Italian Space Indus-

tries Consortium) for a co-ordination in the marketing and in the R & D sector.

ISC-LABEN and FIAR have acquired remarkable status in sub-systems and apparatus for PSN and ESA; FIAT-AVIAZIONE has become a considerable part of ARIANE 5 project (turbine-motor pumps) and other firms have specialized in important apparatus: MICROTECNICA, OFFICINE GALILEO, GTE, CONTRAVES, TELETTRA, DATAMAT, Ciset, GAVAZZI SPAZIO, etc.


The consortia ITALSPAZIO (AERITALIA, FIAR and LABEN) and TECNOSPAZIO (FIAT-COMAU and FIAR) represent a further proof of the industrial capability for co-ordination and consolidation.

OUTLINE OF SPACE POLICY IN THE MAIN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH REFERENCE TO DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES

The main European countries which pursue a space policy with important achievements are: France, West Germany, the U.K.



Harrier II GR5



Sea Harrier FRS 2 and EAP

At an over-national level, ESA is playing a key role.

Furthermore, also EEC and UEO show some interest.

France, having soon understood the strategic value of space activities, since the '50s has pursued an autonomous policy, a propelling role in Europe and open policy to international co-operation in every field.

The French Government channels the activities through a steering "Ministry Committee" and allocates funds.

Key center is the "Centre Nationale Etudes Spaciales" (CNES) (2000 employees, a budget of 6 billion FF).

The Defence Administration (a budget of 2 billion FF) is completely autonomous also with reference to the contracts. It makes use of the technical assistance of CNES, to which it sends its personnel for joint projects.

The military initiatives, strictly oriented to defensive roles, are carried out both with the loading of military "packages" on board of civil satellites (TELECOM, SPOT), and with specific systems, often resulted from the civil ones (HELIOS from SPOT).

Within General Staff for Defence, a "Space Systems Group" draws up a space plan for Defence, taking advantage of a "Military Space Co-ordination Group", divided into two sub-groups, one operational and the other technical.

Within General Staff Offices of the Armed Forces there are special

and specific operational structures particularly large in the Air Force.

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is active in the space since the '60s; it employs around 5000 people in the industry with a budget at the end of the '80s of about 1.5 billion DM, almost equitably divided between ESA and national projects.

The general political responsibility is given to MRT, Ministry of Research and Technology; a budget almost similar to the one of MRT is managed in parallel by the Post and Telecommunication Ministry.

To MRT support operates D.F.V.L.R., Government Body for Management of General Airspace Research, responsible for operational space centers, training centers, etc.

A Space Agency, established very recently, is responsible for the executive and contract management of the projects.

Up to now, FRG has only carried out civil space activities. Within the Defence Ministry there are no special structures for the space sector, even if special units work within the Defence and Air Force General Staff Offices.

One can notice, however, some increase in the interest for military space applications.

Great Britain (U.K.). It started with highly ambitious and self-sufficient objectives, then the U.K. went on with a discontinued space policy, particularly regarding the resources to allocate to the sector and the

preferential partner (USA, ESA).

Presently, despite remarkable success achieved in the scientific and application field, we can say that the U.K. does not pursue a definite space policy. After France, the U.K. is the European nation more inclined to space applications for Defence and national security.

Within A.D. have been established technical and operational structures for space projects, most likely meant for application in the field of telecommunication and telesurvey.

The European Space Agency (ESA). 16 Nations belong to ESA and they address and control its programs. Its aim is the promotion and development of space research and technology solely for pacific purposes. Its activity is presently geared on a long term plan based on a guideline established by the Conference of Rome in January 1985 and approved in 1987.


It is a fairly active structure, flexible and nonbureaucratic, where each country can express its potential through the flexibility of compulsory and optional projects.

Its limitations to commercial exploitation of the results and to the activity for Defence and European security are inborn in the differences of the participating countries.

The European Economic Community (EEC). EEC is interested in the space applications and has promot-



146 STA with Hawk 200



Land Rover armed patrol vehicle

ed technological research initiatives with reference also to the space agencies.

Western Europe Union (UEO). In 1987 it approved a note to take into consideration the start of a European military program to take advantage of the telecommunication, navigation, surveillance and reconnaissance satellites.

DEVELOPMENT AND PROJECTS OF THE SPACE POLICY IN THE CIVIL SECTOR

The main on - going national projects refer to three sectors: telecommunication (ITALSAT), scientific research (LAGEOS 2, TETHERED, SAX), propulsion (IRIS). They are in an advanced stage of realization with launches foreseen between 1990 and 1991, except for SAX.

Other national projects ensure the Italian presence in very interesting fields like: telesurvey, robotics, microgravity.

In the ESA participation, the latest most important projects are: OLYMPUS (telecommunication), HIPPARCOS (scientific), ERS-1 (telesurvey), ARIANE 4, platform EUREKA. Of essential importance in the medium-long term: the space station COLUMBUS (Italian quota

of 25%), ARIANE 5 (15%). The HERMES shuttle (13-15%), the DRS-DATA RELÉ SATELLITE (35-40%).

Other national activities, like the TV satellite SARIT and the one for Defence telecommunication SICRAL, are waiting for prompt decisions to a near start; the former so that Italy will not be left out of the market for ground equipments, the latter to emphasize and continue the experience acquired with ITALSAT.

In the definition of new future projects it will be necessary to pursue, with continuity, the support of the investments made so far, considering a balance point between national and international projects, also in relation with the relevant policies of France and Germany.

ESTABLISHMENT AND EVOLUTION OF A DEFENCE SPACE POLICY WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE RESULTS OBTAINABLE THROUGH SPACE VEHICLES

Despite the limits set up by international treaties signed also by Italy, the space dimension offers new perspectives for the fulfilment of operational requirements for

Defence and national security.

In particular, the most interesting space systems are considered those which ensure:


- telecommunication;
- telesurvey;
- navigation;
- the presence of man in space.

From an analysis of these space applications it comes out that the requirements of Defence and of national security can be met through:

- systems of great magnitude and means, to be employed in peacetime and to be achieved with a vast national and international support;
- systems of more limited size, costs and performance but of high operational validity in times of tension and/or crisis.

Both for the former and for the latter (even more extensively) it is absolutely necessary that, with time, A.D. reaches its own autonomy in the development and use of the systems themselves. In particular, it is necessary for A.D. to:

- increase and consolidate its capability to determine needs and requirements of space systems;
- acquire the capability both of managing its own satellites in orbit, and of allotting the resources the space systems offer;



Limpet exercise mine



Sea Skua

- incite, in the proper way, an international co-operation for the realization of launching-grounds open to the activities of interest to A.D.;
 - suggest the relevant topics to the Organizations in charge of the national policy in the sector, with special reference to the projects regarding vehicles suitable to match the military requirements.
- For this purpose, it is absolutely necessary:
- a presence of A.D. in the national forums in charge of space policy;
 - the definition of a Defence space policy and of a long term organic plan;
 - the establishment within A.D. of a unitary managing structure to deal with space problems.

OUTLINE OF A CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE IN THE DEFENCE SECTOR

Taken into account both the present structure of A.D. (provided for by DPR 1477/65), and the measures under way for the re-organization of central military structure, the basic steps regarding all applications of interest to A.D. are the following:

- definition of the operational requirements;
- definition of a general policy;
- definition of projects and objectives;
- development of projects;
- management of means coming

from the projects.

Since such steps apply to all relevant sectors and since most of the space applications can be equally and widely used by all Forces, it is possible to sketch the following organization structure of the space sector within A.D.:

- definition of operational requirements: General Staff Offices of the Armed Forces under the coordination of Defence General Staff to reach the best joint accomplishments;
- definition of sector policy: Chief of Defence General Staff (through Defence General Staff) within the global military policy of A.D.;
- definition of projects and objectives: Defence General Staff, with the power of the single Armed Forces to start autonomously anything regarded of specific and exclusive interest;
- development of projects: to be assigned to one Armed Force (best Air Force), or working groups with personnel of the three Armed Forces, guided by an "ad hoc" structure within Defence General Staff;
- management of the resources carried out by Defence General Staff through specific inter-force operational centers.

Downstream of this operational management structure for the space sector within A.D., there are the activities pertaining the military technical-administrative sector which do not refer solely to the con-

tracts, rather more specifically to initiatives on an international level as an introduction to promote a Defence space policy enlarged to a wider scenario, such as the European one.

GUIDELINES FOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL SPACE INDUSTRY AND FOR DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS

Activating and inciting the industry should not be conditioned by the adjustment of a new planning and management structure of A.D.


It is important to create a temporary organization to start, as quickly as possible, the major short-term projects and a dialogue Defence/Industry to establish the specifications and the technological feasibility of future systems.

In particular, it seems highly recommendable:

- the prompt start of project SICRAL, for the continuity of the team work by ITALSAT and for keeping the technological leadership that could be made void, for instance, by France;
- the continuation of SAMO study at a feasibility/definition stage, and of technological development in the sensors area, as well as the preliminary and following decisions on the start of a telesurvey project;
- the maximum utilization of the



Hawk 200



Hawk equipped with Sea Eagle missile

participation to HELIOS;

- the involvement of the industry in a study of medium systems for highly urgent operational missions in times of tension or crisis (satellite systems for telecommunication, navigation, reconnaissance and surveillance with related launchers at national level; launching-grounds; centers of operational management and their joint-activity with civil systems).

On the long term, it is meaningful for the industry to understand as soon as possible (for instance through assigned study) the interests of A.D. in the field of satellites, relays, SIGINT systems, manned stations, airrockets.

At the same time, technological research on specific A.D. topics should be considered important for the timely participation to new national and international projects (TLC, telesurvey, re-entry systems, microgravity - materials and life science).

POSSIBLE INTERACTION BETWEEN CIVIL AND MILITARY SPACE PROJECTS

The utilization of the possible positive interaction at all levels between civil and military space projects can have a favourable impact both on the utilization of economic, human and technological

resources and on management and services.

With reference to the operational requirements and to the kind of mission, we can have: military projects completely separated from the civil ones; military projects with participation of the civil sector; civil projects with the participation of A.D.

The solutions to the various options imply an exchange of information between A.D. and the civil sector on the plans, projects, technologies.

For the launchers at national level, there is a mutual interest, of low priority for A.D. in comparison to the one shown by the civil sector.

For the related launching-grounds, beside the political checking on the possibility of exploiting S. MARCO ground, because of A.D. needs, proper solutions appear complicated. For airrockets, even if on a long term, a co-ordination between civil and military sector can improve their planning and direct the nation's attitude.

A highly common policy is surely shown in the satellite systems for telecommunication, telesurvey, navigation, despite the specific difference in military requirements (mission; operational survival in hostile environment; no access to the broadcasted information by third parties).

Such coincidence and difference

can be found also at the sub-systems and components level to be relevant mainly in the electronic field, for scientific components for military applications using hardening and shielding technologies.

THE INTER-RELATION TO BE ACTIVATED NATIONWIDE AMONG THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENT BODIES TO ACCOMPLISH A UNITED, CONSISTENT AND SYNERGIC NATIONAL SPACE POLICY

The A.D. interest for space is often complementary or in common with the one of the civil sector, particularly in the field of telecommunication and territory survey.


In addition to the Ministry of Scientific and Technological Research (MRST) and to the Foreign Affairs Ministry already involved in ASI, the following Ministries are involved.

- Civil Welfare (telecommunication, telesurvey);
- Environment (telesurvey);
- Post & Telecommunication (TLC, radio/TV);
- Industry (space material production).

The Law establishing ASI does



Rapier



Laserfire

not provide for the possibility for ministerial activities other than of MRST and MAE to enter or affect ASI only through MRST.

The agreements provided for by the Law refer to a technical-scientific ground; in the case of A.D. one must keep in mind the need for operational autonomy and the existence of qualified structures.

The same intervention by CIPE expresses more an economic-financial content than a strategy addressing and control to be pursued in the decision-making of space activities.

In any case, there is the lack of a Body which, at a level of political responsibility, can process the lines of a national space strategy.

Duty of such Body should be to consolidate all initiatives into one plan, in order to avoid scattering and overlapping and, most of all, contradictions, also because of international implications. There is no argument on the decision-making and financial autonomy of each Ministry, but the risk that, in the present situation, the available resources might not be used for the best.

Only the creation of a specific

"Inter-Ministries Committee" could solve the problem.

The new Body, that could be named "Inter-Ministries Committee for the Co-ordination of Space Activities" (CICAS), should be established within the Prime Minister Cabinet and presided by the relevant Under-Secretary. It should be formed by the directly involved "dicasteri" (State Departments), at Ministers or Under-Secretaries level with a specific mandate: Research, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Civil Welfare, Environment, Post & Telecommunication, Industry.



Archer and Sea Wolf equipped Type 22 frigate




Vertical launch Sea Wolf



OTO MELARA

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LE IDEE DI
«DIFESA ALTERNATIVA»
ED IL RUOLO DELL'ITALIA

RIVISTA
MILITARE

ALTERNATIVE DEFENCE IN ITALY





The study is divided into four chapters

Chapter 1, the introduction, is composed of three sections.

Section 1 gives a brief outline of the study and describes the subjects dealt with in the various chapters. It also contains some information on the terminology ("defensive defence", etc.)

Section 2 explains why ideas of defensive defence have not enjoyed much currency to date. The main reasons are interrelated and seem to be of a historical and technological nature. The historical ones, include the experience of the Second World War (with the failure of the Maginot line and the decisive importance of tanks and bombers) and the somehow similar Arab-Israeli wars of 1956 and 1967. Technological reasons refer to the constant increase in destructive capacity (enhanced by nuclear weapons) and the development of delivery systems, such as long range missiles, that can hit any target in enemy territory, without there being any real possibility of defence. As a result, and quite apart from the potential use of nuclear weapons, strategic concepts that give much importance to offensive ground capabilities (Warsaw Pact) or the potential for mass destruction of enemy territory in the rear (NATO) have taken root within the two alliances in Europe.

Section 3 explains why naval forces, which are of considerable importance for Italy, have been excluded from this study on defensive defence. First of all, despite the destabilizing aspects of naval doctrine, activity and weapons that would suggest the usefulness of that kind of analysis, theoretical work has only just begun. Therefore, only a very general description could be given. Secondly, the possible application in the Mediterranean theatre of concepts of the kind seems to be absolutely premature from a political point of view, given the complexity of the situation, which cannot be simplified to a confrontation between the two military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact.



Chapter 2 entitled Review of ideas and concrete examples of "alternative defence" is divided into four sections.

Section 1 examines the ideas and models of those who can in a more or less strict sense, be considered advocates of defensive defence.

The general considerations of Clausewitz and, more recently, the theses of Liddell Hart are recalled. The Englishman claimed that defence had ensured itself a growing material advantage over offense in the last century and a half. The proposals made by the former German officer Von Bonin in the early fifties are also stated. Precursory of the defensive models for the German Federal Republic on the central front, they are based on the establishment of a fortified zone approximately 50 km wide along the entire length of the inter-German border.

Alternative models and ideas from the seventies are then outlined in chronological order. A brief summary by category is given below.

Discussion first centers on ideas

and concepts that are very critical of NATO strategy, such as those expressed by:

- the group of experts from the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, coordinated by the physicist Von Weizsäcker, who in 1971 opposed NATO nuclear strategy on the grounds that it was unstable;
- the Dane Boserup, who has theorized mutual defensive superiority — in which the adjective "defensive" refers more to the overall organization than to the weapon systems — as a condition for stability;
- the Alternative Defence Commission, close to the left of the English Labour Party, which worked out a security policy for Great Britain in the first half of the eighties that does away with the national and the extended American nuclear deterrent.

Defensive defence models that may be defined as "pure", in that they exclude all possibility of counterattack, are also described. These models (for the national defence of each author's country) have been conceived by:

- Brossolet (France), who puts emphasis on the objective of creating the conditions for conventional deterrence through non combat;
- Spannocchi, (Austria), whose model is partially derived from Brossolet's and is the basis for Austrian territorial defence;
- H. Afheldt, (German Federal Republic), who has worked out a model based on a large number of light infantry platoons (technocommandos) scattered throughout the territory of the FRG, that is presented as being consistent with a number of criteria that should guide security policy;
- Hannig, (FRG), who subsequently proposed two very technical models of static defence with the emphasis on long range fire.

Finally, models that may be defined as "intermediate" or "mixed" (some of which should be transitory) are discussed. Defensive systems and capabilities are predominant, but some kind of response or counterattack capability is not ruled out. They have all been worked out for

the defence of the Federal Republic by scholars from that country, such as: H. and E. Afheldt, whose model, unlike the one by H. Afheldt alone mentioned previously, calls for the deployment of mobile armoured units in the rear;

- General F. Uhle-Wettler, who advocates massive use of light infantry for combat on covered terrain;

- General J. Löser, who proposes a three-layer model;

- L. Unterseher and his study group (SAS), close to the SPD, whose model, reviewed a number of times and named "spider in the web" is meant as an alternative to NATO strategy. It provides for the capability of counterattack only in the territory of the Federal Republic;

- A. Von Bülow, whose proposals for restructuring of the Bundeswehr, somewhat more traditional than those of Unterseher, were almost integrally approved by the SPD in 1986;

- A. von Müller, also a scholar close to the SPD. His model is based on the concept of structural stability, seen as an improvement in, rather than an alternative to, NATO strategy and in keeping with the principle of forward defence (whose objective is not to give up territory).

The Bundeswehr is also interested in "attenuated" forms of defensive defence. It also stated in a document that "the incorporation of modules of reactive defence" into the NATO structure might help achieve "a significant improvement in advanced defence at acceptable costs".

The various political and military criteria that are common to all defensive defence models and have to be satisfied are summarized at the end of Section 1. The political criteria are:

- credibility with respect to the country's security needs;
- social acceptability;
- lowest cost compatible with security requirements;
- congruity with arms control and disarmament measures.

The military criteria are:

- deterrent capability, that is, conventional denial capability;

- superiority of defence capabilities over those of attack;

- stability in case of crisis;

- non-concentration and redundancy of targets, in order to do away with all incentives for "preemptive attacks";

- no ambiguity about the defensive nature of one's military instrument.

Section 2 describes the systems of territorial defence adopted by Switzerland, Yugoslavia and Austria.

The Swiss system is called total defence. It consists of four types of defence: military, civilian, economic and psychological. Military defence is based on an armed force made up mostly of reserve troops (625,000 men, equal to 97% of the total) that can be mobilized in 48 hours. The army is equipped with modern weapons, including the highest density of anti-aircraft missiles and artillery in Europe. The best troops (three field corps with mobile armoured units, and a mountain corps) are to defend the central area, while 17 independent brigades (with static characteristics) are to protect the borders. The Civil Defence Corps is responsible for civilian defence (health services, surveillance and alarm, bomb shelters), while economic defence (food, war industries and transportation) is coordinated by the Ministry of the Economy.

Yugoslavia's defensive system is also called total defence. It took on its present configuration in 1969, at the same time when the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) were being

organized by the different republics. The Yugoslavian People's Army (YPA), on the other hand, is organized by the state. The YPA consists of 210,000 men, of which 120,000 are conscripts. It is divided into 19 brigades, seven of which are armoured. Reserves that can be mobilized number 600,000 and the TDFs can count on approximately one million people. In case of aggression, the YPA would be charged with combat at the borders, with the objective of inflicting losses and gaining time for the mobilization of the TDFs. Afterward, the surviving forces of the YPA would unite with the TDF to continue an organized resistance inside the country. Thus, the break down of tasks between territorial forces and the heavier mobile units seems to be the opposite of the Swiss system.

Organization of defence in Austria is constrained by the Peace Treaty of 1955, in which the country committed itself to permanent neutrality and renounced the use of certain weapon systems (such as missiles). The army is much smaller than those of Switzerland and Yugoslavia: around 50,000 men and 200,000 reserves. The idea of total territorial defence was adopted in 1975 and translated into operational terms in 1983. The basic concept behind it, worked out by Spannocchi, is one of area defence related to the geographic characteristic of Austria, which is crossed by two East-West corridors. It is taken for granted that the lowland borders cannot be defend-



ed. Efforts are, therefore, concentrated on defence of certain key areas inside the country, where defence should be prolonged.

Section 3 reviews the debate on defensive defence as it has developed in recent years.

Debate on defensive defence outside of the FRG was almost nonexistent in the past. This is not completely true of some isolated "defensivist" concepts such as the role of light infantry, remote controlled precision weapons, barriers and fortifications, etc. In fact, one person who in the early seventies advocated the application by NATO of schemes similar to the "intermediate" models described was Brigadier General K. Hunt, the former vice director of HSS in London.

Despite the growing interest in recent years, critical analysis of ideas of defensive defence is still relatively scarce. It is generally restricted to American authors and scholars, who often approach the subject in the framework of the broader debate on ways to deal with the tendencies towards "conventionalization" of the military structures of the two blocs. Among those favourable to defensive defence are R. Forsberg and, in a less radical way, J.P. Holdren, who believe that a solution in-

volves the restructuring of the forces and doctrines of both sides, in such a way as to reduce the attacker's possible advantages. Others in favour of certain aspects of defensive defence (strengthening of defence, conventional stability, negotiated solutions), but not others (reductions of the capability of counterattack, unilateral measures) are the former ambassador to the MBFT negotiations, J. Dean, the Democratic Congressman, L. Aspin and the security expert, S.L. Canby. More or less radical critics include the Scot D. Gates, who for various reasons considered defensive defence ineffective, the American S.J. Flanagan who, with greater moderation, points out a number of difficulties and considers deterrence based on "denial" of victory alone insufficient, and General Rogers, former (1986) SACEUR of NATO, who thinks that the concept of defensive defence is full of fault, above all, the fact that it does not deter very much.

NATO has not taken an official stance on defensive defence. It has, however, in conjunction with the coming CFR negotiations in Vienna, increasingly put the emphasis on the concepts of stability — a stability which is threatened by the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in those weapon systems (tanks, artillery and armoured vehicles for troops transport) that can carry out large scale offensive operations and conquer and occupy territory. Once these imbalances have been reduced, states the ministerial communiqué of the NATO session held on 8-9 December 1988, it will be possible to look beyond towards a restructuring of the armed forces that improve defence capabilities while further reducing offensive capabilities.

In the last two or three years, various declarations have been made by the Warsaw Pact concerning the need to change military doctrine and the force structure. Perhaps the most important document is dated 28-29


May 1987 and calls for reductions to a level at which neither of the two sides has the means for a surprise attack, or more in general, for offensive operations, while maintaining its defensive capabilities. Similar positions were later assumed by other high-ranking Soviet military officers. In the autumn of 1987, Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, were even more explicit in asserting the principle of a reasonable defence sufficiency. The Jaruselsky Plan (8 May 1987) was based on analogous ideas. This evolution in the positions expressed by the Warsaw Pact has also been manifested in debates and exchanges of ideas with Western experts. Finally, of great importance was Gorbachev's announcement to the United Nations (8 December 1988) of significant unilateral reductions in the Soviet military machine, followed by similar decisions by various other allies of the USSR. The Soviet troops that remain in the Eastern European countries, Gorbachev announced, will be structured differently, with a reduction in tanks, making them clearly defensive.

Section 4 briefly touches on civilian-based defence. More specifically, it describes the ideas associated with the techniques of non-violent resistance and their application in the framework of national defence policies. Thus, views of a philosophical nature and/or originating in a radically different context from that of Europe, like Gandhi's, are excluded.

The ideas on which civilian-based defence are founded can be summarized as follows:

- defence is a matter which directly involves all citizens;
- the object of defence must be a country's values, freedom and institutions, not its territory.

One of the first theorists of civilian-based defence after the war was the Englishman S. King-Hall. In a book published in 1958, he maintained that resources should not be thrown out in the military field and attention concentrated, instead, on the political-ideological conflict. The





important thing is to keep up a competition "in civilization" during peace time and rely on civilian-based defence in case of invasion. King-Hall's thought already contained some of the conceptual cornerstones of civilian-based defence:

- rejection of nuclear deterrence;
- trust in the role of public opinion and the correlated confidence in the effectiveness of forms of dissent and noncollaboration;
- emphasis on preventive training in civilian-based defence;
- belief in its deterrent capabilities.

More recent works on civilian-based defence are by the American G. Sharp and the West German T. Ebert. They are characterized by an effort to bring civilian-based defence theories closer to the debate on defensive defence. Ebert, in particular, considers the two approaches at least temporarily reconcilable. Both emphasize the technical-defensive side to civilian-based defence, rather than its ideological-ethical side. Sharp underlines the deterrent effects of civilian-based

defence and the comparative advantages in case of war (no mass destruction).

Important scholars of international affairs such as T. Schelling and G. Kennan have also shown interest in civilian-based defence. In 1964, Schelling claimed that it could work and, in 1986, Kennan underlined its innovative nature.

The third chapter is on Relations between NATO strategy and defensive defence and is divided into seven sections.

Section 1 deals with some recent developments that could favour the future adoption of forms of defensive defence. The developments are:

- the new international climate, which has resulted in better East-West political relations, an important arms control agreement like the one on the elimination of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) (with a radical change in the Soviet stance on the acceptability of on site inspections), measures of partial unilateral reduction of weapons and troops by the USSR and its allies, and fi-

nally, a narrowing of the gap between the positions of the two alliance on the requirements for stability and security in Europe;

- a sharp increase in the cost of military procurements, due to increasing technological complexity. In fact, the cost per weapon system increases by 5-10% each year, a burden which is unbearable for all in the long run and provides a strong incentive for less military confrontation;
- the new possibilities which technology offers defence. Although technological progress has been made in all fields (and, therefore, also in offensive capabilities), the cost effectiveness of last generations anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems is outstanding;
- the crisis in the current NATO strategy. A brief history follows of NATO strategy, which, despite changes, has always been largely based on the nuclear guarantee of the United States. At present it is based on flexible response and advanced defence, two concepts that have been the object of increasing

criticism: the first, because of its lack of credibility and the danger of nuclear escalation, which would presumably be disastrous for all; the second because of the risk of instability in case of crisis, given the close confrontation of heavily armed forces;

- the debate on the conventional forces balance on the central front. Underlying NATO strategy, with its accent on the possible use of nuclear weapons, has always been an assumed inferiority in the conventional field. This assessment, essentially based on certain numerical comparisons, is now being questioned by various Western scholars, who underline the importance of some qualitative factors which seem to favour NATO: the performance of many weapon systems (in particular, aircraft), technology, unit readiness, training, reliability of allies, economic-industrial potential. Some experts have even used dynamic analysis of quantitative force relations, to back their questioning of the alleged rapid break-through capability of Warsaw Pact forces. Less pessimistic estimates of NATO military capabilities support the possibility of change.

Section 2 examines the relation between equilibrium and stability, a central concept in defensive defence.

A military situation that reduces the possibility of conflict to a minimum in a given international political framework depends more on

structural stability, a condition which exists when the capabilities and the opportunities for defence prevail over those of offense, than on classic forces parity (which, among other things, can only be measured and computed using inadequate quantitative parameters). If there are obvious advantages for the attacker, the situation is tendentially unstable and may become dangerous in case of crisis, even when a perfect balance between the forces in the field exists. If an attack seems counter-productive, stability is substantially assured, even if there is a certain disparity in forces.

Applying these ideas to the balance of forces between the two alliances in Europe, it may be stated that:

- a surprise attack seems most unlikely, even from a strictly military point of view; in this sense, the present situation can be considered sufficiently stable;
- stability is greatly reduced in the

event of serious crisis between the East and the West. The present forces structure may act as an incentive to preemptive attacks;

- the adoption by the two alliances of military systems in keeping with the ideas of defensive defence should bring this second kind of instability down to a minimum.

Section 3 compares the flexible response doctrine with the ideas of defensive defence.


A brief examination follows of the deterrent principles of flexible response, which calls for credible reaction capabilities suited to various kinds of conflict. Three main possibilities are provided for:

- direct defence, which is meant to prevent the enemy from prevailing, keeping the level of conflict constant, whatever it is;
- deliberate escalation (nuclear or not), with the transition to a different and/or higher level of warfare, as is most convenient;
- general nuclear war, which is not generally theorized as a choice, but as an extreme response to a global attack by the enemy.

Comparison of current NATO strategy with the ideas of defensive defence reveals elements of compatibility and incompatibility. The general principle of deterrence and the idea of the need to be able to implement a credible and effective defence are compatible. However, defensive defence excludes the concepts of punitive deterrence and deliberate nuclear escalation, or offensive response or destruction of enemy territory, in general.

Section 4 touches on the relation between the concepts of defensive defence and the role of nuclear weapons (in particular, the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe).

In theory, the principles of defensive defence are in contrast with all weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, etc). Of the various models, some are more radical and call for the abolition of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Others are more vague, allowing for a reduced number of TNWs, at least in the





medium term, with an exclusively deterrent role against the enemy's first use.

The "defensivist" also have different views on the present stage, which could be a transition period. One view is that no serious steps towards defensive defence can be taken unless the role and the quantity of TNWs are immediately and clearly reduced. Another maintains that the difficulties should not be increased by linking conventional stability and nuclear disarmament too strictly. A serious improvement in the conditions of conventional stability will subsequently facilitate a reduction in nuclear systems.

Section 5 deals with the prospects of a transition towards the principles of defensive defence. This transition could be carried out by means of unilateral initiative or in the framework of East-West negotiations for the reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

The transition to defensive

defence was initially conceived of as a unilateral choice. Recently, however, the possibility has emerged of the necessary transformations being negotiated by the two alliances, which have officially declared their intent to pursue greater conventional stability. This does not mean that the unilateral approach is not valid. A number of unilateral measures, in terms of strengthening of defence, would meet with consensus because they are advantageous in any case (for example, the strengthening of "static" defenses). However, such measures should not be of a purely "supplementary" nature, as that would aggravate costs.

If the transition to defensive defence were pursued wholeheartedly by only one of the two alliances, undoubtedly many objections would take on more weight. A defensive defence structure confronted by an enemy with considerable offensive forces can be accused of:

- being predictable in its response in case of attack;

- being unable to regain lost territory (in the systems provided for by "pure" models);

- "sanctuarizing" enemy territory. The overall effect would be a reduction in deterrent power. For NATO, this would also involve difficult problems of restructuring and redeployment of allied troops, especially American troops in Germany. One argument in favour of the unilateral approach to defensive defence is the political advantages, which advocates of that approach claim are greater than the possible military risks and disadvantages.

A bilateral transition to defensive defence would eliminate any counter-arguments based on asymmetries favouring the enemy with offensive capabilities. The only remaining option would be the possible use of offensive or counter-offensive forces against third countries, a controversial subject behind the setting up of Rapid Intervention Forces. Regardless of whether the

approach is unilateral or bilateral, "methodological" or "philosophical" objections to defensive defence are often raised. It is maintained that the distinction between the term defensive and offensive is more dubious than the "defensivists" claim and that, in any case, the "systemic" effectiveness of defensive models is neither convincing nor easily demonstrated. Finally, the adoption of defensive defence schemes implies renouncing the classic objective of "victory".

With the approach of the CFE negotiations on conventional forces in Vienna, some negotiating proposals based on defensive defence have been made. The proposals described are by the West Germans A. von Bülow and H. Funk, by the West German A. Müller and the Pole A. Karkoszka, and by the American J. Dean. They have various points in common:

- a plan for implementation in successive stages;
- a final symmetry in the force levels of NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- a division into zones of different levels of demilitarization and denuclearization;
- a final reduction in offensive ground weapons (tanks, artillery, etc.) to approximately half of the current number possessed by NATO;
- no limits to the strengthening of clearly defensive systems. In view of the CFE negotiations, Ebenhausen, the center for political and strategic analysis close to West German official spheres and NATO, has also worked out a series of proposals for restructuring of NATO forces along "mixed" defensive defence lines. NATO is more cautious. In its proposals worked out at the end of 1988, it only calls for a reduction of offensive ground systems to common levels (for example, 20,000 tanks), just below its current potential. It does, however, hope that the armed forces will be restructured to improve their defensive capability and further reduce their offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact outlined a three-stage plan in 1988:

- exchange of information and elimination of imbalances;
- reduction of troops to approximately 500,000 men;
- further cuts and "defensivist" restructuring.

It subsequently (October 1988) proposed new and more restrictive confidence building measures. Finally, in May 1989, the USSR announced the common limits to be achieved in reduction (by 1997) of the most important weapon systems. These limits are quite similar to those of NATO, except for the inclusion of aircraft and helicopters. In any case, the initial unilateral approach to defensive defence is now shifting to a negotiated one. The idea of defensive superiority is much more convincing when it is reciprocal, that is, when it becomes mutual defensive superiority, a concept that can be associated to the more political term, common security, in that it represents its natural military dimension.

The Vienna negotiations could become the fulcrum of a process of

transition in both blocs towards defensive defence. A number of obstacles are predictable:

- the complexity of negotiating among 23 countries;
 - the possible controversies on the political as well as military role of American and Soviet forces in central Europe;
 - the problems of achievement of a stable military equilibrium, given structural asymmetries;
 - the complex relation between conventional forces and nuclear weapons;
 - questions linked to verification.
- Yet, the common points mentioned earlier in the proposals by Bülow-Funk, Müller-Karkoszka and Dean could provide the conditions for making the negotiations propulsive in this direction. Maximum openness in dealing with controversial problems (aircraft, nuclear weapons, verifications) is needed; discussion must finally include questions addressing the future, such as those relative to the naval sector. From the point of view of defensive defence, other goals are also important, such as possible agreements on limitation of productions of certain weapon systems, extension and reinforcement of confidence building measures, the establishment of a permanent NATO-Warsaw Pact center for crisis management and, finally, regular discussion and consultations among highranking military and political exponents of the two alliance on all subjects connected with security and defence.

Section 6 discusses the prospects for reduction or elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Europe, that is, nuclear, and more briefly, chemical weapons. As far as the former are concerned, there is good reason to believe that their importance is diminishing, not only for political (the concerns of public opinion) but also for technical-military reasons (the low credibility of the scenarios for nuclear escalation). This means that the relative importance of conventional weapons will increase. But the outcome will not necessarily be univocal: besides the





theories of the “defensivists”, there are opposing currents of thought (the “offensivists”) who feel that conventional systems will have to take over the functions of nuclear weapons, providing forms of punitive deterrence with the prospect for the enemy of serious losses and damage.

A list then follows of the different kinds of nuclear weapons found in Europe today:

- tactical nuclear weapons owned totally by the United States;
- tactical nuclear systems with American warheads and delivery systems belonging to the European NATO allies;
- tactical and strategic nuclear systems belonging to Great Britain and France;
- tactical nuclear systems owned wholly by the Soviet Union;
- tactical nuclear systems with Soviet warheads and delivery systems owned by the European Warsaw Pact allies (there is some doubt about the last case). An estimate of the number of tactical nuclear warheads of the two alliances is also provided: approximately 4500 nuclear warheads for NATO and around 4800 for the Warsaw Pact (the second estimate is much more questionable).

Mention is made of the decision

of the Atlantic Alliance at Montebello (October 1983) to reduce NATO tactical nuclear warheads by 1400 (they numbered around 6000 at the time) and modernize the remaining systems. Historical divergencies within NATO on tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) are then retraced: the United States has always tried to assure Europe, yet kept its own nuclear options flexible. The Federal Republic of Germany has sought an American nuclear guarantee, while minimizing the risk of war (conventional and nuclear) on its territory. The positions of France and Great Britain stand aside. Both have independent nuclear capabilities, but their histories are very different. The former pulled out of NATO in 1966, with a declaredly independent policy, which now tends to emphasize the elements in common with the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. The latter is traditionally close to the United States. After the agreement on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF), “modernization” of the Lance missiles, provided for by the Montebello accords, has split NATO into countries in favour of modernization (in particular the United States and Great Britain) and those (in particular, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium,

Norway and Italy) inclined to render it superfluous through further negotiation with the Warsaw Pact for the reduction of ground-based nuclear missiles with a range of less than 500 km as well. The division is not rigid and compromise solutions are possible. While the USSR seems to be in favour of reduction/elimination of all nuclear missiles and, more generally, of all TNWs in Europe, it has nevertheless accepted the exclusion of nuclear weapons from the mandate for the CFE negotiations.

The proposals for denuclearization (partial or total) of different areas in Europe are then described:

- the proposal formulated by the Palme Commission in 1982 for the creation in central Europe of a 300 km wide corridor (150 km on each side) free of nuclear weapons;
- the proposal to create a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in northern Europe, including Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland; the proposal to set up a NWFZ in the Balkans, including Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

As for the prospects for the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, the political difficulties (lack of a negotiating site, limits on unilateral

initiatives) and technical problems (verifications — a complex problem that can be resolved through on site — inspections) are pointed out. It can reasonably be assumed that there will be no sensational developments in the near future. The situation could change considerably in the medium to long term, but every significant reduction in TNWs will be implemented in parallel with strategic and organizational revision of the two alliances. The different significance of the priority reduction/elimination of different tactical nuclear systems, such as artillery, missiles with a range of less than 500 km, or attack aircraft, is briefly mentioned. In fact, no NATO country currently seems to be willing to eliminate attack aircraft. Finally, complex forms of partial denuclearization may politically be the most likely kinds of reductions in central Europe. At the moment, NATO is explicitly against the setting up of nuclear weapon free corridors or zones. Outside of central Europe, the creation of a NWFZ in northern Europe would not meet with particular difficulties and would depend on the political will to do it. It would de jure sanction the state of non-possession of nuclear weapons which has de facto always existed in the countries in question. An NWFZ extended to the Balkans is very unlikely today, due to the presence of American nuclear weapons in Greece and, above all, in Turkey.

The most important negotiations on chemical weapons are the multilateral ones calling for a total ban (CW Convention), that is, not just on their use, which is already prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, but also their development, production and possession. Proposals have been made for the setting up of chemical weapon free zones (CWFZ):

- the most important concerns Central Europe (the CWFZ would include the FRG, the GDR and Czechoslovakia);
- another involves the Balkans.

The prospects for agreement on the CW Convention are better than



in the past. This is due to the positive developments in East-West relations and the fact that the complex problems on verification of the agreements can be resolved more easily than in the past, since the Soviet Union is more willing to accept intrusive on-site checks. Despite this improved overall picture, it should not be forgotten, though, that some Third World countries seem to oppose chemical disarmament unless it is linked to nuclear disarmament (at least in the Middle East). While the setting up of CWFZs would be superfluous if the CW Convention goes through, in the event that an agreement on the latter is delayed, the proposal for a CWFZ in central Europe could return to the limelight, especially if the Social Democrat Party (SPD) returns to power.

Section 7 outlines a possible role for Italy in promoting a transition to a more stable order in Europe, based on the idea of defensive defence. Until not long ago, there was little discussion of defence problems in Italy, because of sharply opposing political positions for or against NATO. The situation has changed in recent years, both because the leftist opposition no longer opposes Italy's membership in NATO and

because the change in the international climate has fostered debate on new East-West relations, on security, on a defence model and on the role that Italy can play.

Italy could play an active part in promoting a transition to the concepts of defensive defence in various ways:

- by promoting the adoption within NATO of doctrines congruent with the criteria of defensive defence;
- by supporting at the CFE negotiating table proposals in keeping with this approach such as those mentioned above;
- by working for a regional plan for partial demilitarization (using confidence building measures) together with Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary. A plan of this kind would come up against technical difficulties (the neutral status of Austria, etc) and would not have much credibility politically if it were implemented independently by Italy, outside of the framework of the Atlantic Alliance;
- by debating within the Atlantic Alliance the possibility of transforming the Italian defence system as a kind of pilot experiment. The military industry would, consequently, require restructuring according to the new requirements.



The fourth chapter, entitled *Alternative models for Italian land and air forces*, is divided into six sections.

Section 1 examines the balance of forces in the conventional field on the northeastern front and the threat Italy has to cope with.

On the northeastern front, as elsewhere, assessing the balance of forces means measuring "capability" rather than evaluating "intentions". Given its structure and organization — 77,000 men, to be reduced to 68,000, with a medium to low level of operational readiness — the Hungarian army would only be able to contribute minimally to a possible attack against Italy. On the other hand, the forces of the Soviet Union stationed in Hungary have a good level of operational readiness (category I). They are made up of 2 armoured divisions and 2 motorized

divisions, with a total of 65,000 men and 1200 tanks. By 1990, however, one armoured division (with 10,400 men and 450 tanks) will be withdrawn. If required, eight other armoured divisions with a medium level of operational readiness (category II) and eight motorized divisions with a low level of operational readiness (category III), all now stationed in the Kiev district, can be brought in. But that would mean subtracting these forces from use on the central front: in fact, the hypothesis of use against Italy is part of a "worst case analysis", in which pessimistic and improbable hypotheses are deliberately considered. In any case, lack of knowledge of how the Warsaw Pact would divide its troops along the various fronts is a fundamental limit to any regional analysis of balance of forces. In order to reach Italy, Warsaw Pact armies would have to cross

Austria or Yugoslavia. They would presumably come up against some resistance in Austria, but the greatest obstacle is the Alps and the few mountain passes, all well suited to defence. Crossing Yugoslavia would be even more dangerous for an attacker, given the Yugoslavian defence system. The hypothesis that Yugoslavia would offer no resistance or actually support the attackers cannot be ruled out, but it seems quite unlikely and incongruous with Yugoslavia's history, especially after 1949. Besides the Alpine passes, which can easily be defended, the only real route for entry is the Gorizia Gap. An attacker breaking through there would not, however, be able to count on the advantage of the factor of surprise.

The Italian army has a total of 1200 tanks and the air force a total of 400 combat aircraft. The costs of

procurement have increased remarkably, both in absolute and percentage terms, since the mid-seventies, when a ten-year modernization plan was approved (which was later partly postponed). As a result, the army forces are now almost totally motorized, even if deficiencies limiting efficiency persist. Besides 5 Alpine brigades, Italy has deployed 9 armoured and motorized brigades, all its missile forces and the majority of its anti-aircraft forces in the north-eastern region: 130,000 men in all, equal to about two thirds of the army's operational units.

The difficulties in regional comparisons have already been mentioned. This is especially true for air forces: the forces deployed in Italy are certainly superior to those deployed in Hungary (but, given the mobility of aircraft, the comparison loses meaning). For ground forces, a general assessment can be made using the ADE, that is, the equivalent of the force of one standardized division, as a unit of measure (also used by the United States Department of Defense). It is estimated that Soviet forces in Hungary equal approximately 3 ADEs, Hungarian forces about 1 and Italian forces 2.5. Although in favour of the Warsaw Pact, the balance of force is not alarming and will further decrease (approaching parity) with the completion of the Soviet Union's and Hungary's plans for reduction. These conclusions are confirmed by analysis of the geographic factors and the force-space ratio. Obligated to pass through the Gorizia Gap, no more than a certain number of attacking troops can be built up, and the number of Italian units seems to be sufficient to prevent a breakthrough and momentous advance. Of course, in the event of prolonged conflict, changes in the balance of forces would depend on the calling up of reserves and it is difficult to predict how many units the Soviets could move to the Italian front. Given the number of Italian reserves, the superiority of the Warsaw Pact should not reach dangerous levels. Many analysts feel that a prolonged con-

flict would generally not be to the advantage of the Soviet Union. On the whole, the present balance of conventional forces seems compatible with marked cuts in Italian troops and armaments, provided analogous measures are taken by the Warsaw Pact.

Section 2 illustrated those aspects of the Italian military apparatus (weapons and doctrine) that could be perceived by the Warsaw Pact and neighbouring countries as having offensive potential or being threatening.



The elimination, total or partial, of weapons that are potentially threatening in an offensive sense would promote greater stability (in particular, in case of crisis). Among the systems of this type are the Tornados and the F-16s (the latter owned by the U.S. Air Force), which are dual capable — nuclear and conventional — fighter bombers. Among their priority missions is counteraviation, that is, in depth attack to destroy enemy aviation and relative infrastructures on the ground. Fighter bombers of this kind (belonging to both the alliances) could, in time of crisis, be both the instrument and the target of a preemptive attack, aimed at acquiring decisive superiority in the air. They, thus, constitute an element of instability. In considering a possible restructuring in a defensive sense of the air forces of both sides, possible measures to

decrease vulnerability, increase the alarm and defence capabilities, and reduce the offensive potential are of particular interest. Another problem of this kind, mainly involving the security of the neighbouring countries, concerns the role of Italian ground forces. Official documents maintain a certain ambiguity about the hypothesis of bombing foreign artillery outside of national borders in case of an imminent attack. Some experts have spoken of the possible emergency "predeployment" of Italian units in Yugoslavia and

Austria.

Section 3 summarizes the past debate in Italy on the best defence model for the country and, in particular, the ideas on territorial defence.

In the fifties and sixties, Italy had an operational doctrine and a structure of forces based on much infantry and a few armoured units in rear positions. With the restructuring undertaken in 1975 and the new publications on doctrine of the 800 and 900 series, infantry was markedly reduced and motorized and armoured units deployed in positions close to the borders. Opposition to these transformations was principally of a military (greater dependence on nuclear weapons, the disadvantages of a more shallow defence) and economic (greater costs) nature. Debate was mainly confined to the Armed Forces. Critics emphasized the pos-



sibilities of forms of territorial defence that would integrate forward defence or, in case of occupation, could be transformed to carry out organized guerrilla operations to undermine the enemy. To that end, locally recruited light infantry units were proposed. A military transformation for Alpine troops was also suggested, replacing heavy artillery with light anti-tank and anti-helicopter weapons, while improving the logistic organization and the systems of communication and surveillance. In this debate, comparisons with other countries that had (totally or partially) adopted forms of territorial defence were made, but they were inconclusive because of the differences in Italy's geostrategic position. The main argument against territorial defence was its presumed

incompatibility with NATO strategy. In the seventies, emphasis was often put on the link between territorial defence and a new system of regional conscription, with draftees stationed not far from home. Albeit for different reasons (efficiency, costs and social acceptability), the debate on conscription has become topical once again and may encourage a rethinking of the Italian defense model.

In Section 4 two models of restructuring of the Italian armed forces according to the principles of defensive defence are given as examples.

Unilateral restructuring of the Italian armed forces is politically unthinkable. However, the situation would be quite different if NATO as a whole were to embrace alternative solutions of this kind. One

hypothesis, based on agreements between the two alliances, would be regional transformations in an at least partially defensive direction, involving the northeastern area of Italy and Hungary and supported by Austria and Yugoslavia.

Going into a little more detail, a model for the Italian armed forces of in-depth defence, similar to the one worked out by Horst Afheldt, is described. It is emphasized that this is obviously not a proposal, but only a preliminary contribution to debate, and that some of the characteristics of the model imply radical changes. The model assumes that the area to be defended is the Triveneto (40,000 sq km, of which around 40% impervious). The plain area would be protected by territorial forces, made up of a large number

(1600) of small static platoons of 20 men (technocommandos) with an anti-tank role and other small units with various roles (missile artillery, aerial defence, engineers and communications). A total of just over 60,000 men. Great importance would be given to technologically advanced light weapons (anti-tank missiles, mobile and/or remote controlled mines, sensors, remotely piloted vehicles, etc.), the information and communication network, ground preparations and the setting up of obstacles. Aircraft would have to be based in well protected airports set well back and have a limited range of action, with air and close air defence missions. The role of the Alpine troops would also be enhanced.

A less extreme and more realistic hypothesis for the transformation of the Italian defence model is more similar to the "two component" or "intermediate" or "mixed" models worked out for Germany. North-eastern Italy would be divided into two zones for defence:

- one friction zone, consisting of the Friuli-Veneto corridor, which extends from the eastern border to the Brenta River. It would be protected by light infantry units for a total of not more than 25,000 men, charged with delaying and "channeling" the enemy attack;
- a rear manoeuvre zone, in which armoured and motorized units, smaller than the current ones, would be stationed in peace time. In case of attack, they would block the enemy offensive and counterattack to regain lost ground.

Both these hypotheses are compatible with a leaner Italian army. More in general, compensations between quantitative reductions and qualitative improvements seem possible. A predominantly professional army with a large nucleus of long-term volunteers is one idea. This would call for abolition of conscription or at least a substantial reduction of its length. A choice of this kind would also be a solution to the problems posed by the demographic drop and the resulting decrease in

the number of draftees.

Section 5 briefly touches upon some hypotheses for total or partial withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Italy.

The first nuclear weapons were brought into Italy in 1956. There has always been much less information available on these matters in Italy than in other Western countries. The significant data come from independent experts and not from official sources. It seems that the total number of American nuclear weapons in Italy is approximately 500. The distinction between nuclear warheads that can be used with Italian launchers and those that can be used with American delivery vehicles is important in terms of control: only in the first case is the "dual key" provision effective. That is, only in that case can Italy really prevent the use of the weapon.

Arguments in favour of the withdrawal of short range nuclear weapons (nuclear projectiles and Lance missiles) from Italy seem more convincing than those for their withdrawal from NATO as a whole. In fact, on the one hand, an attack against Italy would have to do without the surprise factor, on the other hand, nuclear warheads would necessarily end up on Austrian, Yugoslavian or Italian territory. For other nuclear systems (air or naval) in Italy, the general considerations made previously (political and/or military, for or against) with respect to tactical nuclear weapons hold true. Denuclearization measures, such as the reduction or elimination of certain categories of weapons or their elimination in certain areas, can be envisaged for Italy, too. In any case, it is of the utmost importance that a different organization of defence be worked out together with NATO for the implementation in parallel with the restructuring of the Warsaw Pact forces.

Section 6 outlines the possible meaning and roles of concepts of civilian defence in Italy.

In Italy, the application of the concepts of civilian defence has always been seen from two distinct


points of view: as an integration of military defence or as an alternative to it.

In military spheres, the subject is generally divided into two sectors. Most attention has been directed to "civil defence", generally considered to be the protection of the civilian population during the emergencies of war, but also to "civilian defence", taken to be the protection of the social, economic and political structures of the country attacked or invaded. This has led to a set of proposals for a structure of overall national defence with strong links between civilian and military sectors of society. From a concrete point of view, however, the results have been meagre, except for the growing commitment of the armed forces during rescue operations following natural catastrophes.

Non-violent and anti-militaristic groups have a totally different attitude to civilian defence, which is divided between genuinely popular defence and defence delegated to the military. Conceptual elaborations have often favoured the more radical authors. In this way, however, specific discussion of the comparative effectiveness of civilian and military defence has been overshadowed by ethical considerations and emphasis on links with social struggles, shifting the enemy to be combatted from a hypothetical foreign invader to a hypothetical authoritarian domestic power.

In considering a transformation of the Italian defence model, the concept of civilian defence (in the sense of an active role for civilians during a conflict) could be of interest in the urban areas in the Triveneto region, if military defence were considered too costly in terms of civilian victims. But this idea requires further study; the problems and negative aspects (social acceptability, psychosis of war, etc.) must be thoroughly weighed. Some Italian advocates of civilian defence have proposed that Italy should promote through the UN the establishment of essentially unarmed international peace brigades charged with peace keeping.

Un'opera dalle pregevoli caratteristiche grafiche e tipografiche sull'arte epica nei musei, nelle gallerie e nei palazzi romani.



PRESENTAZIONE DI
GIOVANNI SPADOLINI

**UNA NUOVA GRANDE
INIZIATIVA CULTURALE DELLA
RIVISTA MILITARE**

SIMULATION PATTERNS FOR ARMAMENTS CONTROL

Rapporto di ricerca del
Centro Militare di Studi Strategici

LA POLICY SCIENCE NEL CONTROLLO DEGLI ARMAMENTI

Una rassegna critica delle
applicazioni matematiche
allo studio dei conflitti

**RIVISTA
MILITARE**



Aim of the research is to present a critical outline of the main analytic and simulation patterns for armaments control, as well as an evaluation of their applicability to the study of the effects of alternative proposals for conventional armaments control in Europe (CST) on the Italian military position. The research focused on:

- analytic and simulation methods to evaluate forces;
- patterns applicable to conventional land and air forces for ground support;
- European scenario, with special reference to Central Europe (NGA aerea) and to North-East Italy.

The research emphasized three problems connected with simulation:

- static analysis of forces (problems of the empirical indicators of conventional forces);
- dynamic analysis of forces (friction patterns);
- political-strategic simulation methods at scenario level.

Together with the study there is an application of two options for friction patterns with reference to the force ratios on the Italian North-East front. These applications are meant to show the effects of supposed options on force ratios.

FORCE INDICATORS

The problem of military force indicators of a country and of alliances of opposite countries is preliminary to any analysis and evaluation of the force ratios themselves, be it static or dynamic. There are 4 groups of problems with reference to the military force indicators:


- the problem of which countries of the two alliances to count on in a specific scenario. For instance, in the case of NGA there is the problem of including or not France and Denmark on the NATO side and of the political reliability of minor allies of the Warsaw Pact.

In the case of the Italian front there is the problem of Yugoslavia, in addition to the possible employment of Czechoslovak and Rumanian forces;

- the problem of which forces, of these same countries, to number in a specific scenario. For instance, in NGA area there is the problem whether including or not the West-German Army, and that of how to count the divisions not of Category 1 of the Warsaw Pact. Similar problems there are on the Italian front for the Warsaw Pact forces, while for Italian forces there is the problem of the actual combat forces;
- the problem of how to count these forces. This is a specific problem of the most proper indicators to supply an estimate of the military force of the two sides to allow a comparison. The research presents two kinds of indicators:
 - simple or one-dimensional indicators, like the number of men in the army, the number of units (expressed in divisions-equivalent), the number of combat soldiers;

• compound or multi-dimensional indicators, which combine estimates of firing power, of mobility and precision of the different arm systems of a division, expressing them in comparable units of measure, like the Armored Division Equivalent (ADE), the Fire-Power Unit (FPU) and the Heavy Division Equivalent (HDE). These indicators are used to compare forces on the scenario of Central Europe (NGA) and on that of North-East Italy;

- the problem of when these forces can be used on the battlefield. This is the problem of force mobilization on the spot and of the arrival of forces out of the area. The research looks into the most frequent assumptions taken from the relevant literature on the times for mobilization and arrival of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. These assumptions are applied to study the static force ratios on the Italian front related to the "build-up curves" of the forces of the two fronts, expressed according to different indicators.




Data Elaboration Nucleus

EVALUATION OF FORCE RATIOS

The research indicates three basic methods to evaluate opposite forces:

- **edge ratios.** The forces of the two sides are compared and the result is compared to different "edge ratios" which are generally held important in a conflict. Typical edge ratio is 3:1 between attacker and defender, beyond which one deems the attacker in a position to get such a superiority to grant him break-through in specific areas of the front. The edge ratios represent the most typical expression of the so-called "static analysis" of forces, in which from an evaluation of the inputs of a conflict one can predict the result of the conflict itself;
- **patterns of force friction.** Contrary to the static analysis, in the dy-



Informative System of the Managing Director's Office of the Army Officers

dynamic one the result of the conflict results from a simplified reconstruction of the interaction between opposite forces. This simplified reconstruction is generally based on a series of equations aimed at reproducing the interaction between two opposite forces. Two are the patterns (or better, the pattern groups) examined in this research. On one side the group of Lanchester equations, from the starting ones - linear and quadratic - up to its extensions, deterministic and probabilistic; on the other, the adaptive pattern of Epstein. The Lanchester quadratic equation, in the Kaufmann version, and the Epstein adaptive pattern have been then applied to the case of the Italian North-East front, to show the effect of different assumptions regarding the course of the battle, at equal input, on the result. The patterns of force friction represent the "hard core" of any more complex simulation pattern;

- **simulation patterns.** The simulation patterns tend to reconstruct in a more detailed way than a friction pattern a military fight, either at battalion, division, army corps or scenario level. The research emphasized some different alternative patterns, generally at scenario lev-

el, showing, where possible, also the major results of studies carried out on the base of these relevant patterns for the problem of arms control. The main considered patterns are:

- the systems dynamics;
- the STATE II of Shape Technical Center;
- the VECTOR II of Vector Research Inc.;
- the CORDEF - Corps DEFence Model of National Research Defence Organization;
- the BASIS of Huber and others;
- the CEM of Concepts Analysis Agency;
- the Rand Strategic Assessment System (RSAS) of Rand Co.

For each of these patterns there is an abridged presentation of their frame philosophy and their main applications in the arms control. Special attention was devoted to RSAS, which, unlike all other patterns, enables an integration between the political dimension with the strategic-military one.

CONCLUSION

The main conclusions of the research are the following:

- there is no pattern, already estab-

lished by other research centers or institutes, which can be "imported" and straightaway adapted to the requirements of political-strategic simulation in Italy. On one side, only few patterns explicitly consider the European South front (but for its naval component), and on the other even fewer are those patterns which consolidate naval, air and land forces in an explicit way. In the long-run perspective, the most suitable pattern to the requirements for political-strategic planning and evaluation is the one which enables the conduct consolidation of the three Armed Forces, in a geographic area being centered on the South side, but which considers also the other two NATO sectors;

- there are some patterns that, more than others, help to meet the requirements of political-strategic simulation in Italy, and which can be profitably used in the short term. Among these there is the pattern produced by Rand Co., of which has lately come out a simpler version and which enables the study of the conduct of different decision-makers other than the US and USSR;
- the implementation of these patterns implies in any case:
 - a researchers team to work full time at its construction, in close contact with the Armed Forces;
 - a joint and political-strategic approach (which represents the novelty item with regard to the already remarkable Italian experience in the area of sector simulations);
 - a functional liaison with similar, more advanced foreign experiences;
 - the establishment of an accurate and reliable data base, preferably in the form of comparable multi-dimensional indicators to supply the vital input of the pattern.

I SOLDATI DEL PRIMO TRICOLORE ITALIANO



Oltre 170 figurini, decine di illustrazioni, numerosi documenti dell'epoca arricchiscono il testo che, per la prima volta, descrive compiutamente le truppe delle Repubbliche cisalpina ed italiana nel periodo dal 1796 al 1804. Non c'è dubbio che i soldati cisalpini, i primi a seguire la bandiera dai tre fatidici colori verde, bianco e rosso, sono gli iniziatori del grande movimento risorgimentale italiano.

L'opera - realizzata su carta speciale e rilegata in tutta tela con sovracoperta a colori e cofanetto - racconta la loro storia così densa di eventi notevoli e tuttavia poco noti e si inquadra nell'ambito delle celebrazioni del bicentenario della rivoluzione francese.

RIVISTA MILITARE

Gibe

THE MILITARY CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

MISSION AND STRUCTURE

Art. 1

The Military Center for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) carries out studies and researches on strategic, political and military matters; develops the cooperation among the Armed Forces and Italian and foreign Universities and Research Centers, as well as other Ministries and Institutions involved in studies in the security and defence sectors; fosters

the specialization of young Italian researchers; publishes the most important studies.

Art. 2

The Scientific Committee (C.S.), the Board of Directors (C.D.) and the Executive Committee (C.E.) are in charge of the Center's activities.

Art. 3

The Scientific Committee

gives directions for the Center's activities, defines the study subjects, and sets the appropriate guidelines for the analysis and evaluation of the chosen issues.

The Members of the Scientific Committee are:

- the Minister of Defence (Chairman);
- the Defence Chief of General Staff (Vice Chairman);
- the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs;
- the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces;
- the Secretary General/NAD of the Ministry of Defence;
- the Chairman of the Higher Council of the Armed Forces;
- the President of the Center for High Studies on Defence (CASD);
- experts appointed by the Minister of Defence, as needed.

The Director of the Military Center for Strategic Studies acts as Secretary of the Committee.

The Scientific Committee meets at least once a year.

The research requests are formulated by:

- the Minister of Defence;
- the Chief of General Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces;
- the Secretary General/NAD of the Ministry of Defence.

The priority schedule of the subjects defined by the Scientific Committee is set by the Minister of Defence.

Art. 4

In accordance to the directions given by the Scientific Committee, the Board of Directors defines the Center's yearly activities, approves the programs and the financial ceil-



ing of each research proposed by the Director of the Center; moreover, it approves the choice of research directors, and coordinates and monitors the Center's whole activity.

The Members of the Board of Directors are:

- the President of CASD (Chairman);
- the Deputy Chiefs of General Staff and of Armed Forces;
- the Deputy SG/NAD of the Ministry of Defence;
- the Chief of Cabinet for the Minister of Defence;
- the Diplomatic Counsellor for the Minister of Defence;
- the Director of CeMiSS.

Art. 5

The Executive Committee (C.E.) develops the program of each research, approves the detailed programs and the budgets of the researches proposed by each director of research and decides on studies acceptance and the possible issuance of penalties in case of non-fulfilment of contract clauses.

The Members of the Executive Committee are:

- the Director of CeMiSS;
- three Deputy Directors of CeMiSS;
- the Secretary of CeMiSS.

Art. 6

The office of Director of CeMiSS is held by a Major General (or equivalent rank) appointed by the Minister of Defence, upon the nomination of the Chief of General Staff.

The Director submits the programs of researches to the C.D.; he is responsible for their implementation and for the financial management of the Center.

The structure of the Military Center for Strategic Studies are issued through orders by the Chief of General Staff.

CeMiSS makes use of the logistic

and administrative support and of the data-bank of the CASD.

Art. 7

The Military Center for Strategic Studies carries out researches employing its own staff, the staff active at the CASD, military and civilian experts from other Ministries, temporarily appointed or otherwise authorized to work on researches at CeMiSS.

Finally utilizes civilian or specialized Research Centers experts and researchers from Italy and, upon authorization by the Minister of Defence, from abroad.

Special research contracts are entered into with the above-mentioned staff members and institutions

according to the currently legislation.

Special conditions are applied in order to provide incentives for the cooperation of young researchers.

Art. 8

The «Operating Rules» of the Military Center for Strategic Studies are issued by the Chief of General Staff, following the approval of the Minister of Defence.

Art. 9

This decree by the Minister of Defence substitutes and abrogates the previous decree, issued on June 26, 1987.

Rome, 20 June 1989



OPERATING RULES

Art. 1 – Activity of the CeMiSS

The Military Center for Strategic Studies carries out researches on strategic, political and military matters.

Furthermore, it develops the cooperation among the Armed Forces, the Universities and Italian and foreign Research Centers as well as the other Ministries and Institutions operating in the defence and security sector. It fosters the specialization of young Italian researchers. It publishes the most important studies.

Art. 2 – Collegial Organs

The activities of the CeMiSS are led by the Scientific Committee (C.S.), the Board of Directors (C.D.)

and the Executive Committee (C.E.).

The C.S. carries out its functions by issuing dispositions and directions that are defined in the collegial meetings held at least annually.

For those meetings to be valid a presence of the 2/3 is required.

The C.D. meets periodically to examine the progress of researches or in relation to the needs, upon decision by the President of the CASD. In case of absence of the President of the CASD the meeting of the Board of Directors is presided by the Deputy Chief of General Staff.

The members of the Board of Directors appoint their substitutes.

The deliberations of the Board of Directors are expressed by the simple majority and are valid with

the presence of at least the 2/3 of the members or their substitutes. The tasks of secretariate of the Board of Directors are performed by the CeMiSS.

The C.E. approves the detailed research projects and the financial budgets prepared by the research directors, within the ceilings set by the Board of Directors, and it decides on studies and researches acceptance, on their settlement and the issuance of penalties when needed.

The Executive Committee of CeMiSS is composed by the Director, the Deputy Directors and the Secretary of the CeMiSS. It expresses its deliberation unanimously. The CeMiSS secretary's office is secretariate to the Executive Committee.

Art. 3 – The Direction of CeMiSS

The Direction of CeMiSS is composed by a Director, three Deputy Directors and has a secretariate.

The Director proposes the programs of studies and researches to the Board of Directors and is responsible for their implementation.

The Deputy Directors of the CeMiSS are Brigadier Generals, or equivalent rank, one for each Armed Force.

They assist the Director of the CeMiSS in the accomplishment of the activities and are responsible for each research project.

The secretariate supervises the functional and organizational activities of the CeMiSS. It manages the coordination of the logistic and administrative support supplied by the CASD, the preparation of the draft conventions with the researchers, the support of young graduating students who are interested in strategic-military topics, the cooperation with the CASD for the updating of its data-bank, and the editorial activities of the Center.

The secretariate is integrated with a group of conscripts assigned to the Center because of their studi-



es in strategic-military matters, accomplished in Italy or abroad.

Art. 4 – Type of researches

There are three types of researches implemented by the CeMiSS:

- those implemented on its own by the CeMiSS with the partial part-time participation of the CASD students, officers or civil staff of the Defence temporarily appointed to the CeMiSS (internal researches);
- those ordered by the CeMiSS to military or civil personnel of the Ministry of Defence qualified in the matter, that participates in the researches outside the ordinary service and the normal tasks (researches within the Defence);
- those assigned to external cooperators, generally single researchers and eventually institutes, individually or with the constitution of «ad hoc» research groups headed by a research director (external researches).

Foreign researchers can participate to the researches, upon the authorization by the Minister of Defence who also authorizes the joint activity of the CeMiSS with the corresponding foreign institutes.

The requesting authority of the research has to design a «contact point» responsible for the verification, together with the direction of CeMiSS, of the correspondence of the research to the goals to be reached and for the supply of the needed documentation.

Each General Staff, the General Secretariate, the Cabinet of the Minister of Defence can appoint their representatives both to follow the progress of the work and to participate actively in the concerned research groups.

Art. 5 – CeMiSS internal researches

They are implemented with the resources of CeMiSS and CASD, and when needed also with staff of the Defence, appointed «ad

hoc» to the CeMiSS for a specific research project.

Such researches do not lead to any compensation and are approved by the President of the CASD under proposal of the Director of CeMiSS.

Art. 6 – Researches within the Defence

The researches ordered to military and civil personnel of the Ministry of Defence, outside their normal task and schedule, give to the Ministry of Defence the right of priority in the publishing of researches.

Independently from their publishing, the above mentioned researches generate a compensation which size is determined, for each single case, by the Executive Com-

mittee of the Center and is approved by the President of the CASD.


In determining the compensation both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of researches will be considered.

The evaluation will be expressed through a special report.

Such researches are approved by the Board of Directors upon proposal of the Director of the Center.

Art. 7 – External researches

The external collaborations are ruled by special contracts of research prepared by the Secretariate of CeMiSS and signed with the single researchers or with the concerned Institutes by the CASD administrative department, under authorization and approval, according to the law.



Art. 8 – Diffusion of the studies

The completed studies and researches are sent to the requesting authority and to the members of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff accompanied by:

- short syntheses (15-20 pages);
- policy papers (2-3 pages);
- proposals of further diffusion.

Art. 9 – Papers

The Board of Directors (C.D) determines the deadline for the presentation by the Director of the Center of a paper on the progress of the researches.

At the end of the annual cycle of activities the Board of Directors

sends a final paper to the Scientific Committee.

Art. 10 – External cooperation on Study and research

In order to fulfil its tasks, the CeMiSS utilizes the external cooperation of single military researchers with the prerequisites mentioned in the following art. 16.

It can also utilize the cooperation of Italian Institutes and specialized Centers. The cooperations are temporarily limited to the reaching of the contract fulfilment.

The results of the researches made by the CeMiSS become property of the Ministry of Defence and can be published upon propo-

sal of the Director of CeMiSS and approval of the President of CASD. With the above mentioned procedure, CeMiSS can obtain the copyright of studies considered interesting for the Defence. Particularly theses and doctorate researches.

The cooperation of University professors and personnel of other Ministries is ruled by the law.

The cooperations outside the Ministry of Defence are implemented only in case the research cannot be fully executed within CeMiSS (with CASD support) or with the personnel of the Ministry of Defence.

Art. 11 – Special Appointments

For special scientific and organizational needs in highly specialized sectors, the CeMiSS, upon approval by the Minister of Defence, following the proposal of the Director and agreement of the Board of Directors, can assign special studies to University professors and personnel outside the Public Administration with a particular knowledge in the specific sectors of interest. Those cooperators should fulfil the requirements stated in the following art. 16.

Art. 12 – Utilization of the personnel of other Departments

For the fulfilment of specific tasks of scientific and organizational consulting (data-bank, library, etc.) personnel from other Ministries can be utilized temporarily. This personnel should fulfil the requirements stated in the following art. 16. This personnel receives compensations and allowances – when needed – according to the law. The Ministry of Defence also pays the expenses for activities away from the normal station.

The Ministry of Defence keeps the right to buy the intellectual property and copyright of the works, following the same regulations of the military magazines and the Histori-



cal Bureau of the Armed Forces.

The utilization of personnel from other Departments should be approved by the Minister of Defence.

Art. 13 – Guidelines for the implementation of external cooperations

The cooperation of external researchers is made through the constitution of temporary special research groups with the participation of civilians, and are under the responsibility, for the coordination of the activities, of a research Director.

Considering the specific knowledge and expertise in the field, the CeMiSS can request the execution of some researches to University Centers or to Italian private specialized Institutes, that will have to agree upon the names of the researchers that will participate in the studies.

The documents and material, which are not available in the CASD library and must be bought for the studies, become property of the library at the end of the study. The Ministry of Defence acquires the copyright of the results of the research and may proceed to the publishing, making the modifications considered necessary for secrecy or opportunity. This decisions are taken generally with the consulting of the Director of the research or the single researchers.

The external researchers may, when considered necessary by the Director of CeMiSS and according to the security regulations, have access to classified information to be consulted at the Center for Classified Information of the CASD.

Art. 14 – The implementation of external cooperations

The activities to reach a contract that rules the external cooperation is composed by three successive phases: the choice of the researcher or the researchers (institute/institutes), the compilation of the detailed program of the research and the de-

finition of the research contract.

Whenever it would not be possible or effective to implement a research within the Defence, the Director of the CeMiSS proposes to the Board of Directors the researcher or the researchers (institute/institutes) to whom assign the researches, documenting the reasons for his choice. Following the approval by the Board of Directors, the Director of CeMiSS asks to whom it may concern (more than one group in case of competitive projects among which to choose one) the detailed program of research, stating objectives, timing and – when needed – procedures.

The detailed program is, in a second time, evaluated by the Direc-

tor of CeMiSS and has to pass the approval of the Executive Committee with the proposal of a draft research contract.

In case of an interdisciplinary research group, the responsibility of the detailed program bears on the director of the research. With the same procedure the CeMiSS can request financing for specific researches to the National Research Council (CNR) and to the Ministry of Education according to the law.

The CeMiSS must follow the status of the researches, also through periodical papers on the progress of work, in order to control that they are finalized to the objectives of the requesting authority.

The Director of CeMiSS can,



upon approval of the Board of Directors, suspend or dismiss the research contract in case of non-fulfilment of the contract clauses. The suspension or dismissal is enforceable until a date, stated in the contract, corresponding generally to the two thirds of the time forecasted for the research.

Art. 15 – Incentives to the cooperation of young researchers

Following the specific knowledge and referring to the particular needs, the external cooperations can be assigned to young graduates whose thesis of graduation, specialization or research doctorate, is con-

nected with strategical or military problems, in order to incentivate in Italy the study of strategic-military matters.

The participation of young researchers is generally within interdisciplinary research groups and it is incentivated by the Director of CeMiSS in agreement with the director of research.

Art. 16 – Evaluation of the academic titles of the external cooperators

An external cooperation has to be evaluated by the Board of Directors following the proposal of the Director of CeMiSS, and then as-

signed to researchers and specialized institutes, according to the following parameters:

- experience in General Staffs, War College, Government Departments or International Organizations, with managing functions connected to the specific field of research;
- teaching activity in military or civil institutes at University or post-University levels;
- academic titles (Bachelor, Master, Doctorate) granted in Italy or abroad;
- qualifications granted at specialized Italian or foreign Institutes;
- cooperation with the Ministry of Defence in studies on strategic-military matters;
- publications (thesis included; reviews, news and articles excluded). For the evaluation only publications of the last five years are considered;
- full time cooperations with magazines or newspapers concerning strategic-military problems;
- researches on strategic-military matters, made or in progress, with the financing of NATO, CNR, Ministry of Education or with other financing from the other Ministries, research institutes or foundations, Italian or foreign;
- particularly nationally or internationally important academic publications on non strategic-military matters.

The comparative evaluation of such requirements has to consider mainly the scientific production of the last five years, keeping what has been stated in the last paragraph of the preceeding Art.13 about the incentives to young researchers, who are chosen mainly for the quality of their thesis and the specialization courses taken in Italy and abroad.

Art. 17 – Files of the academic activity of the researchers and of the Italian institutes specialized in strategic-military researches

For the sole purpose of the assignation of the external cooperations the CeMiSS provides for the constitution and the periodical updating



of a file listing the activities and of the academic titles of possible (military and civil) cooperators and specialized research institutes that have or may have cooperation relations with the CeMiSS.

The same file is kept for the foreign researchers and research institutes.

The data-bank is composed of individual notes compiled by the single military and civil researchers and by the specialized Research Institutes that utilize special forms set by the CeMiSS Direction.

The researchers and the specialized Research Institutes are invited by the Director of CeMiSS, also through requests published on military magazines, to compile a note for the evaluation of possible future cooperations.

The subscription of the note implies the engagement to its periodical updating, with a particular atten-



tion on new scientific publications.

Any cooperation relation with the CeMiSS is reported officially on the note.


Art. 18 — Note content

The note has to state — apart from the anagraphic data — the indication of the academic titles provided for in the preceeding art. 17, and, for the research institutes, a copy of the statute, the list of positions and the fulltime cooperators, the programs of the researches in progress or in project, and a short paper that illustrates the research activities implemented since the constitution of the Institute.

Both the individual researchers and the Research Institutes must indicate on the note one or more principal interest and specialization fields among the following:

- strategic theory;
- international relations and security policy;
- political-military relations, organization of the Armed Forces and giuridical problems of the Defence;
- military sociology;
- structure and operational doctrine of Italian and foreign Armed Forces;
- industrial armaments of the Defence;
- economy of the Defence;
- other fields of military interest.





THE THREAT TO NATO CONTINUES



A thought we hear with increasing frequency is that NATO may no longer need deploy foreign troops on the soil of other countries — particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany. It has even been suggested that the overseas garrisoning of such troops for the past forty-four years has been too long. History, however, shows that this is a relatively short period of time when compared with our Roman experience. Indeed, the Romans were with us for at least 200 years. In fact, many of them discovered that they quite liked the place and, therefore, settled there. In much the same way over the last forty-four years, a number of foreign officers have also adjusted to living in Central Europe. Like the Romans, some might even be reluctant to be recalled home! I would like to ask them to stay here — and not go back.

It is not over yet, because the “threat” continues — albeit in a possibly new form! The problem is that nobody is absolutely clear about the new nature of that threat. The Soviet Union is still in a tremendous state of flux. Who can say at this time exactly where Perestroika and Glasnost may lead? Fresh situations, as yet unforeseen, may arise over time. Soviet military policy could

quite rapidly reassume its traditionally aggressive and expansionist guise. What then would be Gorbachev's chances of success? Again, no one really knows that they will be. The problem is too complex and involves too many factors that are not clear to us — or to the Russian themselves for that matter.

Current Soviet Policy and the threats to Gorbachev's position


Where do *we think* the danger to

Gorbachev might come from? It is probably not from the Soviet Military. They certainly seem satisfied with him. For example, although Akhromeyev may no longer be Chief of Defence, he apparently continues to have just as important a job as advisor to the Soviet leader. On a recent visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, it was obvious that Gorbachev was paying particular attention to what Akhromeyev said. Thus, Akhromeyev is probably quite pleased about his new position. In another instance, I recently heard a talk by General Lushev, Commander in Chief of the Joint Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, at the Royal United Service Institution in London. He gave no hint of dissatisfaction either with Gorbachev's performance. Therefore, we should probably look elsewhere to find potential dangers to Gorbachev.

Mikhail Gorbachev is a product of his system. He is linked to his past and his past is linked to him. Already

at the 26th party Congress in 1983, Andropov — the Soviet leader and former head of the KGB — hinted that changes might be needed. As he was dying, Andropov supported Gorbachev as his successor because he was confident that the system would be safe in Gorbachev's hands! Like all others before them, the last two Soviet leaders owe much to the system. After all, it elevated them to the supreme power. Perestroika would probably have occurred anyway — even without the charismatic Gorbachev! I have read "Perestroika — New thinking for our Country and the World"; not just the Foreword, but all three other parts as well. After reading this book, I do not understand why people maintain that Gorbachev is basically anything other than a Leninist. He may be prepared to support considerable structural and economic changes in Soviet society. Yet, as a product of the Soviet communist system, he is in no way willing to consider reducing the crucial, central and dominating role of the Communist Party in Russia. His central dilemma stems from the fact that fundamental and far-reaching reforms to the Soviet system are essential *but* must reduce the power of the Party in order to be effective. Therefore, they are almost impossible to achieve.

On 7 December 1988, Mr. Gorbachev announced the first batch of his latest arms control intentions! He stated his plan to cut back the Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000, to withdraw six divisions from Eastern Europe and to remove 5,000 tanks. Yet, we must by no means accept such unilateral reductions as an alternative to a properly negotiated and verified treaty. One day after Gorbachev announced his proposals at the United Nations, NATO presented its own proposals. The difference was that Gorbachev had declared unilateral reductions — which could not be checked — while our proposals were for an initial negotiating position which would be assured by treaty and thereafter veri-



Renault VAB three-axled armoured car

fied. (At least, Gorbachev is moving in the right direction!) In essence, we suggested asymmetric reductions down to 20,000 tanks on each side. We proposed that there should be a total of 40,000 tanks from the Atlantic to the Urals area. No single nation should be allowed to possess more than 30 percent or 12,000 of these 40,000 tanks, to avoid domination by one. In addition, armoured personnel carriers and artillery were to be reduced in similar proportions. Now, Gorbachev seems to be accepting the logic of our proposals and to be coming in our direction. I am sure he wants to reach agreement with us and that is the way we should go. Again, progress in arms control requires properly negotiated agreements that are verifiable — not unilateral, unnegotiated gestures.

Gorbachev certainly intends to cut his defence budget — if he ever can discover its real cost! A few years ago, the CIA and DIA were involved in a friendly dispute over exactly what the Soviets spent on defence. They could not accept each other's figures. Now, it seems that estimates were wrong — they were far too low! Within a period of nine months, Gorbachev has revised his assessment of Soviet defence expenditure *upwards* by three to four times! Even so, has he got it right yet? The previous German Defence Minister, Dr. Scholz, once asked Soviet Defence Minister Yazov how much a Soviet tank cost. Azov replied that it was very difficult to give an answer since so many accounting and management divisions were involved during its production. The system was so complex that no final amount could be computed. If that is the case, how can the level of a Soviet defence budget ever be assessed?

Nonetheless, Gorbachev has declared his intention to reduce his defence budget from about 17 to 14 percent of the GNP, and I am sure he means it! Yet, even at 14 percent, the Soviet percentage of GNP allocated to defence is still more than twice the U.S. percentage! In Brussels recently, Professor Feldbrugge

«Mangusta» A-129 fighting helicopter



— NATO Sovietologist in Residence — stated his belief that Gorbachev desperately needs money to be released from the defence budget and even more! To get such resources, he must radically change the way Soviet society is organized economically. I also believe that the entire Soviet leadership realizes that something fundamental must occur. It is not just Gorbachev! Mr. Gorbachev enjoys Politburo support because they understand that whoever is in power would have to act that way. No doubt Andropov himself would be talking of Perestroika and Glasnost today — if he were still alive and the Soviet leader! Thus, the near bankruptcy of the Soviet Union is a crucial determinant of current Soviet policy — probably far more than the personality of any one individual man.

However I have no doubts that Gorbachev is a courageous and far-

sighted leader. For example, he must be brave to allow a member of the Brezhnev family to go to trial. Also, Gorbachev's position will become increasingly dangerous unless he can deliver on the economy. Thus, economic success or failure will most likely determine his longevity in office. It is not Western military power that presents the greatest danger to Gorbachev but, rather, sub-standard living. Failure to appease Soviet expectations in this area will undoubtedly have an impact on his long-term future. There lies the biggest threat to Gorbachev's position as a leader.

The Soviet Union now officially admits that it produces 2,000 tanks annually. Gorbachev has been in power for just over four years; so, according to this figure, a total of 8,000 new tanks have been produced during that time. France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Repub-

lic of Germany have a *combined* existing tank force of just over 75 percent of that number, or about 6,300! Actually, NATO thinks that Soviet figures are wrong again. The Alliance evaluates current Soviet tank production at over 3,000 per year. As to aircraft production, I have heard that international air shows display M-29 with price tags in dollars! Perhaps then, some of this Soviet excess production is for export? Soviet products sell! They may not be as sophisticated as some Western equipment but they sell — maybe because their buyers do not want extremely sophisticated weapons! This may partially explain apparent Soviet over-production in armaments, but it is certainly not the full reason!

It was only five or six years ago that the Brezhnev era ended. The Brezhnev administration presided over the biggest build-up of Soviet Weaponry since World War II. This build-up of armaments and force is now admitted openly by the Soviets.

Yet, no one in the West can explain with certainty why it occurred. I doubt that the Soviets know either. Because of the Brezhnev expansionist years, even a reduction of 500,000 troops — as announced by Gorbachev on 7 December 1988 — will still keep Soviet troop levels as high as they were in 1982. Reductions of that kind certainly reflect, in part, a Soviet desire to modernize and streamline forces. Russian military officers are probably very much in favour of leaner, meaner and more professional armed forces. Such notions normally appeal to any professional officer corps! Thus, this may be another reason why Gorbachev retains the support of his military. He might be doing exactly what they want him to do!

It is sometimes said that NATO is losing public support. This is probably not quite right! What the Alliance is really doing is losing the public relations battle. We *do* have the best arms control proposals — and yet, we *don't* get credit for them. Our proposals just do not seem very "sexy" to our publics — principally because *we* make them! On the other hand, when Gorbachev makes such proposals, or proposals that are very close to or even inspired by our own, he receives tremendous coverage and credit from the Western press. After NATO came out with its arms control proposals on 8 December 1988, was it not interesting that the paper that possibly gave them the best welcome was "Pravda"? They were not as well covered or received in the Western media. I am unsure about what we can do to rectify this, but I do feel we should put maximum effort into publicly explaining why we take the positions that we do.

NATO strategy for the future

At this point, I want to return to our strategy. What are our future intentions? Do we want to continue our current strategy of war prevention — not just nuclear but conventional? Is it still our aim to defend

and then restore deterrence if peacetime deterrence fails? At a recent Summit, our political leaders answered these questions. They once again endorsed Flexible Response and Forward Defence because they believe that this strategy remains valid and entirely workable. However, Flexible Response and Forward Defence call for means that are totally different from those required to simply "slog out" a war. If we are still trying to prevent war, though, I am absolutely convinced that it cannot be done without a well-supported nuclear element. This element must also be credible at every level. It was General Maxwell Taylor who, in his book "The Uncertain Trumpet", first expressed in the early 1960s the following idea (that remains true): we must clearly demonstrate to the other side that we are fully prepared to deter at all levels and in all circumstances.

At the moment, the "wheel of history" may indeed be turning again, but we will still need to keep all our capabilities. Thus, I find impossible to predict how we can negotiate on SNF until we have first agreed on how the Vienna negotiations will affect the strength and deployment of conventional forces. Only after we know what the future size, shape and location of conventional forces on both sides will be can we decide exactly how to proceed on SNF matters. Nonetheless, I am quite clear that the Alliance really did need the leadership President Bush exercised on 2 May, 1989. The Bush package of arms control proposals was appealing to all sides. On the one hand, these proposals let nations that benefited from them accept the package without loss of face; on the other, they caused nations who may not have particularly liked them to agree — because they were difficult to reject. For example, the reduction of U.S. troops in Europe from 305,000 to 275,000 was an excellent signal to Congress. It was also an excellent signal to Gorbachev — especially since it conceded on the matter of including aircraft in the negoti-



M/113 truck with armoured turret with 25 mm four-barrel machine gun

ations. However it was certainly *not* a signal to other Alliance members — to suggest that unilateral national arms reductions were acceptable. This would be a big mistake.

As Secretary of State Baker said, a time scale of six to twelve months is *optimistic*, but is *not unrealistic*. Everyone wants an agreement to happen and it should be achievable. I am also pleased that we found a way ahead on Standard Nuclear Forces (SNF). But, as Mrs. Thatcher herself stressed, “partial” is not “zero”. SNF weapons cannot be abandoned. We still need them in the future as part of our strategy. The Bush package, now a full-blown NATO proposal as well, was timed perfectly. That NATO Summit showed just what sixteen sovereign states can achieve. Before it took place, NATO was said to be in “disarray”; there certainly was *no* “disarray” at its end!

Now, of course, come the difficulties of implementation. The Summit proposals must be translated into a detailed negotiating position for Vienna. The way ahead should be as follows. SACEUR starts working on the requirements to implement Flexible Response and Forward Defence in order for the package to be implemented. Once this is done, it should *not* be his task to decide which nations must reduce and by what. That, I believe, is a matter for the High Level Task Force (HILTF). The HILTF, in consultation with the concerned nations, is clearly the best forum for this! Unfortunately for us, it is not just the Soviet defence budget that is on the decline. Most of our national defence budgets are declining too. Our capitals ask for cuts in order to save money. Our governments are impatient. They naturally want to know quickly if they can reduce their defence expenditures. In some cases, they may even be tempted into pre-emption. Yet, Western unilateral reductions would be extremely counter-productive in arms control terms. Such moves would be destructive because they could totally undo our carefully

worked-out negotiating positions in Vienna. We would make it very easy for the other side — all they would have to do is just sit and wait! Now is *not* the time to make such reductions — let us negotiate from strength.

Our publics need to understand that Gorbachev's unilateral reductions *do not* correct asymmetries, and that the Soviet preponderance is still being maintained however it may ap-

pear! We must negotiate this Soviet preponderance to lower levels. However, this will be very difficult for our negotiators if NATO members begin making unilateral and nationally-inspired reductions immediately. (I have said exactly this



Dropping of air-borne troops

to the German Defence Minister and to two other NATO government leaders recently). Unfortunately, far too many people now have absolute faith in Gorbachev. Whatever he says, they believe and immediately accept. They feel that any announcement he makes can be immediately "wrapped up, put in a bag and taken home". It is "game, set and match" as far as they are concerned. But it is far more difficult than that. Arms control is all about keeping stability, and every proposal should be carefully checked against the yardstick. While I am quite sure that the economic situation is now the driving force in East-West relations, our security needs require that we take the greatest possible care in order to retain military stability in Europe. At such a critical phase in our developing relationship with the East,

I would like to warn again against reductions in Western defence budgets which may give entirely the wrong signals. We must let our negotiators in Vienna reach a successful outcome on the conventional side before any such moves are made and we must help propagate the view.

General Wolfgang Altenburg

General Wolfgang Altenburg was Chairman of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the time he presented this Keynote Address at the NATO Workshop on Political-Military Decision Making. Previously he was Chief of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany.

THE THREAT TO NATO CONTINUES



Otomatic 76/62 self-propelled anti-aircraft machine gun (cannon)



OTOMATIC 76/62 AA TANK

OTO 76/62 AA 'OTOMATIC' TANK

OTO Main Antiaircraft Tank for Intercept and Combat

The capability of facing the present and future air threat with the full exploitation of the performances of a highly advanced AA defence system are the basis of the OTOMATIC 76/62 AA tank.

Its 120 rpm fire power can cope with high density attack scenarios and counteract the long range, high payload, high terminal effectiveness of the present air launched weapons: OTOMATIC can achieve equivalent Cumulative Kill Probability at three times the range of any other point defence weapon system.

The search and track radars of its integrated FCS are designed to minimize ARM lock-on probabilities.

Powerful APFSDS ammunition enables the OTOMATIC 76/62 AA tank to engage armoured fighting vehicles in attack or self-defence actions.

The OTOMATIC is intended for:

- defence of armoured vehicles and troops against air attacks on the battle field;
- defence of forces and vital objectives in rear areas;
- armour engagement in support of own forces and self-defence.


The system consists of a 76/62 Super Rapid gun, linked to a self-contained FCS with active and passive search and track systems, installed on the chassis of the PALMARIA SPH, or any other suitable MBT chassis, on Customer's request.

The main features of the OTOMATIC system include:

- autonomous capability in detecting and engaging flying targets, either using the active or the passive electro-optical line of sight;




- high effectiveness in tactical missions under all weather conditions, by day and by night, and in NBC environments;
- high firepower with the rate of fire of 120 rpm;
- high kill capability, due to the special ammunition available;
- high operational survivability against air and ground threats;
- unequalled growth potential.



THE OTOMATIC TURRET



A MBT CHASSIS



THE OTOMATIC 76/62 AA TANK



OTOMATIC SYSTEM CONFIGURATION

The main elements of the OTOMATIC system are the turret and the chassis.

The turret (housing the elevating mass and the gun feeding mechanisms) is a self-contained system of the armoured rotating casemate type and comprises: the radar and opto-electronic search and tracking system; the gun electro-hydraulic servo-system; the ammunition automatic magazine and ammunition stowages; the data link and radio equipments.

The gun feeding system, fire control system (computer and console) and radar system (transmitter, receiver and junction boxes) are inside the turret; the sensors and their associated elevating and retracting mechanisms are arranged in the rear of the turret, protected by an armoured shield when folded down.

for replenishment of the automatic feeding magazine.


The fire control system, integral with the gun system, operates on the inputs from its own active and passive sensors. These are: the search and tracking radars, the commander's search periscope, and the gunner's optical tracking sight. This latter includes a laser rangefinder and a DL TV camera, providing a stabilized optical search and tracking capability. Although the existing prototype has no FLIR search equipment, production OTOMATIC will be fitted with a high resolution FLIR as a passive search sub-system against flying targets. This will enable the OTOMATIC to operate with only slightly reduced performance in hostile electronic environments, such as under stand-off/escort jamming or in full passive mode, under ARM threat.



The OTOMATIC system can be fitted on the chassis of the Leopard 1, Leopard 2 or M1. Present prototypes are mounted on an OTO PALMARIA chassis. Only small modifications to the chassis are required for stowage of rounds and the installation of the APU and navigator equipment.

The ammunition feeding system, consisting of a translator on the basket base, two rocking arms feeding the gun at any elevation, and two transfer drums on the gun mount, is hydraulically operated and linked to the gun recoil movement. The spent case ejection system is hydraulically operated.

The crew consists of four men, the driver and three operators in the turret: the commander, who has tactical control of the system, the gunner, performing target engagement and the loader

1 - Ammunition stowage; 2 - Auxiliary power unit; 3 - Slip ring for electric, hydraulic and ECS connections; 4 - AA ammunition vertical transfer magazine; 5 - Armour shield for folded sensors; 6 - Commander and gunner; 7 - Loader; 8 - Control and command console; 9 - Tracking optical device; 10 - Gun elevating mechanism; 11 - Rocking arms; 12 - Gun mount; 13 - Bore evacuator; 14 - Tracking radar; 15 - Auxiliary TV camera; 16 - Search radar; 17 - AT ammunition stowage.





76/62 AA GUN

The gun is a rifled cannon with bore evacuator, screw connected to a breech ring, mounting a mechanically actuated breech mechanism with a twin recoil and counterrecoil system and a single run-out gas recuperator. The breechblock is the vertical falling wedge type with mechanical firing system.

The gun loading system consists of a loading tray with vertical alternating movement, actuated by the recoiling mass through a lever system. The forward movement is boosted by a hydraulic system.

The loading tray system also handles the extracted spent cases which are ejected outside the vehicle, at all elevations, by a hydraulically operated ejection system.

The feeding system of the AA rounds consists of a magazine-translator, two rocking arms and a loader drum.

The translator is a vertical transfer magazine arranged on the turret basket, to the left of the gun.

This mechanism, through a spider wheel system, transfers the rounds, manually loaded by the loader, to an end station where they are automatically clamped by the rocking arms.



The two rocking arms, hydraulically actuated, carry the rounds onto a loader drum on the gun mount. The rocking arms have an alternating movement, synchronized with the rate of fire, and follow the gun elevation.

The loader drum (on the left side of the gun mount) transfers the rounds from the rocking arms to the loading tray. Electrical and mechanical interlocks synchronize the complete loading and feeding system.

AT ammunition: an auxiliary loader drum for AT ammunition is fitted on the right side of the gun mount. The anti-armour ammunition is advanced to the ramming position by a step by step rotation after being manually loaded by the loader.


The APDS drum magazine is interlocked with the AA loading system and is hydraulically driven.

Gun servos: the servosystem is two axes stabilized.

The elevation servo, with a sector from -5° to $+60^{\circ}$, consists of a hydraulic actuator with a built-in balancing device to compensate for elevating mass unbalance.

The traversing servo has an unlimited traverse sector and drives the turret through a hydraulic motor with reduction gear drive directly coupled to the turret crown gear.


Hand operated mechanisms can be used for emergency operation. An automatic brake prevents undue movements of the turret when the traversing mechanism is off.



ITALIAN BATTLEFIELDS

MAY 1917

by Army Quarterly and Defence Journal



British and American war correspondents with the Italian Army in the First World War reported the day to day events well and from time to time leading writers made short tours of the Front and gave their impressions. One of these was Rudyard Kipling who spent two weeks in Italy in early May 1917. On his return he wrote five pieces which appeared in the *Daily Telegraph*, the *New York Tribune* and, in translation, in *Milan* (1). In Italy, these are regarded as being among the best accounts of Alpine warfare ever written. A reprint of a 1917 Italian translation

by the *Army Quarterly's* sister journal, the *Rivista Militare*, has become something of a best seller (2).

Kipling had been invited to tour the Italian Front in May 1916 by the British Ambassador at Rome, Sir Rennell Rodd, who was anxious to counter the considerable German propaganda effort in Italy. He was also concerned about the lack of understanding in Britain of the Italian war effort. Regrettably, it was never understood how the Italian war effort helped the British Army on the Western Front nor was it generally realized that the scale of the Italian

casualties was if anything slightly greater than the British.

Rodd's idea was that well-known writers should visit and write about the Front in the hope that the words of a favourite author would be read more widely, make greater impact and carry more conviction than material from the propaganda agencies. In exchange for a visit by Rudyard Kipling, he hoped that d'Annunzio could be persuaded to visit the British troops in France and write a series of articles for the Italian press.

Kipling stalled until mid-April

Incorporating The United Service Magazine first issued in 1829

Volume 119 No 3 July 1989

[illegible]

All over the world general officers, ministers, civil servants, diplomats, senior businessmen and students at staff colleges are influential readers of the Army

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The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal,
1 West Street,
Tavistock, Devon. PJ.19 8DS*

Kipling and Landon arrived in Rome on May 5th to be given a highly organized welcome. There were briefings by politicians and generals, dinners with the Ambassador, Sir Rennel Rodd, the Minister to Pope Benedict XV, Count John De Salis, not to mention a gourmet lunch with Cardinal Gasquet (a former headmaster of Downside) which had some political overtones. However, the highly charged political atmosphere and the equivocal attitude to the war (3) was not to Kipling's

... I can't give you any idea of the excellence, or the amplitude or the smoothness of the arrangements. It appears that we are — very much so — the guests of the Italian Government who have a breadth of vision as to the duties of a host which fairly takes the breath away.



After calling on General Cadorna, the Chief of the General Staff, and the King, Kipling dined with General Delme-Radcliffe and Colonel Pirelli, the latter "... cavalry officer and millionaire, the son of the motor-car tyre manufacturer...". Kipling's description of the town at night may bring back some memories to those readers who knew Udine in the closing stages of the Second World War and afterwards:

It was on the edge of moonrise just before ten when we walked back to the quarters here. Udine at night is lit — for obvious reasons — with

a few lights all dark blue. It's a beautiful city in itself — with a main square, a Cathedral and a few other old buildings all grouped together which are extraordinarily beautiful. The effect under the moonlight in the great square, dotted here and there with the blue light was lovely beyond words. The town was silent; the moonlight slashed the fronts of the old buildings and the arcades and loggias showed like pits of blackness...

However, Kipling was there to write about the war, not to report an exchange of pleasantries with the

King and the General. He was faced with the problem of devising an approach which would make an impact on war-weary readers. Although the inevitable descriptions of the hardships, the bravery, the squalor, the casualties, the cemeteries could not be avoided, it was vital to identify and highlight the special characteristics of the Italian Front which made it different from France. In essence, he had to create in the minds of a lowland audience a picture of a war between European armies in the hostile environment of the high mountains. This he did by emphasising in every article the harshness and extremes of the climate and terrain, and the difficulties of personal survival and of moving the material of war in such an environment. These were the factors which Clausewitz lumped together as «friction» and which were to dominate the war in Italy. Time and again, the plans of the generals were constrained or defeated not by the enemy (who faced identical problems) but by weather, terrain, the amount of water which could be pumped, the speed of road making and maintenance, bridging, rail capacity and the like. The engineers and logisticians held the key to all operations and their influence deserves better treatment from military historians than it has received so far.

And so the tour began. To set the scene, Kipling uses a briefing by an Italian officer to describe the geography of the Italian Front:

«We have three fronts», said my informant. «On the first, the Isonzo front, which is the road to Trieste, our troops can walk, though the walking is not good. On the second, the Trentino, to the north, where the enemy comes nearest to our plains, our troops must climb and mountaineer, you will see».

He pointed south-east and east across the heat haze to some evil-looking ridges a long way off where there was a sound of guns debating ponderously. «That is the Carso, where we are going now», he said; then he turned north-east and north where nearer, higher mountains

showed streaks of snow in their wrinkles.

«Those are the Julian Alps», he went on. «Tolmino is behind them, north again. Where the snow is thicker — do you see? — are the Carnic Alps; we fight among them. Then to the west of them come the Dolomites, where tourists use to climb and write books. There we fight, also. The Dolomites join on to the Trentino and the Asiago Plateau, and there we fight. And from there we go round north till we meet the Swiss border. All mountains, you see».

Having got the geography clear, Kipling describes a visit to the battle lines along the lower Isonzo where the Austrian were defending the approaches to Trieste. In both the letters and the articles the road building and the constantly motor transport getting men and materials from the railheads to the line drew his attention:

Every road was flanked by a little flashing water channel and lined with piles of limestone pebbles from which every few hundred yards a couple of men or a man and boy spread spadefuls of pebbles in every tiniest depression and worn spot, and poured water out of a tin can at the end of a pole atop. The incessant traffic of motor-cars, tractors and carts ground the stuff down almost at once and the water made it bind: so that, the heavier the traffic the better the road. It was a miracle to watch. The Italian are Princes among Roadmakers.

As they went southwards to the lower Isonzo an embankment had slipped down on to the new road and Kipling again uses the device of reporting the words of his Italian escort:

«It's rather a fresh road. Altogether we have about four thousand miles of new roads — and old roads improved — on a front of about six hundred kilometres. But you see, our kilometres are not flat».

The amazing motor-lorries were thicker on the more amazing road that they had been. Our companion apologised for them. «You see, we

have been taking a few things up to the Front in this way in the last few days», he said.

«Are all Italians born driving motors?» I demanded, as a procession of high-hooded cars (4) flopped down the curve we were breasting, pivoted on its outside edge, their bonnets pointing over a four-hundred-foot drop, and slid past us with a three-inch clearance between hub and hub. «No», he replied. «But we, too, have been at the game a long time. I expect all the bad chauffeurs have been killed».

Just outside Gradisca they crossed

the Isonzo, probably on the magnificent wooden bridge built by the Italian sappers, to arrive not far from the 6-inch howitzers of the XCIV and XCV Heavy Artillery Groups, commanded by Brigadier-General P. D. Hamilton. They were the first British units to be sent to support the Italian Army and went into action a few days before Kipling's visit with the 2nd Heavy Artillery Raggruppamento of the Italian Third Army. In an article in the *Army Quarterly* (Vol. 112, No 4, October 1982) Major-General Ashton Wade described his experiences with one



of the batteries, which he joined just before the Third Army withdrew in the wake of the defeat at Caporetto. A longer and more detailed account of the life of a Gunner subaltern in Italy is given by General Ashton Wade's fellow officer, Hugh Dalton in his «With British Guns to Italy».


The Italian and the British gunners were on the edge of the terrible battlefield of the Carso (Kars). Many writers have described the Carso, but Kipling does so as well as any of them:

«And that is the Isonzo River», said the officer, when we reached the edge of the Udine plain. It might have come out from Kashmir with its broad sweeps of pale shoals that tailed off downstream into dancing haze. The milky jade waters smelt of snow from the hills as they plucked at the pontoon bridges' moorings which were made to allow for many feet rise and fall.

... the ridge on the far side of the river that looked so steep, was in reality only a small flattish mound among mountains, and resembled no land on earth. If the Matoppos had married the Karroo they might have begotten some such abortion of stone-speckled, weather-hacked dirt.

The road wrenched itself uphill among the dead trenches, through wire entanglements red-rusted on the ground — looking like «harrows fit to reel men's bodies out like silk» — between the usual mounds of ruptured sand-bags, and round empty gun-pits softened at their angles by the passage of the seasons.

Trenches cannot be dug, any more than water can be found, on the Carso, for a spade's depth below the surface the unkindly stone turns to sullen rock, and everything must be drilled and blasted out. For the moment, because spring had been wet, the stones were greened over with false growth of weeds which wither utterly in the summer, leaving the rock to glare and burn alone. As if all this savagery were not enough, the raw slopes and cusps of desolation were studded with numberless



pits and water-sinks, some exquisitely designed by the Devil for machineguns positions, others like small craters capable of holding eleven-inch howitzers, which opened at the bottom through rifts into dry caverns where regiments can hide — and be dug out.

I saw one such place which had been used as a bombproof by a couple of Austrian battalions, not far from a forlorn little assembly of in-

side house-walls, all silvery-grey, who leaned and whispered together in the thin air like gusts. These were what remained of a village often taken and retaken. The only thing with life in it was an engine pumping water through pipes up the hills and over the stone flats and beyond, across the far haze to the thirsty troops lying in waterless trenches. «We had the Austrians full on the run here once», said the officer.

«The only thing that stopped us was want of water. Our men went on till they choked in the dust. Now these pipes go with them».

We wound under the highest rise of the ridge and came out on its safest side. There was no pretence of green — nothing but rock, broken and rebroken, as far as the eye could carry, by shell-fire, as though it were the far end of Lydd ranges. Earth, however battered, one can make some sort of shift to walk on, but here there was no more foothold than in a nightmare. No two splinters were the same size, and when a man stumbled on the edge of a shell-crater, its sides rolled down with the rattle of a dried tongue in the mouth.

«If you come into this shell-hole — I don't think I should stand up too much — I'll try to show you what we want to do at our next push», the officer said. «We're just getting ready for it» — and he explained how it was intended to work along certain hills that dominate certain roads which lead, at last, towards the head of the Adriatic — one could see it, a patch of dull silver to the southward — under some dark, shadowy hills that covered Trieste itself.

A sun-warmed water-pipe crossed our shell-hole at about the height of one's chin, and the white of a distant shell. The officer's explanation was punctuated by the grumble of single big guns on the Italian side, ranging in anticipation of the serious work to come. Then the ground hiccuped a few yards in front of us, and stones — the poisonous edged stones of the Carso — whirled like partridges. «Mines», said the officer serenely, while the civils automatically turned up their collars. «They are working up the steep side of the ridge, but they might have warned us!»

The mines exploded in orderly line, and it being impossible to run away over the stones, one had to watch them with the lively consciousness that those scores of thousands of dead beneath and around and behind were watching too. A pneumatic drill chattered under-

ground, as teeth chatter.

... we walked into a great rock-cut gallery with rails running underfoot and men shovelling rubbish into trucks. Half-a-dozen embrasures gave light through thirty feet of rock. «These are some of the new gun-positions», said the officer. «For six-inch guns perhaps! Perhaps for eleven».

«And how'd you get eleven-inch guns up here?» I asked.

He smiled a little — I learned the meaning of that smile up in the mountains later.

«By hand», said he, and turned to the engineer in charge to reprove him for exploding the mines without warning.

Leaving the Carso, they went back to the hill of Podgora which overlooks Gorizia, once a favourite retirement town for Austrian Colonels (often referred to as the Cheltenham of Austria). Kipling wrote:

Now Podgora is a Gibraltar of mud — even as it turned into hardest red earth but one realizes what a muck it must be when it is wet. Again the road left the plain and shot up and doubled and twisted for hundreds of feet until it reached the shoulder of this isolated Gibraltar. We entered it by a boarded gallery of infinite steps that climbed up and up to the very top where there was an artillery observation post. We were told not to show ourselves too much up above as we were in plain sight of the enemy. Below us, not half a mile away as the eye goes lay Gorizia and certainly without much life...

... And when we had seen and discussed all the hot sullen landscape and the frowning hills close by returned to our car and went into Gorizia — in order that we might say we had been there. Gorizia in its hollow is amply and thoroughly and plentifully dominated by the enemy guns. They pepper it every day — a few methodical 11 inch or even 15 inch howitzers. Hardly a house could I see that had not been shattered and pitted by shrapnel — the Cathedral was in ruins; and

house after house had been laid down. But the Italians mend and clean up as quickly as the Austrians destroy. There were no holes in the streets and the rubbish was all carted away. There were about 1000 people left in Gorizia still as well as the troops. Half the roads are screened by hanging mats, from the observation of the enemy: but in the main place the full stately chestnut trees are all in flower and the wind goes through them lazily. We spent about half an hour there, during which the Austrian very kindly did not send in anything...

On the way back to Udine, they stopped at the village of Cormons to have lunch with General Capello, the Commander of the Gorizia Group of Armies, and were then taken to a British Red Cross Radiographic Unit:

... run by the Countess Gleichen and Mrs Hollings which has been doing wonderful work. They have about half a dozen women assistants... they dress in khaki and their hospital — which was some sort of palace — has a garden full of irises, and they have two cars to carry their apparatus and they are deeply grateful when they are allowed to go into Gorizia and practise their art there among the explosions and gas shells. Mrs Hollings had lost her only boy and so took up this. Both she and Countess Gleichen have been affected by the X-Rays though I believe not to any serious extent *yet*. They have conducted close upon 6000 radiography examinations. And we had tea and left them to their bravery and simplicity.

Lady Gleichen was also a painter and sculptress and in her spare time she had painted some good, mostly equestrian, scenes which convey a better impression of the Isonzo battlefields than any photograph. Landon knew her well, for in 1905, she had provided some illustrations of his book describing his experiences with the Younghusband Expedition to Tibet.

The tour continued along the sector which runs north from Gorizia, where the front lines run close



together along the banks of the narrow, deep sided, thickly wooded gorge, the river being the no-man's land. However, there were two bridgeheads; firstly, the Italian one at Plava, which Trevelyan described as being «untenable by all the rules of war». With courage and endurance, the Italians maintained this

tiny foothold at enormous cost for almost two years; then, in August 1917, they broke out and were able to reach the open country of the Bainsizza plateau and an advance to Ljubljana, only forty miles away, seemed just possible. The other bridgehead was farther north, where the Austrians had managed to hold

on to the hills of Santa Maria and Santa Lucia in the bend of the river, just across from Tolmino.

Kipling entered this sector from the foothills of the Collio which rise from the Udine plain and up to the ridge of the Monte Sabotino. Turning north along the ridge, they were able to look down to the Isonzo



almost vertically below and across the valley to the Austrian lines on Monte Santo:

We bored up and into the hills by roads not yet mapped, but solid as lavish labour can make them against the rolling load of the lorries, and the sharp hoods of the mule, as well as the wear and tear of winter, who is

the real enemy. Our route ran along the folded skirts of a range not more than three or four thousand feet high, more or less parallel with the Isonzo in its way from the north. Rivers that had roared level beside us dropped and shrunk to blue threads half visible through the forest. Mountains put forward hard

shaly knees round which we climbed in a thousand loops that confused every sense of direction. Then, because the enemy seven miles off could see, stretches of the crowded road (5) were blinded with reed mats while torn holes above or below us proved that he had searched closely.

... And here were batteries upon batteries of the heaviest pieces, so variously disposed and hidden that finding one gave you no clue to the next. Elevens, eights, fours — sixes, and elevens again, on caterpillar wheels, on navy mountings adapted for hand work, disconnected from their separate tractors, or balanced and buttressed on their own high speed motors, were repeated for mile after mile, with their ammunition caves, their shops, and the necessary barracks for their thousand servants studded or strung out on the steep drop behind them. Obscure pits and hollows hid them pointing to heaven, and how they had been brought up to be lowered there passed imagination as they peeped out of the merest slits in green sod. They stood back under ledges and eaves of the ground where no light could outline them, or became one with a dung-heap behind a stable.

... They, like the others down the line, were waiting for the hour and the order. Not half-a-dozen out of a multitude opened their lips.

When we had climbed to a place appointed, the shutter of an observation-post opened upon the world below. We saw the Isonzo almost vertically beneath us, and on the far side were the Italian trenches that painfully climbed to the crest of the bare ridges where the infantry live, who must be fed under cover of night until the Austrian are driven out of their heights above.

Kipling's observation point was at the northern end of the military road which runs the length of the Kolovrat ridge. From just below the hamlet of Sredjne there would have been a clear view of Tolmino, the bridgehead and river flats, and dominating the whole scene, Monte Nero (or Krn):

All that day a snow peak had ris-

en like a master wave, now to one side, now to the other, of our road. On the steepest slopes of its topmost snows it carried a broad, open V, miles long on either limit, which appeared in the changing lights like a faint cattle-brand, or giant ski-tracks, or those dim canals of Schiaparelli which mark the face of the red planet Mars. That was Monte Nero, and the mark was the line of the Italian trenches on it. They are cut through snow that melts, into packed snow that never melts, into packed snow that never softens: and where the snow cannot lie on the sheer rocks, they are blasted in and out among the frost-ridden rubbish of the mountains crest. Up there, men fight with field-guns, machine-guns, and rifle, and more deadly shoots of stones heaped together and sent sliding down at the proper time. Up there, if a man is wounded and bleeds only a little before he is found, the cold kills him in minutes, not hours. Whole companies can be frostbitten and crippled even while they lie taking cover in the pause of a rush, and the wandering mounting gusts take sentries from under the lee of their rock as they stand up to be relieved, and flick them into space.

The mountain draws its own supplies and troops for miles and miles back, over new roads that break off from the main arteries of traffic and split into mule-trails and man-tracks, emerging, at last, against the bare rocks, as thin and threadlike as the exposed roots of a botanical diagram

to illustrate capillary attraction. There has never been a greater work of invention, preparation, and endurance among fantastic horrors than the winning and holding of this one post. And it has passed almost unnoticed by nations, each absorbed in its own hell.

Kipling was referring to one of the most spectacular feats of Alpine warfare, the capture of the peak of Monte Nero in June 1915 by the Alpini under the command of General Etno. The «triangular peak» is in fact the southern face of the ridge of the Krn Massif. Under cover of darkness, the Alpini approached along this ridge from the north, seizing two lower peaks before surprising the Hungarian troops on the peak itself. The Italians held Monte Nero until the Battle of Caporetto. In the Second World War, the Krn Massif was again the scene of fierce Alpine fighting, this time between the German Army and the Partisans.

Leaving the observation post, Kipling and Landon returned to Udine along the military road which skirt round the shoulder of Mr Matajur. Little did they know that Caporetto, the tranquil Italian village they could see at the foot of the mountain was to be the scene of a defeat which was to profoundly affect the whole Allied war effort. However, all this lay in the future and for the moment, Kipling turned away from the Isonzo and headed for the scene of the last two articles: the front lines in the snowcapped mountains they could see to the north of

Udine and the uplands where the British troops under General Plumer were to find themselves later in the year.

Peter Lewis

NOTES

The «Kipling papers» referred to in the following notes are those held by the Manuscripts Section of the University of Sussex Library, Brighton. The Author is grateful to the National Trust for permission to quote from the letters.

(1) The titles of the five articles were: The Roads of an Army (6 June 1917), Podgora (9 June 1917), A Pass, a King and a Mountain (13 June 1917), Only a few steps higher up (16 June 1917), The Trentino Front (20 June 1917).

(2) *La Guerra nelle Montagne*, Rudyard Kipling, Rivista Militare, Rome 1988.

(3) A good, clear and concise summary is to be found in Italy by Denis Mack Smith, Univeristy of Michigan Press, 1969.

(4) These small Fiats were surely the ancestors of the Jeep.

(5) A marvel of military road building under fire, the serpentine road from Verhovlje down to the bridgehead at Plava and back by «Badoglio's Road» of thirty-two hairpin bends.

Peter Lewis is a former RAF officer, who served in a wide variety of appointments at home, in Europe and in the Far East. Latterly, he has worked as a consultant with a main interest in East and Central Europe. He has studied the pre-Caporetto Italian campaign in the First World War in some depth, making extensive tours of the battlefields in Italy and Yugoslavia and has lectured on Kipling's 'War in the Mountains' in Venice and in London.

ITALIAN BATTLEFIELDS MAY 1917

by Army Quarterly and Defence Journal

ITALY'S WAR

SCENES FROM


by

G. M. TREVELYAN



My heart goes out the poor little families all over this great kingdom who stood the brunt and strain of the war, and gave their men gladly to make other men free, and other women and children free. These are the people, and many like them, to whom, after all, we owe the glory of this great achievement.

PRESIDENT WILSON AT ROME
January 1919



CHAPTER V

Villa Trento Field Hospital —
Gorizia during the occupation —
The Carso.

During the first two years and more of our work in Italy — until, in fact, the Retreat brought that side of our activities to an end — the field hospital at Villa Trento, working for the 6th Italian Army Corps, formed a part of our Unit. The Director of the hospital was Dr. Brock, well known for twenty years past in Rome. His courtesy, tact, and long-acquired sympathy with things Italian, and the skill in the language acquired by many of our nurses, enabled him to give to our hospital an Anglo-Italian character that made the soldiers who came there glad to be in the hands of foreigners who understood and attended so well to their wants and feelings. This, to my thinking, was a considerable feat.

The hospital learnt much on Scotland, for, besides Dr. Brock, we also had the honour to have with us Sir Alexander Ogston, whose fame and

whose quiet, benevolent courtesy to all persons great or small added to the prestige and popularity of Villa Trento. Dr. W. E. Thompson, of Canada and Scotland, ably represented the younger generation of surgery.

Villa Trento grew to be a field hospital of 180 beds, with a nursing staff of a score of British Sisters and V.A.D.'s, under the matron, Sister Power. But this organization was only gradually built up, for when we first came out, in August 1915, the Italian authorities still had a rule against women nurses at the front. At the very moment of our arrival this rule was set aside, and we were encouraged to send for women nurses. In this aspect of hospital work the country of Florence Nightingale has two generations start of Italy, and nothing was more interesting than to see the employment of women nurses begin and take root in the Italian field hospitals around us. Those of them whom we saw — like the Signorina Italia Garibaldi, in whom the heroic traits of the fa-

mily were not wanting — were capable and devoted to a degree, struggling each to do the work of ten women, for naturally in the infancy of the movement the supply of trained or even half-trained nurses was small.

This important development took place under the fostering care of the Duchess of Aosta, the head of the Italian nurses. She was a frequent visitor at Villa Trento, a good friend to us English, and, as we are proud to remember, an admirer of our hospital. It has been a great good fortune for this difficult early period of female nursing in Italy, and for the sick and wounded during the war, that the Duchess of Aosta was a born leader. She established the position of female nurses at the front against all old-fashioned critics. Not only does she possess the distinctively "royal" qualities in an attractive form, but she is a lady of great wisdom in management and of tireless energy and devotion. In difficult times, both in the Retreat and very notably during the equally rapid and



longer advance in November 1918, when the excellent machinery of the Italian field hospitals was thrown out of gear by the pace, the Duchess was to the fore where things were worst, carrying with her a group of her best nurses to plant down where they were most shockingly needed, and herself going for an incredible number of hours without food or rest.

On one occasion, in the summer of 1917, we took in at Villa Trento an overflow of fifty patients from the British army hospital then established for General Hamilton's newly-arrived batteries. I remember being struck by the difference on entering our "Garibaldi Ward" on the first day that it contained British; every one on that day was reading something, whether book or newspaper. The Italian soldier, on the other hand, generally prefers to lie still, quietly happy in a comfortable bed and the sense of companionship around. On the days for evacuating groups of patients there were heart-rending scenes; some who has been with us a while were desolated at

having to depart, and in the literal sense of the words, "lifted up their voices and wept." Often when they got to the base hospital and finally to their own home, simple peasants once more, but too often now lacking an arm or a leg, they would write or cause to be written letters, or whole series of letters, of gratitude and affection to the "Signorine Inglese" who had tended them so devotedly at Villa Trento.

Our Allies appreciated the close individual attention in nursing, and the atmosphere of "home" which we did our best to create for our patients in the fine old villa and shady grounds assigned to us. Our Italian medical chiefs, General Bonomo, Inspector-General of Hospitals at the front; General Angelantonio, Medical Director of the Second Army; and Colonels Morino and Santucci, Medical Directors of our Army Corps, and subsequently of the Second and Third Armies respectively, were deeply interested in our hospital and most generous in their praise of it.

Of Colonel Morino I have spoken already. Of Colonel (now General) Santucci it is difficult for me to speak, I owe him so much gratitude, and feel for him so much affection. Second to none in the Italian army as an organizer of their gigantic and carefully-systematized medical service, he was from his heart outwards the friend of England and Italy held together. Always thinking of our work and interests, whether as regards the ambulances or the hospital, he was to me the very embodiment of the spirit of the *entente* between the two countries, and of the finest and most solid Italian enthusiasm for the ideal side of the common cause. In the ever-recurring seasons of disappointed hopes and unexpected disasters, when Rumania fell, and whenever Russia failed, nothing did me more good than either to see General Santucci draw himself up with his good eyes kindling, and wave his hand saying, "*Ho grande fiducia*", or else to see Sir Alexander Ogston smile as he smoked his pipe. They were two

different ways of expressing the same idea. But did either of those optimists dream of anything like this wonderful ending?

Besides our nurses at Villa Trento, there were two groups of ladies who played a remarkable part on the Italian front in 1916-17 — the Radiographic Unit of Countess Helena Gleichen and Mrs. Nina Hollings, and Mrs. Watkins and her "canteen" ladies. There was no more characteristic sight on the roads than the radiographic cars being driven by Mrs. Hollings and Countess Gleichen from hospital to hospital at the front (1). And England was equally well represented by the other ladies who served that Unit during the great Italian offensives of 1917, whether in their shell-battered house in Gorizia or in the safer but more romantic railway tunnel in Plava gorge.

The Radiographic Unit did a great deal of valuable work where it was most needed. But Mrs. Watkins's contribution to the cause was of no less practical service. Canteens for the wounded passing through had been set up in the principal railway stations throughout the Peninsula by local Italian committees. But since there could be no local committee to set up a canteen at the railheads on the Isonzo front, Cervignano, and San Giovanni Manzano, Mrs. Watkins and a band of English ladies undertook the work there. But Mrs. Watkins's influence went further than her canteen work. It was she who suggested and who helped General Capello to set up the first of the Case del Soldato, or recreation huts for soldiers, which afterwards became so essential a part of the life of the forces in the field. The huts were from the first a work of the Italian army; but Mrs. Watkins's part in the originating of the movement should stand on record.

Gorizia was a health and pleasure resort of the Austrian military and bureaucratic classes, lying in a mild climate (2), on a little plain through which the blue Isonzo rushes out from the iron gateway of Sabotino and San Gabriele. Overlooked by



those twin gaunt giants, Gorizia is even more closely dominated by the lower more comfortable heights of Podgora and San Marco. The Italians now held Sabotino and Podgora; but the Austrians were firm on San Gabriele and San Marco, their positions on the latter being in some places not a kilometre from the heart of the town, which was only to some very slight extent protected by the ancient castle on its

hilltop. Such, from August 1916 to September 1917, remained the position. When, in 1917, British officers began to visit or serve on the Italian front more frequently than before, I had often the pleasure of taking one or another of them up the Oslavia road to show them the view. When they saw it they were always amazed at the exposed position which the Italians in Gorizia were making good, with enemy heights



rising straight up from the feet of their outposts, and a rapid river behind perpetually beating on their shelled pontoons.

In these circumstances the year of occupation was one long bombardment and a series of fierce infantry struggles for the heights beyond the town. San Marco's woods, which had waved green welcome when we entered Gorizia in August 1916, disappeared as Podgora woods had disappeared before them, and soon the crests of San Marco shone in the dis-

tant view, bare and red as Podgora ridge itself. If on any one occasion in the year's fighting the Austrians on San Marco had been able to advance a kilometre, they would have retaken the town and put the Italians into the river. The fighting for Santa Caterina, the offshoot of San Gabriele, above Salcano village, was scarcely less frequent and bitter, and equally barren of result.

Until the Russian defection in the summer of 1917 gradually turned the tables, the Italians in Gorizia had the

preponderance of artillery. They brought their guns up not only to Podgora and Sabotino, but over the river into the town itself. Gorizia and its pleasant villa suburbus were honeycombed with batteries that barked and roared night after night. The guns were packed so closely that they were often near enough to the hospitals and dressing-stations to offer some excuse for the destruction by enemy bombardment of one after another of the sanctuaries protected by the Red Cross sign. On those occasions, as we witnessed, the Italian medical officers by their example inspired their men with a calmness which enabled the evacuation to take place in perfect order. The maintenance of regular field hospitals in Gorizia itself, only two kilometres from the enemy's lines, was a feature in the Italian medical policy differing, I believe, from the practice in some other armies. It enabled first-class surgical operations to be carried out at the front at the price for the wounded of an appreciable amount more of danger and disturbance from the bombardment. There was clear loss and clear gain.

Since, however, no corner of the city and suburbs was safe, it was desirable to move across the river to safety, at the earliest possible moment, all those patients whom the doctors did not decide to keep in the hospitals. We therefore took up quarters for our ambulances in Gorizia, so as to be at the beck and call of the dressing-stations by night and day. Our main establishment was a large house on the northern outskirts of the town (No. 16 via Ponte Isonzo), looking up a pleasant grove and garden to San Gabriele, but screened from view of the Austrians there by some fine old chestnut trees, beneath which we parked our cars. Here we spent a busy and romantic year.

One night early in December 1916 a shell broke in the wall of the room where our night drivers slept. Three of the four were out on service over the bridges, and so escaped the fate of their beds; one of the



three, Phil Arundel, has since been killed as a flying man in France, and another, Lionel Sessions, afterwards lost his leg in our service. But the fourth occupant of the room, Hamish Allan, was in bed, and was severely wounded. After that we constructed a fine dug-out beside the house, in which we took great pride as the work of our own hands and of our scanty leisure. The design, however, was not entirely our own; for we profited by the technical advice of an Italian officer of *genio*, who looked in on us one day, and, after reviewing the dug-out as we were then constructing it, remarked, "There are two sorts of dug-outs — a dug-out to live in, and a dug-out to die in. This is a dug-out to die in."

One day some of us were royally entertained at lunch by the officers of the 24th Sezione Sanità in Gorizia. After the Intesa toasts in Asti, they brought in a very fat common soldier, who without preface

burst into song — Verdi's "Otello" — with a baritone voice as powerful as Plunkett Greene's, and of marvellous beauty. In the little dining-room it seemed to endanger the stability of the walls. We hurriedly opened the windows, and it drowned the cannon which were roaring in the garden fifty yards away. It was one of the most surprising scenes at which I have ever attended. He sings in the great opera houses in Italy, thereby corresponding in popular position to the Matador in Spain, and is now a common soldier in the Sanità. My experience is that ordinary Italian voices when singing are more discordant than ordinary English voices, but that there are a large number of voices of this baritone type in Italy which for volume and beauty are absolutely unmatched in England.

The training that such voices undergo for the severe purpose of classical Italian opera is analogous to the

training of professional athletes in England. The popular interest in the opera, which would bore an English audience to tears, is very genuine and very remarkable. There is comparatively little corresponding in Italy to the song-books of England or of Scotland, either to the beautiful and serious repertory of times gone by or to the music hall and *revue* choruses of to-day. But the classical opera is a national passion. In July 1918 the staff of the 11th Division, which we had served in the battle of the previous month, invited some of us to their divisional theatre, where, every night so long as the division was *in riposo*, men and officers entertained their comrades. And how did they entertain them? Mainly by excellent renderings of the most famous passages from the operas of Verdi and Rossini. Our hosts told us that they had taken the idea of a divisional theatre from a British division with whom they had frater-

nized on the Asiago plateau (3). But I am sure the British divisional theatre had a very different and more variegated programme. *Suum cuique tributo*.

Our own life in Gorizia during that winter of 1916, as at all other times, was cheerful and interesting enough; but for the *povero fante*, the patient Italian infantryman, life was becoming a sordid and weary misery. Here was the second winter spent by him far away from his beloved family and farm in the hollow of the Apennine or in the rich alluvial plain, spent by him in slavish drudgery amid damp trenches and grimy ruins, for a cause that had never been intelligibly explained to him by the book-learned who had dragged him from his home. The bright hopes of victory held out in the early autumn by the taking of Gorizia, the Russi-

was properly painted in large letters on the bodies of the cars. More than one Italian came up to us in Gorizia that winter to complain of the brave inscription. "Oh yes! Lloyd George has said so. You English think this war is sport!" In vain we discoursed on the various meanings of the word "sport", and the particular character of the Sportsman's Fund. No; it was an offence. Even on our ambulances we announced to our too patient allies that the war was sport!

One excellent feature of the Italian occupation of Gorizia was the treatment of civilians who still insisted on clinging to their homes in spite of the bombardment. It is arguable that they should all have been removed; there were a fair number of casualties, and almost certainly some who remained were spies. But since it was decided that they might stay,

and schooling, and some resided there altogether. Their happy child's life went on during day after day of the wrath of man, subterraneously in time of danger, at other times emerging into the courtyards of the gradually crumbling convent. I never met a finer woman than Sister Matilda, or a wiser. She took her part in this world and was shrewd in her judgements of it, yet she moved "above the *mêlée*." When finally, late in 1917, they took the children from her and sent them to Leghorn, it seemed a cruel necessity, but necessary indeed it was, for the building was being hit every day. She remained on among the ruins, and we found her there still, serene and practical as ever, when we returned on the tide of final victory in November 1918.

In the early part of the winter of 1916-17 the Emperor Francis Joseph, known to every Italian as "Cecco Beppe", died on the precarious throne which he had occupied for all but seventy years. Called to the uneasy heritage in 1848, when the old Austrian Empire of Metternich was in actual dissolution, and only Radetzky's army stood firm, he had, contrary to expectation, and contrary to the world's true interest, succeeded by no little valour and wisdom in holding together, first under German-Austrian, and then under German and Magyar tyranny, all those peoples, nations, and languages. This artificial structure, full seventy years too old, now depended for a further lease of life on Prussia's victory in the world contest. One is glad that the old man did not live to see the fall.

The feeling against "Cecco Beppe" in Italy was personal. He was the man of whom their fathers had told them. His soldiers had hunted Garibaldi and Anita in the marshes; his armies had held insolent sway in half the fairest cities of Italy; his hangmen had hung the martyrs; and, since the union of Italy, his officials had persecuted their brothers of the lands still unredeemed. So when the old man died there was non pretence of any feel-



an victories, and the entry of Rumania, had ended in the dismal Russian Betrayal No. I.

About this time Mr. Lloyd George made his famous speech in which the war was likened unto a sporting prize fight. The figure pleased not the Italians, otherwise well content with our new Premier. Now it chanced that we had in the Unit some ambulances generously provided by the Sportsman's Fund, President Lord Lonsdale. This fact

it was well that everything was done to render their life supportable. The Italian military authorities supplied them with food, and enabled them to get down periodically to Udine to market. We helped to supply clothes to the civilians, especially to the children; and this first brought Geoffrey Young, who had the matter in hand, into contact with the most notable civilian in Gorizia, Sister Matilda at the convent. Several hundred children came there every day for food

ing but satisfaction.

From that moment forward one noticed a further shifting of Italian hatred from Austria to Germany, from the mask to the face behind it. It is true that this change was hastened by many other causes besides the old Emperor's death; indeed, Italy had declared war on Germany before he died. But the traditional feeling against "Cecco Beppe" could not be transferred to "Carlo and Zita"; the young couple were good-humouredly despised or pitied, never hated. I remember, for instance, a mural monument which the Austrians had erected near their dug-outs on Oslavia hill. After its capture in August 1916 the Italians had decorated it with a portrait of "Cecco Beppe" as the duce. But later on, after his death, the pictured fiend took on the likeness of a Prussian in his spiked helmet. During 1917 mural decoration at the front became more and more anti-German. One house in a village of the plain was illuminated on the wall facing the street by an enormous fresco of a cloaked Prussian figure cutting off the hands of a Belgian child. What was more important, patriotic talk ran more and more on anti-German lines, based on a broader understanding of the world struggle against the spirit of military despotism. With this went a better understanding of England's part and policy.

During the winter of 1916-17 I composed a lecture on Garibaldi which was translated into very choice Italian by my friend Major Lionello De Lisi, whose medical science is adorned by his literary gifts and lofty, patriotic enthusiasm. I gave our lecture first to the officers in Udine, at the invitation of the Comando Supremo; then to mixed civil and military audiences in Milan, Treviso, and Venice. At Venice, being the guest of Professor Pietro Orsi and the Athenaeum, I got an inside view of some of the leading patriotic families of the "home front", and of the remarkable civic life of the Queen of the Waters. As we shouldered our way through the narrow *Merceria*, Orsi said to me that


the absence of horses and carriages had made Venice more equalitarian than any other city in Italy. Since riding horses were forbidden in 1300 A.D., the leading citizens and their wives have always had to rub shoulders with the crowd.

The Venetians were very valiant and patriotic, though the war hit them harder than any one else in Italy. With their port closed and the *forestieri* away fighting each other, their two main occupations were gone. But Venice had risen to meet her own needs. A Citizens' Committee, of which my hosts were active members, had in good time procured vast war orders from Government of the king that could be done in Venice, and had distributed the work and the requisite raw material among the small workshop and private houses of the *popolani*. Wood-

pled, or had even been stimulated by the fact of the war. I came away from that visit with an historic sense of the undying spirit of Venetian democracy and fellow-citizenship with which Manin had worked his miracles.

During the same winter, the Commissioner, Lord Monson, brought round Mr. E. V. Lucas to see the British Red Cross work in Italy. The visit pleased and encouraged us, and resulted in a characteristically delightful and kingly tractate on our work, entitled, "Outposts of Mercy".

The road to Trieste, chosen as the principal battlefield on which Italy and Austria wore down each other's "will to resist", in the continuous and bloody warfare of 1915-17, was divided into two parts — the Plava-Gorizia zone to the north, and the



work for shell cases and barrows, soldiers' clothing, small iron work and children's toys, to replace the German, were the chief. The Citizens's Committee had also set up a scientifically-managed relief system, and a distribution of milk for infants. Largely in consequence of this organized mutual aid, Venice had a finer feeling of patriotic fellowship, and was more ready to go on with the war than other cities whose industries were far less crip-

Carso to the south. Our Unit did no service on the Carso, but in the year 1917 I paid several visits to that strange land, sometimes to Italian friends, sometimes to Mr. Alexander's Third B.R.C. Unit, and sometimes to the officers of General Hamilton's batteries.

The Carso is a world by itself. It is limestone tableland, lying between the Gorizia valley and the sea, and stretching along the coast beyond Trieste. Its sides facing north and

west are partly wooded, but the table-land itself has no vegetation higher than grass and stunted brushwood. The earth is red, the limestone white; in winter these are the two colours of the Carso, but in summer an outcrop of green grass completes the Italian tricolour. The sparse villages, all ruined and unroofed by the war, each visible for miles away on that high, flat wilderness, were inhabited in peace time by herdsmen, for the patches of grass are good pasturage in spring. Indeed, our South Africans compared the Carso to the veldt.

To me, as a North Englander, the character of the ground at close quarters recalled the top of the limestone scars of Yorkshire and Westmorland, only, instead of being, like Whitbarrow, a mile across and a few miles long, the Carso is seven miles across and more than twenty long. Indeed, the more distant view, with the illimitable desert spaces rising into low hills far away, was like a Scotch or Northumbrian moor stript of bent and heather, if such a monstrosity can be conceived.

But the native peculiarity of the Carso was the *doline*, or cup-shaped hollows, each twenty, fifty, or more yards across, said to have been worn by the action of water collected for ages in the flat limestone surface. In these hollows, which were counted by the hundred, men, huts, and guns were hidden away by both sides, so that when half a million soldiers were inhabiting that uncanny wilderness, it looked more deserted than in peace time, and yet no available cover was to be seen. Nothing, in fact, was visible except the ruins of the villages, the screening of the roads, the stone walls raised by the shepherds, and an occasional car scudding swift and silent across the ominous ambushed desert where Browning's Childe Roland might well have found the Tower.

Over this terrible land, from June 1915 to October 1917, the Third Army, under the Duke of Aosta, won its way, yard by yard. The Carso yields as little shade or water as the Sahara, and its splintering rock

doubled the effect of every shell. Those can judge best of Italy's effort who walk over that ground, as they now safely may, viewing line after line of broken wire entanglements, and of trenches blasted out in the rock surface and then blown to pieces by bombardment.

The Italian advance progressed farthest along the northern edge of the Carso, overlooking Gorizia, till finally, from well beyond Fauti, the rear of the enemy's San Marco position could be enfiladed. But to the south, along the sea coast, progress beyond Monfalcone was well-nigh physically impossible, though it was desperately attempted in the summer of 1917. For here the steep Hermada, or hill of Medeazza, blocked the coast road to Trieste. Across the western approach to Hermada, as if by a prevision on nature's part of Austria's needs in this war, stretched a reedy marshland, lying between the Carso and the sea, passable only by narrow causeways and long wooden foot bridges over the sullen water. Any one viewing the region wonders not why the Italians failed to establish themselves on Hermada, but how they at any time succeeded in crossing the marsh (4).

In the spring of 1917 the British batteries, under General Hamilton, arrived on the Italian front, the first combatant troops of any Allied Power. Their guns at one moment rose to the number of sixty-four. By that time the French also had batteries in the zone of Gorizia and the Middle Isonzo; but the British batteries always served the Third Army, some of them being placed in *doline* on the Carso tableland, and others, more fortunate in the heat of the summer, on the banks of the Vipacco where it flows deep, a joy to bathers, through the fertile country below the northern edge of the Carso. As the season advanced, General Hamilton put his men into slouch hats of the Colonial type as a protection against the sun; they never appeared in the sun helmets that distinguished Lord Cavan's army in Italy in the following year. They got on very well with the Italians. Politically as well as

militarily the experiment was a decided success, and if the unity of front had been complete, might have encouraged the Allies to send some English and French divisions to aid the push on Bainsizza that autumn. But the German divisions came instead. Otherwise it is possible that instead of Caporetto we might have had the crumbling of Austria-Hungary at the end of 1917 instead of a year later. Many thought this at the time; and from all that we have learnt now that the armistice has lifted the veil on the internal condition of the enemy countries, they may think so more strongly than before. But for good or for ill the fates had willed it otherwise, perhaps for the more complete final discomfiture of the Dynasts. Before the triumphant close, a huge and terrible Fourth Act of the drama had yet to be played, searching the souls of men and nations, and teaching us children of earth to —

"let determined things to destiny
Hold unbewailed their way".

G.M. Trevelyan

continue

(1) We had a fixed radiographic plant at Villa Trento, but the ladies' 4th or Radiographic B.R.C. Unit was mobile, and went the round of the Italian field hospitals, which, especially near the front, seldom had a plant of their own. In other zones of the war the Italian Red Cross had similar mobile radiographic cars working.

(2) Hence there are many more villas and places of residence round Gorizia than round Trieste, which, as I discovered in the happier winter of 1918, is blown over perpetually by the cold Bora, and boasts as uninviting a winter climate as Edinburgh.

(3) The *teatro del soldato* had been started here and there on the old Isonzo front shortly before the Retreat. But that was run by artists imported from Italy. The 11th Division's theatre was run by the soldiers of the division themselves.

(4) It was in the great Italian offensive here in May-June, 1917, that Mr. Davis of the 3rd B.R.C. Unit was killed in Monfalcone, leaving a memory very pleasant to his comrades.

ENGLISH - ITALIAN

GLOSSARY

S

Sabotage	sabotaggio	scabbard	fodero
counter s.	controsabotaggio	bajonet s.	fodero per baionetta
saboteur	sabotatore	scale	gradazione, dose, dotazione
saddle	sella, valico montano	first line s. issue	dotazione di prima linea (UK), (V. USA: basic load);
pack s.	basto	individual s. issue	dotazione di seconda linea
safe	sicuro, fuori pericolo	unit (or organizational) s. issue	dotazione di reparto
minimum s. distance (MSD)	distanza di sicurezza nucleare	scale	scala (topogr.)
s. burst height	altezza di scoppio di sicurezza	small s.	piccola scala
safety	sicurezza	large s.	grande scala
fallout s. height (HOBfs)	altezza di scoppio di sicurezza da ricaduta	plotting s.	scala di riferimento
radius of s.	raggio di sicurezza	scattering	dispersione
range s. factor	altezza di sicurezza	s. of shots	dispersione dei colpi
s. arc	arco di sicurezza	schedule	programma, prospetto, orario
s. box	cassaforte	master training s.	programma addestrativo di massima
s. line	distanza di sicurezza	unit weekly training s.	programma di addestramento
s. measures	misure (dispositivo) di sicurezza	scheduled	settimanale di reparto
s. officer	ufficiale addetto allo sgombero poligono	scheme	programmato
sailor	marinaio	s. of manoeuvre	schema, progetto, disegno
sallent	saliente	school	disegno di manovra
sand	sabbia	air warfare s.	scuola
s. bag	sacchetto a terra	artillery s.	scuola di guerra aerea
s. table	plastico del terreno		scuola di artiglieria
sanitation	igiene, servizi igienici, pulizia		
sapper	zappatore		
satellite	satellite		

cadet s.	scuola allievi ufficiali	intelligence s.	dell'Esercito
flying training s.	scuola di pilotaggio	main s. of depot	sezione informazioni
infantry s.	scuola di fanteria		frazione principale di
service branch s.	scuola di applicazione		magazzino
	d'Arma	recovery s.	sezione ricuperi
training s.	scuola di addestramento	repair s.	sezione riparazioni
shift	turno di servizio	s. chief	capo sezione
scientist	scienziato	s. of depot	frazione di magazzino
scope	attribuzione, ambito,	staff s.	sezione del comando
	portata, sfera, campo di	topographic survey s.	sezione rilevamento
	azione	transport s.	sezione trasporti
score	punteggio, segnatura	sector	settore
	punti, votazione	assigned s.	settore assegnato
scout	esploratore	battle s. (UK)	settore di azione
s. car	autovettura da	defensive s.	settore difensivo
	ricognizione	mountain s.	settore alpino
s. platoon	plotone esploratori	plain s.	settore di pianura
scouting	esplorazione, esplorante	s. boundaries	limiti di settore
s. detachment	distaccamento	s. of attack	settore di attacco
	esplorante	s. of fire	settore di tiro
scramble	decollo immediato	s. of observation	settore di osservazione
scree	ghiaione	to secure	assicurare
screen	schermo, riparo, difesa,	secure voice	telefonia protetta
	cortina	security	sicurezza
smoke s.	cortina nebbiogenica	antiaircraft s.	sicurezza contraerei
to screen	nascondere, occultare	antitank s.	sicurezza controcarri
screening	vaglio	flank s.	sicurezza sui fianchi
screening forces	forze di copertura	frontal s.	sicurezza frontale
screw	vite, elica	local s.	sicurezza locale
air s.	elica	rear s.	sicurezza sul tergo
levelling s.	vite di livello	s. at rest	sicurezza in stazione
seaborne	trasportato via mare	s. classification	classifica di segretezza
s. assault	assalto dal mare	s. clearance	nulla osta di sicurezza
to seal	chiudere		(NOS)
to s. a breach	chiudere una breccia	s. control	controllo della sicurezza
seaman	marinaio	s. in the move	sicurezza in marcia
seaplane	idrovolante, idroplano	s. patrol	pattuglia di sicurezza
search	ricerca	s. violation	violazione alla sicurezza
air s. and rescue (SAR)	ricerca e soccorso aereo	signal communications s.	sicurezza delle
s. party	squadra di soccorso		trasmissioni
searchlight	riflettore, fotoelettrica	to seize	impadronirsi, conquistare
s. station	stazione fotoelettrica	seizure	conquista
s. unit	unità fotoelettrici	selection	scelta, selezione
seaside	spiaggia, riva del mare	aptitude s.	selezione attitudinale
secondary	secondario	s. of objectives	scelta degli obiettivi
s. attack	attacco secondario	target s.	scelta degli obiettivi
s. effort	sforzo secondario		(bersagli)
secrecy	segretezza	self-injection	autoiniezione
secret	segreto	self-propelled	semovente
NATO s.	NATO segreto	s.p. artillery	artiglieria semovente
top s.	segretissimo	s.p. vehicle	veicolo semovente
COSMIC top s.	segretissimo NATO	s.p. weapon	arma semovente
section	sezione	sentry	sentinella
advanced s. of depot	frazione di magazzino	to be on s. duty	essere di sentinella
	avanzata	to keep s.	montare di sentinella
air ground operations s.	sezione operativa	to relieve a s.	dare il cambio ad una
(AGOS)	terrestre		sentinella
air transport liaison s.	sezione di collegamento	s. box	garitta
	per il trasporto aereo	sequence	serie, successione, il
combat operation s.	sezione operativa aerea	s. of events	susseguirsi
(COS)	sezione di collegamento	sergeant	il susseguirsi degli
ground liaison s.			avvenimenti
			sergente

lance s.	cap. magg. che fa le veci del sergente	camouflage s.	telo mimetico
s. first class (USA)	sergente maggiore	map s.	foglio cartografico
s. major (UK)	sergente maggiore	work s.	foglio di lavoro
staff s.	sergente del comando di serie, in serie	shell	proietto, bomba, granata
serlal	scaglione di marcia (di una autocolonna)	armour-piercing (AP) s.	proietto perforante
march s.	numero di serie, numero d'ordine	armour-piercing s.	
s. number	serie, successione	capped	proietto perforante con cappuccio plastico
series	in serie	chemical s.	granata a caricamento chimico
in s.	in gruppi di	high explosive (HE) s.	granata ordinaria
in s. of	serie delle carte	high explosive antitank (HEAT) s.	
map s.	topografiche	illuminating s.	proietto controcarri
map s. name	nominativo della serie di carte topografiche	incendiary s.	granata illuminante
s. connection	collegamento in serie	inert s.	granata incendiaria
service	servizio, (pl. fam.) le Forze Armate	percussion s.	granata (proietto), inerte
administrative s.	servizio di amministrazione	practice s.	proietto a percussione
automobile s.	servizio automobilistico	smoke s.	granata per scuola di tiro
chaplain s.	servizio assistenza spirituale	tracer s.	proietto nebbiogeno
chemical s.	servizio chimico	shelter	proietto tracciante
compulsory military s.	obbligo di servizio militare	air raid s.	riparo, ricovero, rifugio
courier s.	servizio corrieri	dug-out s.	refugio antiaereo
field s.	servizio di campagna	gas-proof s.	ricovero interrato
geographical s.	servizio geografico	individual s.	ricovero antigas
intelligence s.	servizio informazioni, servizio segreto	prone s.	riparo individuale
judge advocate general s.	servizio della giustizia militare	splinter-proof s.	riparo per uomo a terra
laundry and bath s.	servizio lavanderia e bagni	underground s.	ricovero a prova di schegge
medical s.	servizio sanitario	sheld	ricovero sotterraneo
postal s.	servizio postale	protecting s.	scudo, difesa, schermo
secret s.	servizio segreto	shift	scudo (schermo)
supply s.	servizio di commissariato	to shift	protettivo
temporary duty s. (TDY)	servizio isolato	to s. fire	cambio, turno di servizio, muta
territorial s.	servizio territoriale	ship	cambiare, spostare, trasferire
transportation s.	servizio trasporti	battle s.	spostare il tiro
veterinary s.	servizio veterinario	flag s.	nave
water supply s.	servizio idrico	inshore fire support s.	corazzata
to be in active s.	essere in servizio attivo	landing s.	nave ammiraglia
set	apparato, apparecchio	merchant s.	nave per il fuoco d'appoggio (nelle operazioni anfibia)
hand s.	apparato portatile	war s.	mezzo da sbarco navale (v. landing ship)
radio s.	apparato radio (v. radio-set, radio communications)	shipping	nave mercantile
radioteletype s.	radiotelescrivente	shock	nave da guerra
setter	compositore, regolatore	s. action	imbarco, spedizione
pace s.	ufficiale con l'incarico di regolare la velocità di una colonna	s. effect	marittima
shallow connecting	camminamento	s. wave	colpo, urto
Sheeptrack	tratturo	shoes	azione d'urto
sheet	foglio, telo	physical training s. (PT shoes)	effetto d'urto
basic composition s.	scheda dell'ordine di battaglia	rope-soled s.	onda d'urto
		ski-s.	scarpe
		to shoot	scarpe da ginnastica
		to shoot down a plane	pedule
		shortage	scarponi da sciatore
		critical s.	sparare
			abbattere un aereo
			deficienza
			deficienza critica

s. in basic load

shot
shovel
sick
 to feel **s.**
 to report **s.**
s. book
s. leave
s. list
sickness
 air **s.**
 mountain **s.**
 radiation **s.**
 sea **s.**
side
s. looking aerial radar
 (SLAR)

siege
sight

angle of **s.**
 dial **s.**

enemy in **s.**
 muzzle **s.**
sign

call **s.**

conventional **s.**
 link **s.**
 net call **s.**

route **s.**
signal

recognition **s.**

s. communications

s. corps
s. equipment

s. officer

s. operating instructions
 (SOI)

s. standing instructions
 (SSI)

sound **s.**
 tele-type **s.**

visual **s.**
 whistle **s.**

signalman
signature

deficienza nelle
 dotazioni di 1^a linea
 sparo, colpo
 pala, vanga
 ammalato, indisposto
 sentirsi male
 chiedere visita medica
 registro ammalati
 licenza per malattia
 elenco degli ammalati
 malattia, morbo, male
 mal d'aereo
 mal di montagna
 male da raggi
 mal di mare
 lato, fianco, versante

apparecchiatura per il
 rilevamento radar
 laterale
 assedio
 vista, alzo (di un'arma),
 sito

angolo di sito
 cannocchiale
 panoramico
 nemico in vista
 mirino
 segno, contrassegno,
 segnale, indicante
 nominativo di stazione
 (trasm.)
 segno convenzionale
 nominativo (trasm.)
 nominativo di miglia
 (radio)
 indicante (stradale)
 segnale, trasmissione,
 segnalazione, messaggio
 convenzionale
 segnale di
 riconoscimento
 trasmissioni,
 collegamenti
 arma delle trasmissioni
 materiali delle
 trasmissioni
 ufficiale addetto alle
 trasmissioni

istruzioni sull'impiego
 delle trasmissioni

disposizioni permanenti
 per le trasmissioni
 segnalazione acustica
 trasmissioni in
 telescrivente
 segnalazioni visive
 segnalazione con
 fischietto
 trasmettitore
 firma

silence
 radio **s.**
simulated
simulator
slren
 air raid **s.**
site
 angle of **s.**
 line of **s.**
 loading **s.**

pick-up **s.**

situation
 critical **s.**
 initial **s.**
s. map
 stress **s.**
 tactical **s.**
 unforeseen **s.**
size

out-**s.**
 out-**s. vehicle**
 platoon-sized unit
 company-sized unit
skating
sketch
 field **s.**
 to ski
 ski
 s.-lift
 s. boots
 s. stick
 s. training
 s. wax
 skid
 tail **s.**

skier
 downhill **s.**
skins
 skirmlish
 skirun
 slab
 wind **s.**
sleigh
slide
 s. projector
sliding
 diagonal **s.**
 sideways **s.**
sling

slit
s. trench
slope

silenzio
 silenzio radio
 simulato
 simulatore
 sirena
 sirena di allarme aereo
 sito, luogo posto
 angolo di sito
 linea di sito
 posto (luogo) di
 caricamento
 punto di raccolta, di
 prelievo (es. da parte di
 elicotteri, senza
 atterraggio)
 situazione
 situazione critica
 situazione iniziale
 carta della situazione
 tensione
 situazione tattica
 situazione imprevista
 grandezza, dimensione,
 misura, livello
 fuori misura
 veicolo fuori misura
 unità a livello plotone
 unità a livello compagnia
 passo di pattinaggio
 schizzo, disegno
 schizzo campale
 sciare
 sci
 sciovia
 scarponi da sci
 bastoncino da sci
 addestramento sciistico
 sciolina
 pattino
 pattino di coda (di
 aereo)
 sciatore
 discesista
 pelli di foca
 scaramuccia
 pista da sci
 lastra, banco
 banco (lastra) di neve
 slitta, traino
 diapositiva
 proiettore di diapositive
 slittamento (con sci)
 slittamento diagonale
 slittamento laterale
 cinghia del fucile, fascia
 (benda) per sospendere
 un arto ferito, cinghia
 per trasporto materiali
 con elicottero (braca)
 fenditura lunga e stretta
 trincea stretta
 pendio, versante,
 pendenza


maximum s.	massima pendenza	s. arge	era spaziale
reverse s.	pendio (versante)	spade	badile, vanga
	inverso	spare	ricambio, scorta
snow s.	pendio di neve	ordnance s. parts	parti di ricambio
talus s.	cono di deiezione	spark(ing)-plug	candela di accensione
sloping	declive, in pendio,		(di un motore)
	degradante	specialist	specialista, specializzato
smok	tuta	speciality	specializzazione
camouflage s.	tuta mimetica	military occupational s.	
smoke	fumo, fumogeno,	(MOS)	specializzazione militare
	nebbiogeno	speed	velocità
s. agents	nebbiogeni	average s.	velocità media (kph/mpg)
s. ammunition	munizioni nebbiogene		= chilometri all'ora /
s. candle	candelotto fumogeno	average cruising s.	miglia all'ora)
signalling s.	fumata per segnalazione		velocità media di
s. producers	nebbiogeni	speedometer	crociera
s. shell	bomba nebbiogenea		tachimetro-
s. screen	cortina fumogena	splint	contachilometri
	(nebbiogenea)	splint	spirito, animo
snake	serpe, vipera	martial s.	spirito bellicoso
s. bite	morsicatura di vipera	team s.	spirito di squadra (spirito
snapping	moschettone (alpin.)		di corpo)
sniper	tiratore isolato	splint	stecca per tenere
snow	neve		insieme le ossa
crust s.	neve con crosta	splinter	fratturate
hard frozen s.	neve dura	s. -proof	scheggia
heavy s.	neve attaccaticcia	splint-pin	a prova di schegge
new s.	neve fresca	to spot	coppiglia
powdery s.	neve polverosa	spot	riconoscere, localizzare,
s. shoes	racchette da neve	s. elevation (USA), s.	individuare
snowplough	spazzaneve (con sci)	height (UK)	luogo, punto
central s. descent	discesa a spazzaneve	spotter	
s. turn	svolta a spazzaneve		quota del terreno
soldier	soldato	spotting	cartuccia da
fellow-s.	commilitone		aggiustamento
private s.	soldato semplice	flash s.	rilevamento,
soldierly	militare, soldatesco,	spring	localizzazione
	marziale	magazine s.	rilevamento vampa
s. duty	dovere militare (di	s. hook	molla
	soldato)	spur	molla del caricatore
s. honour	onore militare	mountain s.	moschettone (alpin.)
soon	subito, presto	spy	sperone
as s. as possible (ASAP)	al più presto possibile	squad	sperone roccioso
sorties	sortita aerea	assaulting s.	spia
source	fonte, origine, sorgente	decontamination s.	squadra
power s.	fonte di energia,		squadra assaltatori
	alimentatore di un	intelligence s.	squadra
s. of intelligence	apparato	light weapons s.	decontaminazione
south	fonte informativa	machine gun s.	squadra informatori
southern	sud	mortar s.	squadra armi leggere
sowing	meridionale	rifle s.	squadra mitraglieri
mine s.	semina, posa	scout s.	squadra mortai
s. technique	posa delle mine	squadron	squadra fucilieri
	tecnica di posa (delle	air s.	squadra esploratori
space	mine)	cavalry s.	squadron, squadriglia
	spazio, posto, superficie,	recce s.	squadriglia aerea
air s.	larghezza	staff	squadron di cavalleria
cargo s.	spazio aereo		squadron esplorante
	spazio destinato al	air s. officer (ASO)	Stato Maggiore,
road s.	caricamento (su un		Personale del Comando
road s. of a vehicle	mezzo di trasporto)		ufficiale di Stato
	profondità di marcia		maggiore
	profondità elementare		dell'Aeronautica

allied s.	Stato Maggiore Alleato	(MAS)	Standardizzazione
Chief of S. (COFS)	Capo di Stato Maggiore	s. agreement (STANAG)	accordo di unificazione
combined s.	Stato Maggiore combinato	stand-by	pronto, allerta
Direction s. (DI Staff)	Direzione esercitazione	s. b. alert	stato di allarme aereo al suolo, di immediato intervento
Joint S.	Stato Maggiore interforze	stand-down	ordine di cessato allarme
S. Officer	Ufficiale di Stato Maggiore	stand-to	ordine dato per allarmare un reparto in caso di pericolo permanente
General S.	Stato Maggiore dei Comandi di Grande Unità	standing	disposizioni permanenti per le trasmissioni
assistant Chief of s.	Sottocapo di Stato Maggiore	signal s. instructions (SSI)	disposizioni permanenti
Personnel (G1)	Ufficiale addetto al personale	s. operating procedures (SOP)	ordine permanente
Intelligence (G2)	Ufficiale addetto alle informazioni	s. order	stella, stelletta
operation and training (G3)	Ufficiale addetto alle operazioni e all'addestramento	star	stella polare
Air-ground Cooperation (G3/Air)	Ufficiale addetto all'aerocooperazione	polar s.	inizio, partenza
Logistics (G4)	Ufficiale addetto ai servizi	start	linea di partenza
Civil Affairs (G5)	Ufficiale addetto agli affari civili	s. line	inizio dell'attacco nemico
unit s.	ufficiali dei comandi di unità inferiori	s. of hostile attack	punto di partenza
executive officer personnel (S1)	ufficiale esecutivo	s. point (SP)	stato, situazione
intelligence (S2)	ufficiale addetto al personale	state	situazione munizioni
operation and training (S3)	ufficiale addetto alle informazioni	ammunition s.	stato di approntamento di una demolizione (armata o in sicurezza)
air-ground cooperation (S3/Air)	ufficiale addetto alle operazioni e all'addestramento	demolition s. of readiness (armed or safe)	stato di prontezza, stato di approntamento
supply (S4)	ufficiale addetto all'aerocooperazione	s. of readiness	stato dei rifornimenti
special s.	ufficiale addetto ai rifornimenti	supply s. (SUPSTATE)	dichiarazione
stage	composto dagli altri	statement	dichiarazione ufficiale
s. of battle	ufficiali del comando per una specifica operazione	official s.	stazione, posto
s. of development	(compresi i comandanti delle unità di rinforzo o di supporto)	station	posto di medicazione (USA)
staging	grado, fase, scena	aid s.	posto antenna
s. area	fase della battaglia	air cooperations signals s.	stazione emittente (radiotrasmittente)
s. post	fase di sviluppo	broadcasting s.	posto di raccolta feriti
stalemate	sosta	collecting s.	posto di medicazione (UK)
nuclear s.	zona di sosta	dressing s.	stazione sanitaria
to stall	posto sosta	medical holding s.	campale
standard	punto morto, equilibrio	missile early warning s. (MEWS)	stazione di allarme antimissile
s. day of supply	equilibrio nucleare	prisoner of war	campo di transito e smistamento prigionieri
standardization	fermare	processing s.	stazione (posto) radiotelefonica
Military Agency for s.	temporaneamente	radio-telephony s.	stazione ricetrasmittente
	standard, tipo	relay s.	stazione fotoelettrica
	giornata standard (tipo) di rifornimento	searchlight s.	stazione di collegamento
	standardizzazione, unificazione	signal s.	testa di scarico
	Ente Militare per la	terminal s.	centrale termica
		thermal s.	stazione di transito
		transit s.	stazione radiotelegrafica
		wireless telegraphy s.	livello, stato, condizione
		status	livello addestrativo
		s. of training	bastimento, piroscalo
		steamer	nave cisterna
		tank s.	

steamship	piroscafo	bundle of s.	balla di paglia
stenographer	stenografo	s. for ground cover	paglia per giacitura
step	passo	strength	forza
goose s.	passo dell'oca	adsent s.	forza assente
route s.	passo di strada	actual s.	forza presente
sterilization	sterilizzazione	assigned s.	forza assegnata
s. equipment	attrezzatura per la sterilizzazione	attached s.	forza aggregata (da altri reparti)
stern	poppa	authorized s.	forza bilanciata
stick	bastoncino, decollo (nucleo di paracadutisti)	below s.	con gli effettivi ridotti
control s.	barra di comando, cloche	detached s.	forza distaccata (assegnata ad altri reparti)
ski-s.	bastoncino da sci	effective s.	forza effettiva
s. leader	capo decollo	enemy s.	forza del nemico
stirrup (line)	staffa (alpin.)	enemy s. computation	valutazione della forza del nemico
stocks	scorte, provviste, giacenze	enlisted s.	forza arruolata
quartermaster s.	scorte di intendenza	full s.	forza piena
reserve s.	riserva di materiali	peacetime organizational s.	forza organica di pace
s. number	numero categorico	reserve s.	forza in congedo
stockpile	riserva di grande quantità di materiali	up-to s.	con gli effettivi al completo
stockpiling	costituzione delle riserve	wartime organizational s.	forza organica di guerra
stomatologic	stomatologico	to strengthen	rinforzare, rafforzare, fortificare
s. affection	affezione stomatologica	strengthening	rafforzamento
to stop	fermare, fermarsi, arrestare	stress	tensione
stoppage	sospensione, arresto	s. situation	periodo di tensione
s. of pay	sospensione del soldo	stretcher	barella, lettiga
storage	deposito, immagazzinamento	s. -bearer (UK)	portaferiti (v. litter- bearer)
stores	provviste, scorte, depositi, magazzini	strike	attacco, (specialm.)
defence s.	materiale di rafforzamento	air s.	attacco aereo
general s.	scorte di materiale vario	air-to-ground s.	attacco aereo al suolo
medical s.	scorta di materiale sanitario	nuclear s.	attacco nucleare
military s.	rifornimenti militari	striker	percussore (d'arma)
ordnance s.	scorta di materiale bellico	striking	attaccante, d'attacco
to store	immagazzinare, depositare, ammassare	s. force	forza d'attacco aereo
storehouse	magazzino	strip	striscia
storekeeper	magazziniere	air s.	striscia di atterraggio
stove	stufa, fornello	identification s.	telo per la segnalazione
portable s. (Primus)	fornello portatile Primus	mine s.	striscia minata
stragler	disperso, sbandato	take-off s.	striscia di decollo
s. collecting point	punto di raccolta	stripes	galloni
straight	dispersi (sbandati)	to lose one's s.	perdere i galloni (essere degradato)
to go s. on	diritto, dritto	strongpoint	caposaldo
strap	andare sempre dritto, andare avanti	supplementary s.	caposaldo integrativo
shoulder s.	cinghia, correggia, striscia di stoffa	temporary anti-tank s.	caposaldo controcarri
strategic	spalline	unoccupied (U) s.	caposaldo predisposto (non occupato)
s. movement	strategico	structure	struttura
s. position	movimento (mossa)	static s.	struttura statica
strategics (strategy)	strategico	struggle	lotta, contesa, mischia
straw	posizione strategica	stunt	acrobazia (aeron.)
	strategia	s. flying	volo acrobatico
	paglia	subaltern	ufficiale subalterno
		subject	oggetto, soggetto, argomento
		sub-machine gun	mitra

submarine	sottomarino, sommergibile	requisitioned s.	materiale requisito
midged s.	sommergibile tascabile	special s. (al pl.)	rifornimenti speciali
mine-laying s.	sommergibile posamine	supplementary s.	rifornimento straordinario
nuclear s.	sommergibile a propulsione nucleare	s. and evacuation s.	rifornimento a sgombero
submariner	sommergibilista	state (SUPSTATE)	situazione dei rifornimenti
subordinate	subordinato, dipendente	to support	sostenere, appoggiare
s. unit	unità dipendente	support (sp)	sostegno, appoggio, mantenimento, rinalzo
subordination	subordinazione, dipendenza	air s.	appoggio (concorso) aereo
subsistence	sussistenza, mezzi di sussistenza	close air s.	appoggio aereo diretto
subversion	sovversione, eversione, sovvertimento	close s.	appoggio ravvicinato
counter-s.	contro eversione	direct s. (DS)	appoggio diretto
war of s.	guerra sovversiva	fire s.	appoggio di fuoco
to succeed	aver successo	general air s.	appoggio aereo indiretto
success	successo, vittoria	general s. (GS)	appoggio generale, massa di manovra, appoggio indiretto
summary	sommario, compendio	immediate air s.	appoggio aereo immediato
intelligence s. (INTSUM)	sommario delle informazioni	in s. of	in appoggio a, a sostegno di
personnel daily s. (PDS)	sommario giornaliero del personale	logistical s.	sostegno logistico
sunrise	il levar del sole, alba, est	mutual s.	appoggio reciproco
sunset	tramonto, ovest	naval gunfire s. (NGS)	appoggio di fuoco navale
superimposed	sovrapposto	preplanned air s.	appoggio aereo pianificato
superiority	superiorità	tactical air s.	appoggio aereo tattico
air s.	superiorità aerea	s. platoon	plotone di rinalzo
decisive s.	netta superiorità	s. squad	squadra di rinalzo
nuclear s.	superiorità nucleare	supporting	in appoggio, a sostegno
supervision	ispezione, sorveglianza, controllo	artillery supporting fire	fuoco di appoggio
supply (al pl. supplies)	rifornimento, provvista (v. anche classes of supplies); rifornimenti all'immediato	close s. fire	fuoco di accompagnamento
accompanying s. (al pl.)	seguito	s. unit	unità di supporto
air s.	rifornimento per via aerea	s. weapons	armi di accompagnamento
air-dropped s. (al pl.)	rifornimenti aviolanciati	supposition	supposto
ammunition s.	rifornimento munizioni	suppression	repressione
built-up s. (al pl.)	provviste accantonate per i rifornimenti successivi	s. fire	fuoco (tiro) di repressione
common user s. (al pl.)	materiali di uso comune tra più unità	supreme	supremo in capo, superiore
critical s. and materials	rifornimenti e materiali critici	s. commander	comandante in capo, comandante supremo
daily replenishment s. (al pl.)	materiali per il rifornimento (reintegro) giornaliero	surface	superficie
expendable s. and materials	materiali di consumo	earth's s.	superficie terrestre
follow-up s. (al pl.)	rifornimenti al seguito (non immediato), rifornimenti successivi	surge	ondata, flotto, nube
locally procured s.	rifornimento locale	base s.	nube nucleare di base
main s. route (MSR)	asse principale dei rifornimenti	surgeon	ad anello
on call s.	rifornimento su richiesta	surgery	chirurgo
		emergency war s.	chirurgia
		s. team	chirurgia di emergenza
		surgical	in guerra
		s. treatment	nucleo chirurgico
		surplus	chirurgico
		surprise	trattamento chirurgico
		s. attack	eccedenza
		surrender	sorpresa
			attacco di sorpresa
			resa, capitolazione

to surround surveillance air s. area of s. battlefield s.	circondare, accerchiare sorveglianza sorveglianza aerea area di sorveglianza sorveglianza del campo di battaglia sorveglianza terrestre piano di sorveglianza rilevamento, rilievo rilevamento del terreno rilevamento della radioattività rilevamento topografico ufficiale topografo sopravvivenza sopravvivenza al combattimento addestramento alla sopravvivenza superstite, sopravvissuto data di scadenza sostenere, prolungare sostenuto, prolungato combattimento sostenuto prolungato sforzo prolungato travolgere giurare, prestare giuramento spazzatore spazzamine spazzaneve centralino telefonico simbolo, emblema simbolo (emblema)	national s. syndicates sub-s. syrette syringe system air ground operation s. alarm s. communications s. control and reporting s. feed s. grid s. high altitude bombing s. (HABS) loading s. low altitude bombing s. (LABS) radio communications s. s. of outposts tactical air control s. telephone communications s. teletype communications s.	militare simbolo (emblema) nazionale gruppi sottogruppi siretta per autoiniezioni siringa per iniezioni sistema, metodo sistema operativo aeroterrestre sistema di allarme rete delle trasmissioni sistema di avvistamento, controllo e riporto sistema di alimentazione di un'arma sistema di quadrettatura della carta topografica sistema di bombardamento ad alta quota sistema di caricamento sistema di bombardamento a bassa quota sistema (rete) delle trasmissioni radio sistema di avamposti sistema di controllo aerotattico rete dei collegamenti telefonici rete delle trasmissioni in telescrivente
s. of ground s. officer survival combat s. training in combat s. survivor (opp. survivor) suspense date to sustain sustained s. combat s. effort to swamp to swear sweeper mine s. snow s. switchboard (swbd) symbol military s.			





*Officier de Carabiniers 1862
(Genève)*



*Carabinier (caporal) 1874
(Genève)*



*Carabinier (sergent) 1916
(Genève)*

*Carabinier (sergent-major) 1925
(Genève)*

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and Perestroika in the West

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CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICO STRATEGIC CONTEXT



We are experiencing a time of radical transformations in the configuration of security in Europe. Much has already changed, and more is going to change, owing to the acceleration of the political evolution in Eastern Europe, also as a consequence of the free elections that will be held in many countries, including the Soviet Union.

As a consequence, the security systems are also changing. We are proceeding from the rigid contraposition, existing in the bipolar world, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to an approach that can be called, even now, "cooperative" in defining the systems of security, which ought to be reconsidered in their very foundations. From a unilateral conception of security, which had caused the armaments race in Europe - or more precisely, the race with which the west had, more or less feverishly, tried to balance the increase of the military threat coming from the Warsaw Pact - in Vienna one senses the possibility to proceed to a form of mutual and balanced security, attaining the lowest possible level both of financial and social costs and risks of conflict.

The logic of the balance of forces must be progressively replaced by a joint system of Pan-European security, which should avoid imbalances and instabilities and adjust to the political transformations occurring in Europe. These transformations prelude the overcoming of the setting situations deriving from the outcome WWII. Deterrence, which has

been essential in order to avert a conflict in Europe, must be integrated, at first, and subsequently substituted with forms of cooperation in mutual security.

Clearly we must act with realism and gradualism. The implementation of the proposals under negotiation in Vienna is not a forgone conclusion nor can we consider the reductions envisaged by the Vienna agenda as already occurred. Disarmament must

be seen, first of all, as a means to achieve more security. Therefore it is essential to maintain, during the entire process of transformation of the present strategic balances in Europe, an adequate power of deterrence and defence, not only for elementary prudential considerations, but also in order to foster a positive development of the negotiations. Let us not forget that Vienna is the fruit of the cohesion, the will and the solidarity of the west which have convinced the Soviet leaders that the increase in military power of the Warsaw Pact not only would not achieve any military goal but would in the end affect the Soviet economy and that of Central and Eastern Europe irremediably. The west has always carried out a policy aimed at reconciling deterrence with détente and economic and cultural cooperation. With ups and downs, this view has proved to be decisive, and today we witness the opening - but not the conclusion - of a phase of great and positive evolution.

We must not waste this great opportunity because of excessive impatience. We should not forget that the actual power of the Warsaw Pact is still 97% of that of December 1988, when Gorbachev announced at the United Nations the first unilateral plan for reducing the Soviet forces. These are only the material aspects of the power ratio, while the politico-social ones, which are nevertheless essential elements for a global assessment of the problem, are going through a phase of rapid and positive dynamism. Undoubtedly the warning times have lengthened and therefore there are less possibilities of a surprise attack, also in relation to the actual transformations undergone by the decision-making mechanisms of the Warsaw Pact. Previously, the operational orders did not have to pass the screening of the various member governments of the Pact, as is the case with NATO. Now it is by no means sure that the armed forces of the Eastern countries would obey the orders of the WP Commands. But, as I stressed

Facing page, left.

Review Inspector in full dress - 1800.

Facing page, right.

Colour-bearer, Foot Grenadiers, Presidential Guard - 1804.

Right.

Chief of Brigade, Line infantry - 1802.



before, the agreements on the reduction of armaments concern armaments themselves, not political statements, promises or decision-making mechanisms, which are indeed important but must not be mistaken with the actual means of defence and security.

Therefore we must be cautious and courageous at the same time. We must assess the present and think of the future. And the need to think about the future is all the more convincing as the rhythm of the

present transformations is rapid, and even unexpected.

EUROPE'S POSSIBLE FUTURE SYSTEMS OF SECURITY

If the Atlantic Alliance has been the frame of reference of the European security, it should continue to be so, also in the transition phase towards the new organizations of security, which will be created following the changes and the possible

transformations of the Soviet model. Of course, the Alliance will have to evolve, emphasizing its political characters vis-à-vis the strictly military aspect. A thing that is easier to say than to put into practice. It is a fact that if NATO cuts down its military component, also by reducing the American forces stationed in Europe, it will increase the responsibilities of the European component, which will have to tackle either individually or collectively.

This will occur in a changed strategic setting - gone from a threat characterized by high intensity but relatively limited probability, to one of lesser intensity but more difficult to master - and in the context of reduction of conventional weapons resulting from the Vienna negotiations (CF).

This framework includes the aspiration to reduce the military expenses, which is not an obvious and immediate result.

On the contrary the announced American savings - together with the cost of the controls deriving from the implementation of the CFE agreements - risk to burden rather than lighten the national defence budgets. Hence the absolute necessity, from a practical point of view - besides the political reasons - to achieve a high-level of cooperation and cohesion in what concerns European security and defence. This is also the reason of the clear Italian preference for a system of verifications at NATO and WEU level which motivates, among other things, our proposal to transform the Comiso-Base into a training Centre for the personnel who shall be charged with the controls. The future system of security and military organizations will have to be Pan-European, in order to avoid the reappearance of divisions and contrasts which, at least as far as Western Europe is concerned, we hope to have definitively overcome. In this perspective, it is a mat-



Dragoons' Officer - 1798.

ter of considering all possible scenarios. Nevertheless, the political developments are so swift that consideration and action must have a very close link.

I wish to stress in particular two themes which are the subjects of your most careful analyses: the institutional issue of European defence and its Mediterranean dimension.

THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE OF EUROPE

The idea that the current process of reduction of armaments in Europe could lead to a total "Europeanization" of European defence and to the end of the Atlantic Alliance at least in the form it has had until now, i.e. a transformation in a simple pact of American guarantee or, as some even more boldly maintain, a Russian-American guarantee, does not appear realistic and is perhaps contradictory for the security and stability of Europe and the world.

The maximum goals of "Europeanization" that can be concretely foreseen today are those expressed by the WEU in the common platform of the Hague. The European identity must be strengthened also in the security sector and we should achieve a more balanced relationship within the Atlantic Alliance between the American superpower and the other member nations. As always, one cannot envisage sudden and radical changes. Nothing would justify them in the present situation. One can think instead of gradual pragmatic measures, with mutual concessions, to be adopted without on-principle inflexibility, so as to harmonize and adjust the existing institutions to the new realities.

First of all, all the Organizations concerned with the security policy

in Europe could be grouped in a single centre. The members of the WEU assembly could be the same parliamentarians of the Atlantic assembly, and the WEU could have an organization mirroring that of the Atlantic Council - Military Committee, envisaging possible particular links, of a personal kind, between the two institutions.

The WEU could be strengthened and polarized towards precise objectives, by charging it with specific duties. An interesting forum of thought in this regard could be the Institute of European Studies on Security, recently instituted by the

WEU. It could give precious indications about the future configurations of the European system of security in every sector, from recruitment to force structure, from procurement to technological controls and export of armaments, from 3CI systems to the future doctrine of deterrence, i.e. of preventing the outbreak of a conflict.

MEDITERRANEAN AND OUT-OF-AREA PROBLEMS

Generally NATO's attention is focused on Central Europe, where the bulk of the forces of the two blocs is concentrated. Nevertheless the strategic link of the Southern Region with the Central Region is a primary factor for the stability of the entire area. If it did not exist or became excessively weak, there would be dangerous consequences: the creation of a *de facto* zone of differentiated security; the reduction of the Alliance in Southern Europe to a mere zone of compensation for the security agreements of each individual state with the US; the assimilation of the problems of security of the Mediterranean to those "out of area". Southern Europe and the Mediterranean do not only constitute a regional dimension of the Atlantic Alliance within the East-West confrontation, but have a wider strategic function as a zone of contact between Europe, Asia and Africa. Here the national policies of the United States and of each individual country of Southern Europe, as well as that of the other littoral countries, overlap in an often incoherent way. Moreover, it is emerging in the area, albeit with difficulties and contradictions, a European policy for the Mediterranean. It is spreading, little by little, from the economic sector to the political and the security sectors, with a preference, as concerns the latter, for bilateral or multilateral "variable geometry" agreements, without precise obligations, except the gener-



Doctor or surgeon, Modena National Guard - 1797.

ic one of "timely consultations should common interests be involved".

Nevertheless, at least in the short term, the problem of coordinating the European policies in the area remains open, even if the common platform of European security, approved at the Hague in October 1987, mentions concentrations for the out-of-area problems and not mere consultations, as envisaged by the Harmel report and at the meeting of the Atlantic Council of May 1983.


Among the initiatives which can be considered in their institutional aspect, it would be of particular significance to extend WEU to Greece and Turkey; this could encourage a policy of European security for the whole Mediterranean area, a policy not limited, as is now, to bilateral agreements for the Western Mediterranean. In addition, from the politico-strategic standpoint it would be necessary to work out, within the WEU, a global concept of European security, which should organically include the Mediterranean dimension.

To this end, the coordination of appropriate national initiatives and the promotion of complementarities (economic, political and military) among the various nations, appear to be preconditions of an integrated European cooperation that could be flexibly activated whenever there is a convergence of political wills.

A greater European presence in humanitarian interventions as well as in civil and environmental defence would be urgent and significant. A coordination by the WEU and also by the EEC in this sector could in fact increase the weight of the European presence, as well as Europe's commitment for the stability and peace in the area.

As a matter of fact, the problem of security in the Mediterranean must be seen as a specific aspect of European security and therefore within a global framework of cooperation, of which the military element is only one component. The situations of potential danger or crisis

First Class War Commissar «Ordinatore» in full dress - 1803.



that frequently arise in the Mediterranean spring actually from the interaction of multiple tensions - demographic, economic, ethnic, social, religious - which, to a lesser or greater extent, have an impact on the security of all of our Europe.

The Mediterranean is at present the area with the largest demographic imbalance in the whole planet, with the development of a large-scale migration from South to North; the Mediterranean is also the area of the world where there are the widest disparities in living standards, and risks to become the most tragic frontier of the North-South confrontation; besides, it is the initial meeting - or clashing - point of ethnic and cultural realities, which are certainly not devoid of significance for our continent.

Finally, the Mediterranean immediately reflects also the crises emerging in connected and adjacent geographic areas, and this makes the geopolitical and strategic whole of the Europe-Mediterranean area even more intricate.

INITIATIVES AND MEASURES THAT COULD BE ADOPTED BY THE WEU

In order to make the European action more incisive, the WEU can therefore take a number of initiatives both within the framework of East-West relations and as regards the out-of-area problems. To make an example, and in an extremely synthetic form, I shall mention some of the aspects which I consider more significant in connection to what I have just said:

- study of a Pan-European system and, within its bounds, of a Western-European subsystem of security;
- future strategic relations between Europe and the United States;
- configuration of a minimum nuclear deterrent in Europe;
- harmonization of the structures

and systems of recruitment of the European armed forces;

- coordination, at European level, of the systems of controls envisaged by the Vienna agreements, which will become essential also for the forthcoming warning and intelligence strategic system of an integrated defence of Europe;
- institutional adaptation of the WEU to permit a progressive strengthening of the European pillar, albeit appropriately coordinated with NATO;
- systems of strategic connection between Central Europe and its flanks, in order to avoid that the greater stability of the former results in an instability for the latter, especially in the long term;
- elaboration of a joint European position in connection with the problems concerning the transfer of strategically critical technologies;
- definition of standards, as homogeneous as possible, for weapon production and trade.

As far as the external areas are concerned, I believe that the WEU can play an active role in a wide range of sectors that touch on every aspect of security, such as:

- preventive actions of stabilization. In coordination with the institutions of the Community we could tackle the question of economic policies and aid to development, both at bilateral and Community level, in the perspective of a more precise targeting on the objectives of security. The Mediterranean group of the WEU could moreover extend its considerations to the politico-strategic impact of military assistance, of armament export and of the transfer of planning and productive capabilities in this particular sector to the non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean;
- prearrangements of the joint management of crises, deterrent manoeuvres and possible initiatives. The goal should be the interoperability of the systems and centres of crisis management of the various WEU nations. A par-

ticularly important sector appears to be that of intelligence pools and the development of a European satellite network, which acquire particular significance also in connection with the requirements of verifications and controls of armaments as well as environmental monitoring and civil defence, also within the UN initiative on this subject (International Decade for Reduction of Natural Disasters);

- a particular sector which appears to have good prospects of develop-



ment, thanks also to its high degree of political acceptability, is that regarding the coordination of the special antiterrorism forces among the countries concerned, as well as a joint approach as regards the policies against drug traffic and organized crime;

- an even higher level of cooperation, also within the WEU, could concern the interoperability and the joint training of the rapid intervention forces, as is already the case among some European countries; this would have moreover an intrinsic deterrent value, being the weight of a joint European action surely superior to the sum of the capabilities of the individual nations;
- a special attention should be paid to the problem of missile and chemical proliferation in the Third-World countries nearer to us. This problem is susceptible to a response that could also be European, particularly from a dissuasive point of view;
- an accurate inventory of the specific measures adopted by our country could permit, if necessary, to develop a structure of cooperation, even if only for contingent situations.

THE FUTURE OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASIS OF THE WESTERN DEFENCE

A sector that seems to require a more incisive European action is that of armament production. Be as it may, the CFE negotiations will cause a reduction of orders and, moreover, in general, national Parliaments will be less inclined to appropriate funds for defence.

Besides, the huge stocks of materials that would become available for the export markets after the CFE negotiations, will further diminish the export of new armaments.

Officer, Line infantry - 1802.

Considered the dimensions of the national markets and the technological and industrial fragmentation, the mentioned decrease will have to be countered by giving impulse to the tendencies towards cooperation and specialization of rôle within the European sphere. On the one hand, we shall have to work seriously at restructuring the armament industry but, on the other, we shall have to avoid the negative repercussions on the European and Atlantic security that could derive from the disappearance of entire productive sectors. This is a new area in which the WEU can and must give a further contribution to the appreciable action of stimulus and direction which it carries out already within the IEPG. As a matter of fact, these are contributions which will eventually facilitate the indispensable coordination of the EEC's industrial and technological defence policies, also according to art. 30 of the European Single Act.

CONCLUSIVE CONSIDERATIONS

In concluding this presentation, if I am allowed to propose some considerations, schematic as they may be, on the historical changes occurring in Europe, I believe I can say that we are in front of new events which, certainly, could not be foreseen, due to their swiftness, but which are not accidental. There is a relationship between what is happening and our inspiring principles.

Italy - together with her European partners - has developed as a democratic nation within the bounds of three fundamental choices:

- the observance of the principles of the United Nations, and in particular that of cooperation as a peaceful means of settlement of international disputes;
- Atlantic solidarity as an instrument of cooperation and defence of countries which share a common ideal of democracy and progress in peace;
- the progress of European integra-

tion aimed at creating an area of stable cooperation among the peoples of the Old Continent. The success of these choices, and especially that of European integration, are probably the primary factors of the radical changes in the coordinates of the European and world policy that we are witnessing.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The role played by this organization has gone through alternate phases, but has been unquestionably positive for the development of a new international order founded more on understanding than on opposition. The evolution of the East-West relations should have a favourable influence also on the activity of the UN, strengthening especially the instrument of "preven-

tive diplomacy". Prospectively, one can presume an increase in the UN peacekeeping activities and, in this sense, a more substantial contribution could be required also of the countries of Western Europe. This also is a sector where a concerted European action appears desirable and where the WEU, can find interesting propositional spaces. As far as Italy is concerned; I can confirm that, in so far as the obligations of security and budget allow, we shall not fail to give, as in the past, our active contribution.

NATO

I have already mentioned the prospects of emphasizing the political role vis-à-vis the military role of the Atlantic Alliance.

The desirable overcoming of the divisions and oppositions between the blocs and the progressive acceptance, by the European Societies, of the principles sanctioned by the Act of Helsinki, will simultaneously lead to increased military responsibilities of the European allies, also in relation to the Mediterranean dimension of the Continent's security. But NATO will not be in a position, as far as one can see at present, to do without the politico-defensive support of the North American component of the Alliance, without which the stability of our area could be less guaranteed.

The Atlantic Organization remains, at the present stage, the best vehicle for the upkeep and strengthening of the relations between Europe and North America and for the participation of the United States and Canada in the European concert: this will be even more so if the simplification of the complex and multiform reality of the European institutions facilitates the dialogue across the Atlantic.



*Bandsman, Venice National Guard
- 1797.*

PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

The progressive opening of the East European countries to the patterns of a Western-style pluralistic democracy, as desired and desirable as it may be, if there are no appropriate frames of reference risks to create a state of confusion and, in the final analysis, a state of political void.

The danger of the occurrence of conditions of instability and nationalistic tensions, which have characterized previous phases in the history of our Continent, is actually possible but must be made impossible.

The historic process of European unification has probably been the most stimulating example for the political transformations occurring in the East, and also the most evident demonstration of the ways to overcome the narrow limits of national egoism. Therefore it is the duty of the European institutions, first of all, to make sure that the wealth of experience accumulated during these years of integration goes also to the advantage of the other side of Europe, working as a pole of attraction, thus avoiding perpetuate an asymmetrical development of the two Europes.

A first significant step in this direction should be made through the European Council. Once elections in the East European countries are carried out and the principles of pluralist democracy and respect of the rights of man are established, the European Council should admit at full right the countries that apply for membership. It is one of democracy's training grounds and, besides, a forum of Pan-European cooperation which should not be underestimated.

Besides the central point of inter-European cooperation, and the most complex as well, remains the Community.

The European Community will

have to do its utmost to promote its economic, social and technological development; in order to accomplish this in a satisfactory way, on the one hand, it will have to strengthen its internal cohesion speeding up the process of economic and political integration and, on the other, foster the birth of a pole of multilateral cooperation among the Eastern countries themselves. The EEC could consequently lay down the lines of a global cooperation with the Eastern countries, with a view to a more structured cooperation extended also to the EFTA. Next and urgent, as the succession of events indicates, come the problems of the reunification of the German people. It is peculiar that the Community has taken no initiative as yet in this regard, and only in the last few days the President of the Committee, Delors, has asked to examine the question during a special session of the European Council. True as it is that, according to the principles of self-determination, the times and modes of reunification of the two Germanys are for the German citizens to decide, it is also true that the obligations existing within the

Atlantic Alliance and the Community especially, emphasize their intrinsic European significance.

The sacrosanct right to unification of the two Germanys is absolutely beyond question, on the contrary, it is a matter of ensuring that this legitimate aspiration is allowed all its due capacities in the process of European unification.

The Community cannot be a neutral bystander. On the contrary, it is called to its responsibilities, so that this decisive historical event becomes a further element of stability and progress of the whole Continent.

The German people's reunification, as well as the reintegration of the East European countries in the democratic society, must find in the European Community its primary reference point.

This does not diminish the responsibilities that belong to the Atlantic Alliance and to the wider frame of reference constituted by the CSCE. But, given the level of integration achieved, it is above all the European Community's duty to ensure the conditions for the peaceful and democratic development of a new European order.


Last but not least, the question of the Soviet Union. Also, in this regard, a strong commitment by the West is required, in order to make sure that the current evolution can progress without destabilizing risks. It is a long way, full of uncertainties which, on the international plane, is anchored to the process of the negotiations held within the framework of the CSCE. But as the reformist trends under way will gain more and more ground, as we hope, CSCE and the agreements on the reduction of armaments will have to be complemented with agreements for wide cooperation, in order to help modernize the Soviet productive structure and the economic and social development of this great Nation.

Mino Martinazzoli

*Presentation of the Minister
of the Defence at the WEU,
on February 15th, 1990*



War Commissar «Ordinatore» in
undress - 1801.



PACIFIST AND ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENTS IN ITALY 1980 - 1988

CENTRO MILITARE DI STUDI STRATEGICI

RAPPORTO DI RICERCA SU:
I MOVIMENTI PACIFISTI E
ANTINUCLEARI IN ITALIA
1980-1988

**RIVISTA
MILITARE**

The objective of the research was to study the Italian pacifist movement. In order to reach this goal two perspectives have been adopted. The first perspective aims to accomplish a social historical analysis of its nature. The second one aims at evaluating its impact on two actors of the political system that are important albeit different: public opinion and political élites.

THE MOVEMENT AND ITS NATURE


In the present decade, particularly in the first half, a big debate on the meaning to be given to the peace movement has involved the Italian political and cultural forces, as individuals and groups. The analysis and the evaluation of the rich bibliography on the matter show that such a debate - often well documented and always live and passionate - opposed, as it happens in these cases, two parties. These parties are opposed on the judgement to be given on the movement not only about the merit but also on the political and philosophical assumptions, as well as on the method. Schematically and for synthesis' sake, these two perspectives may be led one to the political view and the other to the sociological view. The first one interprets the movement mainly in terms of the consequences (positive or negative according to the opposing points of view, both equally represented) that it had on politics. The other one deals with the movement itself, focusing on its motivation and forms of expression rather than on the immediate effects of its action.

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Tato: *Volte's Street to Ferrara*, oil on canvas cm 45 x 52, 1928.

Above.

Tato: *Dynamism of a landscape*, oil on canvas cm 51.5 x 60, 1928.



Accordingly, an analysis of the bibliography on Italian peace movement in the '80 shows a "dialogue between deafs and mutes" not only between (with a purely indicative simplification) traditionalist and innovators but mainly (although the two first classes do not reflect necessarily the second ones) between "politicists" and "sociologists". In this dialogue, the movement starts by arguing about the problem that generated it and on which it is based (in this case the installation of cruise missiles in Comiso as a step in the rearmament escalation).

Critics themselves answer to this statement by making to the movement a number of questions inevitably issued by its action (those questions range from the main fundamental themes as the link peace/freedom, peace/justice etc. to specific political, diplomatic and strategic questions). However the movement, albeit "willing to", (with the will capability that is conventionally given to social actors), is not able to give an answer to its interlocutors. This because of two reasons.

The first reason is the single-issue nature of the movement. The movement focuses its action on one problem only. The movement is not a political party. Differently from a political party it has no position, no objective, no program on every politically relevant matter: the movement has a position on only one matter (certainly with political relevance), that on which the movement itself is based.

The second reason is that the position of the movement on the matter for which it is mobilized is substantially negative. It indicates an *against*, it does not indicate (or indicates only indirectly) a *for*. That is the movement is born against the deployment of missiles in Comiso and not for something. Also this characteristic is not an accidental datum, an imperfection or a fault that the movement could take in charge or that it could decide to modify. It is a structural characteristic, which cannot be avoided within a social phenomenon constituted by a mobilization (thus by an instable balance of behaviours) rather than by an institution, by an event that



Tato: *Still life*, oil on cardboard cm 30 x 19, 1922 (rare paint of Olga Mazzini).

re-acts facing an external condition in itself, rather than a free and primary event.

Finally, pushed by its critics, but also dragged by the most "political" among its supporters, at a certain

point of its history the movement will begin to answer to the pushes that lead it to the widening of its own range of analysis, from the big theoretical problems to the pressing but "endlessly" unsolved questions of international politics. This characteristic that may arise the critical political observer's indignation does not surprise (which does not mean

that it is justified) the sociologist. Instead the sociologist finds in this failed attempt of "answer" and "widening" the decline of the peace movements as social movements.

THE IMPACT OF THE MOVEMENT

Aiming at evaluating the entity and the nature of the consequences determined by the peace movement our study has analysed particularly two actors: the Italian public opinion and the decision makers. As to the former, the analysis has considered both the impact of the movement on the international system image and the propensity of Italian people to mobilize on this matters.

THE IMPACT OF MOVEMENTS ON PUBLIC OPINION

The public opinion analysis is meant to answer to the following questions:

- what is the image that Italian people have of the international system in the '80s;
- is this image changed and to what extent it is comparable to the image in the '50s and '60s;
- what are the consequences, on security, of a possible change in image.

The data elaboration on the survey published so far gives the following results:


- in the period from 1979 to 1983 support towards NATO, opinion about USA and USSR, trust in the NATO ability to insure the credibility of the nuclear deterrent are substantially unchanged. Both the decision of December 1979 and the mobilization for peace did not affect the public support for the main lines of Italian foreign and military policy;
- what did really change is the image of the international system in which such institutions and poli-

cies operate. The image of American hegemony and the Soviet threat, prevailing in the Italian public opinion's view in the '50s, have been gradually replaced by an image of gross parity between the two super-powers and by the unlikelihood of a possible Soviet aggression towards West. The turning point is the détente period in the first half of the '70s;

- the acceptance of NATO does not imply a similarly acritical acceptance of all the policies elaborated by NATO. This is shown by the aversion of public opinion to the increase of military spending and, most of all, to "no matter what" modernization measure in the armaments field, with particular reference to the deployment of euromissiles. These positions, themselves, are based on the idea that there was a substantial parity both in nuclear and conventional arms already before 1979;

- contradictions between the basic beliefs of public opinion and the official policy do not generate a lack of trust towards the institutions that manage these policies (particularly NATO), but instead, they generate a growing concern for the possibility of a world conflict, even not intentional. Such a concern has increased to never-reached levels in the period going from 1980 to 1983.

On this point one may conclude that the decision on Euromissiles did not start a declining trend in the support of NATO and that the peace mobilizations did not produce a lack of affection for the security policies traditionally implemented by Italy. However these events show that the Italian public opinion is neither unconditionally "passive" towards international events, nor lacking of image on how the international system works and thus on the judgements to be issued toward the real government policies. Once the well rooted idea of the public opinion on the military parity between East and West has been set in contradiction with the policies of NATO itself that



Tato: *Dynamism of crowd*, oil on canvas
cm 94 x 94, 1922.

affirm the inevitability of rearmament, the result has been a strong concern for the levels of international tension and for the possibility less and less remote of an international conflict, as well as a spread opposition to the proposed measures of missiles modernization.

Once the scenario in which the peace movement is born has been defined, the research aims to the deep analysis of the relation between this phenomenon and its environment.

THE TENDENCY TO MOBILIZE FOR PEACE

A wide elaboration of the data of

the Eurobarometro survey of 1984 has been made. It devotes a special part to the peace movement. This survey is essential in the study of the factors that might have contributed to explain which sectors have been affected mostly by this concern, to the point of mobilizing themselves against the decision of euromissiles. A multivariate regression analysis has shown which social-political characteristic explain different attitudes taken towards the movement by different sectors of the public

opinion.

Seven independent variables have been related to the dependant variable "activism for peace":

- attitude towards modernity;
- fear for a nuclear war;
- materialistic/post materialistic orientation;
- personal belonging to the social network of a movement;
- satisfaction towards democracy and life in general;
- national pride;
- party preference.

The results of the regression analysis indicate that three variables are significantly related to the attitude taken toward participation in the peace movement. Ranked by importance those variables are:

- the previous belonging to other mobilization networks (particularly the anti-nuclear civil movement);
- the degree of post-materialism (meaning the support to the symbolic value of psychological welfare and life quality opposed to the material values of economical and physical security);
- the fear of a nuclear war (far behind, with an explanatory value three times less powerful than the first variable).

Four kinds of considerations issue from this analysis.

First, it shows the particularly qualified nature of the public willing to mobilize on peace matters. These subjects may be defined as "post-materialist", already involved in the civil nuclear problem, characterized by a higher educational level, more flexible knowledge capabilities and a younger age in respect to the "materialists". The central structure of the peace movement is composed by individuals that are élites-challenging rather than élite-mobilizable; they may be placed in a central position in respect to the social-political system. Unsatisfaction for life and for the political system does not give any indication on who will mobilize on these matters. Among the people who mobilize one will find instead only who is already in a social network that is sensible to political mobilization.

Second, the "fear for war" factor is not an irrelevant one. The above mentioned surveys showed that this feeling spread *before* the mobilization for peace had taken place in Italy. One can deduct that the fear for a conflict represented the trigger that brought about the aggregation of a


movement. The basis for this movement were already set in the relationship and experiences network built up in the previous mobilizations, particularly the nuclear ones.

Third, this analysis shows how the peace movement may neither be defined "unpolitical" nor "apolitical", that is to say external to the political setting of Western societies. Although widely inferior to what expected, party preference has shown a limited explanatory role (5 times less than the most important variable, belonging to other movements) in determining the propensity to mobilize for peace. People prone to vote for left-wing parties outnumber people prone to vote for right-wing parties in propensity to mobilize for peace. This preference shows that the political coordinates of the active members of the movements keep, although less than in the past, the classical right and left cleavage.


Fourth, the analysis shows the link between environmentalism and pacifism: the objective to participate in the big decisions in survival matters made by political institutions and by technocratic organizations. In fact, the ecological and pacifist mobilizations of the '80s has a common argument object: nuclear, in the military version (missiles) as well as in the civil version (nuclear plants). A specific (albeit decisive) technology has become the symbol of a destiny that the common man cannot determine. On the other hand the warning for this situation, although largely spread in the public opinion at a latent level, is transmitted by the sectors of the society that are culturally and socially more qualified than the average.

THE IMPACT OF THE MOVEMENT ON POLITICAL DECISION MAKERS

Finally, in order to verify the im-



Tato: *Futurist daybreak*, oil on board cm 28 x 28.



Tato: *The procession of S. Luca to Bologna, 1926.*

pact of the peace movement on decision makers in Italy, a sample (N = 40) of congressmen and senators, representing the different political forces of the Parliament, has been interviewed. They were assumed as relevant subjects (although not exclusive) in the decisional process that brought Italy to adhere in the program of modernization of theater forces.

The results can be summed up as follows:

- the attitude of Parliament representatives towards the peace movement is overall positive. With a 65% of "positive answers", congressmen and senators are proving even more well-disposed towards the movement than samples representing the Italian population interviewed in the opinion surveys of the '80s. This does not mean,

in itself, that the overall positive judgement expressed on objectives, intentions and methods of the peace movement has effectively conditioned the choices of the single Members of Parliament beyond their opinions preceding the peace movement;

- first of all, one should note the huge chronological lag on the centrality on the agenda of the euromissile matter, for the Members of Parliament on one side (until 1980) and for the movement (from 1981 on) on the other side. This lag reflects the timing and the structure of political decision, particularly in defence security policy. Because of the complex political and technical dimensions of these problems, they are dealt within a selected arena by particular technical high-level executive and government organizations and, only in an already advanced phase,

they are submitted to the legislative analysis and decision. This makes a big difference with the decision-making processes on other matters (for example of domestic nature). Here the flow is reversed as the demand builds up in the civil society and from there, once a certain level of visibility and legitimation has been reached, it is accepted by the legislator. In security matters, on the contrary, problems generally become decisions and only then they are transformed in issues to the public opinion eyes. The euromissiles problem is a good example. Preceded by a debate known only to specialists, the decision to install cruise missiles in Italy has been adopted at a national and international level in less




Tato: *White Christmas*, oil on board cm 28 x 28.

than 3 months (autumn 1979). After this date there were no substan-

tial decisions that parliamentary Italian institutions could take (apart from the improbable dismissal of the commitment) because any political development of the matter had been delegated to the Geneva negotiations between USA and USSR. Thus the attention put in the matter by the Members of Parliament fell from

the 87% of 1979-80 to the 26% of 1981 and following years. By the way, the peace movement is born in this second period. The movement arises the interest of the political world but it does not modify in a sensible way the positions of the parties or of the single Members of Parliament;



Tato: *Intersection of figures with landscape*, oil and, enamel on card-board cm 59 x 47, 1921.

- these results are confirmed by an analysis of the impact of the mobilization of Members of Parliament. 92% of interviewed Parliamentarians stated that peace mobilizations had arisen a big interest within public opinion. 71% admits that the same interest is shown within their own party. However, only 40% of inter-

viewed Members of Parliament thinks that these mobilizations influenced parties' positions in some way.

CONCLUSION

The overall conclusion, at this point, seems to lead to the substantial uneffectiveness of the peace movement action. This seems true mainly at the political level, also because of the structural rigidity that characterizes decisions in security matters. This dimension, albeit decisive, is not the only one in which the social man and the citizen express



themselves. Actually, it would be wrong to underestimate a second dimension - sociological and cultural - that, albeit less visible than the former one, constitutes its base.


The importance of the values and feelings that are the base of opinions, issues from the data coming both by public opinion and decision makers' élites. As to public opinion, it is significant that, although the participants to the peace movement are a minority, the consensus area that it generates is a large majority. The data on Members of Parliament are even more significant. Parliamentarians have a mainly positive attitude towards the movement, which is unexpected considering:

- the different nature institutional/anti-institutional (or at least a-institutional) of the two actors (the author of the evaluation - the Members of Parliament - in respect to its object - the movement);
- the substantial homogeneity of the political judgement on the main issues of foreign and security policy. Albeit indifferent on the contents of peace mobilization the sample of Parliament representatives shows to be significantly open as to the method. 50% says that the peace movement led them to modify their ideas on the way in which foreign policy should be conducted in a democratic country.

Thus the peace movement action, albeit substantially lacking and ineffective in the determination of political choices, shows a different impact in the field of elaboration (that may be defined "geological" because of its visibility and timing) and diffusion of new definitions of politics.

**PACIFIST AND
ANTI-NUCLEAR
MOVEMENTS
IN ITALY
1980 - 1988**





RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION IN THE DEFENCE SECTOR

RAPPORTO DI RICERCA DEL
CENTRO MILITARE DI STUDI STRATEGICI

L'ORGANIZZAZIONE
DELLA RICERCA E SVILUPPO
NELL'AMBITO DIFESA

VOLUME I

 RIVISTA
MILITARE

RAPPORTO DI RICERCA DEL
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NELL'AMBITO DIFESA

VOLUME II

 RIVISTA
MILITARE

The classification of R&D activities is important not merely on an academic level, rather it is fundamental for the definition both of the Bodies designated in the various stages (having different characteristics and priorities) and of the planning and management procedures and methodologies.

There have been indicated the characteristics and the activities connected with the basic research, the preliminary research, the applied research and the development. The situation in Italy looks quite foggy for the lack of a long-term research planning policy, for the little clearness on the authority of the various State Bodies in the sector and for a borderline not clearly defined between general research activities and the technological research tied to the development of arm systems whose procurement is decided by the Armed Forces.

An abridged description of the systems used in France and in the US shows how much clearer the situation is abroad where, in particular, there is an effective coordination in the Defence field with an "upstream" research activity free from the planning and development of the single arm systems.

Key objective is the integration of military research planning in the wider context of national research. This means clear ideas and conceptual order in the two sectors, to be in a position to present detailed programs to the inter-ministries coordination Body.

Stages in the planning and production of an arm system

The procurement of an arm system goes through different stages, from the first object definition by the General Staff to the mass production of the system itself.

Within NATO and European IEPG, it has been adopted a planning system for conventional armaments, CAPS, which has lately replaced the PAPS (Phased Armaments Planning System). The system

is deemed suitable to overcome many technical problems and to determine better co-operation conditions.

For each stage are detailed the responsibilities and authorities of the various interested Bodies (Researchers, Industry, Armed Forces).

A mention is made to the little importance given to homologation during the whole process (authority of the Armed Forces), which is often confused and concealed in the development stage (authority of the Industry).

A second point emphasized is the key importance, since the planning stage, of the so-called "growth potential" of the arm system during its active service period. A third point is represented by the passage from the "philosophy of the system" (that is from the completely new manufacturing of complete means) to the one of the component (modernization and technological updating of the various system components). Such an approach helps in achieving a reduction in costs and procurement time of the means.

Special problems posed by the technological innovation progress

The most advanced Western Countries (in particular the US) have focused on innovation technologies.

The USSR, on the contrary, focused on imitation technologies. The former allow great steps forward in the single performance; however, they are expensive and risky. The latter employ tested technologies to be improved; their adoption is less expensive, but it implies delays and technological "gaps".

In Western Countries there is an increasingly large attitude to a more systematic use of ongoing technologies, which allows a better exploitation of technological and industrial capabilities. Therefore, a close link between civil and military R&D is becoming more and more essential.

The new concept, giving more effectiveness and flexibility to the "Research - Development - Production" system, reduces times and

costs and slows down the trend toward the hypersophistication of the means, which is at the base of the so-called "Structural disarmament for costs inflation".

Defence must therefore have available an organization capable of establishing reliable evaluations of cost/effectiveness and of adopting ways and methodologies typical of "Defence Management" economics, in contrast with the present orientation of General Staff Offices, of technical Bodies (evidently inclined to look for the best) and of the firms interested to develop their technological capabilities also due to the positive effects military investments have on their commercial production.

It is very difficult to establish the balance-point, also because sophistication is often an obligatory choice connected with the kind of threat the arm system must oppose.




Even more so, it is necessary a highly effective projects management with full capability of the public purchasing bodies to address and control the industrial purchasing firms in a determining way.

Characteristics of R & D and demands faced by Defence

R&D in the Defence sector are determined by peculiar aspects. The most important ones are:

- high technological content, close relation between advanced technology and basic technology and frequent recurrence of technological gaps;
- supremacy of operational efficiency over cost;
- increasing internationalization of the military R&D system;
- systematic application of the growth potential and of the system evolution;
- delicate relations between Defence and Industry and interest conflicts.

To counterbalance all this, Defence must develop a propelling action of address and control, delegating to no other outer Body duties which are its institutional



responsibility and it must be in a position to:

- select the technological R&D sectors of its own interest;
- carry out short and long terms planning of the whole relevant R&D range in a unitary and co-ordinated way;
- ensure proper financing;
- co-ordinate its own R&D policy with the support of the outer Bodies of the sector, matching the national and the international co-operation activities;
- play a leading role in the experiments, in the tuneup of prototypes, in the testing and final inspections which have to be planned from the very beginning of the financing programs;
- carry out proper evaluation of cost/effectiveness;
- make a systematic effort in defin-

ing the R&D needs also for the long-term procurement, in order to promote the creation of planning capabilities for the future and not to be penalized by the inevitable internationalization process of the armaments industry. This might be contradictory with short-term interests, but in the long-term it will represent a key factor for the upgrading of an industrial supply, which will have to leave the comfortable sailing of the protected, safe market to face tough competition.

The present situation in Italy

It is just a note on the present situation, well known to everybody, and on the duties and responsibilities of the various relevant Bodies

(General Staff, USG/DNA, Chiefs of Staff Committee, CTSD).

Public Financing


Public financing of military research goes through 3 channels:

- the Ministry of Defence;
- the "Funds" for research;
- the Public Economic Bodies.

It is not easy to determine the funds administered by the Ministry of Defence for the R&D activities, since in its budget those figures are shown broken down in the many expenditure chapters.

A small portion is reported in Chapter 7010 "Expenditure for Scientific Research", presently utilized for the R&D inter-forces activities.

This chapter is part of Section II



"Expenditure in Capital Account" of the State Budget which consolidates the allocations for investments, meaning mainly infrastructures and equipments.

For administrative and accounting purposes, the purchase of goods and services is attributed to Section I "Current or Working Expenditure".

Most of the funds devoted to research are therefore in the Chapters of Index 12 "Defence Modernization and Renewal (4011 - 4031 - 4051).

These are the case of equipment procurement programs for which it is not possible to divide the portion related to R&D.

Law 1984 N. 456 (EH101-AMX-CATRIN) has established that the high costs for the tune-up of a modern arm system need and adequate and direct public support from

the very formulation of the project.

Being impossible to obtain the figures for the research expenditure from the Budget, we are left with the "General Report on the State of Scientific and Technological Research in Italy", yearly issued by CNR, the "Additional Note to the Defence Estimate Budget" drafted by the General Staff of Defence and the data published by UEO and ISTAT.

All the above data have little impact since there are often unexplicable differences.

A second channel of public financing is represented by the two "funds" for research, by the Law for the support of aeronautic industry and by CNR.

In these cases, the military interest is marginal and the financing is granted on the base of an econom-

ic, industrial and scientific evaluation rather than military (in fact, the Ministry of Defence is not institutionally consulted, but for the aeronautical Law N. 808). The same two funds are administered by two different Ministries and there is no co-ordination, thus causing overlapping and intervention dispersion.

Starting from 1984, the problem has been eased out, at least formally, by the establishment of an Industry-Defence Committee, formed by representatives of all relevant State Bodies which engage also in the research activity. So far the effectiveness of this Committee has been fairly poor.

Lastly, also CNR has started ten finalized projects with partial military implications.

A third channel of public financing is represented by the State Hold-

ings that, through IRI and EFIM, have regularly levelled the heavy deficit of the public industry.

From the outlined picture and from the many figures supplied by the study, it comes out that also in Italy military research is getting a greater and greater public support.

There is, however, a sensible delay over the main European allies/competitors in the very moment of rapidly increasing research through international co-operation.

Research in the Industry Sector

Totally unknown is the expenditure for industry R&D, also due to the fact that there are no fiscal mechanisms to incentivate research, and no reliable data.

The figures supplied by the firms budgets answer an administrative management logic; they have no account checking and must be considered very carefully. The criteria used are not homogeneous and therefore any comparison is hard to do. A further confusion element is given by the frequent aggregation of public financing with self-financing and with the quota in the customer's charge.

Generally speaking, one can say that only a few firms are highly engaged in the research sector and we believe that the Italian industry is not yet on line with the more technologically-advanced countries.

The Main Wants

The main wants of the present organization are:

- of instrumental nature;
- due to financing;
- deriving from the contractuality.

The Wants of Contract Nature

The main ones are:

- the CTSD (Defence Technical Scientific Committee) is not in a position to operate. Cut down to

practically just one secretary, and with no technicians and scientists, it merely expresses an opinion on projects proposed by the Armed Forces not in a general framework, rather on an equal allocation of funds among the 3 Armed Forces. No real evaluation of cost/effectiveness is performed and consequently there is no real Defence scientific-technological planning, which, in any case, is divided among the 3 Armed Forces;

- as already mentioned, most of the R&D activity is financed by the individual Armed Forces on their modernization chapters, and it is addressed to development, tune-up and testing of the prototypes rather than to applied research. In this framework, the SG/DNA which should represent the top unit to consolidate the scientific research policy of Defence, has little chance to operate;
- the Technical Bodies of the 3 Armed Forces are separate, inadequate by the number and have a different and often uncertain organic placing with double institutional or factual sub-ordination. The Technical Centers, which used to be the brain and the core of the technological development of means, are drained and some report to the General Staff Officers and others to the "Direzioni Generali" (General Head Offices).

The situation is worsened by the lack of liaison with the State scientific research and by the lack of technical-scientific information exchange. Very few the exceptions: the Space Division for Research and Experiment (DASRS), Maritelerada and CRESAM.

By assigning this last Center to General Staff of Defence instead of to SG/DNA, the latter has lost an effective instrument and the technical support necessary to lead one united policy in the sector of basic and applied research. Such support cannot be replaced by the one given by the Officers of Technical Bodies, even if on duty in the "Direzioni Generali", who often

represent outer agencies of the General Staff Offices who act largely on their own;

- remarkable wants exist also on the equipments and in the testing centers, making it necessary sometimes to resort to centers of other countries;
- as a consequence, the initiative taken by the Armaments Industry largely prevails, thus replacing the Defence in its duty of giving a united address, impulse and support to research.

Wants due to Financing

In the last five years the amount of funds allocated to R&D in the Defence Budget increased by over 4 times. In 1988 the threshold of 900 billion was overcome. The increase is due to the approval of Law 1984, N. 456 for projects EH101 - AMX - CATRIN and to the start of other major projects like EFA, the combat tank, the anti-tank helicopter and others. To the Research sector will also be assigned the production costs of CATRIN.


On the contrary, extremely poor is the funds' allocation for upstream research like CTP (Cooperative Technological Projects) and LTET (Long Term Emerging Technologies).

One must also point out that the public financing system through the "funds" laws favours the big firms, rather than the small-medium ones. This is a factor that penalizes the development of scientific and technological innovation for military purposes.

Leaving out the small-medium firms from the Defence market reduces the incentive for knowledge, absolutely necessary for innovation.

Wants because of Contract Standards

Contractuality is a crucial factor for the effectiveness not only of management, but of the R&D planning itself.



This study analyses the merits (few) and the faults (many) of the procedure used up to now (private bidding, tenders, private deals) and emphasizes the validity of US norms, which are flexible and fitting the needs, while in the Italian standards there is a supremacy of formal and law-abiding aspects inspired by a pedantic juridical formalism.

Law 770/86 on the contracts for high technology is meant to mend most of the existing problems, and it offers a quick and flexible instrument to the sector operators, on line with the most modern European regulations, thus eliminating also most of the problems encountered in the participation to international projects. It still needs to be put into effect and the adjustment of the practice and of the officials' frame

of mind.

Critical remains the sector of costs' estimate, of their control and of the methodologies for the evaluation of cost/effectiveness of the development plans for new arm systems.

The experience of CNR in finalized projects and of ENEA could be useful to improve the capability of Defence in this key sector.

International co-operation in the Defence R&D Sector

The market supplied by the Armed Forces of the individual European States is too small to allow the development and production of advanced arm systems on economically-favourable terms.

Expansion can be carried out through co-operation projects or through exports. Presently export markets have greatly shrunk and their collapse poses big troubles both to Industry and to Defence.

One must resort to a wide European and Atlantic co-operation activity to ensure vitality and future life to industry. The capability to reconvert from an export trend to one of co-operation requires on the Defence side a careful procurement policy linked with an effective research and technological development policy in the European and Atlantic area.

The study analyses the historical background and the several stages that brought to the establishment of the various NATO IEPS forums where the research problems are de-

bated and it particularly stresses the so-called "Resources Strategy" proposed by NATO.

This strategy aims at rationalizing research, development and procurement within the Alliance with the purpose of:

- avoiding duplication,
- achieving synergy among nations,
- reducing costs,
- reaching a higher standardization,
- increasing inter-activity.

For its realization NATO has:

- processed a reference pattern establishing the priority operational needs to be met by the mass utilization of new technology;
- faced the problem of the equitable sharing of costs related to the contribution capacity of each country, trying to part it from politics and consider it under a technical-military aspect;
- tried to balance the military budgets between the US and Europe, strengthening on one side the European industry under the leadership of IEPG and on the other providing for concrete measures to promote standardization and inter-activity;
- tried to promote, together with "arm systems families", "industry families", supporting common projects and permanent consortia.

In practice, the enforcement of the mentioned concepts of the "Resources Strategy" faces five major obstacles:

- under the political point of view, no nation wants to give up an industry manufacturing the whole of the necessary systems for its own Armed Forces;
- under the economic point of view, there is a suspicion that any integration within NATO would end up, in reality, in a "Buy American";
- the technological gap among nations;
- different procurement policies, due to the specific strategies of the various national situations;
- a more and more emphasized US trend to restrict the technological "transfer" to the allies.

The paragraph closes with a

detailed analysis of the European activities, in particular those of IEPG and of the latest steps forward reached by this Body for a real technological and manufacturing European integration in the military sector (the new "panel 2" and the EUCLID project).

Italian Participation to the Co-operation Activities in the R&D Sector.

On an international level, Italy has started many scientific-technological research projects and, furthermore, it is arranging several R&D projects with European and US partners.

On a scientific-technological level, it is the industry itself which has extremely dynamic initiatives with direct agreements with the main European firms.

The so-called CTP (Cooperative Technological Projects) represent in this sector a European attempt to coordinate the scientific-technological research for military purposes in a parallel way and with similar spirit to the one which inspired the EEC technological projects (Esprit, Eureka, etc.).

As far as development research, Italy is participating in several major co-operation projects.

Co-operation is definitely increasing and involves almost one quarter of the prime procurement of our Armed Forces.

Actually, international co-operation is an unavoidable reality that our country must be in a position to face, thereby promoting all the necessary actions not to make this co-operation paralyzing for our industry and Defence, rather on an equal basis to avoid dependance.

Vredeling Report and the Future of European Co-operation in the Defence Research and Industry Sector.

It closely looks at the major trends for a co-operation development,

shown in a key-document: Vredeling report of IEPG, "Towards a stronger Europe", whose analyses and suggestions, although accepted by the Ministers of Defence of IEPG countries, have so far had no effect, despite the fact also that the National Directors for Armaments have been entrusted to draft an action plan for their practical realization. Essentially, in the scientific-technological research sector the gap is widening further and further between Europe and its two economic competitors worldwide: the US and Japan.

This gap has essentially the following features:

- the market is a monopoly of Governments and military bureaucracy;
- industrial policy is a component of Defence policy and it must be on line with safety policy; economic competition and strategic "partnership" are clashing factors that must be tuned in;
- the post-war reconstruction process has brought to a close integration between European and American firms;
- military production aims more to products' innovation than to process' innovation, which is, however, at the base of success of European commercial productions;
- the easy access to American technologies "Mecca" has given Europe top-level productions avoiding the costs for research;
- changed strategic situation.

Vredeling report shows that what Europe lacks is not the scientific and technological base, rather the capability to manufacture with top efficiency, reduced costs and short times.

Production only can incite research.

The problems faced by a co-operation development within Europe are indicated in the Report at three levels:

- at a political level, in particular, the action of Ministries of Defence that with their buyer's policy determine the supplier's answers;
- at a level of production organiza-



tion and armaments trading;

- at a level of research organization, of the scientific-technological base and of its industrial application for the development of components, systems and macrosystems.

The study analyses in detail the main problems faced by the three above-mentioned levels (it is advisable to read the whole report).

SPECIAL ASPECTS OF R&D ACTIVITIES FOR DEFENCE

The coming into force of the Common Market regulations will, most likely, not have an immediate impact on the whole Defence research and industry sector. This, however, will have to adjust to the measures provided for the market, the free circulation of goods, capitals and people. Consequently, in addition to physical borders also technical borders will fall.

Very pragmatically has the EEC Commission proposed the mutual acceptance of rules, standards and national controls also outside the origin country, while then little by little conforming the legislative, administrative and technical regulations. This will ignite quite a revolution all over the European industry.

Despite the easily predictable resistance by the State bureaucracies, both military and industrial, the whole production system will change tremendously. Completely unified will be the basic components' market and the research system since the military sector cannot be kept artificially apart from that of general scientific and technological innovation. Many have already been the EEC initiatives to re-affirm the idea of European technological Community.

The various initiatives (Esprit, Eureka, ESA, BRITE, etc.) have been incited by the industry itself,

under the pressure of increasing worries of a European technological weakening.

As far as Italy is concerned, it will be essential to better harmonize the scientific-technological research for Defence with the general one, as it happens in other nations.

The spin-offs of Defence Scientific and Technological Research in the Civil Sector.

The problem of spin-offs has received great attention in the US and in the U.K., where proper Bodies have been established to systematically investigate the employment of military technology in the civil sector. In Italy the spin offs area is very neglected. There are no systematic studies, no data banks and within the industrial groups themselves the technological transfer is

very limited, although the Italian Defence Industries generally have a mixed nature and consequently an easier job in the sector.

Technological capabilities comparison between the Western Countries and the Soviet Bloc.

Western Countries have always aimed at a higher technological level to compensate the quantity superiority of the Warsaw Pact. In many sectors, however, this technological superiority is cracking down. The study presents a comparison picture between the US and the USSR in the twenty major basic technological areas. As far as Europe is concerned, the situation is less balanced.

As far as Italy, there are no official evaluations available.

On the contrary, regarding the armaments in force, the technological gap between the US and the USSR is smaller than the one in the basic technology sector. The USSR, in fact, is leading in many sectors. According to the experts, this is the answer to the fact that the Western RST system is poorly linked to industrial productions for Defence and that there are problems in the transfer of technological superiority into a real operational superiority.

Possible causes are:

- the trend of General Staff Offices to claim military performance at the stretch of technological limits;
- the adoption of strict military requirements also for small components and material already in circulation (very often under industrial pressure);
- the development of expensive arm systems, more of formal prestige than of real operational importance.

Italian Participation to SDI Project.

The study points out how SDI project will for sure speed up scientific and technological innovation in



many key sectors and will give the US the opportunity to catch up, at least partially, the technological superiority faded in the last few years.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS

The analysis has pointed out several problems to be solved; the pace of changes is awfully slow, while in a dynamic reality such as military research every effort must aim to increase efficiency and to reduce the gaps from the more technologically-advanced countries.

Prime strategic objective is the proper management of technological innovation, which requires top efficiency by the Military Purchasing Bodies, and which not only uses

technology but which has the role of institutional inciter.

Presently, military research is mainly propelled and driven by the industrial world which answers more to entrepreneurial logic than to scientific strictness. Therefore, Defence must become a sound and trustworthy counterpart at all levels of planning and management of scientific-technological research. On the contrary, the risk is to reverse the relationship between purchaser and supplier and to make void the direction and control capability of the State.

Adopted Measures and under Adoption

There are listed the main measures that during the past decade have



brought to an upgrading of the sector (or the ones which are under way):

- the so long-awaited for re-organization of the military top ranks which would bring order in the responsibilities and authorities in the research sector;
- the establishment of the Industry-Defence Committee;
- the consolidation of the Army Technical Bodies;
- the re-organization of CRESAM;
- the creation of DASRS (Air Division for Study, Research and Experiments);
- strong impulse to co-operation activity within Europe and the Atlantic area;
- funds increase for R&D;
- the coming into force of Law 770 for high-tech contracts.

Blanks, Inconveniences and Wants

The blanks, inconveniences and wants are:

- bureaucratic inertia;
- lack of systematic liaison with the national scientific community;
- lack of an organic presence in the Committees for the co-ordination of national industrial and technological policy;
- want of a Planning Body, in a sole framework, for the research not directly connected with the development of arm systems;
- lack of data banks and of Bodies able to carry out:
 - • operational analysis and research;
 - • technological comparative evaluations;

- • evaluations of cost/effectiveness;
- • results' control;
- logic of a leading Armed Force;
- poor inter-forces integration and trend to systematically prefer the short-term;
- excessive dependence on an industry which has not yet reached the necessary concentration level to guaranty a "critical mass" according to European standards;
- charitable-like procurement policy;
- Defence inability to take quick decisions;
- want and instability of general and financial planning;
- reduced number of Technical Bodies of the Armed Forces, mainly employed in administration

tasks and left aside from the decision-making circuits by the General Staff Offices who prefer direct contacts with the firms;

- lack of an organic Co-ordination Body among Defence, scientific research and industry;
- poor co-ordination and cross-link among the various Technical Centers of the Armed Forces;
- inadequacy of tests, inspections and experiments;
- lack of flexible legislation to suit the R&D dynamic activity.

Intervention lines on the long-term

The remedies to such a poor situation as it came out must be radical measures to be carried out in a reasonably long time. It is necessary, meanwhile, to recognize the several difficulties in finalizing, in our times, wide reforms that, being based on joint initiatives, can easily jam, thus making it almost impossible to bring remarkable changes.

The long-wished for approval of the Bill on the military top ranks, which could mean a definite improvement, represents a symbolic example.

Anyway, the main measures that could be taken on the long-term are the following:

- establishment of a Scientific Advisory Board for Defence, headed by a leading personality in the scientific world able to activate also an organic co-operation among public Research Bodies and the Armed Forces. The Board would have not just the task of expressing opinions, but also of carrying out a proposing action both on research planning, and on results evaluation. The permanent Secretariat of the Board should be placed within the "Direzione Nazionale degli Armamenti" (National Head Office for Armaments);

- clear-cut identification in the general and financial Defence planning of the R&D, testing and production activities. In particular, it is necessary to plan separately the upstream research activity from the one for the development of arm systems;
- establishment of a General Department for Scientific and Technological Research (DGRST) with the task of:
 - • planning and managing the whole upstream research activity;
 - • representing the Defence in the Bodies for interministries co-ordination;
 - • ensuring the link with the Public Bodies, the research firms and the Universities.

Under its supervision there should be an inter-forces Technical Center for Study and Research (CTSR), established starting from CRESAM.

DGRST should also:

- • have a documentation center;
- • be capable of estimate and scientific-technological analysis;
- • have a "simulation and operational research center", mainly for evaluation of costs/effectiveness in the projects like similar centers in other European countries;
- quantity and quality reinforcements of the technical units of the Armed Forces, which should be consolidated or, at least, coordinated among themselves and placed under the supervision of SG/DNA;
- long and very long planning of scientific and technological Defence research;
- institutional presence of the Minister of Defence, or for him of the SG/DNA, in the interministries Committees which set the research and industrial promotion policies (CIPE, CIPI, etc.).


Intervention lines on the short-term

As already mentioned, the realization of the above general master-plan presents problems of legal-administrative level and unpredictable times.

However, it is possible and right to carry out those intermediate measures, of less weight but of easier realization, which can, in any case, improve the situation:

- to promote a study to be given to CNR management with the participation of General Staff Offices of the Armed Forces, of Defence General Staff and of USG/DNA, meant to carry out an analytical review of all main projects under way or due to start in the scientific and technological field;
- to transfer CRESAM under SG/DNA;
- to establish a Committee of the Chiefs of Technical Units of the Armed Forces under the supervision of SG/DNA;
- to abolish CTSD (Technical Scientific Advisory Board for Defence) which is not able to advise on anything, but only to balance the inter-forces financing among the three Forces;
- to grant SG/DNA a fixed quota of the investment of the Armed Forces (1 - 2%), so that it can finance with no delays both the Italian participation to international scientific-technological co-operation, and the similar national activities;
- to place under the Chief of the Technical Unit of the Army all the Technical Units of the Army;
- to re-organize radically the Defence Technical-Scientific Documentation Center.

Only by realizing this very minimum program, will Defence update and decrease its dependence on industry and on foreign countries and allow an effective Italian participation to co-operation projects in the European and Atlantic area.



CENTRO MILITARE DI STUDI STRATEGICI

RAPPORTO DI RICERCA SUL:
IL FUTURO
DELLA DISSUAZIONE
NUCLEARE IN EUROPA

 RIVISTA
MILITARE

THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE



Aim of the study: to work out a nuclear strategy for NATO that takes the changes underway into account and encourages their positive development, while confirming its ability to deter, control and neutralize any attacks or conflicts threatening the Atlantic Alliance.

These criteria call for a general plan that can act as a basis for the much hoped for conventional stability with a "lower" number of nuclear weapons. We propose to define the choice as a strategy of *essential or simple deterrence*. It will be consistent with the aim of reducing NATO's tactical nuclear arsenal further numerically, but will certainly require the modernization and in any case the maintenance in Europe of "theatre" nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.

NATO DOCTRINE

The "flexible response" doctrine is still the official NATO doctrine. It states that "the response will be appropriate to the level of aggression", but also that the enemy should not know what level of response will be considered appropriate, that is, what the NATO choice will be (alternatively or simultaneously) between:

- defensive efficacy;
- punishment for the aggression;
- a sign of the allies determination to combat the aggression.

In December 1970 NATO accepted the Provisional Political Guidelines (PPG), a compromise between the two main factions: the *demonstrators* in favour of rapid escalation towards the highest levels and the *warfighters*, emphasizing the use of tactical nuclear weapons for operational-military purposes. Thus, the PPG calls for a sufficiently strong initial response to improve the military situation, but stipulates that it must have a clear and explicit political purpose: either to provoke an

interruption, giving both sides some time to think things over or to reestablish the situation of deterrence that existed before the beginning of hostilities.

THE GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT

After the approval of the PPG, the decision making process of the Alliance continued its evolution with the working out of a "strategic concept" for the use of allied forces. The General Political Guidelines (GPG) were only adopted at Gleneagles in 1986.

There was greater clarity among Europeans about the need to diminish the *collateral damage* caused by the possible use of nuclear weapons and, therefore, increase the *selectivity* of the use of nuclear weapons, even during attack of Warsaw Pact territory. Technology was improved assuring greater accuracy of delivery vehicles and variable explosive capability for warheads, thus making nuclear weapons adaptable for different uses while limiting collateral damage.

MODERNIZE AND REDUCE

The compromise on the GPG was facilitated by the decision to modernize the Alliance's nuclear arsenal, through the deployment of the GLCMs and the P-IIs (commonly known as Euromissiles), withdrawing an equal number of tactical nuclear warheads besides those already previously earmarked for withdrawal.

The next stages of modernization were to include the withdrawal of more tactical nuclear weapons and relative warheads (over and above those decided upon at Montebello in 1983). Finally, the double zero option ratified by the Treaty of Washington eliminated the INF systems and their warheads, thus completing the quantitative reduction of

A «Peacekeeper» missile being launched by the «cold launch» system from its armoured silo.

the NATO tactical arsenal (approximately 3000 warheads less than in the seventies).

These progressive reductions were based on the assumption that technological modernization would allow for the implementation of a strategy of flexible nuclear response, aimed at deterring the enemy (and not destroying it or *attaining victory*).

But once again the political picture changed more rapidly than strategic conceptions.

Let's take the problem of the INFs, for example, and the compromise reached with the USSR on the double zero option, that is the elimination of the INFs. This was certainly a political victory for NATO, since the USSR was forced to accept an agreement on conditions which it had previously defined as unacceptable and by which it destroys a much larger number of systems than the West. But is the victory actually only apparent?

The problem is that without modernization and without credible longer range weapons available, the GPG compromise can no longer be realistically implemented in the field, without resorting to systems that are of more difficult or dubious use. In fact, the compromise reached at Gleneagles is based on a mix of short and longer range nuclear missiles. The short range missiles keep the Pact from concentrating attack forces and provide NATO with the possibility of "smaller scale" operational options. Longer range weapons make escalation possible, not only vertically or in intensity, but also geographically to other territories. Furthermore, from an operational point of view, they allow for the targeting of particularly valuable strategic targets, such as large operating bases, C3 systems, etc.

Numerous political restraints keep the Alliance from reopening technical discussion of the weapons needed to give it credibility today. In particular, there is the fear of impeding detente and the disarmament agreements, which provide an opportunity to balance the historical conventional disequilibrium between

NATO and the Warsaw Pact which led to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in the fifties.

COUNTRIES LEFT ON THEIR OWN?

The tactical nuclear weapons left in Europe after the double zero agreement are, moreover, considered particularly dangerous for the front line countries hosting them (above all the German Federal Republic), as they directly threaten their territories and their populations. At the same time, the political and military exposure of other countries less directly connected to the front is decreased. Therefore, some countries, in particular the FRG, are being singled out and left alone. This explains demands for a triple zero arrangement eliminating the remaining short range missiles (SNF), justified by the fact that the Warsaw Pact has far more tactical nuclear weapons than NATO.

Essentially, the *Global Concept* approved by the allies in May 1989, reaffirms the need to maintain short range nuclear weapons (SNF) in Europe. It also confirms the willingness to negotiate their *reduction* (and not their *elimination*), provided the USSR agrees to reduce its present numerical superiority in this field, and only when the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces have ensured a real conventional stability through large-scale reductions by the Warsaw Pact.


In the meantime, however, all decisions concerning the much needed *modernization* of NATO's short range missiles, which will become obsolete in 1994-95, have been postponed to 1992 at the soonest. There are considerable doubts that modernization can actually be ensured at that time. In that case, the whole compromise reached with the *Global Concept* would be annulled and NATO would be left to hope for the unilateral reduction of those weapons by the Warsaw Pact or a

third zero option.

CRITERIA FOR A NUCLEAR CHOICE

The requirements for a NATO nuclear force in the near future should be based on the following general criteria:

- allied nuclear forces should be built and operated within severe budgetary bounds;
- they should be conceived so as to reduce or at least not aggravate the suspicions of public opinion about nuclear weapons in general;
- they should take into consideration the difficult compromise reached in the GPG and the Global Concept and substantiate it, unless another compromise can be reached;
- those forces should be conceived to ensure a fair sharing of risks and responsibilities and the largest possible participation of all allies in decisions and operations;
- such nuclear forces should be up to date with technological developments;
- they must be able to ensure an *effective contribution to defence* as well as to deterrence, by threatening a wide range of possible Warsaw Pact targets, especially those that seem co-essential to the Pact's military operations;
- from a strictly military point of view, those forces must respond to criteria of *survival* in the face of conventional and chemical threats, as well as nuclear threats, as much as possible;
- those forces must take into consideration foreseeable developments in conventional forces which could affect them in various ways. For example: the *actual and realistic* capability of "emerging" conventional systems, capable of carrying out some missions generally entrusted to nuclear fire today, will have to be taken into account. In that case, however, the specific deterrent value of nuclear systems will have to be considered;
- planning of theatre nuclear forces



will have to take into consideration (and condition, as well as be conditioned by) all negotiations on arms control and the actual prospects of disarmament.

It is not easy to bring all these criteria together. Some final remarks on the political and strategic *essence* of NATO nuclear doctrine may help.

JUST DETERRENCE

Today, the term *extended deterrence* is used to define the NATO strategy that would extend the American nuclear umbrella to guarantee European security and defence. Yet, extended deterrence is a relatively new and, on the whole, inappropriate concept. What is defined as extended deterrence today, was just plain deterrence - without

any other adjectives - in the fifties, at the birth of NATO. The word "extended" was added to the word "deterrence" as a consequence of the growing vulnerability of United States soil to Soviet nuclear attack.

Two different concepts of deterrence have emerged from this debate:

- in the first, the need for nuclear deterrence is essentially expressed in terms of the need to compensate for Soviet conventional superiority and deter the Soviets from use of nuclear and/or chemical weapons;
- the second considers nuclear deterrence *also* (and primarily) as a means of eliminating war as a feasible political option, a means which has proven more successful than any other up to now.

The first is relatively simpler than the second in terms of military planning. The second is considerably

The U.S. «B-52» bomber launching a ALCM. The loading apparatus is located beneath its left wing.

more acceptable than the first in political terms.

The NATO strategy has been worked out in response to the need to deprive the enemy of all chances of successfully achieving political objectives. This initial principle *has evolved towards increasing emphasis on nuclear arms control and restraint in their use.*

Thus, this strategy must be defined as simpler than extended deterrence or other technical forms of nuclear response (massive, flexible, etc.), and that is, *just deterrence* clearly directed at control, restraint and selective use besides calculations of immediate military effectiveness, with the aim of achieving immedi-

The future U.S. bomber made its first flight in the spring of 1988.

ate war termination and inspired by the idea of *preventing war*.

NATO is certainly committed to *just deterrence* and has gradually increased its inclination towards greater political control of nuclear weapons, greater operational selectivity, and greater restraint in scenarios for their use, etc.

Therefore, this logic must guide the Alliance's future choices as well. It obviously does not tend to increase the operational use of nuclear weapons in conventional combat; it tends to set the technical conditions needed to deter war or to terminate it immediately in the best possible conditions.

In this light, however, it must be kept in mind that there are two profoundly different logical approaches to deterrence. Whether we will be able to fully implement the concept of *just deterrence* or whether we will take a giant step backwards *favouring the return to older and more dangerous*, as well as less credible, *conceptions of deterrence* depends on which of these logical approaches wins out.

The first approach, which can be defined as *regressive*, puts the emphasis on *minimal deterrence* (at times defined as *existential deterrence*). Its various political corollaries include greater decoupling of American and European forces, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of non-nuclear countries, etc. One extreme version of this approach is a return to *massive retaliation* and another, apparently the exact opposite but actually perfectly in line with the first, (at least as far as the use of nuclear weapons in Europe is concerned), is an emphasis on the operational role of these weapons actually conceiving of scenarios of *geographically limited nuclear war*.

The second approach accepts deterrence as a *higher principle* (for example as compared to a conventional balance only) and therefore tends towards *just deterrence* (which we will

refer to as *essential* in this paper), trying to maintain its credibility under changing circumstances.

Acceptance of the second approach somehow simplifies the criteria underlying the Alliance's future deterrent force. It makes interpretation unambiguous, emphasizing a possible diminution of weapons, justifying modernization in accordance with the criteria for maintaining essential deterrence, and reviewing the criteria for operational use in light of the political goal of deterrence inspiring the whole approach.

STRATEGIC FORCES


Western nuclear deterrence will continue to be dominated by the composition and the strategy of American nuclear forces. The number of warheads and the type and quantity of delivery systems will be determined by the course of the START negotiations and the USA-


USSR bilateral accords. An important reduction, of about 35-45%, may be predicted. Above all, this would affect the so-called "first strike" forces with counterforce capability (like the ICBMs with multiple independent warheads). Possible consequences include:

- a change in the quantitative balance in strategic warheads among the USA, USSR, France and Great Britain, as well as and combined with;
- an increase in the importance of an agreement between France and Great Britain on forms of collaboration in the nuclear field (even if they seem to exclude all forms of integration for now).

Either of these could bring a kind of "force multiplier" into play in favour of European nuclear forces, bringing out a kind of *minimum concept of deterrence* already rooted in Europe although not spread throughout it.

In order to understand the effect, we have to consider the number of French and British strategic nuclear





forces that could actually be brought to a state of alert at any time. Although rather low today (176), this number will increase considerably after modernization (to 544 or more) and could rise further if the two deterrent forces were to undertake some form of operational cooperation. In particular, targeting would benefit, as targets threatened by nuclear forces could be multiplied and diversified.

At the same time, the number of targets that the two superpowers can threaten will decrease considerably and if the modernization of NATO continues along the modernization *cum reduction* lines we have hypothesized up to now, the number of targets taken into consideration by NATO's operational plans - currently 5000 - will also drop.

In that situation, the gap between the deterrents of the superpowers and the deterrents of the two European powers would narrow and the usefulness of independent Franco-British deterrent for the overall strategy of NATO would increase.

ITALY AND THE SOUTHERN FLANK

As far as Italy and the Southern Region in particular are concerned, it should be pointed out that a structural difference exists in the potential deterrent commitment of European deterrents. British forces are directly committed in Germany and central Europe (the BAOR, the British forces in the FRG) and, besides being present militarily on German territory, France is also geostrategically linked to the defence of southern Germany. None of this is true of the Southern Region, or at least not so directly. In particular, it is not true in the eastern Mediterranean which, for Italy, is rather like Germany for France.

The restationing to Italy of the 401st Wing of American dual-capability F-16s and the continuous presence of the VI Fleet in the Mediterranean constitute guarantees of coupling. In the future, a European guarantee could flank the

American one, with integrative forms of military exchange among the forces of countries in the Southern Region and the Central Region. In particular, Germany and France could act as hinges, as well as Italy and Spain.

FORCES IN THE THEATRE

The Global Concept approved by the Atlantic Council in 1989 referred to all these systems as "tactical", SNF, or also as *sub-strategic* systems.

This novelty in terminology is not without significance as it tends to link these shorter range systems closely to strategic and intercontinental systems, underlining the fact that both *have the same fundamental deterrent role*.

With the elimination of the INFs, it seemed that two nuclear strategies were emerging - a strategic one and a tactical one - that were not clearly related. In practice, this meant a weakening of the GPG compromise.

As it was difficult to make up for the INFs concretely, NATO decided to compensate semantically, promoting the nuclear weapons normally defined as tactical or short range to the rank of *sub-strategic*. But actually this semantic change could be important for the future, because it will tend to influence the future decisions on NATO nuclear strategy and weapons. For example, if SNFs are *sub-strategic* weapons, then that means that their mission also has to be reduced in some way. A strong cutback in the number of those weapons and a limitation on the types of delivery systems can be envisaged.

Then again, the term *sub-strategic* adopted by NATO (and earlier still by the WEU) is oddly similar to the term *pre-strategic* adopted by the French to describe the role of their shorter range national nuclear systems. They are not yet exactly the same (there are still differences between the two concepts), but they



U.S. nuclear OHIO submarine.

are no longer worlds apart as they were in the past.

FROM LANCE TO FOTL

The programme for modernization of the Lance missiles (FOTL: Follow-on to Lance) has taken on considerable political importance, above all for the following reasons:

- this program is of remarkable political and military importance for the future adjustments in the balance of forces, both conventional and nuclear, between East and West;
- the usefulness *in defence* of a land-based, reliable and accurate missile system with a greater range than the Lance (an increase from around 100

km to just less than 500) is evident.

LAND MISSILES

The essence of the Western approach could be expressed by a simpler formula: "modernize to reduce and negotiate". At times, this makes it difficult to define exactly what quantities are being aimed at. The options for the FOTL are focussed on a second generation missile that can be launched from the new MLRS (the M-270 mobile rocket launcher), but also include the French Hades and a completely new missile.

This system would be useful in attaining two goals: maximum penetration capability and maximum operating range. This would make two other operational goals attainable:

- increasing the survival capability of systems by moving their bases farther back;

- using the ability to cover "lateral" and deep targets to a maximum.

This could make a reduction in the number of systems possible.

THE FUTURE OF THE AFAPs

Battlefield weapons (in particular artillery) play a minor role in strategic and military planning today. NATO is replacing its old 155 and 203 rounds with new shells that are safer, more accurate and have a longer range (at the moment, approximately 200 W-79 rounds and an initial number of W-92 rounds. Their main characteristic is that they increase the range of nuclear artillery up to 30 km and cut reaction times down from one hour to about fifteen minutes.

If we consider the development of conventional MLRSs with terminally guided sub-munitions and their greater effectiveness, it can be said

that nuclear artillery is being kept in operation mainly for political reasons: it may be a useful card to play in arms control negotiations. Therefore, no further programmes for the modernization or the expansion of these systems could, therefore be rationally justified.

Moreover, the elimination of AFAPs actually creates a number of operational problems. Above all, it requires a notable modernization of conventional forces (emerging technologies able to carry out FOFA missions - attack of second echelon forces) as well as the successful outcome of the negotiations with respect to conventional stability. In fact, these weapons are kept by NATO to deter massive attacks by conventional Pact forces.

However justifiable, the elimination of the AFAPs in the short term would tend to upset NATO's political and strategic priorities once again. They could safely be done away with once actual conventional stability is attained, but under the present circumstances, their removal *before* the positive conclusion of the negotiations would make other modernization measures imperative.

DUAL CAPABILITY AIRCRAFT

The most important and substantial part of theatre nuclear systems must, therefore, be played by dual capability aircraft. Nevertheless, in order to respond effectively to nuclear theatre roles, they have to fulfill some criteria for survival and readiness.

Besides obvious budget implications, operational readiness and the actual availability of aircraft for a nuclear role at the required time are strictly linked to the definition of the number of aircraft needed to carry out the nuclear and conventional missions at the same time.

Among other things, the problem of survivability implies:

- the protection of airbases from sur-

prise attack; the need to be able to disperse one's own forces (thus the availability of a larger number of bases; an agreement with France could be important here), and a "technical" solution depending on the availability of aircraft with V/STOL capability, better anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence of bases, etc. These programmes also require considerable resources;

- an increase in "on mission" survival, thanks to electronic defence systems, the reduction of radar signature and other suppression techniques and the development of better stand-off systems.

SRAM-T vs ASMP

The development of stand-off systems (up to a range of approximately 500 km) is in full technological bloom and progressing rapidly. This means that it could lead to the rapid development of new systems. An air-to-land theatre nuclear system could have high accuracy and a high capability of penetrating enemy defences. But a lot depends on the kind of agreements that may regulate their procurement. The idea of a system developed jointly by the United States, Great Britain and France is attractive for obvious reasons and would have both technological and economic advantages, as well as being an important political sign as far as the compactness of the Atlantic Alliance and its internal solidity are concerned. But other solutions are possible.

Aircraft are not only the systems most suitable for broad deployment and the requirements of flexibility of theatre nuclear forces, they also facilitate the distribution of roles and participation in decision making and nuclear operations for a large number of allies. This could be tied in to the debate on burden-sharing not only between Europe and the United States, but also among European countries.

SLCM AND THE SOUTHERN FLANK

Just a short comment on SLCMs in as much as they are theatre systems. They seem to be particularly useful for operations in the Southern and Northern Regions of the Alliance. However, this tends somehow to underline a difference between the two areas and the Central Region, because the SLCMs are American - neither European nor NATO - systems. Are agreements on sharing like the ones for aircraft possible for SLCMs? The subject should be given more serious consideration.

At the moment, only a few nuclear versions of the SLCMs are deployed on American ships and submarines (the overall programme calls for the deployment of around 750 SLCMs of this type). Their deployment is more defensive/deterrent than anything else (it complicates enemy targeting problems), even though the "Maritime Strategy" of the US Navy is trying to find some "offensive" justification for them, be it strategic or theatre. In any case, they play a minimal role in the defence of central Europe (reductions? concurrent missions?) But they nevertheless cause planning problems because they are tied to the other primary missions that the American naval platforms have to carry out. Too much involvement in theatre tasks could restrict the mobility of the American fleet (and, thus, create problems of efficiency and survival).

ARMS CONTROL PROBLEMS

Ever since the Harmel Report in 1967, the Alliance has tried to reconcile a policy of detente and arms control with its own security needs. For many years, acceptable forms of compromise were found, but they became more difficult after the "double decision" in 1979 on INFs.

Any further withdrawal or reduction of Soviet nuclear forces deployed forward against Europe

would not eliminate the Soviet nuclear threat against Western Europe; it would, however, increase the relative dependence of the USSR on strategic or long range forces. This underlines the need for a clear link between NATO and American deterrence. Then again, the primary objective of Soviet nuclear forces is to destroy NATO's nuclear capability in order to give more weight to the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces. Bilateral nuclear disarmament in Europe would *increase the weight of the Soviet conventional threat* and, therefore, the risks of war.

A ban on chemical weapons, which represents an advantage for the Alliance *per se*, also demands caution and attention. The use of chemical weapons is so dangerous and disastrous and the possibilities of clandestinely setting up chemical arsenals so high, that the need for the Alliance to keep a nuclear deterrent capability against this threat has to be reiterated.

Some claim that asymmetrical reductions should be made in conventional weapons until the same level is reached for both sides, equal to approximately 50% of the current NATO forces. We would like to point out here that as things stand today, reductions to a mere 75% of the level of current NATO forces could have a destabilizing effect in favour of the Warsaw Pact (given the greater impact of geostrategic factors). If steps were, however, to be taken in that direction, allied forces would have to be completely reorganized, eliminating those elements that are more prone to surprise attack.

As far as conventional weapons are concerned, the following points must be pointed out:

- conventional imbalances increase the probability of surprise attack or attacks with very little warning, thus

dangerously reducing the reaction times for a nuclear response (and reducing the options);

- the withdrawal of certain Soviet forces may reduce the probability of surprise attack and lengthen warning times, thus increasing the deterrent capability of NATO nuclear and conventional forces;

- the goal pursued at the CFE negotiations, that is, significant asymmetrical reductions leading to parity of the conventional forces of the two alliances in Europe, would not eliminate the possibility of a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact, but it would *reduce the quantity of nuclear weapons needed for deterrence*. Furthermore, warning times could increase considerably if the geographic distribution of the reductions were studied carefully;

- from what can be gleaned from present indications, national defence plans for the nineties will lead to reductions in forces that in some cases will even go beyond the objectives set for the CFE negotiations. This could have negative effects,

creating new imbalances and wiping out the positive effects of a possible CFE agreement on the planning of nuclear systems. It could even *increase NATO's dependence* on nuclear systems;

- this could increase interest in disarmament agreements that go beyond the current CFE objectives, aiming at much more substantial reductions, up to 50% of the present NATO arsenal. However, the consequences for NATO nuclear weapons are not yet clear: it would probably lead to greater allied dependence;

- the real final objective of the process of weapons reduction is to achieve a *profound restructuring of conventional forces*, so as to reduce structurally the fear of conventional attack. Yet, European history shows how vain hopes of stable conventional balances have been in the past. And in any case, none of the structural reforms conceived of today would completely eliminate the possibility of conducting a conventional attack. Therefore, a nuclear



The Soviet ICBM «SS-25» on a wheeled off-road motorcraft.

component to confirm and stabilize the credibility of deterrence of war would nevertheless be needed, only that it could be *extremely limited in number and quantity*;

- finally, an agreement must be reached on the *modernization* of these forces. Adoption by NATO of new technological systems (such as the ACM, advanced conventional munitions) may multiply force and render some kinds of tactical nuclear systems useless. But while this would reduce *operational dependence* on nuclear weapons, on the one hand, it would not *replace* the deterrent function of nuclear weapons, on the other.

There is, therefore, a close tie between NATO's conventional and nuclear options, in the sense that changes in the conventional field will affect calculations defining NATO's nuclear arsenal. This increases the *conditionality* of nuclear planning, but in no case does it eliminate the need for a NATO nuclear arsenal. In any case, two major risks always have to be kept in mind:

- the first: the greater the cutbacks in conventional forces, the more difficult it will be to understand fully the requirements of conventional stability (and, therefore, the greater the nuclear uncertainty);

- the second: NATO's nuclear requirements are determined by the conventional, nuclear and chemical options of the Warsaw Pact. It is, therefore, possible that a reduction in NATO's nuclear arsenal, carried out on the basis of changes in the conventional threat, could create greater vulnerability for the residual nuclear arsenal, exposing it to preemptive chemical and/or nuclear attacks by the Pact, and in turn upsetting the conventional balance.

Be that as it may, the possibility of balanced progress in both fields has to be taken into account.

The best possible objective and the only one that can in some way solve the doubts and problems that we have outlined up to now and that is *in keeping with maintaining the certainty of deterrence* is for East and West to establish a situation of *joint*

deterrence. In that case, both parties should accept and apply negotiated or tacit measures that enhance strategic stability and do not weaken deterrence.

A development of this kind would include, among other things, reciprocal agreement on rules of engagement, measures for stabilizing armament controls, extensive agreements on verification and reciprocal knowledge and understanding, etc. up to *explicit* acknowledgement of the right of both sides to maintain a form of *just deterrence*, along the lines described previously. This kind of *joint deterrence* could include safeguard measures for agreements on conventional and chemical disarmament, measures for rearmament to counterbalance violations or other breaches of the agreements. This would give a new and more stable sense to disarmament negotiations as a whole.

This kind of *joint deterrence* could lead to an ampler agreement on deterrence in general as an *interim solution* accepted by both sides until new deterrent relations that do not imply the present situation of confrontation are defined. In that light, a mutually negotiated and accepted European order could finally remove the military component from political competition, reducing the residual arsenals to mere *safeguards* for respect of the order established and for elimination of war from the range of historical possibilities, at least in Europe.

On the whole, therefore, should NATO opt for this line, it would have to maintain a clear deterrent policy based on less nuclear weapons (the lowest level compatible with their operational and deterrent efficiency, and nothing less), so that the goal of keeping up a credible minimum of defence and deterrence would remain valid. This underlines the importance of what we might call the "transparency" of the balance, and that is, systems for verification and supervision (in the future, these should also be more NATO and more European than American for obvious reasons of confidence).

FIGURES, COMPROMISES AND ESSENTIAL DETERRENCE

The figures given in various circles seem to be more of political value than based on actual analysis of operational strategy. Nevertheless, there seems to be a notable tendency towards levels that might be defined as *essential deterrence*. Regardless of the fate of the AFAPs, those figures are quantitatively close to the ones agreed upon at the time when the INFs were being deployed (500 - 800 nuclear systems), more or less in keeping with the same strategic logic and calculations.

HYPOTHESIS A

Hypothesis A (a total of 3000 warheads) is presumably a reflection of what SHAPE (the NATO Supreme Allied Command in Europe) calculations might be. It provides a rather high number of short and medium range nuclear systems, allowing NATO to maintain its present nuclear targeting practically unchanged while ensuring some savings and a further reduction of about 1160 warheads over and above those already independently decided upon or agreed upon with the USSR in the framework of the Treaty of Washington for the elimination of the INFs. Therefore, it contains elements of disarmament, as well as elements of preservation of the existing operational strategy and, obviously, the GPG. The nuclear systems are still rather numerous and diversified and can therefore continue to act as a balance and "substitute" with respect to conventional imbalances. The reductions foreseen concern about 33% of the forces presently deployed by NATO and bring NATO forces down to approximately 40% of what they were a few years ago.

It is likely that in this hypothesis, a new FOTL missile would dominate the nuclear forces structure.

The new Soviet nuclear submarine «Akula», which should make up the launching-platform of the SLCM «SS-N 21» from a range of 3,000 km. The container of the ecogoniometer can be seen in the stern.



HYPOTHESIS B

Hypothesis B (2000 warheads) takes into particular consideration the criticism expressed by German political spheres (especially conservative) towards the AFAPs and the German reluctance with regard to massive deployment of new FOTL systems. The cutback in nuclear warheads, in exchange for modernization, would be more than 50%. (The residual warheads would be less than 30% of the NATO warheads at the beginning of the '80s.) AFAPs would be cut back by 80%.

In this alternative, short range systems would be sacrificed, while the role of longer range systems would be strengthened, with a clear preference for those launched from aerial platforms rather than FOTL.

This kind of compromise between the desires of SHAPE and those of a large part of German public opinion would, in any case, assure a credible survival capability of the allied deterrent (increasing it with respect to the present). It would involve a limited but real capability to threaten concentrations of the Pact's conventional forces and would reduce the risk of a political clash between the USA and the Federal Republic.

HYPOTHESIS C

Hypothesis C (1000 warheads) embraces the most extreme theses of the "demonstrators", who would like the nuclear weapons in the European theatre to be reduced to a simple "existential" role of "general" or assured deterrence.

In this case, there would be no difficulty in accepting a "triple zero" option with the USSR. On the con-

trary, it would be in NATO's interests to propose it, so that the more numerous SRINFs of the Warsaw Pact would be eliminated along with NATO's. A "fourth zero" eliminating the AFAPs would also be needed. In that way, NATO could anticipate Gorbachev politically and catch him off guard.

The only nuclear forces that would remain according to hypothesis C are those launched from aerial platforms (a combination of stand-off missiles and free-falling bombs).

Such an option would obviously be rather vulnerable to surprise attack against NATO's airforces and MOBs in general (the main operational airbases) of which there are relatively few in Western Europe (and less than in the Warsaw Pact). However, those attacks would also be more difficult and less probable because the USSR would no longer have its present superiority in terms of short range missiles aimed at Europe, able to "wipe out" almost all Western MOBs. An agreement with France allowing for use of bases on French territory would be essential in this scenario (and a similar agreement with Spain would also be very useful).

With this hypothesis, NATO targeting would be limited to long range. This means that the role of operational and defensive support played by the NATO tactical nuclear forces would be almost totally eliminated. The hypothesis is, therefore, closely linked either to the success of the negotiations on conventional stability in Europe or to a notable strengthening of the conventional capabilities of NATO forces.

HYPOTHESIS D

The same can be said for hypothesis D (1000 warheads or less). It represents a compromise between C (considered too extreme) and B (still considered unsatisfactory with respect to the demands of public opinion and Gorbachev's propagandistic offensive).

Basically, it consists of a scheme for essential deterrence involving from about 800 to 1000 systems. A reduction of this kind could be partially offset by a technological leap, as well as by a different commitment on the part of the French and the British for nuclear defence/deterrence in the European theatre. In any case, it guarantees against the "denuclearization" of Europe. Strategically, however, it cannot but markedly reduce the number of options open to SACEUR, not so much in the field of deterrence as in the field of defence. This would mean reviewing the GPG once again and probably transforming the role of the American troops and forces in Europe in some way.

As far as the mix of those forces is concerned, it is likely, for the reasons given previously, that they cannot be reduced to only aerial forces with stand-off missiles. They will also have to include FOTL land systems. If they had a long enough range, replacement of the Lance missiles deployed in Europe today would not have to be done on a one to one basis. Considering that the total number of launching ramps is between 50 and 90 (on the basis of the existing Lance launching ramps); between 200 and 250 FOTL could be



The Soviet ICBM «SS-24» on rail.

a reasonable option, with a decrease of approximately 450 warheads with respect to the Lances. If the USSR were to agree to cut the number of its SRBMs down to the NATO number (a request put forward by the Alliance in its Global Concept), the strong present Soviet missile threat against Western MOBs could be done away with.

The rest of the warheads would be linked to aerial delivery systems for the political, strategic and operational reasons given earlier. They would be mounted on long range stand-off ballistic systems. It could be useful to keep a certain number of free falling bombs to maintain an equal division of responsibilities and risks among the allies, especially with those countries that do not or cannot adopt expensive and complex stand-off systems and the relative advanced aerial platforms.

The four hypotheses outlined do not exhaust the range of possible choices. A number of other proposals have been made which will be examined below.

Some, for example, claim that all land-based ballistic missiles can be eliminated from Europe for two reasons. First, this would favour NATO (in that it would oblige the Soviets to dismantle far more systems and eliminate one of the strongest threats of surprise attack to NATO operational bases and command and control centers), and second, the essentially deterrent function attributed to these systems by NATO could be carried out as, if not more, effectively by American sea-based nuclear systems (SLBMs and SLCMs) as well as by airborne nuclear systems.

According to this opinion, NATO would continue to require short range nuclear weapons such as artillery to deter possible conventional attacks and concentrations of ene-

my troops.

There are, however, three main objections to this plan:

- there is strong opposition to nuclear artillery in Germany on the part of both government and opposition forces, as these are the weapons that threaten to "isolate" (or "single out") German territory the most with respect to the rest of the Alliance;
- this would mean increasing the centralization of nuclear decision making in the hands of the Americans;
- the plan would put the national European deterrents under heavy pressure.

Of greater interest and in line with what we were saying previously is another theory that develops two ideas parallelly. The first concerns the future of American nuclear weapons in NATO and the second is a proposal for European cooperation in the weapons field.

The American «Peacekeepers» made movable by the «rail garrison» system.

As for the first, this theory affirms that the number of NATO's nuclear weapons in Europe can be reduced to an *essential* and *non negotiable* quantity, which can be set at around 400 nuclear warheads, distributed between aircraft and modernized SNF missiles. All would be dual-key; they would be distributed among the allies and would have a deterrent function, as far as use and rationality are concerned, somewhat similar to that of the *pre-strategic* weapons in French doctrine.


This hypothesis would be strengthened if the second idea were applied. It calls for:

- greater operational and technical coordination between the two independent nuclear forces of France and Great Britain;
- the possible distribution of French and British nuclear weapons to allied countries, using the same kind of rules and guarantees that govern American "dual-key" weapons in Europe.

The strategic significance of these proposals is that they would allow for a reduction in the number of systems without weakening overall deterrence and, above all, without increasing the "singling out" of Europe as a whole or individual non-nuclear countries within it. Forces can be deployed in a different mix than provided for by NATO planning, while still being compatible with it. The strengthening of a "European pillar" (not just conventional) in the Atlantic Alliance would provide the political, institutional and management base for this kind of compromise.

Some propose the creation of a "European Planning Group" to flank NATO's Nuclear Planning Group that would assure a link between "European" and "allied" options. It could also manage any "dual-key" weapons.

The risk behind a proposal of the kind is ending up with a NATO without Americans in Europe which



would be the worst result of all.

IN OUR OPINION

In our opinion, the last hypothesis could be undertaken in "gradual steps" in order to avoid some of the more difficult management, political and strategic problems the idea entails.

As a hypothesis, therefore, a modernization of the NATO SNFs somewhere between B and D could be envisaged, while proceeding towards greater European cooperation which should include:

- the completion of the revitalization of the WEU;
- greater operational cooperation between France and Great Britain, accompanied by a procedure for information/consultation with the European allies (in WEU) and with the Atlantic allies;
- explicit confirmation of the contents of the Ottawa Declaration of the Atlantic Council (1974) and of the Platform approved at the Hague by the WEU (1987), that is, the "contribution" of the French and British nuclear forces to the deterrent strategy of the Alliance, plus confirmation of France's commitment in 1986 to "consult" with the FRG on the use of its substrategic

weapons in German territory, given the time and the right circumstances. These declarations already foreshadow a closer tie between French and allied strategy. If they were made formal and explicit, this tie might become even stronger;

- since the establishment of a European Nuclear Strategy Group might seem a rather large and as yet vague leap forward, small steps could be taken here, too. For a start, a European Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament could be set up, along the lines of the American ACDA, coordinating European positions in the field of nuclear and conventional negotiations. Thus, a "nuclear doctrine" common to all Europeans and linked to the Atlantic doctrine could be worked out. This agency would then act as a matrix for the subsequent formation of a Group.

The logic behind these proposals is not only to provide for the gradual development of European integration in this field, but also to safeguard Italian long term interests.

It's easy to suppose that greater cooperation between France and Britain or France and Germany or among all three countries would tend to form a "summit" of European countries with nuclear capabilities or consulted on nuclear strategy, from which Italy would initially be excluded. Two reactions are possible to

such a development: the first is to try to kill the child at birth, the second is to try to extend the happy family.

The first solution seems the easier, but it could prove vain for two reasons. First, we certainly can't prevent those countries from entering into bilateral or trilateral relations. On the contrary, our opposition could cost us a prolonged exclusion from the club. Second, killing nascent European cooperation in this field could be a serious strategic error because it would force us to rely solely on the United States at a time of rapid evolution of American doctrine and strong US-USSR bilateral contacts.

On the whole, all these suggestions as well as the hypothesis of *essential deterrence* are not fully satisfactory and, in particular, do not respond to the political and operational criteria agreed upon in the GPG. They are, however, feasible and not disastrous compromise solutions, which could be positive *if all the other conditions were to have a positive outcome*.

It is clear that the validity of such compromises will be all the more valid, the better the CDE agreements and the more satisfactory the decisions on modernization of conventional weapons and the restructuring of defence.

ITALY IN THE ALLIANCE'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY CHOICES

Nuclear weapons in Italy essentially make sense in the framework of the East-West confrontation. As the 1985 White Paper on Defence observes, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons are "linked in the framework of a single strategy aimed at deterring the enemy from undertaking their use at any level and against any part of the allied territory". Furthermore, they must "prevent the enemy from attaining any kind of advantage or victory" and, along with conventional weapons, must "persuade any potential aggressor that the use of military force against one of the countries of the Alliance cannot lead

to any advantage, much less victory".

Moreover, in this East-West situation their usefulness is limited operationally. The short range of the SNFs (with the exception of airborne ones) makes them a threat to the territory of bordering neutral or non-aligned countries or even Italy. Their main operational utility - direct threat of enemy force concentrations at the moment of attack - can only be taken advantage of in a very limited and flat portion of the front and is of no (or very little) help in the mountains.

Longer range land-based SNF missiles (such as the FOTL presently being developed) could certainly give this interdiction function greater depth, provided it hits those forces just when they are concentrating for attack of one of the buffer countries. Other distant interdiction missions would have to be carried out with airborne weapons (especially of the long or medium range stand-off type).

Thus, from the Italian point of view, the use of shorter range nuclear weapons is not as useful as it could be on the central front in a wide gamma of contingencies. It would be limited to a few scenarios, besides participation in the overall deterrence of NATO strategy.

As stated in the 1985 White Paper, "recourse to nuclear weapons is provided for as a last resort to stop an otherwise uncheckable aggression". It is clear that strict application of this principle in Italy would strongly limit the possibility of actual use of those systems.

Finally, the White Paper states that "the concept of nuclear deterrence is, however, being reviewed and may possibly be adjusted to the potential development of new technologies in the 1990-2000 period". This observation essentially refers to application of "advanced defence", defined as "typical of conventional forces" thanks to the support of new technologies that make it possible to stop and combat an aggressor far behind the front line of the front (FOFA doctrine and its operational variants).

If these premises are exact and assuming that the Italian Armed Forces

will be able to acquire the conventional forces needed to effectively apply such a strategy, it follows that Italian military interest for the new tactical nuclear systems based on national territory is relatively low.

Therefore, the choices to be taken should follow two related lines of thinking:

- a *political-strategic* line, aimed at upholding the overall credibility of allied deterrence;
- a *military-operational* line, aimed at satisfying specific requirements defined by military planning.

Nonetheless, the geo-strategic characteristics of the theatre of operations in the northeast of the peninsula again make it possible to restrict the number of systems, as attack options are already strongly limited by high mountain chains and the existence of only a few passes suited to force concentrations (especially armoured).

In this case, a choice could be envisaged between a limited number of AFAPs and FOTL systems. The availability of FOTL systems could provide a greater number of options with a minor number of systems (taking advantage of their accuracy and longer range), increasing their distance from the front and therefore their invulnerability. Deployment in Italy of FOTL systems, should NATO so decide, would have the dual advantage of enhancing allied solidarity (diminishing the possibility of the singling out of the RFG) and confirming the option of a possible link between defence of the northeast front and defence of the central front.

Whether the allies decide in 1992 to deploy these systems or whether they will be sacrificed to disarmament, Italy should nevertheless maintain a quota of airborne nuclear weapons, preferably mounted on stand-off missiles.

These systems would have a *simple or essential deterrent* function linked to American strategic deterrence and the annulment of possible advantages that the enemy hopes to attain through the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

PERESTROIKA IN THE EAST AND PERESTROIKA IN THE WEST



The Danish philosopher Kierkegaard has said that, whereas life must be lived forwards, it can only be understood backwards. Yet, it is always hard to know when historical experience can be projected into the future by applying reasonable imagination, or when conditions for human life have changed to a degree that makes such projections questionable. The threat of nuclear war and the threat of weapons of terror and mass destruction in the hands of insane fundamentalists constitute such changes. So does the explosive population growth in the economically least affluent societies with its resulting mass movements of persons and peoples. We should also include the disastrous and lasting effects of our materialistic vandalism. It appears, however, that there still is a contradiction: although history seldom repeats itself, those who do not learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them.

Soviet Expansionist Attempts. Thus, while we watch with great expectations the new Glasnost and Perestroika in both the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, soberness should help us recall that the Russian-dominated empire has grown in 600 years from infancy, as a small society centered around Moscow, to today's 287 million people. This number represents a multitude of ethnic groups, cultures and languages. Like most empires in history, the Russian empire developed through the use of force. Centrally positioned on the Eurasian Continent, it covers no less than 1/6 of the total land mass of this globe. Expansionist attempts that failed are part of the picture, while others succeeded after the second or third initiative. The more recent history provides us with examples. When Stalin and Hitler discussed future spheres of interest in November

1940, the Russians were given the right to expand in the Fenno-Scandinavian direction and towards the Indian Ocean. As we know, events turned out differently. They resulted, however, in expansion of the Soviet Union and widening of its sphere of influence in Europe by 500 to 1,000 kms to the West. In 1944, Molotov suggested to the Norwegian government that the Russians should take over Bear Island, ceded to Norway in 1925 by the Paris Convention of 1920, and that the other main island of Spitzbergen should become a joint venture. During the Potsdam Conference of 1945, Stalin demanded a naval base on the Bosphorous as well as a trusteeship over a former Italian colony in North Africa, on the Mediterranean coast. There are other examples. Afghanistan is so far the latest unsuccessful attempt to expand the influence of the empire. The forces behind the Russian expansion have shifted: defence for survival that includes a belief in buffers and preventive actions, princes' ambitions and princes' insanity, nationalism, Pan-Slavism, communism and socialism and imperial visions. We cannot exclude that the one "ism" might continue to ride on the back of the other. Strategy and tactics have been flexible. However, Russian national ambitions, stripped of changing ideologies, have shown great consistency so far.

The Difficulty of Perestroika. A drive for Perestroika is nothing new in Russian history. Neither is it new that it is difficult to achieve. Peter the Great opened up to Western ideas, and his imposed Glasnost and Perestroika were sabotaged by the "Partijski" and bureaucracy of his time: the powerful Russian orthodox clergy, the Moscovite Bojars and others. Lenin assimilated the thoughts of two Germans — Marx-





and Engels — and with his successor — Stalin — directed the masses through a violent and bloody Perestroika. This time, the opposition was done away with. Soon, however, a new opposition to any type of Perestroika emerged, this time in the form of the orthodox Russian Communist Party and bureaucracy. Is Kipling right when he says that “East is East

and West is West and never the Twain shall meet”? Well, Russia and the Soviet Union are both East and West, but it is worthwhile noting to what extent both the teachings of the Israeli Jew, Jesus, and the German Jew, Marx, on Russian soil became “Russian”, and Russian is this blend in shifting fashions of orthodoxy, fundamentalism, feudal-

ism, Byzantine rule and utopianism. It is also a most inspiring human warmth with intellectual and artistic nerve. No one can be indifferent to this distinctly Russian identity, and is it not the strongest common denominator within the Soviet empire of today? In the long run, this denominator can hardly be communism.

Detente? Expressions of understanding and a Western conviction that detente is on its way are neither new in the relationship between East and West. Khrushchev practiced his own Glasnost, his rewriting of history, his policy of rehabilitation of “non-persons” and announced his “peaceful coexistence” well before the Cuban crisis. Brezhnev declared during his visit to Washington in June 1973 that the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had reached “maximum stability of irreversible character”. Then came Afghanistan, and more. Therefore, it is not first and foremost theses like “guaranteed mutual security”, “reasonable and dependable sufficiency”, or “sensible competition” that constitute any qualitative change from earlier periods, when we believed that those words indicated a detente. A large number of these expressions are not even new. Yet, it is my belief that the foundation for many current initiatives is somewhat more solid than was previously the case. There is today a more deep-rooted common acceptance of the fact that no one will achieve victory and that, most likely, all will lose in a possible armed conflict between East and West if nuclear weapons ever come to use, and the Russians seem to fully realize that it is not possible to drag the Soviet Union out of its economic and social stagnation while such enormous efforts are simultaneously vested in armaments. The issue here is not only where the money goes, but where to direct the vast intellectual capacity currently engaged in military and military-related research and production.

In the area of arms control and arms reductions, the most important element so far is that *reasonably*


sound data and other prerequisites for negotiations have been presented for the first time by both sides. An agreement to search for arms levels which are significantly *lower than the existing ones* has been reached. It has expressed and demonstrated a common understanding that further steps should be *asymmetrical* where the status of forces is asymmetrical. Furthermore, the Soviets have admitted the Warsaw Pact conventional *preponderance* over NATO in Europe; they have also admitted that their forces have had an *offensive doctrine and structure*. Last, the agreement on *physical control on the spot*, irregularly executed and at short notice, is a breakthrough of a psychological nature, to say the least. National boundaries are no longer completely closed for insight. One must probably be Soviet to fully understand how penetrating this step is for the Soviet Union. We are in for further testing of words against deeds.

PERESTROIKA IN THE EAST AND PERESTROIKA IN THE WEST

Perestroika in the East. The Soviet drive for a revolutionary Perestroika coincides with an already twelve-year old experiment in China — its neighbor to the East. This experiment, under careful scrutiny, shows great uncertainty as to its outcome. Indeed, most societies who have tried the roads to Marxist-Leninist communism (East, West, North or South) are raising questions out of despair and frustration. Whatever its national interpretation, from the Balkan to Tanzania, from mother Russia to Vietnam, communism has not in effect provided the promised ultimate answers to all questions. It has granted little freedom, equality and prosperity. Apart from some very special campuses in the West, communism is an historical anachronism. Unfortunately, dictatorships are not, and some pretty conventional dictatorships may still find it convenient to refer to

Marxism-Leninism when desperately trying to hold on to power.

Perestroika in the West. Glasnost is the norm in societies that enjoy more liberal, pluralistic and democratic traditions, and Perestroika usually follows with less trauma. Yet, evolutionary changes can also be comprehensive and penetrating. Western European states currently make major efforts to enhance economical, political and — over time — military cooperation and to achieve a greater European self-sufficiency, also vis-à-vis the United States. These efforts coincide with ever clearer signals from American quarters that the 320 million Europeans in the West must finally pool their enormous joint resources together and do more to safeguard their own security. Few people believe, I assume, that 300.000 Americans will be stationed in Europe for ever — whether they are a nuclear guarantor or not. I do not suggest that the deep-rooted links between the United States and Europe will break, but good relations are never static. In Europe, we also see the traditional demand that the United States show leadership increasingly mixed with a renewed sceptics — in General de Gaulle's tradition — about having significant questions handled "over the heads" of the Europeans. In the Federal Republic of Germany, thoughts in line with former Chancellor Willy Brandt's ideas on "Ostpolitik" are strongly reflected today in German opinion and politics. They are illustrated by his words that no one can take away from the Germans their responsibility to be more strongly engaged in following-up their interests also in the East. There are Germans on each side of the border, and the fear of a German nuclear battlefield — indeed a battlefield — is profound. Rationality and pragmatism seem to mingle with romantic feelings fostered by ethnic and cultural historical relations with peoples in the East, also beyond the all-German borders. Romantic feelings may be enriching but they usually do not support a pragmatic approach to





things. In Germany, we simultaneously find that political self-confidence and influence are catching up with the economic strength of the Federal Republic and with its contribution to the defence of Western Europe.

The Integration Process Within the EEC and NATO. The French-German Axis and the incorporation of 35 million Spaniards in the European Community and NATO, as well as in the West European Union (WEU), is increasing the weight of continental Europe. France is clearly signalling its continuing interest in being a major player in the Mediterranean, as well as vis-à-vis the Federal Republic and NATO. In spite of many substantial diver-

gences, a unification which neither "La Grande Armée" or other versions of "Blut und Eisen" could achieve is now being reached through the free will and choice of Western European peoples within pluralistic and democratic societies. This process may not leave untouched those East European peoples who have leaned toward the West by tradition. Signs are only too obvious in countries like Poland and Hungary. European common denominators are continuously being strengthened, most fortunately not at the expense of the enriching plurality of old Europe.

Within NATO, the European integration in process is also strengthening the bilateral nature of North American and European relations, naturally at the expense of the originally envisioned multilateral pluralism which, of course, was never fully practiced. A country like my own — an old member of NATO, strategically important to more than the 4 million Norsemens but, by choice, not a member of the EEC or WEU yet — may increasingly find that the menu has already been decided upon when it sits down at the NATO table in Brussels. To excuse my countrymen for still not fully joining the European party, some may claim that such a fiercely nationalistic, flag-hoisting and individualistic stubbornness is a must for the survival of a micro-power in the midst of big power interests. The Norwegians will most likely come along but they certainly should not be invited. Like the salmon in their rivers, they are at their best when they swim upstream. At least so they believe, and perceptions are part of reality here as elsewhere.

The European Flanks. The Soviet Union, the Nordic countries and Western powers with maritime traditions, responsibilities and capabilities, never saw the Northern waters and the strategically important adjacent territories as a distant flank. Also, in continental and central Europe, an understanding has developed over time that the soviet concentration of maritime convention-

al and nuclear power in the North is not a peripheral, but a common security issue. SACEUR's main briefing map for visitors now goes beyond the Skagerrak — which it did not during the first 30 years of NATO. However, this inclusion on SACEUR's briefing map for visitors has not altered the danger of a sectorization that might simplify the thinking process, but not the problem. Even when the issue is restricted to the selection of an adequate procedure for arms negotiations, one should seek to avoid a partition in geographical sectors potentially blurring the strategic coherence between center and flanks in Europe. Such a sectorization could only serve to split NATO in Europe.

Concerning the European flanks, it is also disturbing to observe that the removal of weaponry from the center may be compensated at the flanks. For example, we find that the land-based medium range missiles that are being removed and destroyed in Europe today are replaced, to a large extent, by cruise missiles which can be delivered from submarines, surface combatants and aircraft in Northern water. The removal of land-based missiles did not start this deployment but it most probably speeded it. North of the Skagerrak, the purely national defence rests on what 4 million Norwegians may muster. It would indeed be unwise if we did not seek to have a relationship as civilized and constructive as possible with our big neighbor to the East. Yet, it would equally be unwise to subject ourselves to a situation whereby, without a solid hold onto a trustworthy national and Allied defence, we would have to stand up to pressures in isolation. Our situation has been tricky and might very well continue to be difficult. However, the idea never appeared to "commit suicide in fear of death", to paraphrase Paasikivi — a former Finnish President — in a time of destiny for our Finnish brethren. These two roads to security, I believe, are in short the basic doctrine of NATO as a whole, simply and well formulated in the

Harmel report 22 years ago (1967), later, and elsewhere. Of course, the interpretation of what this doctrine implies must be adapted to a changing environment, just as it must act to influence change for the better.

THE LOWER LIMIT OF ARMS CONTROL

Enthusiasm is necessary in many connections but, when arms control and arms reductions are up for consideration, the most engaged among us should be reminded that, unfortunately, there are limitations. Despite the many declarations from both East and West within the United Nations and elsewhere that a nuclear-free world and total disarmament are the final goals, it is hard to believe that any responsible government, in practical terms, will go below the level of what Gorbachev has termed a "reasonable and dependable sufficiency". What this implies can, of course, be discussed. Yet, as far as we are able to project history with optimistic imagination, it is rather likely that the Soviet Union *would* interpret its security in terms of its relation with the United States. Also, whether American forces remain in Europe or not, it would be strange if the Soviet Union did not feel a need to secure itself against a better coordinated Western Europe which will include, for the foreseeable future, French and British nuclear weapons. It is also unlikely that the Soviet Union will feel safe without troops along its more than 7,000 km common border, against the more than 1.1 billion Chinese and against Japan, the industrial giant who may be even better armed than today. Similar considerations must be expected in most other quarters. However, these security requirements may certainly be met at a considerably lower level than the one that has resulted from the arms competition between East and West since the Second World War.

THE RISE AND FALL OF EMPIRES

There are certain similarities throughout history in the rise, bloom, degeneration and fall of empires. We may wonder whether the Russian empire is moving somewhere along that scale, or whether there is reason to believe that history does not apply in this case. Experience seems to confirm that ethnic and cultural basic values, including religion — or national values — are more firmly implanted than many builders of empires ever took into consideration. Another lesson from history shows that, although an empire may well rise by the means of force, force alone will seldom suffice to keep the realm together. Some "thousand-year empires" only lasted for a decennium, others flourished for a longer period, but empires which had taken in more than they could digest seemed destined to burst. For small neighbors, life has usually been difficult whatever the empire's development and duration.

Like the previous Czarist empire, the Soviet Union is torn by divergences between very different nationalities and cultures. Upheavals against rulers and pogroms from above or by one national group against another are nothing new, nor are Azerbaijani pogroms against Armenians (1905). Yet, forces throughout have contributed to keep most of the Russian realm together. Continuous "storm" from outside and the barbarian occupation of Russian land were not least in contributing to the unification. In a geographical sense, the Soviet Union is an entity. To use a military-strategic expression, political, economic and military power may be projected on "inner lines". The Soviet Union has had, and will most likely continue to have, a political, economic and cultural power center sufficiently strong to act against threatening centrifugal forces. The Russian Federal Republic alone constitutes no less than half the population of the empire, or ap-



proximately 140 million of the USSR's 287 million people. It occupies 76% of the Soviet territory or 17 billion square kilometers — twice the size of China or twice the size of the United States — and it stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from Europe to the Far East. Even if the empire does not survive in its present form, there will still be a Russian realm and, for generations, a Soviet Union that is a formidable neighbor to Western Europe. It will also continue to play a significant and competitive role in world affairs. The breakout from the landlocked position of Russia and the Soviet Union is part of this picture.

Maritime strategies — even doctrines — may change but it is most unlikely that we will see a lasting withdrawal to a coastal defence only,



which will not even safeguard the Soviet nuclear strike capability placed on the least vulnerable platform, the submarine. Applied to the protection of the Kola base complex and to the areas of operation for Soviet strategic submarines in the Northern waters, such a defence will have to encompass the Barent Sea, the Polar Basin, the northern parts of the Greenland and Norwegian Seas well towards the GIUK gap. This is not a particularly pleasing observation for the peoples living on adjacent coasts.

WHERE DOES NATO GO?

The Future NATO Political and Military Doctrine. Then, where does NATO go after the first 40 years and in the light of Perestroika in the East and Perestroika in the West? Defence alliances, by nature, do not survive success easily. We have seen NATO's success, both in its main role of deterring aggression and in its role as the common coordinator of our attempts to break down the

tragic barriers between East and West and within Europe. The Nato forum has set a model of international cooperation for constructive dialog and for sorting out internal divergences between member states. The times that we now live in and that we contemplate, so rich in promising options but also in possible miscalculations, create the most demanding challenges, particularly in the area of coordination of ideas and policies. A strategy of defence is by nature reactive. Confronted with immediate challenges, we are lucky to negotiate from a position of "reasonable and dependable sufficiency", to use Gorbachev's terminology. It may indeed have been this sufficiency that helped bring the Russians to the negotiating table. Perestroika in the East and in the West is a decisive political factor. Questions should be and are now being asked about the more specific character of current and future threats and about the future NATO political and military doctrine, strategy, means, and political and military procedure.

Analyzing the Sources of Change. I

believe we have sometimes tended to deal with the winds of change, rather than with their sources which — either East, West or elsewhere — are invariably firmly anchored in national, cultural and economic history and developments. Faced with Gorbachev's charismatic approach and the momentum of his drive for Perestroika that also addresses the surrounding world, the United States and NATO have been criticized for moving too slowly. However, apart from the fact that a family of democracies takes more time to reach policy decisions than a one-party system does, it is imperative that, with or without Glasnost, we do not jump to conclusions and that we examine and analyze those sources of events to which I referred. We need a sound foundation if we are to regain an appropriate degree of initiative in matters of importance to the future security of our societies. A fairly basic question is, of course, what we actually wish to see happening within the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and what in reality happens. The aim of Gorbachev's revolutionary Perestroika is



to build, consolidate and secure a strong and confident Soviet Union — a superpower capable of influencing policies on a global scale. At least so far, the policy is that the empire shall be ruled by a one-party system. The Party will always be right, even when it changes its opinion. Opinions will change, of course, if for no other reason than the change of leaders, who will also have a most formidable power in their hands in the revised system. Lenin changed his opinion in significant matters, but never on the role of the Party. We may wonder if a one-party system — that is, a rather firm interpretation of “democratic centralism” — is not a prerequisite for holding the empire together?

Influence of the External World on the Perestroika Process. With a most endearing flexibility, Gorbachev meets the re-emerging ethnic, national, economic and other differences within the Soviet realm; within the buffer satellites, he lets “the flowers bloom” — whether their colors are Glasnost and Perestroika, or whether they represent the most extreme traditionalism. On one point, however, the concept is quite clear. In spite of the constitutional text that grants any republic the right to leave the USSR if it so wishes, independence in that sense is out of the question. National boundaries

drawn after the Second World War and subsequently accepted in the West are not open for discussion. Even if Gorbachev were allowed to influence Soviet society with the imagination, vigor and stamina that he has so clearly demonstrated so far, there would be little chance that the Soviet Union, within his time, could be revolutionized and reach the technological and economical level of industrialized nations that have moved along other clearly more successful paths. The practical results of Perestroika after the first few years does not warrant particular optimism or, in Russian words and at grass-roots level: “We wouldn’t have known about any Perestroika if we hadn’t had Glasnost”.

Then, the surrounding world may contribute to the results, deliberately or through misinterpretations. Examples of possible misinterpretations could be, for instance, that Gorbachev’s “Common European Home” would imply the same correlation of forces as De Gaulle’s “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals”; that the Soviet version of democracy would resemble North American or European versions of democratic rule; that a market economy can run parallel to a system which sets money values and prices by Party directives; that a shaky Soviet Union could be to our advantage — including the

fact that internal unrest, potentially leading to a Balkanized Eastern Europe, could promote peace; that the death of communism could mean that the time of ideologies and ideological conflict is out; and, in this context, that the Russians would like to be what they see in the West. The frustrated reactions of Russian dissidents displaced in Western societies from the time of the Czars up to the present day are illustrative. Also, in evaluating Soviet options and policies vis à vis other “Marxist-Leninist”-run countries, we might repeat the blunder of believing that there is such a thing as world communism, implying for example that the Soviet Union and China would ever unite. Hegel once said: “the great tragedies in history do not occur when right meets wrong, but when right meets right.”

Dealing with Symptoms or with their Sources? I questioned earlier whether we had sometimes been dealing with the winds of change — with symptoms, rather than with their sources. For instance, are we discussing in any depth the future role of nuclear weapons or a mere reshuffling of the various missile systems? Considering the current and probable future controversies over short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, and considering a possible major cut of the strategic arsenal in the future, could nuclear deterrence be sea-based to an even greater degree? Could the superpowers, pursuing the SALT I mutually agreed importance of SLBMs’ second strike capability, come to some tacit understanding on sanctuaries at sea, or on a form of conduct at sea in areas where such submarines operate, with practically the same implications? Could this eventually also come as a result of a possible future lack of means to constantly tail such submarines? What are the security implications of such potential zones to countries which happen to be neighboring them? What is the future role of British and French nuclear forces, in my mind, hitherto greatly underrated? There might be an increasing likelihood that NATO and its in-



dividual member countries could inherit conflicts and newer forms of threats from other parts of the world. If so, should the prevention of such so-called "out of area" developments, politically and otherwise, continue to be a matter for the individual member countries only, or should one, case by case, search for some sort of coordination under the auspices of NATO? May otherwise big and superpower coordination go over the heads of the many? Could a possible disarmament, Glasnost and Perestroika, and new versions of a European unification rearrange the European theater to such an extent that they would make NATO a less obvious instrument for deterrence and a less desirable forum for the coordination of other significant joint efforts? Of course, NATO will sooner or later be history, but I doubt that the time is ripe for that. There is more to NATO than containment. We have ideas worth protecting and worth furthering. They go beyond the issue of farm subsidies and beyond the German-Danish quarrel over beer's purity, or beyond the Bavarian "Hoch lebe das Deutsche Reinheitsgebot!" The basic issue is and, for long, will remain whether people belong to the state or vice versa.

Consolidating What Has Been Achieved. It would clearly be mutually advantageous for both East and West if the Soviet Union could take steps toward democratizing thinking, the system, and society. Other

benefits would result if they could see the survival of humanity as more important than class struggle, and if they could reduce their present firm belief that military power is the most adequate instrument when conducting foreign policy. However, it would be a Russian interpretation of these ideas. It would also be promising if the Soviet Union could come to see its security better served in the long run by a more voluntary understanding of its security imperatives among some Warsaw Pact countries. Such development could help the dismantling of the tragic barriers throughout Europe. Unfortunately, we cannot afford to exclude the disturbing alternative that the current drive for Glasnost and Perestroika may break down and that Soviet leaders will revert for short or long periods, to the classical solution of attempting to hold the Empire together and establishing order by referring to external threats. Europeans find the greatest fascination in the fact that, after World War II, they can hardly imagine military force ever being applied again between the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain and all other countries who for so long — with the frequency of at least one war per generation — made Europe one of the world's war torn zones. We are called to consolidate what has been achieved, and to do our best to increase those areas where "absence of war" could be institutionalized.


ON RATIONALITY

Whatever our perceptions may be on where we stand and where we are going, our times are certainly not boring. I started with a few historical observations; I believe we should conclude by reminding ourselves that important decisions throughout history have rarely been a function of purely sound and pragmatic reasoning. At least in Europe, statesmen's gout, mistresses and worse have had the most significant influence on the destiny of nations and peoples. We should certainly make this experience ours because, as a Danish philosopher friend put it: "You may say whatever you like about a sinful life, but it is educating".

General Fredrik Bull-Hansen

General Fredrik Bull-Hansen was formerly Chief of Defense of Norway.


PERESTROIKA
IN THE EAST
AND
PERESTROIKA
IN THE WEST



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EUROPE - EAST AND WEST AND THE SOVIET UNION



Munich



Developments in Eastern Europe are very closely linked with the changes President Gorbachev has initiated in the Soviet Union. At the same time, they are independent of events in that country. Since 1957, Soviet policy has permitted the satellites to reach socialism in accordance with their own traditions and socio-economic conditions. The Brezhnev Doctrine was concerned with the potential effects if a country steers off the path to socialism - or is thought to do so. In his own language, Gorbachev has followed the same line, but it is less clear what he might consider "steering off the right path". Some indications are astonishing - to say the least - especially in Hungary.

EASTERN EUROPE AS A LIABILITY

In Eastern Europe today, it is obvious that each country is developing more and more along national lines. Hungary and Rumania — two neighboring states that represent extremes in the region — are good examples. What Mr. Gorbachev seems to be witnessing is a region that gradually becomes a liability in economic, military and political terms.

Economic Liability. The economic case is well documented. Gone are the days of ruthless Soviet exploitation of the region. Now, many factories in Eastern Europe are kept alive simply because they have a market in the Soviet Union for their out-

moded and poor quality products. A couple of years ago, Gorbachev launched an ambitious plan for CMEA (Council on Mutual Economic Aid) integration in the fields of high technology — computers, robots and the like. Unfortunately, this was a suggestion that the poor help the poor! Both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe must turn to the West for such things. The plan is by now an embarrassment; it is no longer mentioned, and the CMEA countries are standing in line to conclude agreements with the European Community.

Military Liability. In military terms, it has long been admitted by the Soviet Union that the purpose of stationing troops in large numbers in the East European region is two-fold: it is to ensure police duties in the region, as well as forward deployment against the West. Mr. Gorbachev recognizes the costs associated with this, and has shown willingness to change the situation with his promise of unilateral withdrawal and his positive stance at the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) negotiations in Vienna.

Political Liability. Politically, it is a liability to have a row of hostile allies bordering on the West. In a sense, Eastern Europe is a hostage of both the USSR and Western Europe. Stability is the catchword. The Soviet Union does not want instabilities in the region, which might provoke an intervention. Western Europe does not want instabilities in the region either, for fear of jeopardizing detente. In the past, many West European countries have found it difficult to "apply the stick" in reaction to Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe. Indeed, detente with the Soviet Union counts more in the end than the aspirations of the people of Eastern Europe.

THE RISK OF INSTABILITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE


What is happening today in Eastern Europe carries the risk of

great instabilities. Some countries, such as Poland and Hungary, seem to be moving away from the socialist system as we have known it since World War II. Others, such as Rumania and Czechoslovakia, are clinging on for dear life. Mr. Gorbachev carries his message of Perestroika and Glasnost to Eastern Europe, and finds popular response from Gdansk to Mamaia. Yet, the local governments sometimes muffle the message so that it turns into a whisper.

In 1976, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, the advisor to President Carter, lent his name to the so-called "Sonnenfeldt doctrine". At the time, this was widely interpreted as a call for the West to cave in to the facts of life in the Soviet-East European relationship. What Sonnenfeldt really aimed at, however, was the Western acceptance of Soviet security interests in the region in exchange for Soviet normalization of its relations with the Allies. "Normalization" meant letting freedom and self-determination prevail in the area. The same kind of thinking lay behind the militarization of the Polish East-West bound railroad lines in 1981 as an attempt to reassure the Russians during the turbulent Solidarity period. This strategy did not succeed then, but perhaps it might today.

POSITION OF THE WEST TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE

Opening the Frontiers. Turning to the West, especially to Western Europe, there are some hard questions to be answered. Do we really want a development of that kind in Eastern Europe and are we prepared for it? What is actually happening today is that long-held Western policies are becoming a success, and we now have to deal with our own success. Indeed, did we ever intend for our policy to become a success? More concretely, are we ready to open our frontiers to the goods, services and people of Eastern Europe? Are we ready to undertake a serious dialogue



with them about what a jointly developed security system of Europe might look like? How do we define the threat to NATO in a Europe which might no longer be ridden by the Cold War?

Western Reaction to the Transition Process. An immediately pertinent question is: "How do we deal with the transition period"? At present, we are faced with a *process* — both in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union — which may lead anywhere and nowhere. We do not know the outcome, but we must somehow react to the process. Sitting back and doing nothing is also a reaction. For example, the political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe are generally encouraged by the West.

Yet, they will bring about inflation, unemployment, an falling living standards in countries where they are already low. This sort of situation paves the way for a political backlash in countries engaged in the complex process of going from a rather unique one-party dictatorship to some kind of political pluralism and rule of law.


So far, the reaction of the West has been to almost close the frontiers. Now that passports and permisios to leave are readily available in many East European countries, getting to the West is a more than cumbersome procedure. Visa lines in front of Western embassies are endless. Even East European business representatives complain of unfair

business practices, because delays in getting visas to the West have caused them to lose contracts.

Our second reaction is to tell the East that the way out of their economic misery is to produce more and better goods. In other words, they should reform their economy to make their industries competitive. Yet, could this be a short-sighted policy, merely geared at postponing the problems for a while? Factories in the East produce consumer items that we do not want. Even if they were more effective, their main competitors in Western markets would be Taiwan, Korea, Singapore — even India. What is needed is a complete restructuring of the Eastern production patterns to fit in with the economic development of the West. For this, capital is needed.

Setting Up a Fulbright Fund for Eastern Europe. There have been calls for aid to Eastern Europe along the lines of the Marshall Plan. I do not see it coming, even if it were accompanied by the strictest controls over economic and political reform to avoid the mistakes made in Poland under Gierek. The European Community is busy trying to help its Southern member countries prepare for 1992. The United States is no longer the overwhelming economic world power it once was. There will hardly be any capital available for Eastern Europe in a massive way, except possibly from the Far East. The European Community might lend credence to its calls for increased trading production by setting up a fund similar to the Fulbright Fund. This fund would accept young people from Eastern Europe to study such fields as marketing, management, banking, languages — all subjects which are sorely neglected in the East. Pluralism in a political sense also requires education and, in that domain, scholarships for broader liberal arts subjects are well spent.

"Contact" is the cry coming from the East right now. The least response we can make is political. We must take up the dialogue on ideas of pluralism and on Europe of the future. But again, we must be



clear in our own minds on what we want.

Eastern Association with the Council of Europe. Finally, Mr. Gorbachev has launched the slogan of "our Common European house". So far, has been met with a certain amount of skepticism as to his intentions. I think we ought to let him know that we already have the foundation for this "house". Indeed, the Council of Europe, through its various conventions, puts a strong emphasis on the rule of law, human rights, and social welfare — all features of Western democracies. Let the countries of the East associate themselves gradually, as they see fit, with those various conventions and partake in the deliberations of the

Council's Assembly. In some respects, Yugoslavia is already leading the way.

Mary Dau

Professor Mary Dau is currently Member of the Chairmanship, Danish Committee on Security and Disarmament.

The present article is illustrated with paintings of Ninni Verga.

WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION?



Offizier in Parade. Offizier
im Gesellschaftsanzug.

Offizier in Parade.

Freiwillige Krakusen.
1866.

This paper addresses the social and economic aspects of Perestroika in the Soviet Union and their possible implications for the West. Since these questions have been discussed during the workshop largely from a Western perspective, I will focus my remarks on impressions gained from within during repeated visits to the USSR and, in particular, during some very recent trips. Although these impressions are by no means definitive, they do highlight some key challenges that will affect not only domestic change in the Soviet Union, but our entire East/West relationship.

When I mentioned to Soviet friends and colleagues that I would be discussing the Soviet transition, their immediate reaction was: "Transition to what?" This echoed some of the comments that have been made throughout the workshop. As we all know, Soviet society today is beset by enormous economic, political, nationality, environmental and social problems. The Soviet leadership has been moving almost by trial and error to address these problems, often backtracking when one trial does not seem to work. The uncertainty — if not sometimes chaos — is palpable. For the fifteen years that I have been travelling to and living in the USSR, never have I seen my friends and colleagues so exhilarated, yet so apprehensive about the changes occurring in their midst. Nobody really knows — not even the Soviets — where the USSR is headed. This is a tremendous challenge, not only for Gorbachev, but for the Alliance.

There are dramatic differences of opinion in the West regarding the future of the USSR. Some believe that Perestroika is clearly moving — irreversibly — towards a more open, democratic society. Others claim that Perestroika could ultimately lead to a stronger and more effective challenge to our democratic values, although the nature of this threat would likely be different from what we have faced in the past. Among Soviet citizens, one finds an equally wide range of hope and resignation.

Certainly, the Soviet people have been elated by efforts towards fundamental reform and by the prospects of gaining more of a voice in the workings of their government. Many regard Gorbachev as a great hope — perhaps their last great hope. I was surprised, however, at the depth of pessimism and skepticism among wide segments of the population regarding the prospects of those reforms succeeding. As one Soviet colleague put it, "Something could come from behind and, in an instant, the country would revert to the old ways". In the areas of economic and political reform, environmental and social issues, questions abound.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES

Economic Reforms. During the workshop, we talked a good deal about the economic challenges facing Gorbachev's leadership. Soviet colleagues are quick to point out that major economic initiatives — the creation of cooperatives, greater opportunities for foreign trade, the promise of a larger workers' voice in management, and the like — have already injected hope that the Soviet economy may pull itself out of its long peri-

od of stagnation. Yet, these same colleagues are also quick to show that economic conditions today are worse than they were three years ago when many of these reforms were instituted, and that the reforms themselves may not go far enough to affect real change. Throughout the Soviet Union, for example, including in major cities such as Leningrad, ration coupons are now distributed for basic necessities — soap, sugar, dishwashing powder etc. In a recent discussion with the Deputy Director of the Communist party journal "Kommunist", I was told that twelve million people are now in line for an apartment, and at least an additional thirty to forty million would like to apply for one but do not have the right to do so. Many Soviets are complaining about a regime that cannot provide the most basic daily necessities. Many are asking me to bring soap, sugar, salt, toothpaste and similar goods from the West because they are unobtainable in their country. Also, the fact that few individuals express confidence in Gorbachev's ability to reverse the apparent deterioration of living standards has only exacerbated the problem: more and more people are hoarding whatever is available, leading to more shortages in the stores.

Soviet writers stress that low living standards are not just a question of priorities, but are symptomatic of systematic problems. The highly centralized system is simply not structured to respond to demand, to encourage or reward initiative, to get things from one place to another, or even to discourage informal arrangements that conflict with overall economic planning. Indeed, one area of concern to Soviet authorities today is the magnitude of economic and organized crime in the Soviet Union and the new opportunities for organized criminal activity that Perestroika has brought in its wake. Despite the already wide-ranging reforms, many of my Soviet colleagues are uncertain about how willing and able the Soviet leaders are to dismantle that system. We talked during the workshop about some of the trials





Painting of Werner Schuch.

and errors that they are experimenting with as they search for rational economic growth. So far, according to Soviet analysts, the Soviet government seems to have focused on "quick fixes" such as increases in agricultural and industrial production and imports of food and consumer goods. Shopping sprees in London, however, or grafting new arrangements onto an ossified system will not be able to address the increas-

ingly severe economic problems.

Moreover, some of these policies are making things worse or introducing new constraints to reform. The anti-alcohol campaign, for example, sharply reduced government revenues and led to severe sugar shortages with no perceivable positive effect on the economy. Fear has been expressed that the introduction of self-financing without broader economic reform might create serious problems of its own. High taxa-

tion and high prices from cooperatives are miring new economic policies in controversy and raising public anger.

Indeed, perhaps one of the biggest constraints resulting from these policies has been in public attitudes. We hear a good deal today about the Soviet public's struggle against privileges reserved for the Soviet bureaucratic elite. I was also surprised, however, that many Soviet acquaintances were intolerant of the notion that a more liberalized economy will produce its own set of privileges or profits. This was reflected, for example, in the hostility voiced towards cooperative owners who were viewed as charging too much for their goods, or occasionally towards neighbors said to be earning "too much". While many Soviets are hopeful that change may come in the future, a common sentiment about the general economic situation is reflected in a Soviet joke that has Gorbachev addressing his country: "When I came to power", he says, "the economy stood on the edge of an abyss. I am proud to report that we have taken a bold step forward". Nobody seems to agree on whether they will be able to climb out of that abyss. On the issue of economic reform, I met with many questions and much uncertainty.

Political Reforms. Political reform also engenders a combination of hope and skepticism. Economic and political issues, of course, cannot be separated. A most recent case in point is the widespread miners' strikes. These various movements did not only call for better living conditions, but for a greater voice in management, constitutional reforms, truly independent trade-unions, and other fundamental political changes.

Significant political and economic reforms have indeed been made. It has been a remarkable experience to watch televised meetings of the Supreme Soviet, as newly-elected Soviet legislators argue about every aspect of Soviet policy. My Soviet colleagues are greatly pleased by the creation of new institutions staffed by a range of Soviet citizens who no

longer fit into a single mold. They are excited that Soviet citizens have been given a new voice in the running of their government. They welcome the efforts currently under way to change a system that distributes power down to one where the population accepts more of a political role and a greater stake in the system.

As with economic reform, however, these Soviet colleagues underscore the system's resistance to reform, the continued emphasis on centralization, and they question how quickly new institutions will be able to respond to urgent problems. In interviews with the Western press and radio, Andrei Sakharov and several other prominent Soviet scientists and intellectuals have urged caution in assessing the political and institutional changes occurring in their country; they also express wariness over the unprecedented power Gorbachev has concentrated in his own hands. Many are uneasy about the imposition of tough new laws such as the regulations issued in February 1989 that limit journalists' access to "rallies, meetings and the scenes of emergencies" (to be determined by authorities), or new penalties of imprisonment for up to three years for discrediting the State or an official. While these severe laws have often been rescinded, such efforts certainly temper the atmosphere for more liberal reforms.

These conflicting political and economic policies and pressures have led to a mixture of hope and apprehension that seems to underlie Soviet attitudes towards "transition" in their society today. Perhaps nowhere is this felt as strongly as in issues of environmental protection and nationality affairs.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

For a long time, little attention was paid to environmental issue in the USSR. However, the traditional Soviet focus on production at the expense of the environment has now been shown to have had devastating effects. According to Kakimbek



Salykov — Chairman of the newly-created Committee on Environmental Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources under the USSR Supreme Soviet — and according to environmental scientists at a recent meeting in Moscow, more than 20% of all Soviet citizens live in regions of "ecological disaster"; more than 20% of the USSR's major cities are polluted "to crisis proportions"; and 40% of Soviet cities are polluted to levels "unsafe for human health". Figures reported by Academician Yablokov — current Deputy Director of this committee — show that in over 100 large cities, air pollution is ten times higher than "permitted levels" established by both the USSR and the World Health Organization; more than half of the Soviet rivers are severely polluted; more than 40% of all agricultural land is severely endangered.

Indeed, almost every region and republic in the USSR has its share

of horror stories. In the Central Asia region, the Aral Sea is one of the largest symbols of environmental devastation. The massive amounts of water diverted for irrigation from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya — two rivers that feed into the Aral Sea and are the only water supply for Soviet Central Asia — have caused the water level of the Aral Sea to drop nearly 11 meters and its salinity to double over the past 20 years. The Aral Sea was once the world's fourth largest inland body of water. Today, its area is only about 60% of what it was in 1960 and, in some places, what were once port cities are now more than 70 meters from the water's edge. In addition, heavy use of pesticides and other chemicals throughout Central Asian agriculture has ruined the soil and severely contaminated the fresh water supply. According to the Health Minister of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, only 13% of the population in



EJERCITO ESPAÑOL

the republic is supplied via water mains; the vast majority drinks chiefly from the Amu Darya river which he called "little more than a sewage ditch". A symbol of environmental pollution in the Baltic Republics is the port of Ventspils, the largest materials transfer port in the USSR on the Baltic Sea. The product export facility alone releases more than 3 million tons of untreated waste water into the Baltic Sea annually, exceeding Soviet maximum permitted levels by sixty to one hundred times. The port fertilizer factory —

built with the participation of six countries including the U.S. — reportedly discharges more than 50 tons of poisonous materials into the atmosphere. More than 100 tons of petroleum products also end up in the Baltic due to "mistakes made while loading tankers", according to an environmental activist. The entire Baltic coastline was closed to swimming in 1988. Uncontrolled stack emissions are polluting the air in Latvia's principal city of Riga. Liepaja and Ventspils, and all of Latvia's major rivers are severely polluted.

Such environmental tragedies have had huge economic and health effects. Agricultural production for example, has suffered because of pollution at a time when feeding and clothing the Soviet population is one of the Soviet leaders' greatest challenges. In Uzbekistan alone — the largest cotton growing region of the USSR — 44% of the irrigated land is strongly salinated: these increasingly salinated soils prevent farms from producing more than ten or eleven centeners of cotton per hectare and reportedly cause annual losses of roughly 45 million rubles. As salinization increases, many fear that the land may become unusable for agriculture. In Moldavia, a key food-growing region, the press also speaks of declining agricultural yields due to the "poisoning of the earth with toxic chemical and consequent declines in soil productivity". In terms of health, the cumulative effects have likewise been devastating. According to official Soviet statistics, infant mortality in eight of the fifteen Soviet republics has risen dramatically over the past fifteen years — in some instances to levels among the highest in the world. Between 1970 and 1986, for example, infant mortality in Uzbekistan rose by almost 50%, from 31 deaths before the age of one year per 1000 births to 46.2; in Turkmenistan, the rise was from 46.1 to 58.6. According to Latvian sources, birth defects in children born in Ventspils over the past ten years have increased more than 3.5 times, abnormalities during pregnancy more than ten-fold, and bronchial asthma and skin allergies have doubled and trebled respectively. In some villages of Central Asia, life expectancy has declined and averages between 38 and 42 years of age. In some areas, the breast milk of women has a salt content several times higher than normal, and pesticides have been found in women's blood and breast milk.

Today, official recognition of these problems is viewed as a positive first step toward addressing them. Environmental protection has been placed high on the Soviet agen-

da; it has become a major issue of discussion at the newly elected Congress of Peoples' Deputies and Supreme Soviet and comes up frequently in Gorbachev's speeches, both at home and abroad. The creation of high-level institutions with wide-ranging powers — including the State Committee for Environmental Protection, ("Goskompriroda") in January 1988 and the Committee for Environmental Protection, and Rational Use of Natural Resources formed under the USSR Supreme Soviet in May 1989 — illustrate a new government commitment to clean up the country from harmful pollutants. Yet, the tasks of cleaning up the environment are daunting. The Soviet system, as currently designed, discourages environmental protection. For example, increased fines have been imposed in past years on enterprises exceeding permitted emissions levels, but these costs remain low and have simply been worked into the enterprises' operating budgets. Ministries have largely been tasked with policing themselves. Also, resistance to reform often stems from the belief that requiring enterprises to conform to more stringent standards could lead to enormous expense, high unemployment and severe, potentially devastating disruptions in the Soviet economy.

To combat these massive problems, many Soviet citizens are wary that institutional and systemic constraints, coupled with a continued emphasis on production, will impede the much needed progress. Overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities between the new environmental organizations and existing institutions — such as the State Committee for Hydrometeorology, ("Gidromet"); the various ministries tasked with overseeing pollution in their functional areas; the State Planning Committee ("Gosplan"), tasked with economic planning; and the myriad other State committees and organizations tasked with authorities that touch on environmental areas — have placed some aspects of Soviet environmental


planning in temporary turmoil. According to Academician Koptiug, chairman of the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences, five separate institutions — the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the USSR Council of Ministers, Gosplan, the USSR State Committee of Prices, and the USSR Ministry of Finance — with assistance from the USSR Academy of Sciences, were tasked in 1988 to work out within a six month period procedures for payments for natural resources and for fining enterprises that exceed permissible emissions. In the chairman's words, "More than a year has passed, and

the streets of Tartu, Estonia, calling for action against environmental pollution. In Central Asia, the "Committee to Save the Aral Sea" was castigated for its activities by Party authorities. In cities throughout the Soviet Union, public pressure is preventing new plants from being built if there is fear that they may severely pollute the environment or be harmful to human health.

THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES


All these political, economic and environmental questions have become intertwined with perhaps the most serious set of issues facing the Gorbachev leadership today; the relations among the USSR's myriad nationalities. Political control and centralization, economic scarcity and inequality among the republics, as well as problems of environmental devastation, have all become linked in the mind of many nationality groups with a sense of exploration from Moscow and, sometimes, with calls for independence. In Soviet Central Asia, for example, the traditional focus on cotton is now being labeled as economic exploitation from Moscow — a policy that diverted a significant share of resources from the local populations to benefit Russian "colonists". Lamenting the environmental devastation in the Baltic republics, one Baltic observer said: "... human life is worth less (to Moscow) than profit... we (have been) relegated to the status of third class citizens... this is a question of survival of our people".

The past few years have seen serious, often violent nationality tension come to the fore throughout the country. They present the Soviet leadership with perhaps their most complex set of challenges. Perhaps the greatest complexity, however, may lie in the vast differences among the nationality groups — differences in languages, historical experiences, cultures, religions, levels of economic development and perhaps most importantly, demands for Moscow. Na-



what has been done?"

In the meantime, the Soviet people are becoming impatient and, with increasing frequency, are taking to the streets. On 3 September 1988, tens of thousands of Lithuanians formed a human chain near the Baltic Sea to protest its pollution. On September 16 and 17, at least ten thousand people formed a chain around the Ignalina nuclear power plant to demand a safety inspection of the facility by an international team of experts. In June 1988 young people in gas masks marched through



Cheval-légers Polonais - 1808

tionality demands range from receiving a greater slice of the Soviet economic pie, to complete independence. Not all demands, moreover, pit the individual nationality groups against Moscow. Demonstrations in Uzbekistan in February 1989, for example, apparently called on Moscow to effect the ouster of Grand Mufti Babkhan, the official head of Muslim religious affairs in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Placards in other demonstrations sometimes read "Long Live Glasnost" or "Long Live Gorbachev". As seen in the conflicts between Georgians and Abkhazians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and now among fellow Muslims in Uzbekistan, the nationality

groups may be more divided among themselves than they are with Moscow. But as the experience of Nagorno-Karabakh or the recent Georgian demonstrations also show, inter-ethnic disputes can ultimately become directed against Moscow, especially when a number of problems in all the republics are viewed as Moscow's doing.

All these questions again lead to a mix of hope and skepticism. Certainly, there are signs of hope: the enormous economic and political autonomy offered to the Baltic republics; the increasing voice given to different national movements in some parts of the USSR; and the promise of more discussion on na-

tionality affairs are good examples. Yet, other events make some observers skeptical that nationality tensions can be resolved. They include the tragic demonstrations of April 1989 in Georgia in which 31 protestors were killed by official orders; the backlash expressed in the growth of Russian nationalist groups; the leeway Glasnost has given for racist or anti-semitic groups to be formed; and the clear resolve on Moscow's part not to devolve enough power to the republics that threaten the cohesion of the state.

At a time when the Soviet economy is stretched so thin, and when Moscow is trying to maintain central control, many believe it will become an increasingly difficult balancing act for Moscow to satisfy local demands while stopping short of granting full independence. It would be a mistake, however, to focus entirely on whether the Soviet Union will stay together or fall apart. Perhaps the most important questions will lie in the kinds of demands the different nationalities continue to place on Moscow, and in the ways Moscow will or will not respond. A number of adjustments will have to be made that may well change the USSR even more fundamentally than economic or political reform alone.


IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

What does this mean for us? Certainly, the extreme changes within the USSR today present enormous opportunities to engage the Soviet in all aspects of our relationship — political, military, commercial, and otherwise. Yet, against a backdrop of enormous strain and uncertainty, they also demand caution and care. Expectations should not run wild and engagement should be carefully structured so that it meets all of our best interests. Ultimately of course, Western policies will not have a decisive impact on Soviet reform. Expanded trade will not overhaul the Soviet economy; a joint trip to Mars

will not bring "peace". Instead, the Soviets themselves underscore the systemic nature of their economic and social problems. They argue that, without fundamental changes in the system, technology and investment from the West will bring little lasting change. This is in striking contrast with Chris Donnelly's discussion of the Soviet military during the workshop. Despite inferior technology, he told us, the Soviets are quite skilled at putting together a "complex" or system of systems that can together compose an effective military machine. In addressing environmental, economic and social problems, however, the opposite may be the case: no matter how sophisticated a technology the Soviets may be able to obtain, the system itself will have to work more effectively before it can comprise a "complex" to address the magnitude of challenges facing Soviet leaders.

Despite the limitations, today offers enormous opportunities for increased cooperation with the Soviets — to work on global issues together, to trade, to expand exchange of people and ideas. Environmental concerns should perhaps be at the top of the list for this extended cooperative activity, with joint local and global projects of interest to both East and West. Indeed, environment and arms control issues in the USSR are being subsumed together under "national security issues". At a time when greater autonomy is being granted to the national republics, we should perhaps also explore direct ties with those people with whom opportunities abound but with whom our interchange has traditionally been limited.

The most important question, however, is no longer whether we want or not to cooperate, but how to cooperate. Some essential points are not only what areas may offer the greatest opportunity for cooperation, but how that cooperation can best be structured so that both sides have maximum interest in its success. In any given area, what are the limitations from the Soviet side and where do the Soviets see the greatest op-



portunities? What are the highest priorities for us? How can an agreement be structured — in scientific exchanges, commercial trade, joint ventures etc. — so that both parties have a vested interest in a favourable outcome and neither side is disappointed, as was often the case in the past? Where, and how, is greater engagement likely to work and where is it unlikely? To answer these questions, it is important to understand the range of domestic changes in the USSR and the opportunities and constraints as seen from the

Painting of Jean Théodore Géricault.

Soviet perspective. Just as important is the challenge of setting our own agenda — not only several decades into the future — but today.

Nancy Lubin


Professor Nancy Lubin is an Associate Professor at Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

ITALY'S WAR

SCENES FROM

by

G. M. TREVELYAN



My heart goes out the poor little families all over this great kingdom who stood the brunt and strain of the war, and gave their men gladly to make other men free, and other women and children free. These are the people, and many like them, to whom, after all, we owe the glory of this great achievement.

PRESIDENT WILSON AT ROME
January 1919

CHAPTER VI

The great Italian offensives from Plava and Gorizia, May and August-September 1917 — Kuk, Santo, Bainsizza, San Gabriele — The Italian high-water mark reached.

In May 1917 the long Isonzo gorge stretching from Tolmino to the Gorizia plain still divided the opposing armies, except for the Italian *tête-de-pont* at Plava and the Austrian *tête-de-pont* at Santa Lucia, farther north. The gorge was contained on the Italian side by one long, unbroken ridge, from two to three thousand feet in height, and largely clothed with oak woods. The ridge began at the southern end with Monte Sabotino, went on with Monte Planina and Monte Corada above the Plava bottom, turned sharply westward at the heights whence one looked down into the deserted streets of Tolmino, and finally dropped through steep forests into Caporetto. Before the summer of 1917 the *genio* had completed a vast system of high-level roads from Sabotino to Caporetto along the top of this ridge and a whole network behind and athwart it. By means of these smooth and well-graded mountain roads hundreds of heavy cannon were placed along the ridge that summer, destined to blow the Austrians out of their positions beyond the Isonzo gorge, but too many doomed after that to be left behind in their mountain emplacements in the great Retreat.

Besides our work in Gorizia and Plava, our Unit had out-stations of ambulances on this ridge near Liga and Kambresko as well as down in Caporetto itself. Driving that summer along that new high-level road with plain and sea and distant Western Alps in view on one side, and on the other the Isonzo gorge and the enemy heights beyond, on to which we were soon to cross, was the most exhilarating of all our customary routes. For only was Nature seen in every direction in her most majestic aspects, whether of mountain, plain, or sea, but along the road itself one was in the very heart of preparations for a mighty effort of human skill and purpose, to which the keen upland air seemed to impart its own energy. Wooden *baracche* were rising tier above tier on the steepest parts of the mountain where the angle gave most protection from bombardment; here huts were being built out on platforms over the yawning chasm of a precipice round which the roadside curled; there yet another battery was being placed under a grove of chestnut trees.

In this busy and exalted region we became associated with the 4th Bersagliere Regiment, under Colonel Gotti, during the operations of the spring of 1917. Our first hope was that we should cross the Isonzo with them above Canale, where it was rumoured that the main operation of the coming offensive would take place; we had our plans ready for an advance down the lanes on the side of the great gorge. But when the May offensive began, it soon turned out that the

attack of the Bersaglieri above Canale was only a feint, which they performed, indeed, with daring, skill, and success, throwing across footbridges under a heavy fire, and driving the enemy up the steep mountains on the farther shore. But then, to their intense chagrin, they were recalled, because the real blow was being delivered against Monte Kuk from Plava, whither our ambulances had been transferred.

I have described earlier the extraordinary position of the *tête-de-pont* beyond the Isonzo at Plava, where the Italians maintained themselves from June 1915 to May 1917 under every imaginable disadvantage; how their trenches at Zagora ran athwart the steep slope of Monte Kuk, with the Austrian trenches a few yards above them; how all their stores had to be carried across the shelled pontoon bridge at Plava bottom at the only spot where the river could be crossed not actually in sight of the Austri-

ans; and how Plava bottom itself could be reached by wheeled traffic only along a single narrow road from Verhovlje, closely overlooked from across the Isonzo by the Austrians on Monte Kuk.

The failure of the offensive from Plava in August 1916 had been due partly to these local conditions and partly to want of co-ordination with the plans for the more successful attack on Gorizia. In 1917 the forces of the Gorizia and Plava regions had been wisely united into one "Army of Giustizia", under general Capello. He and his Chief of Staff, General Badoglio, saw that the spell of chronic and now traditional failure of every effort to lift the Italians out of the hole that they were in at Plava on to the summit of Monte Kuk could be broken only by providing a second roadway down to the Plava bridgehead. On the existing exposed, one-way road from Verhovlje it was impossible to take down enough material for such an



operation as the capture of Monte Kuk, still less of Monte Santo and the Bainsizza beyond. The new road was opened only a few days before the May offensive began. It was generally spoken of as "Badoglio's road", but in our Unit we called it the road of "the thirty-two hairpins." It was a wonderful piece of engineering, but slow work for a car with a bad lock! Henceforth lorries and ambulances came down to Plava bottom by the "thirty-two hairpins" from Monte Corada in the north, and returned to the upper world again by the old narrow road to Verhovlje. This change more than doubled the amount of heavy material that could be brought by lorries and dumped at the Plava bridge for portage. It also enabled the Italian and British ambulances to get many thousands of wounded away quickly during the battle.

The new road came down through carefully-selected folds of the mountain side, and through forests that afforded considerable cover from the enemy. But the moment the cars came out into Plava bottom and approached the bridge they were exposed to a heavy barrage by which the enemy hoped to cut the slender communications of the new offensive. Several cars, including one of our ambulances, were completely destroyed. Indeed, it was a remarkable scene by night or day, in the narrow space near the pontoon bridge. Everything that fed the great battle on Monte Kuk, and all the returning wreckage of that fierce strife, had to pass and repass by mule or portage over the string of boats swaying in the swift flood. (1). In the lee of a shattered house just above the bridge the wounded were laid out by scores at a time on their stretchers, waiting for the cars to carry them up out of the valley of death. Beside them in the narrow space, the war material brought down by the lorries was dumped in piles, picked up, and carried off over the pontoons. Above all this crush and confusion the enemy's shrapnel burst in periodic gusts of fury, striking the wounded where they lay, and rendering the unloading of the lorries and loading of the ambulances a task requiring the cool energy of the lieutenants and *aspiranti* (cadets) in charge of the operation. In these difficult moments the young officers gladly accepted the co-operation of Philip Baker, who had now permanently taken up his quarters in the valley bottom with the section of our cars under his command. In these days and nights of May we began to make many good friends down in Plava.

Meanwhile, across the river the battle on Monte Kuk was speeding well. The sheer mountain side, unscaleable for two years, was falling at last. The Italian preliminary bombardment, like that on Sabotino the year before, destroyed in a few hours the Austrian wire and trenches. Then the infantry, launched to the assault, climbed straight up the steepest part of the long slope; it was as though one should storm Bow Fell from Mickelden bottom in the face of machine guns and rifle fire of a determined enemy. Having reached the summit, they worked



along the crest in a series of desperate engagements of attack and counter-attack. Every arm — infantry, *genio*, artillery — vied in their zeal. A few days after its capture I saw on the top of Monte Kuk some Italian "seventy-fives" that had been dragged up, Heaven knows how, by sheer strength of arm and will during the *mêlée* itself. By May 22nd, after ten days' fighting as fierce as any in the war, not only Monte Kuk but the greater part of Vodice and the lower slopes of Monte Santo had been captured.

It was now possible to repair and bring back into use the permanent Plava bridge, no longer in sight of the enemy. This relieved the dangerous congestion which I have described on the west bank of the Plava bottom, for wheeled traffic could now cross the Isonzo and even run for a few kilometres along the valley road at the bottom of the gorge that goes towards Gorizia between Monte Kuk and Monte Santo on one side, and Monte Sabotino on the other. Although

the enemy were still on the summit of Monte Santo, the Italian line had been moved across the river the whole way from Salcano to Plava.

It was while working on this road that we got our first complete view of the back of Sabotino. Its presipices that fall straight from the summit into the Isonzo waters are very different in character from the other side of the mountain, the smooth, sloping battlefield that we had watched so long from Quisca (2). The limestone buttresses that washed their feet in the river were so steep that military operations on that face of Sabotino were out of the question. In the forests that clambered among these cliffs, too steep for man's abode or warfare, some wild deer had maintained themselves for a year past, secure as in the Forest of Arden, yet all the while in the forefront of the battle-line. High over their heads the Italian cannon fired from the rock chambers of Sabotino, through windows pierced in its summit to command

Kuk, Santo, and Gabriele. At night time that road along the gorge was full of wonder and of beauty: the pinnacles of Sabotino, far overhead among the stars, yet belching fire from mid-rock; the invisible stream head close at hand, the only voice in the valley; the two noiseless hosts, a felt presence, unseen; the searchlights shifting slow from mountain head to mountain head, now lighting Gabriele's bald scone, now striking the last thin stick of ruined convent on Monte Santo's crest, throwing it out, dazzling white between black mountain and black sky, still erect and pointing, "like death's lean lifted forefinger".

The *genio* lost little time after the victory in May. Monte Kuk is steep and rugged, rising nearly 2,000 feet from the river; but a few days after its capture the Italian water-pipes and *teleferiche* were supplying the needs of the troops on its summit, and in twenty-six days the *genio* had constructed from base to crest of the mountain a winding road of seven kilometres, with perfect gradient and surface, at the cost of several hundred casualties among the roadmakers. Less than a month after the battle had given the roadless mountain side to the Italians, their heavy guns were going up by tractor to emplacements on the top; while lorries with military stores, and our ambulances bringing down the wounded, were passing and repassing on the road to the crest of Monte Kuk. At the same time the *perforatrici* (machine drills) were everywhere hollowing out new caverns in the mountain side and along the river bank, making life every day a little safer on the newly-conquered ground, in spite of the increasing volume of artillery fire due to the constant transfer of enemy guns that summer from the crumbling Russian front. Without the Kuk road and the machine drills the maintenance of the new positions, let alone the advance over Bainsizza in the autumn, would have been utterly impossible.

At the same time the old Verhovlje road was broadened; a fine new road was made from the north-west end of Sabotino to join the river road below Zagora; and yet another new road was constructed forwards from Plava up the pass at Palliovo to a point just short of what was then the new Italian line. All this work, besides the making of the new trenches and gun emplacements, was accomplished in two months within a single area of a few kilometres from Plava. I doubt whether any other army would have done as much work in the same time and space.

While Young continued in Gorizia with half our ambulances, Philip Baker had during the May battle taken up quarters in Plava bottom with the other half (3). It was always difficult to find within a mile of Plava a flat bit of ground that was not either shelled too many times a day, or had not already been occupied by some one else. We managed, however, to park our cars near the great railway viaduct at the foot of the little

Val Grune, where its stream debouches from the woodland steep into the Isonzo. There we pitched our tent and secured also a wooden hut for use by day; but we slept in the rocks above in a shepherd's grotto shared with some Italian friends, as the bottom of the dell was searched by shells every night.

During that strange summer the remote and uninhabited Val Grune was as busy as a London street. The foot and mule traffic came down that way from Monte Planina; and under the railway arches the prisoners were collected as they came in from across the Isonzo, before being marched off through the woods overhead. Here we had our advanced quarters from May till we went on to the Bainsizza late in August, and even then we retained our hut and tent as an intermediate base until the Retreat two months later. After the year of exile on the Piave had gone by, I revisited the Isonzo gorge one day in November 1918, to say to those remembered scenes Hail and Farewell! The once so busy banks by Plava bridge had fallen still and silent. The fever of war had passed away, leaving the valley dead. The sadness of the ruined houses of Plava village, never felt during the lively scenes and doings of the former year, oppressed the soul now that all was empty and desolate. But in the Val Grune, the solitary dell where no house had ever stood, it was a relief to see the reign of Nature restored. Only some military litter round our decaying hut gave proof of man's brief, incongruous irruption into the dreaming vale, where the winter woods rose tier above tier in beauty regnant one more. Man's presence is doubtless an improvement upon earth, but in some places it is very nice when he goes away.

In the three months between the battles of May and of August 1917, we saw much at Plava and Gorizia of the Italian officers, with whom comradeship in recent events had made us more than ever intimate. The advanced clearing station in the rock gallery, hollowed out at the base of Plava hill, where a hundred and fifty patients could lie in perfect safety and considerable comfort, was the base to which we now carried back the wounded from the front. The dominating genius of the place was Major Scarsella, in charge of the Sezione Sanità. Under his individual rule and inspiration Plava became, not only a great place for work, but in the intervals of war a social centre as congenial and amusing as any to which it has been my fortune to be made welcome.

At that time I was deeply interested in the preparations of America for serious entry into the war which she had proclaimed against Germany. The "enrolling" on June 5th of so many millions over there without a hitch seemed to me an event of infinite moment and promise. But I found that my Italian friends did not yet believe in America. The officers had fewer ties with the great Republic than the men, as the Italian emigration to North America is almost wholly of the less-educated class. Neither had Ameri-

ca yet declared war on Austria, or shown any interest in Italy. It was mainly to England that the Italian War Party still looked. My enthusiastic asseverations that Mr. Wilson and his fellow-citizens were preparing to go *fino in fondo* were received by my Italian friends in kindly but obviously incredulous silence. It is interesting to recall this now, because in 1918 America came to loom almost unnaturally large in the Italian eye. But in 1917 it was not so, and when, therefore, the Russians failed again, the discouragement was the greater. Many began to see little chance of winning the war, as week after week during that summer and autumn more and more Austrian batteries and battalions gave evidence of their arrival from the Russian front. But in spite of all this, the finest effort of the Italian army was made in the last half of August and the first half of September 1917. It was only after that magnificent and largely successful effort had proved inconclusive that the fruits of discouragement were reaped in late October.

The month of the most continuously fierce fighting in the whole Italian war opened on August 18, 1917, with a general bombardment from Tolmino to the sea. The guns massed along the Corada ridge, searched the Austrian positions beyond the Isonzo. Next day, along the front from Plava northwards to Doblar, the infantry bridged and crossed the rapid river in face of the enemy, and began to ascend the eastern bank of the gorge. A more difficult operation, in face of machine-gun posts and a determined foe entrenched in ground of such vantage, has seldom been allotted to any force in the world war. Here and there a politically weak link in the enemy armour, like the Czechs on Monte Jelenik, rendered a general success just possible. Gradually, as day followed day of carnage, point after point was won. The high-lying hamlet of Vrh fell, and Hill 711, keys to a whole region. Near Plava, operations began with a false attack on Monte Santo to the south, while to the north the foot of the Robot valley was seized. As we ran our cars up and down the road between Plava and the debouchment of that stream, we saw the line of the battle overhead getting nearer and nearer to the top of Jelenik, till at last it had completely fallen. The Czech prisoners came pouring down the heights into Plava, men whom we were to see again next year in Italian uniforms, with their national colours mounted on the Alpino hat, playing a great part in the Allies' "peace offensive," and no mean part in Italy's war.

But far to northward there was a serious set back. The attempt to turn from the south the positions of the enemy in the Santa Lucia and Tolmino region was held to be so important that General Badoglio himself had charge of that operation (4). But the Austrians could not be dislodged from their fastness round Lom protected by the steep banks of the Vogercek torrent. By this failure the strategic way was left open for the disaster of Caporetto.



The fall of Jelenik was followed on the 23rd and 24th of August by the decisive battle on Vodice and Kobilek, which opened out the Italian advance over the south of the Bainsizza plateau, as the victory on Jelenik had already opened it out over the part to the north. On the crest and flanks of Vodice both sides had been entrenched at close quarters ever since the battle in May. The hero of Vodice was the fine old soldier, General prince Gonzaga. He combined a complete control of the operations of his Division with a boyish enjoyment of danger, a perpetual appearance on the top of the disputed mountain and a gaiety which won the hearts of his soldiers and of all who came near him. On the 24th of August he and his troops had the reward of their long vigil; the whole system of Austrian trenches running from the farther part of Vodice round the head of the Rohot valley on to Kobilek itself, after being subjected to a destructive bombardment, was stormed in the grand style.

Once this obstacle was passed, the pursuit went raging over the Bainsizza plateau with the dash characteristic of the Italians whenever they are well led. Part of the enemy were driven steeply down into the Gargaro valley and chased along it to the northern foot of San Gabriele. Monte Santo was turned, surrounded, and forced to surrender; at long last the "red, white, and green" waved over the ruined convent on the summit, that Italian eyes had gazed on so enviously for two long years (5).

Farther to the north the conquerors of Kobilek, sweeping across the valley in which

Ravne village lies, mounted the limestone crags of the heights beyond, which might have been easily defended, and had, indeed, been prepared for defence, but were carried in that first triumphant rush. On the afternoon of the 24th of August, standing on a line of trenches near Vodice in which the Austrians had been that morning, Baker and I saw a little string of men, black against the white limestone, struggling up those heights beyond Ravne, three miles away as the crow flies. At first we thought they were retreating Austrians, but presently, when the batteries on Ternovo began to shell them, we realized that they were the Italians who had a few hours before stormed the ground we stood on, and were now ranging over hill and valley like hounds on the trail. The string of men soon disappeared over the mountain top, where they and their comrades established on the far side the farthest line that Italy ever reached before the great Retreat.

It was clear that two or three days must elapse before wheeled traffic could follow the infantry beyond Vodice. The excellent road made by the *genio* that summer led up from Zagora as far as the Pass 524 (metres) between Vodice and Kuk, to which point ambulances and lorries as well as artillery and carts freely came; but beyond this pass-top, on the recent No Man's Land, and the scene of so much long and fierce fighting, the old Austrian road had disappeared entirely from sight in a wilderness of trenches, counter-trenches, and shell craters. Already, indeed, the deft *genio* were at work to link up the rest of the army with the vanguard who had gone on across the Bainsizza, but

it was not to be done in a day.

Returning down to the Isonzo gorge, we went that night by the long-deserted river road to Salcano and Gorizia to exchange news with Young and our drivers there. The rumours in the town were of an immediate attack on San Gabriele; fires seen on Ternovo plateau were eagerly watched, in the belief that the Austrians were destroying their stores prior to retreat. Hope ran high. Indeed, it seemed the very moment to push home on Gabriele the moral effect of the victory on Vodice and Santo. But several days went by before an effort was made against anything except the fringes of the fortress mountain.

Meanwhile we fretted on Vodice top and along the gorge road past Canale, but could as yet find no way by which cars could reach either Vrh or Ravne. Beyond those villages we knew there were passable roads; but how to get there? Though our ambulances had work carrying down to Plava the wounded who arrived by hand at Pass 524, or at the foot of the Rohot valley, it irked us to be thrown out of the hunt three or four miles behind the infantry on Bainsizza, and to think that every man wounded had at best to be carried by hand all that way back over the rough mountains in the scorching sun. But indeed our position as regards the transport of wounded was only part of the serious question of interrupted communications that might at any moment be fatal to the Italian vanguard, thrust forward beyond Ravne without artillery, water, or supplies. The *genio* were hard at work by hundreds repairing the road to Ravne, but under a

heavy fire. The Austrian batteries, so far from having left Ternovo, were being daily strengthened, and had settled down to the policy of keeping the road to Ravne impassable, which they pursued with partial success for three weeks to come.

By the evening of August 26th the road to Ravne had been so far reconstructed that artillery and horse carts were passing over it, though not without difficulty. Hoping that motor traffic would be allowed next day, I walked across the moor to Ravne to prepare the way there for our cars. Arriving after nightfall, I sought the authorities, and found General Gonzaga's head-quarters in a little house behind and above the rest of the hamlet. I came only for information and orders, but I got a dinner, a welcome such as would have befitted a brigadier, and, finally, the only other bed beside the General's. He was in particularly good spirits, having just been knocked over and slightly wounded by a shell. At dinner we had excellent talk about Garibaldi and other subjects; the Staff officers were a most interesting and agreeable set of men, much elated by the work they had in hand. The General warmly invited me to bring along the ambulances if they could possibly come, and promised us every accommodation that Ravne could afford.

Walking back at dawn on the 27th, I met a number of ambulances on Vodice under our car officer, Mr. Dyne, trying to get through in a crush with the artillery and carts. Some way along the road the route over the moor comes into full view of the gunners on the Ternovo plateau, and from that point forward the road was under so heavy a fire that the traffic authorities were soon compelled to stop the progress of the column, halting it out of sight of the enemy. Fortunately our two leading cars were the last vehicles to be let pass, and so were the first ambulances, and I think the first automobiles, to reach the Bainsizza. Half-way between Vodice and Ravne, at a ruined hamlet called Baske, we found the narrow road blocked for us by deserted cannon-limbers at the point where the Ternovo gunners were specially concentrating their fire. Fortunately we found the drivers in a neighbouring dug-out, where they had taken refuge after their horses had been killed. On having our predicament explained to them they very kindly came back and moved the encumbrance out of our way. So we got the two ambulances into Ravne that morning, and the others joined them when the rest of the column came on under cover of night.

The incident illustrates the immense difficulties of the Italian communications on Bainsizza, depending, as far as wheeled traffic was concerned, entirely on the Ravne road, which ran in full sight of the enemy. It was, besides, an execrable road, a mere country track, which the Austrians had never converted for military uses. We discovered that they had similarly left the road from Baté to Vrh in very bad condition. Thus the two roads which had for two years past linked up their magazines with their front

line on the Isonzo gorge had both been entirely neglected, though their roads farther east had been kept in tolerable condition. Was it a settled policy of the Austrians to have bad roads at the front in order that if the Italians advanced they should find communications so difficult that the pursuit would slow down? If so, the plan was not unsuccessful. It was exactly the opposite policy to that of the Italians, who ran first-class roads almost up to the firing-line.

But indeed the transport systems of the Austrian and Italian armies diverged more and more fundamentally as the war went on. The Italians learnt to do as much as they could by motor traffic, because they had such plenty of magnificent Fiats; and the Austrians as little as they could, because the British blockade gradually deprived them of rubber. By the end of the war, as we found in the advance of November 1918, all their motors jolted along on iron tyres. It is not, then, surprising that in 1916-17 they had been in the habit of sending little or no motor traffic from the Bainsizza to their front line along the Isonzo heights; hence in part their indifference to the state of the roads at the front, since they used them in the main only for horse vehicles.

We had now the interest of living and working on the Bainsizza plateau. As in the case of the equally famous "Asiago plateau", only a small part of it was flat. It chiefly consists of mountains, like Kobilek and yet higher groups to the east, enclosing between them the valley in which Ravne and Baté lie. But the whole district is on a high level, looking down into the vale of Gargaro. Although it is not so flat as the Carso, it has the same limestone surface and the same queer *doline* or cup-shaped hollows. At the bottom of some of these we saw mud-coloured guns and limbers in the dull yellow livery of Austria, derelict, or already turned round to do service against her. Here and there were patches of wood and scrapings of peasant cultivation, and in some districts the Austrian army had planted potatoes over a wide acreage. On the road back to Vrh the forests grew thick, but forward over the eastern heights, toward the firing line, and down southwards into the dangerous valley of Gargaro, hill and dale were singularly bare. The whole land wore a severe beauty.

But to us the most interesting as well as the most beautiful part of the landscape was our novel view of the back of captured Monte Santo and the north side of besieged San Gabriele, with the Italian shells perpetually bursting on its crest. Just on the other side we knew that our Gorizia cars were working up the Sella di Dol road, not far from the pass top, which we could clearly see from the Bainsizza. Baker was in charge at Ravne and Young in Gorizia, while I, as my Italian friends used to say, was *sempre in giro* between the two, always going round by the long circuit of Plava — for though Ravne and the Sella di Dol are so near together, they were then still so far apart. I was thus able to get a very good general

idea of the two closely-related battles of Bainsizza and San Gabriele, which raged in alternate spasms for the best part of a month.

Until the rough road to Vodice had been re-made by the *genio* — that is, for a week or more — it would have been murder to jolt the wounded of Bainsizza back over it in our cars. All we could do was to collect them from the heavily-shelled dressing-stations at Baté and elsewhere along the forward roads, and carry them to the field hospitals at Ravne. Here the famous movable surgery of the Città di Milano, Italian Red Cross, (6) had come to the aid of the regimental and divisional surgeons, who, cut off from proper supply, were gallantly struggling to make bricks without straw. Ravne, as being on the whole the safest of the shelled hamlets on the plateau, became for a while a great hospital centre to which all the wounded of the Bainsizza battle were now carried. At first there was not even a shelter for all the hundreds whom we brought in daily, and the surgeons and their staff were worked to the limit of human endurance.

It was, therefore, most necessary to evacuate the wounded from Ravne. But until the Vodice road was passable for wounded in ambulances, there was no way of evacuating except to compel the tired infantry, as they came back from the trenches for repose, to spend their exhausted energies in carrying their comrades by relays over the four miles of mountain tracks to the Isonzo, where, at the foot of the Rohot brook, our other ambulances met them, and carried them to the great clearing station at Plava. I cannot enough praise the sheer goodness of heart with which the *povero fante*, coming out half-starved and utterly exhausted from long days of battle without trenches or water, and looking only for a little rest, shouldered the heavy stretchers without a frown or a murmur because it was their brothers' burden.

It will therefore be seen that, during the last days of August and the first week of September, the position of the Italians on the Bainsizza was highly critical on account of their imperfect communications. Meanwhile fresh enemy battalions as well as batteries were constantly arriving from Russia, and the Austrians would have had every chance of success if they had been able, with all the hosts now collecting on Ternovo, to attack the isolated force on the Bainsizza before it had made its trenches or established its communications. It was at this juncture that the great Italian assault on San Gabriele acted as a diversion which saved the Bainsizza; the Austrian divisions had to be thrown one after another into the narrow pen of slaughter on Gabriele's crest, the smoking altar of sacrifice seen afar off by all the spectator armies between Carso and Monte Nero's top.

For us the battle of San Gabriele consisted of our service on the Sella di Dol road. The Sella, or "saddle", of Dol is the high pass that crosses the range between Monte Santo and San Gabriele; over it winds the well-engineered road leading from Gorizia

to the Bainsizza region. This pass top had fallen to the Italians together with Monte Santo, rendering it possible for them to proceed to the assault of San Gabriele's summit, as they could now work round by the northern as well as the southern side of the crest. Various divisions fought on Santa Caterina and the lower slopes, but the 11th Division, which our Gorizia cars specially served, had the task of taking the crest from the saddle. The divisional communications ran up this famous road from the ruins at Salcano to the ruined inn that marked the top of the pass, where the system of Italian trenches now began. All supplies had to reach the combatants on the height by that road; the Austrians had the range of it, and kept up a piece barrage, especially on the upper part of the road, which was clearly visible from their trenches a few hundred yards away (7).

The medical chiefs of the 11th Division, our friends Major Farragiana and Captain Capocelatro, had established a dressing-station in a dug-out on the top of the Sella di Dol. Our cars came up the road to within a few yards of the inn on the top, or as far as the shell-holes of each day allowed passage. The ambulances were the only vehicles that used the road among the infantry and mules ascending and descending; and indeed, but for the combination of such romantic spirits as Farragiana, Capocelatro, and Geoffrey Young, I doubt if we should have been permitted to go beyond Salcano. But we saved many lives and limbs by so doing, and once the service was established it was impossible to break it off, for the infantry going up and down the road during those three weeks of battle came to regard the "Croce Rossa Britannica" as a familiar friend. The infantry officers told us that the sight of our buses up there was an encouragement to the men. One soldier, badly wounded but just able to walk, on being ordered by our friend the roadside surgeon to walk down the road, delighted him by saying, "No, Aspetto. Vado colla Britannica" ("No, I'll wait and go down in the Britannica").

In the early part of the battle, when, in the last nights of August, the full moon lit the crags with splendour, and the shells and searchlights awoke along each mountain crest, the view from that high and busy road was a dream of romance. Far below our feet the shining river swirled round the shoulder of the gorge, and the gigantic triangle in which Sabotino abruptly ends was streaked with ebony and ivory of white scree and dark brushwood. The spell was laid on the Italian soldier, not the least susceptible of the armed races of Europe. "O che bel monte!" "E un bel monte, Sabotino", I heard the passing infantry say as they plodded up the road, and a wounded man as he waited for his turn.

On such a night as that, the last of August, walking through the barrage in front



of Metcalfe's car to clear the pack mules out of its way, Geoffrey Young was wounded by a shell, and subsequently lost his leg by amputation down at our own Villa Trento hospital. The feeling for our friend shown by all the Italian officers, and especially by our medical friends of the 11th Division, who had the first care of him in Salcano and Gorizia, touched us all, and we shall always be grateful for it.

The battle came to its climax, though by no means to its end, on September 4th, the day they stormed the summit. That morning early we found the road blocked for us by a shell-hole a little below the Sella, but we arranged that the wounded should be carried to a large quarry on the roadside that afforded protection, whence two of our cars carried them all morning in a series of short and very useful runs. In this service first Silvester and then Lionel Sessions were wounded; the latter lost his leg by amputation in Gorizia

that afternoon (8). After this the Italian authorities forbade us to run any more ambulances above the point half-way up where the road became directly visible to the enemy.

It had been a day of victory. From the quarry that morning I had seen with sudden joy the Italian soldiers walking against the sky-line on the summit of San Gabriele. But, alas! it had still to be held, and the Italians had not carried all the slopes, or even Santa Caterina down below.

During the next ten days the fire grew hotter on the average upon the road, and although we now kept down on the lower half that was supposed to be sheltered, the infantry and muleteers were even there losing severely. In this period of the war both sides were using "big stuff" of great potency. One morning I saw thirty men lying dead in one dusty heap by the roadside. At other times heads and limbs, mingled with great



rocks, lay scattered over the road. In the trenches up above doubtless it was many times worse. San Gabriele in the first half of September 1917 was a gruesome slaughter-house, with the massed artillery of both armies, now in a high state of efficiency, concentrating on it their fire from all points of the compass. The artificial caves that now (November 1918) are visible on the roadside were only constructed after the battle. When it was most needed, there was but little shelter. The *perforatrici* (machine drills) that had done such good work in rendering Monte Kuk habitable at an early date that summer, seemed to put in a later appearance on San Gabriele. There was, however, a large natural grotto on the roadside close above Salcano, where our friends of the 11th Division Sanità set up a wayside dressing-station. Our cars often changed their loads there, and there we made many friends, among others the medical *aspirante* Sacchi, grandson of Garibaldi's famous Mantuan

surgeon of that name, which he honoured again in this war.

In all that butchery there was no one whom I admired more than the regimental stretcher-bearers on the mountain side, carrying their comrades with painful, patient steps down the rough slope until they struck the road and reached our cars, never hurrying, still less laying down the stretcher, when a shell sent all around them ducking and scampering.

During the ten days following the Italian capture of the summit (September 4th) division after division was flung in by both sides on to the top of San Gabriele, in "a fight for a natural fortress within as narrow limits of movement as any old battle for town or castle. It was a battle of appalling losses, for both defence and attack were implacable" (9). Let it rest at that. Finally the summit was divided between the two heroic armies.

The attack on San Gabriele, though it had

made progress, had not succeeded. But as a diversion it had saved the Bainsizza. By the middle of September, when the fighting on San Gabriele died down, the Italians were well entrenched on Bainsizza, and their communications with the Isonzo had been re-established. The road from Ravne to Vodice had been re-made and screened, and was used by day and night. Our ambulances could now carry the wounded back over it, and lorries with supplies and ammunition came and went by the hundred. The shelling from Ternovo was considerable, especially after the San Gabriele battle died down. In two days after the middle of the month our men counted from the balcony of our house in Ravne as many as 600 shells bursting on or beside a stretch of 150 yards of the road within 300 yards of Ravne. But these 600 shells only hit two bicycles and one lorry, and did not interrupt the traffic; the screening saved the situation.

Meanwhile the *genio* were constructing a magnificent new road up the steep lift from Canale to Vrh, and had repaired the previously existing road from Vrh to Baté; this northern route through Vrh, invisible to the enemy, became from September 19th onwards the principal line of communication between the Bainsizza and the Isonzo.

In the middle of September General Gonzaga and his 53rd Division had been replaced by the 44th Division, under General Papà — a young man, singularly *simpatico*. He inherited the old General's quarters in Ravne and his kind interest in us. On the day when I last quitted Ravne for English leave he was on the roadside as I left the hamlet. I remember his handsome, soldierly figure and kind face as he stood by the car bidding me goodbye. In England three weeks later I heard that he was dead, killed while visiting the trenches. Italy lost in him a servant of high promise.

By the middle of September 1917 the battles of San Gabriele and Bainsizza were over. The Italian success had been great, but the Russian collapse had prevented it from being pushed home. The limit of human endurance had been reached, and both sides settled down exhausted on the ground where they found themselves. For a month past I had seen so much Italian heroism and had lived in such an atmosphere of sacrifice and determination that it never occurred to me that we were on the eve of a great moral and military disaster. Nor should we have been, if it had depended on the troops who had just been fighting at Gorizia, Bainsizza, and San Gabriele. General Capello justly put his confidence in them, but gave, I suppose, too little thought to certain untried elements who were being sent up to the quiet and neglected zone of Caporetto, now added to his over-expanded Second Army. If in 1916 his command had been too limited in area, it was now too big.

On September 22nd, at General Capello's headquarters at Cormons, I asked if I could safely take English leave, and was advised that I could go, as nothing would be



STAB. TIR. LIT. G. MODIANO & C. MILANO

doing for some time. In the garden outside the villa I saw the General in great spirits getting into his car. He called me up in his genial manner, thanked us for our service with many flattering expressions, and inquired, not for the first time, after our wounded. I told him I was going on leave, but would be back to see him finish his victory. *Sed dis aliter visum.*

G.M. Trevelyan

(continue)

the Santa Lucia and Caporetto regions, and was placed under Capello's command.

(5) See frontispiece. Monte Santo used to be visible against the sky-line not only from near Gorizia in 1916, but from Quisca in 1915, over the shoulder of Sabotino. When we first saw it there was a fine group of buildings on the top, but before it was taken these had become by successive stages a heap of rubble.

(6) I should like to recall here the friendship we had with the Città di Milano everywhere, especially with Professor Baldo Rossi himself; at Quisca, at Ravne, and, later, on the Asiago plateau and on the Piave front we had many opportunities to admire their wonderful surgical work at the front, and to experience their kindness. General Bassi, head of the Italian Red Cross in the war zone, became our particular friend.

(7) In the background of the frontispiece, this Sella di Dol road is discernible, climbing up the side of San Gabriele.

(8) For this action Young and Sessions were awarded the silver and Silvester the bronze medal, *al valore militare*. Early in August Young, Sessions, and Metcalfe had been already similarly decorated.

(9) John Buchan, "History of the War" (Nelson's), XXI, p. 22. John Buchan says the Italian loss in the month's offensive was 155,000, and that the enemy lost correspondingly. I know that the proportion of killed and gravely wounded to lightly wounded was higher than in battles before and after, owing to the greater part played on this occasion by heavy artillery. In the Piave battle in June 1918, machine-gun and rifle wounds were more common.

NOTES

(1) As the battle progressed another footbridge was thrown across opposite Zagora.

(2) The Austrians, when they held Sabotino in 1915-16, had made a funicular up one of the gullies on the Isonzo face. It was visible in 1917.

(3) Our First Unit ambulances now numbered between thirty and forty. We were replaced at Caporetto this summer by the Second B.R.C. Unit, under Mr. Sargent, which also worked in Carnia.

(4) Badoglio was now put in command of the 2nd Army Corps. He had been Capello's Chief of Staff when Capello commanded the Gorizia (and Plava) army in May 1917. Now the Gorizia army was merged in the larger Second Army (including the 2nd Army Corps); this army took in

Scenes from Italy's war

ENGLISH - ITALIAN

GLOSSARY

T

table	tavola, tabella, prospetto	patient evacuation t.	cartellino di sgombero sanitario
air loading t.	tabella di caricamento		coda
	aereo	tall	pattino di coda (di aereo)
air movement t.	tabella di movimento	t. skid	decollare
	aereo	to take off	decollo
conversion t.	tavola di conversione	take-off	zona di decollo
embarkation t.	quadro di imbarco	t. area	decollo e atterraggio
firing t.	tavola di tiro	t. and landing	decollo e atterraggio corto
march t.	tabella di marcia	t. and landing short (STOL)	decollo e atterraggio corto e verticale
movement t.	tabella di movimento	t. and landing vertical and short (VSTOL)	decollo e atterraggio verticale
sand t.	plastico del terreno	t. and landing vertical (VTOL)	striscia (pista) di decollo
t. of allowance (T/A)	tabella delle spettanze	t. strip	carro armato
t. of authentication	tabella di autenticazione	tank	(1) carro armato interrato
t. of distribution (T/D)	tabella di distribuzione	dug - in t.	carro armato pesante
t. of medical equivalents	tabella degli equivalenti sanitari	heavy t.	carro armato leggero
	tabella organica	light t.	carro armato medio
t. of organization and equipment (T/O&E)	tavola delle traiettorie	medium t.	assalto carrista
trajectory t.	tattico	t. assault	pezzo semovente, anticarro
tactical	comando aerotattico	t. destroyer	unità carrista
t. air command (TAC)	appoggio aerotattico		(2) serbatoio cisterna:
t. air support	controllo tattico	t. unit	serbatoio carburante
t. control	esercitazione tattica		capacità del serbatoio carburante
t. exercise	tattica	fuel t.	nave cisterna
tactics	tattica della sorpresa	fuel t. capacity	autocisterna
surprise t.	cartellino, etichetta		
tag	cartellino (piastrina di riconoscimento)	t. steamer	
identification t.	cartellino distintivo delle linee telefoniche	t. truck	
marking t.			

water t.	cisterna per acqua	telecast (telecasting)	mine
tanker	cisterna, autobotte,	telecommunications	teletrasmissione
	petroliera	telegraph	telecomunicazioni
air t.	aerocisterna	telegraphic	telegrafo
oil t.	petroliera	t. message	telegrafico
tankman	carrista	t. address	messaggio telegrafico
target	obiettivo, bersaglio	telegraphy	indirizzo telegrafico
demolition t.	obiettivo di demolizione	wireless t.	telegrafia
on call t.	obiettivo su richiesta	wireless t. station	radiotelegrafia
recorded t.	obiettivo registrato	telemeter	stazione radiotelegrafica
scheduled t.	obiettivo programmato	telephone	telemetro
t. area	zona da bombardare	extension t.	telefono
t. dossier	compendio degli obiettivi		apparecchio telefonico in
t. of opportunity	obiettivo eventuale	field t.	parallelo
t. practice	esercitazione di tiro al bersaglio	t. call	telefono campale
		t. circuit	chiamata telefonica
time on t. (TOT)	ora di inizio del fuoco di artiglieria	t. directory	circuito telefonico
time over t. (TOT)	ora di attacco obiettivi (da parte di aerei)	t. message	elenco telefonico
unforeseen t.	obiettivo imprevisto	t. receiver	fonogramma
task	compito, lavoro, incarico, impresa	telephony	ricevitore telefonico
		radio-t. station	telefonica
an arduous t.	un'impresa difficile	telescope	stazione radiotelefonica
t. force (TF)	unità composta di più armi e servizi, organizzata per un compito specifico di combattimento	telescopic	telescopio
			telescopico, fatto a
team	squadra, gruppo (di lavoro), nucleo	t. aerial	cannocchiale, che
		t. finder	rientra in se stesso
air control t. (ACT)	nucleo di controllo dell'Aeronautica	t. lens	antenna a telescopio
combat t.	gruppo di combattimento, raggruppamento tattico	teletype	mirino telescopico
		t. message	teleobiettivo
control t.	nucleo di controllo	to teletype	telescrivente
ground observation t. (GOT)	pattuglia di avvistamenti aerei, nucleo di osservazione terrestre	teletypewriter	messaggio telescritto
infantry-tank t.	gruppo fanteria-carri (in cooperazione)	temperature	trasmettere per
litter-bearer t.	nucleo porta feriti		telescrivente
maintenance t.	squadra manutenzione	critical t.	telescrivente
medical liaison t. (MLT)	nucleo di collegamento sanitario	temporary	temperatura (meteo),
		t. blocking position(PAT)	temperatura febbrile,
pathfinder t.	gruppo di esplorazione	t. defence	febbre
regimental combat t. (RCT)	raggruppamento tattico	t. duty (TDY)	temperatura critica
t. mate	compagno di squadra		temporaneo
t. spirit	spirito di corpo	tension	posizione di arresto
t. work	lavoro di gruppo (in collaborazione)	international t.	temporaneo
		tent	difesa temporanea,
traffic control t.	drappello di circolazione	artic t.	irrigidimento
tear	lacrima	command post t.	servizio isolato, in foglio
t. gas	gas lacrimogeno		di viaggio
technical	tecnico	exagonal t.	tensione
t. manual (TM)	manuale tecnico	general purpose t.	tensione internazionale
t. terms.	termini tecnici	isothermal t.	tenda
technique	tecnica	kitchen t.	tenda artica
mountain climbing t.	tecnica alpinistica	maintenance shelter t.	tenda per posto
skiing t.	tecnica sciistica		comando
mine sowing t.	tecnica di posa delle	oxygen t.	tenda esagonale
		storage t.	tenda per uso generale
		t. peg	tenda isotermica
		tentage	tenda per cucina
			tenda per posto
			manutenzione
			tenda ad ossigeno
			tenda magazzino
			picchetto da tenda
			materiale da
			attendamento

tentative	di prova, sperimentale, provvisorio	t. of war	minaccia di guerra
t. plans of employment	ipotesi d'impiego	t. on flanks	minaccia sui fianchi
term	termine, vocabolo	to throw	lanciare
military t.	termine militare	to t. hand grenades	lanciare bombe a mano
technical t.	termine tecnico	thrower	lanciatore
t. of service	ferma militare	flame t.	lanciafiamme
terminal	terminale	thrust	puntata, spinta, attacco a fondo
air t.	aerostazione	to tie-on	incordarsi (alpin.)
t. station	stazione terminale, capolinea	time	ora, tempo, orario
terminology	terminologia	completion t.	tempo di completamento di un'operazione
military t.	terminologia militare	date t. group (DGT)	gruppo data orario
terrain	terreno	estimated t. of departure (ETD)	ora di partenza prevista
alpine t.	terreno alpino	estimated t. of arrival (ETA)	ora di arrivo prevista
critical t. features	terreno critico	estimated t. of return (ETR)	ora di previsto ritorno
dominant t. features	terreno dominante	local mean t. (LMT)	ora locale
flat t.	terreno pianeggiante	part t.	orario ridotto
impervious t.	terreno impervio	pass t.	tempo di sfilamento di una colonna
key t.	tratto vitale	peace t.	tempo di pace
marshy t.	terreno paludoso	road clearance t. (RCT)	tempo d'impegno di una rotabile
mountainous t.	terreno montano	t. distance (TD)	tempo di percorrenza di un itinerario
rough t.	terreno accidentato	t. interval	intervallo (misurato in minuti) tra gli elementi costitutivi di una colonna in marcia
sandy t.	terreno sabbioso	t. length (TL), (or t. past a point) (TPP)	tempo necessario ad un elemento della colonna per passare da un determinato punto
t. estimate	valutazione del terreno	t. of action	tempo dell'azione
t. exercise	esercitazione sul terreno	t. of attack	ora d'inizio dell'attacco
t. features	forme, lineamenti del terreno	t. on target (TOT)	ora di inizio del fuoco (di artiglieria)
territorial	territoriale	t. over target (TOT)	ora di attacco degli obiettivi da parte di aerei
t. acquisitions	ingrandimenti territoriali	t. zone	fuso orario
t. forces	forze territoriali	war t.	tempo di guerra
t. waters	acque territoriali	work t.	orario di lavoro
to test	esaminare, collaudare	zulu t. (Greenwich mean t.) (GMT)	ora zulu (quella del meridiano di Greenwich)
test	esame, prova, esperimento	tipper	autocarro con cassone ribaltabile
driving t.	esame di guida	token	indicativo di manovra
t. paper	foglio con il testo della prova scritta di esame	tomor	misuratore di coordinate, coordinatometro
t. pilot	pilota collaudatore	tools	attrezzi, utensili
text	testo	carpenter t.	attrezzi da carpentiere
coded t.	testo cifrato	engineers t.	attrezzi del genio
message t.	testo del messaggio	entrenching t.	attrezzi da zappatore
plain t.	testo in chiaro	field t.	attrezzi campali
thaw	disgelo	pioneer t.	attrezzi da pioniere
theatre, (USA) theater	teatro	t. kit	borsa porta utensili
overseas t.	teatro d'oltremare	top	cima, vetta, sommità
t. of operations	scacchiere operativo, teatro di operazioni	t. secret	segretissimo
theodolite	teodolite	t. speed	velocità massima
thermal	termico	topography	topografia
t. radiations	radiazioni termiche		
t. station	centrale termica		
thermometer	termometro		
centigrade t.	termometro centigrado		
clinical t.	termometro per misurare la febbre		
thermonuclear	termonucleare		
t. bomb	bomba termonucleare		
t. weapon	ordigno termonucleare		
thickness	spessore		
half-t.	spessore di dimezzamento		
threat	minaccia, sintomo		

torpedo aerial t.	torpedine, siluro siluro aereo (sganciato dall'aerosilurante) torpediniera cacciatorpediniera mina subacquea aerosilurante tubo lancia siluri laccio emostatico, pinza emostatica rimorchiare, essere rimorchiato aereo rimorchiatore arma (generalmente pezzo) trainata cavo per rimorchio rimorchiatore tossico, velenoso rapporto sull'impiego di aggressivi chimici traccia, segno, impronta, andamento andamento del margine anteriore della posizione resistenza tracciante proiettile tracciante cartuccia tracciante proietto tracciante pista, percorso, rotta, cingolo (di carro armato, trattore), carreggiata mezzo semicingolato sentiero difficile trattore, motrice trattore a cingoli motrice e rimorchio traffico, movimento, circolazione traffico aereo controllo del traffico aereo regolamento sulla circolazione stradale militare controllo del traffico densità di circolazione volume del traffico, portata stradale intensità del traffico traffico radio traccia, scia, coda, (art.) coda d'affusto ufficiale di coda (di una colonna in movimento) rimorchio rimorchio avviatore rimorchio per acqua rimorchio da 1/4 ton. rimorchio da 1 ton. treno, seguito, accompagnamento, coda treno blindato treno ospedale	troop t. unit t. combat t. division t. field t. trainer training advanced individual t. basic combat t. basic hygiene t. centralized t. decentralized t. integrated t. night t. operation and t. officer (G3) physical t. practical t. rock-climbing t. ski-t. tactical t. technical t. theoretical t. t. aids t. in combat survival t. school unit t. trajectory flat t. high angle t. t. table transfusion blood t. transit t. camp to transmit to t. an order transmitter receiver-t. set t. radio set telegraph t. transport air t. motor t. pack-t. tactical air t. t. allocation t. capacity transportable	tradotta militare trasporti di una unità trasporti di 1 ^a linea trasporti di 2 ^a linea trasporti campali allenatore, istruttore addestramento addestramento individuale avanzato addestramento basilico al combattimento addestramento basilico sull'igiene addestramento centralizzato (accentrato) addestramento decentrato addestramento integrativo addestramento notturno ufficiale addetto alle operazioni e all'addestramento addestramento fisico (ginnico) istruzione pratica addestramento alpinistico (roccia) addestramento sciistico addestramento tattico addestramento tecnico istruzione teorica ausili addestrativi addestramento alla sopravvivenza scuola di addestramento addestramento di reparto traiettoria traiettoria tesa traiettoria curva tavola delle traiettorie trasfusione trasfusione di sangue. transito, passaggio campo temporaneo di transito trasmettere trasmettere un ordine trasmettitore, trasmettente apparato ricetrasmittente apparato radiotrasmettente trasmettitore telegrafico trasporto trasporto aereo autotrasporto salmerie trasporto aero-tattico assegnazione di trasporto capacità (possibilità) di trasporto trasportabile
t. boat t. boat destroyer t. mine t. plane (t. bomber) t. tube tourniquet			
to tow			
t. aircraft towed weapon			
t. - rope tower toxic t. report (TOXREP)			
trace			
t. of the main line of resistance			
tracer t. bullet t. cartridge t. shell track			
half-t. rough t. tractor crawler t. (caterpillar) t. and trailer traffic			
air t. air t. control (ATC) military road t. regulation			
t. control t. density t. flow			
t. load wireless t. trail			
t. officer			
trailer engine starting t. water t. 1/4 ton. t. 1 ton. t. train			
armoured t. hospital t.			

air t.
air t. unit
transportation
emergency t.
strategical concentration t.
t. officer

t. plan
transverse
Universal t. Mercator
(UTM)
trap
booby t.
traumatism
travel
NATO t. order

t. order
traverse

traversing
tray
parachute t.
treason
high t.
treatment
dental t.
first aid t.

specialized t.
surgical t.
under t.
treaty
North Atlantic T.
Organization (NATO)
trench
connecting t.
slit t.
trial
full scale t.
triangle
iron t.
triangulation
trigger

trinitrotoluene
(trinitrotoluol) (TNT)
tripod
tromblon
t. Energa
troops
airborne t.
assaulting t.
covering t.

aerotrasportabile
unità aerotrasportabile
trasporto, trasferimento
trasporto di emergenza
trasporti di radunata
ufficiale addetto ai
trasporti
piano dei trasporti
trasversale
universale trasversale di
Mercatore
trappola, insidia
carica nascosta, trappola
traumatismo
viaggio
documento di viaggio
NATO
documento di viaggio
brandeggio (di cannone),
traversata
sfilamento
custodia, compartimento
custodia per paracadute
tradimento
alto tradimento
trattamento, cura
cura dentistica
trattamento di pronto
soccorso
cura specialistica
trattamento chirurgico
sotto cura
trattato
Organizzazione del Patto
del Nord Atlantico
trincea
allacciamento
trincea stretta
prova, esperimento
prova completa
triangolo
triangolo NBC
triangolazione
grilletto (d'arma da
fuoco)
tritolo

treppiede
tromboncino
tromboncino Energa
truppe
truppe aviotrasportate
truppe d'assalto
truppe di copertura

home guard t.
mountain t.
overseas t.
t. carrier

t. train
tropical
t. diseases
t. heat
truck (trk)

1/4 ton. t.

1 1/2 ton. t.
3 ton. t.
5 ton. t.
dump-t.

recovery-t.
triway dump-t.
tube

endotracheal t.
launching t.
thermoionic t.
torpedo t.
tuning
visual t. indicator

tunnel
connecting t.
escape t.
railway t.
turn
turning
t. movement
turret
twilight
beginning, morning
nautical t. (BMNT)
end, evening nautical t.
(EENT)

twin
t.-engined plane
t.-jet
type
t. of ammunition
t. of burst
to type (to typewrite)
typescript
typewriter
typist
tyre

truppe territoriali
truppe da montagna
truppe d'oltremare
mezzo per trasporto
truppe
tradotta militare
tropicale
malattie tropicali
caldo tropicale
autocarro, automezzo
(cfr. (UK) lorry)
autovettura da
ricognizione
autocarro leggero
autocarro medio
autocarro pesante
autocarro con cassone
ribaltabile
carro ricupero
autocarro triribaltabile
tubo, valvola (cfr. (UK)
valve)
tubo endotracheale
tubo di lancio
valvola termoionica
tubo lanciasiluri
sintonia
indicatore ottico di
sintonia
galleria
galleria di collegamento
galleria di uscita
galleria ferroviaria
svolta
aggirante
manovra di aggiramento
torretta
crepuscolo, albore
inizio dell'arco di luce
nautico
termine dell'arco di luce
nautico
gemello
bimotore
bireattore
tipo, carattere tipografico
tipo di munizioni
tipo di scoppio
scrivere a macchina
dattiloscritto
macchina da scrivere
dattilografo
pneumatico

umpire
chief-u.
unclassified (UNCLASS)

NATO u.
unconventional
u. warfare
undercarriage
retractable u.

underground
u. movement
u. railway
u. shelter
unexposed
unfit
u. for service
unforeseen
u. situation
u. target
uniform
field u.
full dress u.
service u.
unit

adjacent u.
administrative u.
airborne u.
air transportable u.
armoured u.
artillery u.
attached u.

battalion-sized u.
bridge u.
cable-car operator u.
camouflage u.
combat u.
cooperating u.
detached u.

fire-fighting u.
frontline u.
fuel consumption u.
(FCU)
higher u. (UK)
imaginary u.

infantry u.
large u. (USA)
logistical support u.
(LSU)
march u.
marine u.
mechanized u.
Military Police u.

giudice di campo
 capo dei giudici di campo
 non classificato
 (documento)
 NATO non classificato
 non convenzionale
 guerra non convenzionale
 carrello
 carrello retrattile (di
 aereo)
 sotterraneo, clandestino
 movimento clandestino
 ferrovia sotterranea
 ricovero sotterraneo
 non esposto, protetto
 inabile
 inabile al servizio
 imprevisto
 situazione imprevista
 obiettivo imprevisto
 uniforme, divisa
 uniforme da campagna
 grande uniforme
 uniforme ordinaria
 unità (in tutti i sensi),
 reparto
 unità laterale
 unità amministrativa
 unità aviotrasportata
 unità trasportabile
 unità corazzata
 unità di artiglieria
 unità aggregata (in
 rinforzo)
 unità a livello battaglione
 unità pontieri
 unità teleferisti
 unità mascheratori
 unità da combattimento
 unità cooperante
 unità distaccata,
 decentrata
 unità pionieri d'arresto
 unità in 1ª linea
 unità di consumo
 carburanti
 grande unità
 unità supposta (nelle
 esercitazioni)
 unità di fanteria
 grande unità
 unità di sostegno
 logistico
 unità di marcia
 unità fucillieri di Marina
 unità meccanizzata
 unità di Polizia Militare

motorized u.
operational u.
parent u.
pioneer u.
psychological warfare u.

railroad-worker u.
rear support u.

reinforcing u.
rifle u.
searchlight u.
service u.
skeleton enemy u.
(force)
subordinate u.
supporting u.
tank u.
task u.
token u. (force)

u. in support
united
U. Kingdom (UK)

U. Nations (UN)
U. States of America
(USA)
universal
u. rule
U. transverse Mercator
(UTM)
unloading
loading/u. operations

u. harbour
unoccupied
u. position

u. strongpoint
unofficial
u. news
unsatisfactory
unserviceable
unsheltered

to untie
unwarned
u.-exposed


to update
uphill
an u. climb
upland

u. region
uranium

unità motorizzata
 unità operativa
 unità di appartenenza
 unità pionieri
 unità di guerra
 psicologica
 unità del genio ferroviari
 unità di sostegno
 logistico arretrata
 unità di rinforzo
 unità fucillieri
 unità fotoelettrici
 unità dei servizi
 unità rappresentata
 (nelle esercitazioni)
 unità dipendente
 unità di supporto
 unità carrista
 unità di formazione
 unità segnata (nelle
 esercitazioni)
 unità di rincalzo
 unito
 Regno Unito di Gran
 Bretagna e Irlanda del
 Nord
 Nazioni Unite
 Stati Uniti d'America

universale
 regola generale
 Unità Universale
 trasversale di Mercatore
 scarico
 operazioni di carico e
 scarico
 porto di scarico
 non occupato
 posizione non occupata
 (predisposta)
 caposaldo predisposto
 non ufficiale, ufficioso
 notizia non ufficiale
 inferiore alla media
 fuori uso, inefficiente
 senza riparo, non
 protetto
 disincordarsi (alpin.)
 non preavvisato
 esposto e non
 preavvisato
 aggiornare
 in salita, arduo
 un'arrampicata
 altopiano, territorio
 montano
 regione montana
 uranio

Un'opera dalle pregevoli caratteristiche grafiche e tipografiche sull'arte epica nei musei, nelle gallerie e nei palazzi romani.



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GIOVANNI SPADOLINI

**UNA NUOVA GRANDE
INIZIATIVA CULTURALE DELLA
RIVISTA MILITARE**

I SOLDATI DEL PRIMO TRICOLORE ITALIANO



Oltre 170 figurini, decine di illustrazioni, numerosi documenti dell'epoca arricchiscono il testo che, per la prima volta, descrive compiutamente le truppe delle Repubbliche cisalpina e ligure italiana nel periodo dal 1796 al 1804. Non c'è dubbio che i soldati cisalpini, i primi a sventolare la bandiera dai tre fatidici colori verde, bianco e rosso, sono gli iniziatori del grande movimento risorgimentale italiano.

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RIVISTA MILITARE



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11

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JOURNAL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856



NOVEMBER
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1990

LIRE 4,000

★ **LUIGI CALIGARIS**
Soviet Strategy in the
Southern Region

★ **FABIO GOBBO**
Defence Industry
in Italy

★ **DOMENICO TRIA**
Career and
Remuneration





NEW CALIBRES
Soviet Strategy in the
Balkans Region

ARMED FORCES
Defence Industry in Italy

GOVERNED BY
Career and
Remuneration

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Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

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CENTRO MILITARE DI STUDI STRATEGICI

Rapporto di Ricerca
su
LA STRATEGIA SOVIETICA
NELLA
REGIONE MERIDIONALE

/// CIVILTÀ
MILITARE

SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

by
LUIGI CALIGARIS

ROME



*Ruine de la porte St. Pancrazio avec l'entrée des troupes françaises à
Rome le 1^{er} Juillet 1849.*

à Paris chez Pierre D'Atri Rue du Commerce N^o 142.

For a right professional integrity, it is due to state in advance that the present study does not achieve the goal of showing a clear and consequential presentation of the future Soviet strategy in the Mediterranean.

This is due to two different reasons:

- on Soviet strategy itself there is not yet enough documentation in general and even less does it exist on the Mediterranean. One must also remark that Soviet publications, the major source for information and evaluation, have always been poor of attention towards the Mediterranean and nearby regions;
- in the West we are still far from studying the political-strategic Mediterranean case outside the orthodoxy of NATO evaluation and the brief considerations on the "offside" of the Region. This study has not been able, of course, to overcome these gaps enough. One can in fact find remarkably different opinions among the works. It was decided not to rectify these differences since they reflect in addition to subjective opinions, everybody's background.

It is considered, however, an important side effect of this work having involved the Soviet Studies Research Centre (SSRC), in the person of its Directors and of its two major analysts, up to now marginally and superficially interested at the Southern Region. SSRC contribution, however imperfect for lack of experience, has brought interesting novelty items.

This work is therefore to be considered positive:

- in its role of incitement of international interest to the political-strategic problems of the Region.
- as a source of hints worth of further consideration and study.

It must hence be considered a useful start of a debate which needs much more attention. It is however advisable to read the work "The Withdrawal of the Superpowers Fleets from the Mediterranean" for

a further study of the subject. The present summary must be taken as a detailed index of the works of which it is suggested to read the unabridged edition. Every work, although as coordinated as possible, is completely autonomous. One should then not be surprised of the great contradictions among authors on specific topics.

The subject is highly debated and its knowledge is very imperfect. The difference in products is not only inevitable but it is believed it should stay that way in order to ensure its authenticity.

SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

Peculiarities of the Soviet Military System

In order to understand the evolution of Soviet strategy in the Mediterranean it is absolutely necessary to grasp the whole strategic subject as it is planned and followed in the Soviet Union. In particular:

- unlike the West, the Soviets have a military doctrine which plans and rules military training of the whole country for the war. This political doctrine enables any Soviet representative in the international forums to refer to a common goal and to represent different interests connected with it;
- unlike Western countries, the Soviets have a powerful and influential General Staff in charge of the whole preparation of the military machinery;
- the definition of the military strategy is based on thorough evaluations of previous wars and on scrupulous calculation of the efficiency of the opposed forces;
- the preparation of Soviet Forces is aimed at a war conduct at various levels and does not follow the mostly managerial setting up of the West;
- the Pact military instrument, planned trained and equipped by the Soviet Union, shows a degree of homogeneity which is not found in NATO forces.

Lastly, as a difference between NATO and the Soviet Union, the whole Soviet military system is planned and prepared for a conduct at strategic and operational level. Autonomy and initiative are subdued to the requirements of "joint" operations (i.e. inter-forces) to be carried out on a large scale. Whereas in the West, the only Armed Forces that can be employed on correspondent scale are Air Force and Navy.

Way of operating

Up to the first half of 1982, Soviet Military Doctrine was openly offensive and planned on "short advance notice-short war". The disruption of NATO front with Operational Maneuver Groups, the depth penetration without consolidating the flanks, etc., were all meant to achieve a political-strategic success in a short time to avoid NATO resort to nuclear weapons as well as strong reinforcement from the US.


Since, however, the Soviets consider the case that the war could go on beyond the foreseen time, they promote side initiatives to reduce the risks of an unwished-for lengthening, such as negotiations for the ban of nuclear weapons in Europe (i.e. those more easily employable) and for the Air Force (strategic reserve of NATO rapid deployment forces), etc. It is interesting to point out that several initiatives of Soviet negotiations all pursue this general target.

The Soviets seem to believe that NATO, nowadays, is less favourable to resort to nuclear weapons to defend Europe mostly when France and Great Britain are not involved and that, therefore, a long conventional war shows less risk of escalation.

The Mediterranean as strategic region according to the Soviets

There are TVD Commands (Theaters) involving the Mediterranean: West, SouthWest and South. Most of Italy belong to TVD SouthWest.

ROME



Deuxième Assaut donné par les français à la ville de Rome pendant la nuit du 29. au 30. Juin 1849.

Chez Pierre D'Atti Rue des Capucins N° 122.

Italy, in this TVD, is considered like Great Britain as "an unsinkable air-carrier" for NATO and the US.

With Spain becoming part of NATO and the reapproachment of France to NATO, Soviet interest for Italy has increased.

In fact nowadays it comes among possible Soviet offensives meant to outflank NATO Central Region and to threat France. Soviet studies on France underline "as France should take away the forces supporting CENTAG in order to protect Albion Plateau in case of a successful offensive through Northern Italy".

Several other unknown factors, "worth of a deep and continuous analytical judgement", press on the scenario of an offensive against Italy: the attitude of Austria, Yugoslavia and Switzerland, the potential instability of African countries, the dispute Greece-Turkey, etc. Actually a more complex, unforeseeable and fleeting scenario than in other confrontation areas in Europe.

In the Mediterranean Region, the

air and naval elements play a vital role. The Soviets in fact fear:

- an air offensive through the Black Sea;
- Southern Region air support to the Central Region. Furthermore, great importance for NATO is reckoned to be the security of communication lines for the resupply of Greece, Italy, Turkey and Israel in addition to the oil distribution from the Middle East. They foresee extensive mining of various areas (Turkey first, Italy immediately after) to obstruct ships passage.

The Mediterranean, because of its instability and increased military importance, will be given greater consideration by the Soviet Union.

Possible Soviet intentions

Regarding Italy:

- reducing US presence;
- trying to curb the technological

upgrading of Italian Armed Forces;

- trying to disconcert, by deception, the Italian Armed Forces on the real nature of the threat, in order to induce them to waste their own resources in the development of the Forces.

Prospective changes in the military doctrine

The Soviets in the development of a new doctrine constantly take into account various historical patterns. Presently, with Gorbachev trend to shift from an offensive to a defensive doctrine, all studied patterns have a peculiarity in common: a defensive deployment in depth and an armoured maneuver unit to counterattack. This unit should keep, according to Soviet military, a high offensive potential. Consequently it would be in a position to destroy NATO forces in depth in the respective territories in the same way as a real offensive.

THE MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

It is pointed out that in the Southern Region there is no balanced relation between the structure of the forces and the materials assigned to it. Too many forces are armed with obsolete means and there is little interest for new technologies.

There is also an explanation of the occurrence of such obsolescence, even in more technologically advanced countries (France, Italy).

In some way the exceptions are the French, Italian and Spanish naval forces which can count on excellent naval industries. It is then emphasized the effectiveness relation between the platform and the arm systems in the Army, Air Force and Navy, pointing out that should the Southern region invest too much in new platforms, it will be doomed to technological obsolescence.

Among major vulnerabilities of the defensive systems of NATO Southern Region, there is the lack of equipments and systems to neutralize anti-aircraft missiles. There is also an indication that air counter-attack could be best assigned to ground-based missiles forces.

In an operational framework of rapid evolution on land sea and sky it is absolutely necessary a radical revision of R&D programs. The whole document should be read since it presents some interesting points beyond the problems of the Southern Region.

FORCE RATIOS IN THE REGION

The "non-aligned" countries, which are quite many in the Southern Region, have a very different military capability. Some can in a very short time mobilize an offensive potential higher than that of NATO members. The study presents the Soviet evaluations on the combat power of all States. This represents a useful standard to measure their relative danger.

Even if recognizing the offensive potential of some nations, like Syria, it is considered very unlikely that

they could intervene in a determining way in a conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Many instances are against this theory: the need for a previous and strong Soviet contribution, Israel detente effect with regard of some, the poor capability of conducting medium-long range operations mostly in a relative-

where. Only Gibraltar, Suez and Dardanelles are on it, and these places can easily be cut off by technologically modern arm systems. Amphibious operations on a large scale are difficult to organize in front of modern anti-navy arms unless in case of complete control of sky and sea.... for these reasons Soviet target could



ly sophisticated operational framework.

Furthermore, many of such nations do not border on NATO countries. Yugoslavia is an exception which, should it align with the Warsaw Pact, could have an equivalent of three Soviet armies against Northern Italy, and could grant transit on its own territory and the use of its own bases to Soviet forces. On the other hand, a Yugoslavia which resists the Pact, represents quite a big problem for the Soviet Union.

The most favourable scenario for the Soviet Union would be:

- a Yugoslavia taking part at the offensive against NATO;
- neutral Israel.

The most favourable scenario for NATO is inevitably the exact opposite.

According to the analyst, however, technology might have reduced the importance of the Southern Region, since "the Mediterranean does not take any-

be to take away air and naval reserves from the more vital Front of the Central Region".

ARMS CONTROL IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

The trends of the arms control policy will most likely be the following:

- to hamper the West technological progress in the field of armaments;
- trying to muddle up the West on the various political-strategic intents which concern the initiatives of arms control. Sticking to general terms the evolution towards a defensive strategy. It is not clear whether Gorbachev will be able to convince the military to give up offensive;
- to show flexibility and openness to compromise according to Lenin principle saying that "in order to gain ground one must be ready to give it up";
- to negotiate during Vienna talks



*La ruine de St. Pierre in Montorio le 29. Juin 1879.
dessiné d'après nature.*

chez Pierre D'Alvi Rue des Capucins N° 142.

measures to favour Soviet forces.

In this framework, in political terms comes out the undoubted centrality of Central Region in Europe. The Southern Region has less military importance but a higher weight on the level of ideological struggle. In any case it is recognized that European and Mediterranean security are closely linked and the same is true for Western and Eastern Mediterranean.

The targets of arms control:

- the withdrawal of the VI Fleet from the Mediterranean or also its reduction to one air-carrier unit in order to remove from Eastern Mediterranean;
- trying to take bases away from the VI Fleet, which are the key element to carry out its missions;
- denying, when possible, the American fleet entry to the Mediterranean in order to reduce also its "outer area" power;
- removing, if possible, nuclear arms

from the Mediterranean;

- getting easy entry to the Mediterranean for the Soviet Navy legitimating its presence at the same time as it tries to remove the VI Fleet;
- forcing NATO to take a position on the debated problem of the "outer area".

Proposals for arms control in the Mediterranean:

- the Mediterranean as a "nuclear-free zone". The first proposal, repeated several times over, goes back to Kruscev;
- measure to create confidence by putting limits to drilling and entry. Probably asking for symmetry with the US;
- cutting forces, according to the Soviets. There is over 1 million soldiers in the Mediterranean;
- withdrawal of other foreign forces from Mediterranean countries (Englishmen and Turks from Cyprus, etc);

- dismantling of foreign bases (also Gibraltar);
- the creation of a "nuclear-free zone" in the Balkans.

Gorbachev will try to achieve these targets mainly by promoting consensus towards such measures. South-East Europe is apparently more suitable for a cooptation job.

THE SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Present orientations:

- the Soviets are trying to acquire bases in the Mediterranean to improve the logistic support to their Fleet;
- the Fleet no longer has an autonomous management but depends from South-West TVD. The Navy must be considered, as far as employment, in the framework of naval operations, with the only exception of submarines. These changes correspond to a

"Burocentric" evolution of the Soviet Fleet;

- the Mediterranean is reckoned important as a space located between the Soviet territory and nuclear weapons. This defense in depth should be possibly enlarged up to Central Mediterranean. The most feared carriers are Cruise missiles, since the American ones are reckoned of higher standard;

- the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean, too, is "conventionalized". Its best instruments are submarines and the aircraft of the naval air force. It is thus increased the complementarity between naval and ground battles. A prime target are the Straits;

- Soviet amphibious forces are of limited operational capability and size in comparison to NATO. They can only be employed for short-range operations;

- the Soviet Fleet has also a political-military role, as a naval presence in the Mediterranean.

As a whole, then, the Soviet Fleet has reduced power compared to the VI Fleet under many aspects: bases availability, direct air support, arm systems, "amphibious" capability, overall placement, etc. Hence, it does not have offensive power.

On the other hand, it is true that its defensive role played in close coordination with the other Armed Forces in the TVD framework grant it a remarkable effectiveness in the framework of the operations in the Southern Region.

SOVIET AIR FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

Air forces:

- it was noticed a remarkable power improvement of Soviet Air forces with technological achievements at the pace of the Western ones. However, in South-West TVD are not yet available command and control centers and air-suppliers as in other TVDs. This means a reduced operational capacity in the whole;
- it is pointed out also that the limited number of flying time is con-

tradictory to the choice of keeping a high operational rapidity.

Attack missions:

- from the point of view of a "short war", offensive actions would have as priority targets air bases and mostly those with nuclear carriers, armoured forces and the chain C31. Other missions are foreseen in cooperation with land forces in order to be accomplished;

- in the hypothesis of "long war", missions depth would increase.

Air defence:

- it is emphasized the high fulness and effectiveness, made even more so by the unavailability in the Southern Region of an adequate number of high-tech aircraft with high penetration capability;

- a positive factor is given by the scattering in various NATO countries, each separated from the other, of the air threat. NATO balance factor is represented by the VI Fleet with its own air units. It is reckoned, however, that the VI Fleet should have at least two air-carrier units to be able to face an air threat in the size of the foreseeable one;

- the intervention of Israeli Air force next to NATO countries would mean a crisis element for the Soviet air defence. Such hypothesis is however not thought probable and it might just be considered in the case of a "long war";

- side element, which is of difficult evaluation, is the role of the neutral countries, i.e. whether they would decide per or against NATO formations flying over, in a possible East-West conflict.

Air co-operation:

- air transportation: with regard to airdrops, it is foreseen that such missions cannot be carried out beyond the action range of Central-Southern Italy;

- air support to ground forces: the recent forward redeployment of air forces and the transfer of the Districts under TVD allows an easier employment during "joint" operations.

Air forces of "non aligned" countries:

it is stated that there is the possi-

bility of using the Air forces of some of these countries, next to Pact forces. It is however mentioned the possible detente effect of Israeli Air force.

Reduction of conventional forces: it has not yet been established which cuts the Soviets want to carry out in the Air forces. On the contrary, their strengthening in all sectors goes on.

GROUND BATTLE

Foreword to the analysis is a comparative evaluation of NATO and Soviet strategic interpretation of the Southern Region. The evaluation stretches to the analysis of the consequences for both. There are also the specific consequences for Italy.

Four different scenarios are studied as well as the implications of each with reference to strategic goals, targets, etc. Due to the complexity of the matter a summary is not adequate. The scenarios are:

- *war "without warning and short"* associated with a surprise, violent and deep offensive. Valid scenario up to the beginning of the '60s;
- *war "without warning, short"* in the intention and then become long due to unforeseen problems in the strategic conduct;
- *"defensive" war*. Of this scenario it is considered only the case that Soviet military support some initial deep defence, followed by a deep counterattack;
- *"transition" scenario*. It deals with the transition period between the scenario of the present threat, still mainly offensive, and a more stable situation.

It is not however considered the scenario of the "worst case", i.e. of "general war" fought by the Soviet on all NATO front and hence preceded by long preparation. This scenario, widely considered by NATO, can in any case be enriched with possible strategic-operational hypotheses taken into account in other scenarios, which would be-

ROME



*La Villa Spada prise par les français le 30. Juin 1849.
(Dessinée le même jour sur le lieu du combat.)*

Chez Pierre D'Atrè Rue du Cours N° 142.

come partial variables in the general picture.

CONCLUSIONS

Gorbachev's proposals on disarmament, on December 7, 1988 at the United Nations are very important both for those who feared that the Soviet Union could hurl a surprise aggression within 48 hours and for those who considered possible only a limited surprise through deception during long and serious pre-crises. These cuts mean that the Soviet Union is not considering any near war.

The Soviet Union needs more radical measures for several reasons. Gorbachev needs visible and rapid results in disarmament. Real im-

provements in the situation should be reached within 3 years.

Technology is rapidly changing war nature. A sensible reduction of Soviet forces would enable them to catch up. The Soviet Army, in order to keep a high pace of operations, must restructure in order to achieve *the least density of its forces compatible with its cohesion*.

Soviet General Staff still believes that for the defence it is vital to keep an offensive capability. The reform of the Soviet system will include every structure, starting from General Staff.

The foreseeable structure, on the ground front, will be:

- in Eastern Europe, strong covering deployments near the border lines;
- creation of "Fortified Regions",

full with artillery, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, mines and rapid fire arms;

- restructuring of mobile armies in brigades, withdrawn from border lines and meant to carry out counter-attacks;
- breaking up of air-troops divisions to give start to similar brigades in depth;
- restructuring of the other Soviet forces and of East-European forces along similar lines;
- re-organization of "Soviet Recruiting Offices" to enable them to accomplish the new roles in the training and mobilization and to establish defence plans;
- development of a theater command system to consolidate the tasks previously in charge of the Recruiting Offices;

ROME



*Prise de la Batterie sur l'ancienne Aurelienne
le 30 Juin 1849.*

Chez Pierre Detri Rue du Commerce 23/24.

- reduction of air and naval activities of "power projection";
- increased importance of space defence coordinated with air-defence;
- "joint" nature of the future battle, with the disappearance of the Armed Forces modules for ground and air forces;
- consolidation of the organization of rear areas and of mobilization.

Such a restructuring would enable:

- to defend East Europe and the Soviet Union with half of the present force levels;
- to restructure forces in order to make them more versatile and suitable to the demands of new tactics and technologies;
- better employment of forces by sub-dividing between defensive missions (less rapid forces) and for

counterattacks (ready forces with better units and command and control systems);

- keeping of an offensive capability;
- presentation to the West of a defensive structure and hence of lesser provocation;
- better integration of ground and air operations;
- reduced vulnerability of Soviet forces through defensive works and depth deployment.

One must bear in mind that the concept of the "reasonable sufficiency of defence", term used to describe this organization, is *not* an element of the doctrine rather a *product* of the new doctrine thought.

That is (not a new formulation of the strategic doctrine but) an instrument of politics, a device to help Gorbachev in achieving his targets.

Should NATO decide not to change its own military structure and doctrine in reply to the Soviet organization, the Soviet Union would be in any case safe from potential aggression. In fact the concepts here summarized are quite valid on a military level while it is not so, according to Soviet General Staff, for the concepts of "defensive" defence. The cuts of Soviet Forces would also be vital to free funds for the Armed Forces and for the development of new arms to enable the Soviets to catch up with NATO.

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DEFENCE INDUSTRY




The purpose of this research was to offer a wide survey on the present problems of defence industry in Italy, advising on interpretation keys of the situation and of the prospects elaborated according to the methodology of economic and industrial policy. The research has, however, brought out some merit indications for a defence industrial policy that have been considered useful to be emphasized in the present summary.

REQUIREMENTS FOR A DEMAND POLICY

First of all one must point out that an industrial policy specifically addressed to the armaments industry is subject to the demand policy. Due to the monopsonistic peculiarity of this market, demand greatly affects the structure and the qualification levels of its own industrial base. So far the awareness of this trend-

setting power mainly resulted through orders primarily oriented towards the national industry. However, demand policy in our country has been largely a "reactive" one, that is it has been pressed by requests coming from the Armed Forces and the industrial system, rather than guided by a well determinate reference pattern. Hence, a different approach both from the French and the English patterns,

IN ITALY



Facing page.
Tracked vehicle VCC-80.

Right.
M-13 self-propelled tank of 1940 with
a mm 75/18 gun.

Above.
M-13 tank of 1940 with a mm 47/32
gun.



where, for instance, the procurement aim is matched by an "active" policy of support to exports and to R&D activity.

Even if it is not absolutely necessary to copy other patterns, which are far from perfect, our conclusions are that a more effective demand policy not only goes along with the spotting of strategic lines, which we will discuss later, but also, and in a certain way as a priority, with the

creation or the strengthening of some basic conditions on three different levels: the "political" one, the "managerial" one and the "institutional" one.

The level called "political" clearly refers to a general context situation.

In our country everything connected with armaments appears to be necessarily linked (in the public opinion) with something negative.

Weapons are closely identified for their destruction aspects and the prevailing conviction maintains that the resources used to acquire armaments are used for a "negative" goal.

The idea of defence as a service to the nation is quite debated and little has been done both by the politicians and by the Armed Forces to change this attitude; on the contrary, the lack, the incompleteness and the



Light truck ACL-90 (4 x 4) of 2 ton.

confusion of data and information on the destinations of armaments expenditure have just contributed to confirm the prevailing opinion. A nearly obscure defence budget, the impossibility of getting complete and reliable information on exports both of arm systems (which are also subject to authorization) and of components, leave to a superficial newspaper information the task to circulate news on such a vital aspect of a nation's life.

An improved information service through the mere collection, systemization, elaboration and circulation of data, which are kept by the various Ministries (Defence, Foreign Trade, Industry and State Holdings) could just be beneficial to reduce the "political bonds" to the demand and to the image of defence as a public service.

A suggestion could be the creation of some Research Office within the Ministry of Defence, closely linked to the activity of the Defence-Industry Committee. A center, which would not only circulate data, but which could also grant access to the original sources, could contribute to a more objective and less ideological discussion on the actual role of armaments market in Italy and help in a clear evaluation of aspects such as export or R&D in the military sector, which are the most debated issues, even if they represent a very important subject of industrial

policy. With reference to the level identified as "managerial", many experts maintain that a deeper knowledge by the procurement responsables of the mechanisms of the demand could facilitate to plan, with higher effectiveness, the allocation of the available resources among the several projects and to choose the procurement sources.

Up to now, the attention has been focused on the quality of the finished product: a quality, as it came out during the research, so-called "assumed", that is merely based on previously demonstrated industry expertise. Our first suggestion concerns the development also of the expertise for the management of a project. A buyer must know not only what he buys and how much he pays, but also, given the supply availability, the actual delivery time, the most critical financial stages, the real risk levels of the projects and so on.

It is indeed a responsibility of the supplier to present a realistic offer, but it is duty of those who examine the offer itself to verify its reliability, not only in terms of the supplied final product and of the total cost, but also of the time length and development. Time, in this specific market, is indeed an expensive production factor, both because it requires the employment of qualified resources and because it affects the effectiveness of the available defence instrumentation. As this research has

established over and over, speed and innovation play important roles in this market. Delays in the development of a project could mean that a product does not include the latest improvements. On the other hand, the allocation of funds according to the very critical points of the project, can greatly facilitate the activity of the supplier and affect his efficiency.

Secondly, since demand has a political-strategic bond which guides it to select the national industry, when the conditions exist, a most thorough knowledge of the opportunities, of the limits and of the potentials of the same, could represent a primary component in the definition of the orders and in the evaluation of delivery times and procurements costs. Information of this kind can be extremely useful in the presently more and more frequent opportunity of projects management on an international co-operation basis.

An alternative to the creation of such managerial skill are the widely used contracts at fixed costs, where the whole risk connected with an evaluation error (either real or instrumental) falls on the supplier. Also in this case, however, the skill for a realistic evaluation of costs becomes, in the long run, a useful tool, since it can avoid resorting to expensive "rescue operations", so often performed in the late tradition of Italian industrial policy.

Finally, the "institutional" level regards the prevalence of institutional conditions that support effective demand formulation and implementation procedures.

For a clear and thorough judgement on the major limits of the procedures in Italy, please refer to Chapter 5 of the research. Here we would just point out the more evident aspect that is the vague authority limits and the too complicated responsibility articulation. The lack of a Central Agency for procurement curtails the possibility of planning and coordination of purchases

among the three Arms, reaffirming the criteria of an "equitable" distribution of available funds that not always goes to the advantage of an effective procurement policy.

The problems and the effects connected with a fragmented institutional structure and with various responsibility levels are also stressed by the experience of "promotional laws", according to which, times and costs formerly budgeted are over and over re-defined and not merely because of costs escalation due to the use of new technologies.

INSTITUTIONAL INTERVENTIONS

With reference to the improvement of institutional requirements, the suggestions emphasized by our research, can be summarized in three groups of intervention:

- first of all, for the aspects more closely connected with procurement, the suggestions focus on:
 - restructuring of SG/DNA office, thereby revising its relation with General Staff offices and their authority on procurement.

The disproportion between the operational capability of SG/DNA office and the coordination duties of 19 "Direzioni Generali" (General Head Offices) and 5 Central and General Staff Liaison offices is quite serious and shows an original fault which indicates the SG/DNA more like a compensator of the scattering of decision-making processes rather than a unit with strong decision and initiative capability. This fault arises again in the structure of the decision-making process, where there is a foggy overlapping between the technical-operational area and the technical-administrative area.

It will hence be desirable an intervention to restructure and re-define specific authorities:

- the establishment of a board of political control responsible

for reporting to Parliament, on a regular basis, on the state of the projects under way and on the proposals for new procurement;

- verification and restructuring of the Defence-Industry Committee together with the establishment of a mandate to a relevant Under-Secretary.

In particular, there is a need for strengthening the proposition authority, in addition to the coordination authority the Committee presently holds. The Committee could become the seat of actual proposals definition for a defence industrial policy;

- systematic control and reinforcement of Italian representatives in the organizations for international co-operation regarding armaments and creation of an observation unit on the competition aspects of defence industry on an international level.

Internationalization of some important sectors of armaments industry is a matter of fact: moreover, this is seen to go along with a more and more frequent concentration process. It is therefore desirable keeping an offer plurality on the international market as well as locating a seat where these processes can be carefully monitored by all interested

governments. According to our mind, the warrant against the creation of a ruling position is very important in this market, more than in any other.

STRATEGIC INTERVENTION LINES FOR A DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY

With reference to the strategic lines on which a defence industrial policy should be based, that, as we have pointed out, coincides with a demand policy, the research has indicated three priority objectives:

- **re-qualification of Italian production** in the military field, most of all in the sense of a substantial upgrading of the technological contents of such production.

Although Italian armaments industry has lately achieved good technological standards, mainly thanks to production licences, it is averagely less advanced than other European manufactures. This result is due both to structural conditions and to a weak "pull" demand action.

Funds for military R&D are fragmented among spending subjects (Ministry of Defence, Industry and State Holdings) and in any case they are of little quantity relevance. Most of the research activity is carried out with reference to the received orders; the basic research is almost completely non-existent. All this ends up in weakening the competitiveness of Italian industry and its ability to

Armoured fighting vehicle CENTAURO.





Tank of the second generation with a mm 120 gun ARIETE.

answer the requests of the demand. A re-qualification strategy, through a greater quantity of resources devoted to research, can strengthen the position of Italian industry in relation with the other industrially-advanced countries, without necessarily coinciding with its expansion. The R&D activity represents the key competition factor, no matter what the total size of the industrial base.

- **higher integration between military and civil production** acting on one side, as a reply to new industrial mobilization requirements and on the other, as a way to handle the problems of reconversion and of sector competition.

What should be favoured is a diversification process of the various activity sectors firms in the armaments industry towards activities showing technological economics, that is towards those activities where the necessary know-how can be largely shared. Mili-

tary production generally has a high specialization level; however, the capacity to increase it in peak demand times remains a problem of difficult solution. Nevertheless, by widening as much as possible the sector of "non specialized" components (with a low quota of military production over the total productions) and by assisting the firms in finding out the diversification sectors with the above-mentioned peculiarities, it might be possible to reach a higher flexibility level. Flexibility that can result functional for a more effective mobilization action and, when appropriate, for the exit of firms from the armaments industry. On this point of view, mobilization and reconversion have some points in common; both, in fact, focus on the need for shifting, in the swiftest and least expensive way, from an activity to another;

- **a greater productions internationalization through international co-operation.** On this last subject, it is necessary to re-consider the conditions of the co-operation agreements and of the offset mechan-

isms connected with them.

As Chapter 3 of the research widely points out, the international co-operation agreements imply high complexity levels due to the large number of the partners involved (governments, firms, bureaucracies) and due to the problems to reach an agreement on the product specifications. To these problems, one must also add the ones connected with the spotting of quite effective organization patterns.

The complexity can be, in this case, reduced, on one side, by minimizing the interference levels between manufactures and buyers and, on the other, by promoting competition among suppliers.

With reference to the first aspect, once an agreement on the specifications of the arm system has been reached, the co-operation between buyer and supplier should be just limited to the technical aspects and should happen within a relationship structure as swift as possible, that is determined by clear-cut rules and by transparency, in order to reduce to the minimum

the need for time-consuming and tiring mediations.

Furthermore, this could be a sector where promoting competition can be profitable, thus leaving the practice of dividing the work quotas in a way strictly symmetric to the financial contribution brought to the project by each country. The bid for the award of the job could be restricted to firms (or consortia/JV) of the countries involved in the project, with no previous sharing on the negotiation table. The spontaneous establishment of consortia would grant a greater organization efficiency, while the competition among many consortia (or firms) could represent an opportunity for procurement cost reduction among the buyers. The same practice of offsets should be widely reshuffled.

THE INSTRUMENTS

If the more meaningful strategic lines for a defence industrial policy resulted from the research are: re-qualification of the production system, higher integration levels between military and civil productions and lastly support to the internationalization process, the instruments by which these strategies can be put into practice are, among others, the following:

- contractuality;
- information initiatives (newsletters, tenders, promotions, etc.) to the benefit of small and medium firms;
- a "quality program" for defence production with the involvement of the technical structures of defence industry (certifications);
- a clear definition of authority of the spending subjects and lastly;
- greater procedure warranty for the firms.

Points 4th and 5th refer to the subject of institutional interventions; it is within their limits, in fact, that can be re-established the allocation of various technical-operational and technical-



administrative authorities as well as improved the work of the bureaucratic system. An efficient and responsible bureaucracy is for sure one of the basic requirements for a better allocation of the poor available resources and hence for a higher working effectiveness of the armaments market.

Points 2nd and 3rd refer to the need for flexibility and civil/military integration of the production system.

Promoting a higher mobility of the small-medium firms that belong to the sub-contractors area (with different specialization levels) can, at the same time, increase the number of sub-contractors which can be potentially activated in a situation of peak demand (mobilization) and upgrade their efficiency. In particular, the certification service that the technical structures of defence industrial area could offer (and in some cases, this happens already) would incite firms to a quality policy which would benefit both the civil and the military productions.

Lastly, contractuality is for sure the instrument with greater power to affect firms behaviour and performance. Although recent legislation interventions have improved the existing situation, there is room for further improve-

Heavy truck ACP-90 (6 x 6) of 10 ton.

ments, mainly in the field of the differentiation of research contractuality from the production one and in the field of sub-contracts. On this last point, we particularly suggest the opportunity of strengthening the trend of giving responsibility for a project to a firm acting as main contractor, leaving to it the full authority in choosing its sub-contractors, keeping at the same time the practice of strict quality checks.

In general, the contract reference patterns must be increased to make them compatible with the various conditions of arm systems productions which are very different one from the other as far as planning time, production time and technological content. The choice about which contract pattern to use should be left at the discretion of responsables for procurement, given the fact that they have available all the information regarding the development of the project, including being familiar with the "management of the project" we referred to in the first part of this summary.

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GENERAL FINANCIAL PLANNING SYSTEMS AND OPTIMIZATION OF RESOURCES IN THE DEFENCE SECTOR

Centro Militare di Studi Strategici
Roma

Rapporto di ricerca su:
**SISTEMA DI PROGRAMMAZIONE
GENERALE FINANZIARIA
E OTTIMIZZAZIONE DELLE RISORSE
IN AMBITO DIFESA**

**RIVOLTA
ITALIANA**

In any Administrative Body the concept and the activities of planning must be framed into a system where organization, planning, management and control are interrelated, interacting and interdependent to reach the object according to economic principles. The whole of these activities is generally called *management*.

At the end of World War II a series of political events occurred that started a political-military trend affecting an economic-military policy





which reconciled systems, methods and institutions typical of a war economic policy — long term planning for the production of complex arm systems, establishment of relevant study and research units regarding conflicts, preferential imports of strategic material, stockage of military supplies, support to national war industry, extraordinary financing to Defence and others — with the normal economic activity in time of peace, directed to reach social objects of economic progress and protection of the purchasing power of the currency and savings.

From then on we can speak of *military economics* and consequently of *defence management*, where the military organization arranges itself into a system, so that every military activity becomes interrelated, interacting and interdependent in the sense that all operational, organizational and logistic activities undergo a comparison between action and employed means in just one picture where the various alternatives are not incompatible or worse contradictory.

Planning represents the main activity of management, since in the civil organizations both singles and groups are inclined to keep the obtained situation and, more often, to improve it, projecting into the future the proper actions and the given means.

Planning in a general meaning can be explained as the projection into the future of all the programs according to the projects fixed in the planning itself, where programs mean an action line projected into the future according to the predetermined goals and available means.

Obviously we can have different kinds of planning: national economic planning for market and level and

Facing page.

Liutenant-General in full dress - 1798.

Left.

Commanding officer, Modena Civic Guard - 1797.

area planning. Military planning belongs to the area planning.

Special emphasis has been put on consumer planning and firms planning. Consumer planning to alert the Bodies for military planning on the "traps" they could fall into due to specific psychological behaviour. Already PARETO expressed that individuals often act by *impulse* and by *instinct*, behaviour which he called "residual". Later other authors, among whom KATONA and DUESENBERY have stressed that individuals feel, think and act, but the way they feel, think and act is influenced by the *group* they belong to, thus determining a behaviour that can be called "imitation effect". This also happens in groups which tend to imitate groups of higher rank. In military planning the imitation effect can happen in the choice of arm systems; a choice which could be justified with a *derivation* — according to PARETO terminology (see par. 17) — that can be represented as a "pseudo-demand for standardization" within an alliance.

Firms planning has greatly developed to state the decision-making process with the most recurring options criteria, among which mainly the analysis cost/effectiveness, the profit analysis and the indifference curves 5/10, as well as the patterns for decision-marking, behaviour and control (par. 11/15), surely not in their application methodologies, rather as a concept, an application field and a start for further search of their profitable application to planning activities in the Defence sector.

Furthermore, the theory of firms planning, stemming directly from military planning (see ANTHONY, HANIK), can easily be used as *feed-back* to be repropounded to military activities, of course with the necessary adjustments.

The content, the information principles and the methodologies of the national economic planning for

market and level represent the necessary presupposition and the base of military planning, find its natural clue in the national economic planning. This happens in many countries — for instance, France, West Germany, etc. — since there is the need for a direct link between military planning and national economic planning.

During the '70s, when it was searched into the possibility of introducing PPBS in the military activities, the magazine "L'Amminis-

trazione della Difesa", through several authors, stressed the assumption that, keeping the objectives of national defence out of the economic planning, the Government cannot verify possible incompatibility between military and social objectives, i.e. those of economic stability and development, or those of currency and savings protection. On the contrary, everything is settled by leaving the choice to the budget policy, thus keeping the same choice to an episodic and fragmentary decision.

Accidental and structural situations have caused the failure of long-term economic planning and the attempts to a rescue, despite deep changes. Due to the insufficiency of the annual budget to make up for the lack of a suitable planning, in 1978 a long-term budget was established — presently of three years —. It is, however, a document of poor operational capability; in any case, the various "slices" for a three-year period of military planning should revert to it.

At the end of the general concept analysis, in the second part one comes to the heart of military planning, stating preliminary that the general expression of *military planning* includes the *operational military planning* and the *technical-financial planning*. Operational military planning (called also operational planning, or military planning and interforces general planning), means a dynamic, long-term, constantly updated process in which, taken into consideration the goals of the national defence policy and the outer threat to their accomplishment, there is indication with reference to a given period of time, of the missions, of the kinds and of the force objectives of the military instrument with relation also to the estimated financial means.

The technical-financial planning (called in some regulations — see art. 2 & 9 of D.P.R. 18.11.1965, n. 1477, art. 1 of Law 8.3.1968, n. 200, art. 3, 4, 5 and 6 of d.d.dl. 557 Senate — "technical-financial programs") is a dynamic, medium-term, constantly updated process in which,



Dragoons' officer - 1798.

through several options, are defined — according to some determined *bonds*, i.e. financial — the means to obtain the objectives established in the planning according to the more profitable ratio “cost/effectiveness”.

The technical-financial planning presents an *operational-military* aspect including the *structural* element — definition of programs and their distribution — and an *operational-economic* aspect including the *analytical* element — definition of the program elements and their consolidation.

Once outlined the general idea and basic structure of the military planning, for a proper comparison, a mention was made of its restructuring provided for by D.P.R. 18.11.1965, n. 1477 and by Law 8.3.1968, n. 200, making some remarks on the *weakening* of the relevant authority of the Chief of General Staff for Defence because of the above-mentioned Law that, in the end, resulted in the re-concentration, through the joint intervention of the Committee of the Chiefs of General Staff, of greater weight and autonomy to the single Armed Forces in the military planning sector.

Here follows an outline on the characteristics and the duties of PPBS and on the reasons for its non-application in our country:

- the bureaucratic apparatus;
- the technical-administrative organization and the following structure (in particular, the lack of a *unitary* concept of the production process of the military instrument coming from an inter-forces planning);
- an inadequate professional capability (need for a proper managerial systematic preparation side by side with the operational capabilities, since self-taught and by-hearsay-men are dangerous rather than useful);
- lack of liaison: since military planning is an *area* planning, it must

be connected with the national economic planning or with substitutive documents (programmatic long-term budget and financial Law);

- political will.

Due to the fact that all these *bonds* could not be overcome, any analysis on the matter resulted in a laboratory practice.

All planning is based on *programmatic* documents. This expression

seems tautology, but it is not. Then, planning documents where its presuppositions are determined that is chosen goals and objectives, both deriving from a stated selection through a decision-making process.

In such a framework, the planning documents of the Defence planning are presently the “White Books” of Defence that, stated the world political situation, express the principles of national defence policy, the



outer threat to their accomplishment and the national military policy also in the framework of possible alliances, to determine the following defence objectives and the means to realize them.

Fusilier, Venice National Guard - 1797.



In our country two "White Books" have been edited, one in 1977 and the other in 1985. Key element of the second "White Book" has been the so-called "New Defence Pattern" representing the "strategic and operational outline that, with reference to the lines of security policy and to the principles of military policy, shows the key operational missions, the defensive priorities, the shape and the array of the forces in the various operational sectors".

On the matter have been expressed some formal and substantial remarks regarding principle questions. The expression "new defence pattern" appeared in 1981 and was uttered by the pro-tempore Minister of Defence, telling the Defence Committee in the Cabinet to "have ordered the General Staff Offices to study an updated defence pattern... which took into account the new reality resulting in the Mediterranean", and specifying also some duties they had to carry out.

The concept was resumed and widened in 1983 by the new Minister of Defence in another presentation at the above-mentioned parliamentary Committee, up to the moment when concept and content resulted into the Defence "White Book" of 1985, with the above-mentioned definition.

Such definition caused discussions and criticism by the relevant Bodies — among which CASD — and by the experts of "res militaris": the "vexata quaestio" was deemed necessary of revision not merely to point out pros and cons, but mainly to look for the correct wording with reference to the task it had to accomplish.

After a thorough analysis were drawn the following conclusions:

- the Defence pattern emphasizes the political decision on national security and the following objectives;
- it materializes the security objectives against outer threat;
- it establishes the lines of military policy for the materialization of the military objectives, whose jurisdiction belongs to the military

Body.

This means that the Defence pattern is a document ensuing from a *political* decision and therefore its jurisdiction belongs to the Constitutional political Bodies — Government and Parliament — and cannot be *delegated* to the military Body — as it has happened so far — even if subject to the approval of the Minister of Defence since it is actually the expression of an act through which the political Bodies establish the foundations on which — considered the resources of the Country, the size of the social and economic activities designed to achieve a determined economic wealth and a certain social standard and the expression of the "national feeling" — they *intend, can and want* organize and accomplish the defence of the Country (see par. 32). Therefore such document is *essential and substantial*, since it ratifies the political will on the Country security and its importance, taking the responsibility, in the sense that the military Body is only responsible of the production "*for the best*" of the military instrument ensuing from the *political introduction*; nor have they any other duty than expressing its possible inadequacy.

After having described the characteristics, there has been indication of the key elements of its content (par. 36), also because, as already mentioned, operational planning is based and articulated on such elements. Anyway, before sketching a possible general picture of planning, it was deemed useful to further discuss on some problems both *in* the system and *of* the system, among which the lack of an inter-forces planning and the partition between military planning and national economic planning — or with a similar document. Not to leave criticism idle, there have been ideas and proposals by analysts to get a logic reference for the research. On the matter, particularly interesting was the "report" of Prof. Virgilio Ilari at ISTRID on July 8, 1988, as well as the "Giacche's Law" and d.d.l. 557 Senate (par. 34).

To go to the core of the subject, a presentation was made, also graphic, of the decision-making process — technical financial planning (encl. E-G), as well as of the *framework* of planning into which to include jurisdictions, criteria, structures, elements, actions and methodologies, activities aimed to outline a kind of planning in conformity with the security objective and compatible with the financial estimated means.

In particular:

- criteria: development of *inter-forces* planning;
- structure: for operational missions;
- elements: verification of the effectiveness and of the efficiency of the military instrument and its components (in particular the arm systems) using also the marginal analysis and the indifference curves;
- realism and clearness in the choice and in its accomplishment;
- attune with NATO procedures;
- methodologies and actions which take into account the general indications for the financing.

The analysis was also addressed to determine the *estimate of expenditure*, both for the production and for the upkeep of the military instrument through the ordinary and extraordinary amortization. One problem connected with such operations is the military inflation — general and technological — but it has not been dealt with due to its complexity and the doctrine could not find a theoretic definition nor practical methodologies for its determination. It seems, therefore, the case to carry out an “ad hoc” research, as it has been done in other countries, although with limited results, since it was not found the methodology to take into account the third variable, i.e. *quality*, in addition to quantity and cost of military goods.

Major problems arose from the jurisdiction of the decision-making process, since the passage from a formulation for Armed Force to an inter-forces one implies overcoming strong frictions and praxis which have been going on for a long time

and are somewhat of a tradition.

Therefore, it was necessary to express two alternatives: one that can be named *temporary* and the other *more fitting* the spirit of d.d.l. n. 557 Senate on the re-organization of military top ranks.

According to the first alternative — called “alternative A” — the iter indicated on encl. L, at the moment of decisions on “partial projects of Armed Force” provides that such projects be re-processed on an inter-forces level within an “inter-forces working group” established and operating at Defence General Staff. Goal of the above-mentioned working group is to draw up a document of unitary planning on which to reach a *technical agreement*, to be submitted to the Committee of the Chiefs of General Staff, and which should represent for the Chief of General Staff of Defence the base on which to draft the “general Defence plan” (operational planning) to be submitted to the approval of Minister of Defence.

According to alternative B, the “partial projects” of the Armed Force have to be re-processed under a unitary inter-forces view — taking into account the “inter-forces operational missions” — by the Chief of General Staff of Defence who submits the relevant conclusive document — project of the military instrument — for its *opinion* to the Committee of the Chiefs of General Staff. Such document represents the base for the formulation of the “general Defence plan” by the Chief of General Staff of Defence and which is submitted for the approval of the Minister of Defence.

A short critical comment follows on the procedures regarding the two alternatives.

The reform underway in the military top ranks of Defence is marked by the establishment of a technical-operational area with the hierarchic and functional superiority of the Chief of General Staff of Defence, and of a technical-administrative area, where operates the Secretary General of Defence who also takes over the office of National Director

for Armaments, and by a structure on an inter-forces level (White Book of Defence 1985, par. 14). Consistent with the above principles, the report on d.d.l. 557 Senate says that “the correct hierarchic system of the military top ranks must comply with the functional requirements of the planning process and with the need to ensure the due authority to the final decision and to the relevant options, with unavoidable sacrifice due to the shortness in resources” and furthermore it adds “it hence complies with this pattern and not with an abstract unifying concept, the superiority position of the Chief of General Staff of Defence, both as a responsible for the general planning (including both the operational sector and the one regarding development and upgrading) of the military instrument, and as supreme responsible for the inter-forces operational missions”.

Regarding the powers of the Committee of the Chiefs of General Staff, it is necessary to point out some remarks. The founding principles of such Body fix that the Committee handle the most important problems and in particular those regarding operational planning with the consequent technical-military programs. This meant that being in force D.P.R. 18.11.1965, n. 1477, the Chief of General Staff of Defence submitted the proposals for the operational planning and the technical-financial planning to the Minister of Defence after having “heard all together the Chiefs of general Staff of the Armed Forces”, while now such proposals are consequent to a joint decision, which the single components are responsible for. The result is that the principles of Law 8.3.1968, n. 200 and of the relevant regulation (D.P.R. 13.10.1971 n. 781) have meant a weakening of the jurisdiction of the Chief of General Staff of Defence in the planning sector.

Considering the above, if the principle of *inter-forces unity* in the planning sector has to be accomplished, it is necessary to re-establish the principle of sole jurisdiction to the

Chief of General Staff of Defence on the matter.

It must anyway be pointed out that d.d.l. 557 Senate (art. 3 and 6) has provided in such sense by giving to the Committee of the Chiefs of General Staff a *consultative* authority on the matter, and this should be carried out through *compulsory* opinions, however not *binding*, in the sense that the Chief of General Staff of Defence is compelled to ask for the opinion of the Committee on the planning project, but he is not bound to such an opinion and therefore free to decide on the content of the project to be submitted to the Minister of Defence for approval, with the only obligation to submit to the Minister *also* the contrary opinions of the dissentients.

From the above foreword, it results that alternative A, if carried into effect, must be of *temporary* nature, in the sense that it sounds like a "compromise" to gradually achieve, also without a legislative regulation, the final system base on the inter-forces top ranks structure and the hierarchic and functional superiority of the Chief of General Staff of Defence.

In this sense must, therefore, be understood the "spirit" which inspired it.

On the contrary alternative B represents a procedure based not only on the principle of the reorganization of the military top ranks, but also on the univocal principle, accepted for any kind of planning, according to which several Bodies take part into the complex planning activities, while their definition belongs to whom has the "gestio" of the Body he is in charge of.

If with a modernistic view, one considers the military instrument and its components like a goods output, planning aims to spot these useful products to achieve the chosen military objectives and to project their availability in a given time; programming, on the contrary, es-



Colour-bearer, «Guardia del Governo» - 1802.

establishes them quality-and quantity-wise through analytic procedures which use proper methodologies of option between possible alternatives and it projects the production, through proper action lines, in the fixed period of time, according to the financial resources. If one accepts such logic formulation, one can describe the military programming as the whole of the activities, in the course of time and logic, giving physical and financial expression to the "program elements" — and consequently to the aggregation of higher order — projecting it into a determinate period of time — 3/5 years — through a proper qualification of planning.

On the matter it is the case to recall a few concepts. For the above-mentioned reasons, military programming is "technical and financial", meaning for technical the "economic-military" aspect, that is the operational and structural component considered in its economic dimension (encl. P). In particular, the technical programming in its double content is and unfolds through a *structural* aspect and an *analytic* aspect.

The *structural* aspect operates through an operational analysis, carried out at General Staff of Defence level, for the *definition* of the systematic elements of programming — already outlined during the planning stage — and that is the programs, subprograms and program elements forming and inter-forces operational mission. In other words, if one considers a program as a *product*, the structural aspect of programming is concerned with the spotting of the products needed to prepare the military instrument.

The *analytic* aspect, on the contrary, aims at the *determination* of the programs, through a systematic analysis carried out at a General Staff of Armed Forces level on the program elements to achieve, through consolidation procedures, complex "*species*". It means then to determine the *type* of product among the several options to meet certain needs: for instance, the choice of a

certain arm system among the available alternatives, according to the criteria of optimization of the function "effectiveness/cost", and to consolidate the different program elements to get to more complex products — subprograms and programs.


Definition and determination of the programs bring to the formulation of the *programs structure* and to the following *programming plan* in the duty of General Staff of Defence. After a verification procedure, such

plan becomes the document of the *technical programming* in duty of the Chief of General Staff of Defence.

The expenditure allocations are thus determined for this goal. The expenditure areas mark the obligatory spending from the optional; the expenditure sectors represent the discretionary spending in programs of force, operating, updating and renewal, research and development.

The expenditure programs represent a partition of the discretionary spending according to the programs being object of the programs structure. The expenditure items, on the contrary, represent a partition according to the procurement contracts.

Officer, National Gendarmerie - 1801.



The financial programming is formed by the whole of the financial programs, divided by each year of projection of the programming itself.

A cross-walk process is used to allocate to the various chapters of the traditional budget — estimate of expenditure for the Ministry of Defence — the various annual “slices” of the financial programming, mentioned on the financial plan.

The technical programming and the financial programming, drafted by the Chief of General Staff of Defence, are submitted to the inspection of the Committee of the Chiefs of General Staff that expresses a compulsory opinion on the matter, however, not a binding one, following which the Chief of General Staff of Defence submits for the approval of the Minister of Defence the two documents that represent the Defence technical-financial programming together with the other document on the operational planning of Defence. Together with these documents are enclosed the possible contrary opinions uttered by the dissentient members of the Committee of the Chiefs of General Staff.

As already pointed out, the “cross walk” procedure will ensure the liaison of the single “slices” of the document of the technical-financial programming, to the traditional annual and multi-annual budgets. This procedure, as well as the administrative-financial control on the programs development, is duty of the Secretary General of Defence.

This is the end of the present “Report” that in a very concise way has presented the outlines of the “research” results: concepts and methodologies of programming in general and possibility of application to military programming; pros and cons of the present system — if we can call it a system — need for a quality jump in the methodologies in order to leave the ongoing “craftsmanlike, episodic and

fragmentary state”; establishment of a “defence system” with just *one* programming and not *three* as it happened in the past and as it still happens nowadays. It was also suggested a “new structure” compatible with the regulations in force and with the one “*de jure condendo*”; showing some alternatives; but all this is not enough. Almost two decades ago when the PPBS had to be applied to the Defence activities, it was remarked that among the bonds which obstructed such implementation there were two key ones: the trained personnel and the political will. These same bonds do still exist nowadays.

With reference to the personnel — the cadres — it is unthinkable

to start a programming and have it managed by self-taught or by hear-say men; there is the need for staff well trained in the science of “management” specialized in “defence management” since the management activities of Defence have to be carried out by Officers of General Staff who with their basic preparation could and knew how to couple management activities to the operational activities, in the sense, however, that the former harmonize with the latter and not viceversa.

While the structures can be achieved on the medium term, the specific training of men is only possible on the long term. It is necessary to start in the Academies, introducing the teaching of military economics and of “defence management”, continuing in the War Colleges, particularly in the higher course, due to their peculiarity of forming the military top ranks. It could also be the case of establishing a specific course in “defence management” — as it happens in other Countries — a top level Body at inter-forces level, where to specialize in management subjects — always with reference to military activities — around thirty Top Officers, Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels of General Staff and some of equal rank in some services, University graduates in engineering and in economics, statistics and mathematics. In a few years’ time it will be possible to obtain a good group of personnel to head the activities of military planning and programming.

The second bond, the political will, is foreign to the sphere of military activity; however, in view of a historical future that will require fundamental choices, it could be enlightened by the knowledge and by the responsibility shown by the technostucture towards the future.

Giuseppe Mayer (research director),
Carlo Bellinzona, Nicola Gallippi,
Paolo Mearini, Pietro Menna

Venetian National Guard - 1797.



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RAPPORTO DI RICERCA SU:
PROFILI DI CARRIERA E REMUNERAZIONI
DEL PERSONALE MILITARE E CIVILE
DELL'AMMINISTRAZIONE DELLO STATO
DELLE QUALIFICHE DIRETTIVE E
DIRIGENZIALI

CAREER AND REMUNERATION OUTLINES OF MILITARY AND CIVIL STAFF IN THE STATE ADMINISTRATION AT DIRECTOR AND MANAGER LEVELS

The research, while answering the stated goal (indicated in the foreword), has tried to investigate two important aspects of military condition: career and the economic and welfare treatment, with reference to what applies to similar civil sectors in the Public Administration.

To pursue this goal, a methodology had to be studied through which to process quite homogeneous career outlines between military and civil personnel in order to compare them.

The result were 11 patterns, 10 of which civil (Foreign Affairs, Interior, Health, Treasury, Labour, Budget, Agriculture, Justice, Defence, Magistrates) to be compared with the pattern established for the officers of the three Armed Forces (Carabinieri included).

Processing the data regarding the economic evaluation of above patterns has allowed the drawing of graphs showing the average assumable outlines of economic career (46 graphs).

Such graphs and outlines have then made possible to carry out the expected analysis and comparison.

Although within the limits of an evaluation in very concise terms, it has been possible to show highly meaningful aspects.

With reference to career opportunities of military and civilians, the difference in the ongoing advancement systems — “due to vacancy” and “according to regulations” — implies inevitable differences in the selection rates.

In reality, a civilian has a chance from 1.3 to 3.8 times higher than a military to reach the first management level and from 1.3 to 11 times higher to reach the highest management level.

With reference to the top ranks, considering the percentage divided among “directors” (up to Lt. Col. included) “first level managers” (Col.) and “executives” (Gen.), it comes out that in the Armed Forces Col. and Gen. together represent the



13% of the officers in permanent active service (of the normal and special rolls), while this rate in the civilian rolls goes from a low 12% in the Justice Ministry up to 41% in the Foreign Affairs and Interior Ministries and reaches the 65% in the Budget Ministry.

This shows that, from a technical point of view, not taking into consideration the evaluations by the order, the recurring criticism on an over-redundancy of top ranks in the Armed Forces is greatly unjustified.

Regarding the career length and rapidity, the study confirms that the military career is much more restraint particularly up to the reaching of the executive level.

The result is that military managers are averagely older than

the civilians.

On an overall analysis, the military career compared to the civil one is slower, particularly in the low and medium ranks, shorter for most of the officers who leave the service as Lt. Col. and undoubtedly more selective.

Within this general framework, it is possible to draw the following considerations:


- there are no corrective measures to be taken from the civil sector in order to improve military career since the two advancement systems are incompatible;
- however, starting with Law 574/80, many unbalancements and malfunctioning existing in the officers career have been little by little smoothed away.

Further improvements coming from career acceleration and selectivity reduction would mean remarkable drawbacks mainly in terms of over-output of Col. and Gen. with the increase of the harmful phenomenon of the "A.R.Q." (Cadres Reduction Scheme).

However, by Law 224/86, this phenomenon has lost many of its negative features and it can be partially kept under control in its development taking into account in the advancement also of the perfect age to get access to the various managing ranks, in order to avoid, when possible and feasible, earlier promotions compared to the average patterns; promotions that would be provided for by the A.R.Q.

Furthermore, the possible change of the mechanism for placement in A.R.Q. according to the age and not to the roll, would not bring any remedy and, on the contrary, would be negative since it would increase the roll instability and uncertainty while not keeping the best personnel in service since the roll enlisting of Col. and Gen. does not take place according to merit lists;

- on the other hand, because of the need in the future to aim to a pyramid-like structure for officers in permanent active service, which will be thinner at the top (to reduce the output of managing ranks), in order not to penalize further the military career compared to the civil one, it would be necessary to provide for compensation mechanisms both on the economic level (the norm of the 15 to 25 years in force for Police personnel would only partially meet the need since it implies the big drawback of flattening the economic pay system, that penalizes the merit) and on the employment level, allowing a certain horizontal mobility of managing ranks towards the Public Adminis-



tration (Interior, Civil Welfare, Foreign Affairs, etc.);

- on the whole, it is thus confirmed the absolute atypic characteristic of military career compared to the civil one.

Any attempt to change its outline is very difficult since it deals with acting on often irreconcilable parameters and variables.

Reduced personnel requirements, higher age limits, quicker advancements, reduced "closed numbers" for officers who must have an adequate employment and a proper economic treatment, represent the basic reference pattern for the near-future careers.

The solution will be difficult and most likely it will be necessary to resort to a more selective and

calibrated recruitment (like in the diplomatic career) for enrolment in the Academies and War Colleges.

With reference to the economic treatment of civilians and of military, the analysis both of the istograms and mostly of the average and possible economic career patterns has shown the existence of remarkable differences in payments, which should not be neglected.

In particular, it came out that the earned economic treatment in officers career (not including the Carabinieri) is remarkably lower than the average amounts in the civil sector and such a penalty seems even higher considering the possible patterns of the various careers which express the hopes of future gains by those who enter those careers.



Alphonse De Meville: «Cavalryman of the Guard of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, cm 41 x 60.

To conclude, in the search for solutions to improve the retribution situation of the officers of the Armed Forces, it appears necessary and proper to keep two fixed reference points: the Carabinieri and the General Managers (Dirigenti Generali) of the State Administration of level "C" and "B".

With reference to the retirement and social security schemes, the situation for the military is presently more beneficial than the one for the civilians.

This is also due to Law 224/86 that brought the following advantages:

- granting of 6 periodic salary increase to officers who leave service for age limits;
- coupling of the auxiliary retribution treatment to the one of staff in service;
- adjustment of economic treatment in A.R.Q. (due up to the age limit); in addition to the old advantage of the promotion "on the eve" (of retirement).

After all, in the retirement field the military seem to be in a condition they more likely have to guard rather than looking for other possible advantages taken from the civil sector.

As a last conclusion, we can say that the results of the study make some common stands on the military condition obsolete; common stands inclined to present it in any case penalized on the economic and social security level compared to the civil sector of the Public Administration.

Penalties and unbalances occur, on the contrary, also within the military system itself (among Armed Forces, Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza) and therefore, it is necessary to proceed to their settlement, thus remaining, at the same time, strongly linked to the solutions being worked out for the civil management to be properly suited to the military management.

Domenico Tria (research director)
Tonino Longhi, Arturo Cerilli,
Andrea Gagnoni, Pietro Menna.

All this, obviously, confirms the general slowness of military career and its remarkable selectivity.

Furthermore, it resulted that the Carabinieri enjoy the most favourable economic situation of all the other examined employments and this finds an explanation in a more favourable economic regulation in force for Police Corps.

To put it in figures, at the end of his career (37 years of service, for instance) an officer (not a Carabinieri) has matured 400 million less than an employee of the Foreign Affairs or Budget Ministries.

Between an Army officer and a Carabinieri officer, the difference to the disadvantage of the former is 600 million.

Other interesting conclusions can

be drawn by examining the growth rate of the total retributions during the course of the various careers.

It came out that an officer (not a Carabinieri) up to the rank of Col. is better paid than a civilian at the same level, while Major Generals and 3 Stars Generals (Generali di Corpo d'Armata) are penalized compared to similar State-employed executives.

Actually, since the retribution difference between officers of the Armed Forces and of the Carabinieri seems more conspicuous, to improve the economic situation of the former it would be proper to proceed to a complete homogenization of the treatments between the Armed Forces and the Police Forces, thus leaving the catching up with the civil sector of non-managers.

**SOVIET CHANGE: ITS
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
ALLIANCE**

*Let
7/89*

The topic I am addressing would normally require a comprehensive treatment. Instead, I will take a fairly impressionistic approach and only consider some key elements. While my remarks will be somewhat speculative and absolutely personal, their main theme will be that the dimensions of change in the East, which we currently witness, place before the Alliance a wide array of management tasks of an unprecedented order. I will first seek to describe the enormous proportions, indeed the enormity of the change, and will then deal with some of its implications.

THE DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE

Soviet and the Alliance.

From NATO's inception, Soviet behavior has uniquely shaped the structure and procedures of the Alliance. Indeed, all of its essential features have been reflections of the way in which the Soviet Union exercised its world power. Traditionally, this has involved accumulation of excessive military might, conquest and intimidation, a rigorous central power structure, dominance of Eastern Europe, as well as denial of both human rights and freedom of individual choice for those within the Soviet sphere of power.

The overriding problem of European — and Allied — security has been the massive conventional superiority of Soviet forces, compounded by the forward stationing of Soviet troops and by their offensive force posture and military doctrine. NATO's strategy, especially the approach to forward defense and its conventional and nuclear posture, has been mainly shaped by this threat. Alliance institutions — both in the political and command structure areas — have equally reflected Europe's security predicament. As a defensive alliance with no intentions or potential to move forward and seize territory, NATO has also remained in an overall defensive and reactive mood, while its "offensive" political strategy has long been un-

derplayed. Changes are beginning to occur in the posture, and the prospect of a considerable enhancement of conventional stability in NATO's key area of concern. These new positions should naturally have a profound impact on the Alliance. If the Soviet military role in Central Europe has been the principal determinant of NATO's overall position, then removing this key factor must entail comprehensive change. It follows logically that the Alliance is in need of a fundamental rethinking of its way of doing business, commensurate with the degree of change on the other side.

Wider Patterns of Change.

It is characteristic of our era that, in spite of their overriding importance, the changes in the Soviet Union are not an isolated phenomenon. They coincide with global trends and are reinforced by them. I will brief-

Above.

Nicola Natale: *The meeting and the lunatic house*, 1988, distemper, wax, cinchona and collage on card-board.

Facing page.

Nicola Natale: *Without a title*, 1989, oil on canvas.

ly recall the most important:

- the worldwide advance of democratic systems;
- the continuing demise of oppressive systems of government, or of their unencumbered existence;
- the growing emphasis on free political and economic choices, in the face of an increasingly perceived inability of communist-type systems to fulfill the needs and tasks of post-industrial societies;
- the emergence of the phenomenon of comprehensive interdependence, meaning that no country can remove itself without penalty from an increasingly more integrated world market of technology;





Nicola Natale: *Introspection 1*, 1980, oil on board.

- the continuing occurrence of more cooperative features in world politics demonstrated, for instance, by the way in which developing countries articulate their relationships with the First World;
- the growing awareness among governments and peoples of global concerns, including the environment;
- the change in the role of military power with increasing doubts about its effectiveness, and indeed a wider perception among decision makers and populations alike, that war can no longer be a means to promote political ends. Thirty years of contemporary history in which no war has been won have impressed upon all that the disadvantages of lost peace weigh much more heavily than the seeming advantages of war. There is an incipient but growing conviction of the futility of war;

- quite in keeping with the preceding observation, a change in the way world power can effectively be exercised. The Soviet Union may have become the first major nation to experience a new paradigm of world power: military might — alone — can no longer underpin great power aspirations and confer indisputable status.

Directions of Soviet Change.

Soviet changes must be deliberately placed in the larger conceptual framework of global change. This leads me to the following key assumptions on current and prospective Soviet policy and on the Soviet position in the world:


- the highest goal of the current Soviet leadership appears to be the preservation of Great Power status under changing conditions. Gorbachev's underlying prime motive is to ensure the competitiveness of the Soviet Union as a world power in the 21st century;

- in managing this change, the Soviet leadership is faced with a snowballing effect of ever more reform, while the logic of freedom and free choice is increasingly at work within the old system's boundaries. These are pushed further and further, disintegrating the system and its erstwhile control mechanisms;
- the Soviet leadership has come to realize that stability abroad is a prerequisite for any successful effort at domestic reform under conditions of inefficient internal control. Consequently, the Soviet Union is now retreating from many military ventures and destabilizing activities worldwide; it seeks to stabilize military relationships through arms control, especially with the West but also with China and other neighbors; it also seeks to replace confrontations with cooperative relationships in order to secure a more stable environment, and does so increasing-

ly with traditional diplomatic means.

This dependency of the internal reform process on outside steady support confers on the West an unprecedented role of player in the evolution of Perestroika. In sharp contrast with earlier autonomous Soviet effort at reform since Lenin's time — be it the NEP (1) or Khrushchev's reforms — the current attempt is revolutionary in nature, of worldwide proportions, and involves the global political and economic environment. To that extent, the West — as the dominant outside force in world politics — has an active role in Soviet change. We are not mere onlookers but, to a large degree, the judges and makers of Perestroika's credibility and indeed of its success, however much the reforms may be essentially incumbent on the Soviets themselves. Since, in this analysis, change in the Soviet Union is part of larger worldwide patterns of change, Soviet events are not fortuitous or arbitrary and are likely to be long-term. In particular, the Soviet quest for external stability is likely to remain a prime feature of Soviet policy as long as the reform requirements are not fully met.

Nicola Natale: *Archaeology*, 1980, wood, oil and objects.




POLITIC-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

NATO Analyses of Soviet and Eastern Economic Growth.

NATO analyses show that the long-term economic prospects of the Soviet Union are alarming. A further levelling in economic performance and a relative economic decline of the Soviet economy in relation to other countries are likely to be steady features of the next few decades.

A recent NATO document has attempted to provide a model analysis of Soviet growth prospects into the 21st century. The assumptions vary from a success for Gorbachev's reform policy — whatever this may mean in detail — through a medium 'success scenario, to outright failure. The resulting average annual growth which would still have to be deflated by a factor of demographic increase to reflect per capita income, appears to vary between 1.6 and 2.7% — 0.9% to 2% on a per capita basis. This small predicted growth would be unlikely to be qualitative. The troubling element in this analysis is the minute difference between the best case and the worst case scenario. This would seem to indicate the marginal role of specific reform policies in the overall process of revamping the Soviet system. In each scenario, the Soviet Union will fall back further and decisively behind its major industrial competitors, winding up in the economic position of a medium-sized industrial power by the turn of the century. No breakthrough is in sight and the Soviet Union is thus likely to lose out on most blessings of the oncoming information age, forfeiting perhaps irretrievably the chance for accelerated growth in the early part of the 21st century.

The Eastern European case is only marginally better. Levels of infrastructure and know-how exist and Eastern European populations still recall more purposeful economic behavior concerning market, administrative efficiency and work morale.



Nicola Natale: *Woman's figure*, 1968, oil on canvas.

Yet, these systems are equally flawed, their production structures are outdated and the environmental conditions are increasingly precarious. All East European economies, notwithstanding their relative differences, show the practice of large-scale economic disinvestment. At least in the medium term, prospects are as gloomy as further East.

Significance of these Developments for NATO.

What is the significance of these developments for the Alliance? First, there is a systemic consequence. We have readily conceptualized the global post-war development in terms of two competing societal and economic philosophies — one based on free choice, one on central fiat. It now appears that, at least tendentially, our system competitor is losing ground. This means that economic development in the West and in the East, and increasingly worldwide, will take place according to the rules of our societal model: a free market economy with social ingredients. That, of course, will also place a critical load on our own system and its ability to ensure growth in harmony with justice and environmental requirements. Criticism can



Nicola Natale: *The tree*, 1986, oil on board.

no longer be diverted to a competing, less capable system. This must motivate us, much more than before, to improve our approach and to optimize its performance.

At the same time, the long-term structural weaknesses of our Eastern neighbors will prevent them from playing their full role as our European partners. If we have stagnant or slow-moving partners on the continent, then the degree of partnership which we could construct will be uneven and precarious. In any event, it will be less mutually benefi-

cial. By their very existence, Eastern countries will be demanding resources which, on the other hand, they cannot yet put to optimum use. Politically speaking, the long-term economic differential will generate frustrations and resentment, and will make a closer political cooperation structure unsuitable. This was also discussed in the preparation of the recent NATO Summit Declaration, where an awareness of our limited ability to help was combined with a nuanced overall offer of cooperation. In a meaningful economic sense, reform is incumbent upon the East. Lest we sink precious funds into a lost venture, we can only hold out

the rewards of our free and performing system to the extent and at the rate that the other side is capable of absorbing it. The predictably impoverished and underprivileged state of our Eastern neighbors, their economic frustrations and under-supply mean that a good deal of economic and political instability is likely to ensue.

In particular, the Soviet Union will be unlikely to play its full global role, commensurate with its immense size and historical importance. It will also be unable to join the West as it should in co-financing the needed cooperative endeavors in the fields of worldwide environmental

care, underdevelopment, hunger, debt relief and basic research. The position of the Soviet Union in the new hierarchy of states, as it will emerge in the 21st century, will be reduced. The consequences for the Soviet world power quest are obvious: the economic underpinnings of a competitive political and military system, even at the level of a reduced military capability, will remain extremely shaky. The Soviet Union will also have difficulties in remaining a resourceful and reliable partner for other players in the world community. Of course, the prospect of the long-term regenerative power of the Soviet Union will remain further into the twenty first century. Short of predicting it, one thing is certain: for a few decades, during the period of relative economic decline of the Soviet Union, the West will have a window of opportunity which it must actively seize. It needs to integrate the Soviet Union into a cooperative security framework that could be a central feature of a more peaceful world community. To that effect, we must encourage reform and promote cooperative developments, remaining wisely aware of the limitations of the Soviet potential in the short medium term.

POLITIC-MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

Scaling Down of the Soviet Military.

I would like to touch on the continuing and changing military threat emanating from the Soviet Union, and on its implications for our strategy. This is because I discussed the shrunk Soviet resource base and the larger changes in the role played by the military factor in world affairs. With both of these in mind, I see the likelihood but no certainty of course — concerning either the dimension or the evolution of the threat — of an unprecedented scaling down of the Soviet military effort within the next few years. Several consequences may ensue. First, this project changes the role and the dynamics of arms control. As we have known

it in the past, arms control was a regulator of the status quo, practised mainly to smoothen the sharper edges of a destabilizing arms competitions. Under the new circumstances, it could become and indeed it does become an instrument of change. It even becomes perhaps a prime agent of change, helping us to redefine the role of military power in state relations. At least, our populations are acutely aware that arms control is developing a new dynamic quality. These new dynamics are troubling because of problems of controllability and because of the conceptual difficulty in negotiated

CFE negotiation in Vienna. It is important that we assess the meaning of dramatic conventional reductions that now appear possible. We must also evaluate the effect of an essential military balance in Europe that could be an early result of the first phase of the negotiations. This is a task to be performed now, when we still have the time to devise appropriate arguments and public strategies. There is no doubt that we will be facing enormous argumentative difficulties vis-à-vis our public. This will be, for instance, in order to make clear that a certain level of parity may be stabilizing but that few-



Nicola Natale: *Freedom in death*, 1967, oil on canvas.

arms control to aim exactly at that lower level of armament which optimizes security. The Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament, which NATO has adopted at its recent Summit meeting, may stabilize these dynamics and help us — or our governments at least — to keep firmly in mind the relationship between security, strategy and arms control.

Psychological Effects of a Military Balance in Europe.

Even with this useful conceptual instrument in hand, it will be difficult to understand fully the colossal psychological challenge which may result from a successful

er weapons may paradoxically be less stabilizing, or to show that a sustained defence effort, aiming at modern and costly weapons, will continue to be required at the new levels. In fact, we may have to review for the benefit of our publics the entire misleading concept of conventional stability. We will also have to deal with the painful problem of how to divide up the agreed reductions among the Allies. More important still, we will have to look at what the new psychology of arms control after a Vienna accord will



Nicola Natale: *the roofs of Lanciano*, 1980, oil on board.

be released between now and the middle 90s?

A Strong and Credible Defense.

In our own dialogue with the public, designed to make the defense effort intelligible and acceptable, it will be imperative to use the right argument. Indeed, what we need for the psychologically delicate period ahead is a new discourse on defense, a new refined rationale. We have made a beginning in the recent Summit Declaration. The Declaration is unequivocal in its strong quest for credible defense, spelling out that security will be the central function of the Alliance in the future, as in the past. Yet, this quest is no longer predicated solely on the existing threatening capabilities of the Soviet bloc. The Declaration also says that strong defense is needed to confront the hazards that may result from severe future strain and crisis. Thus, it is not the Soviet man who is 10 feet tall and may be only 6 next time, but the prudent provision for the future, the insurance policy against uncertainty and instability which, in keeping with the Summit Declaration, should be moved increasingly to the center of the Alliance's defense rationale. By the same token, it is important to devise a new rationale for the residual levels of nuclear weapons which we will need for the future, indeed for a very long time. It must be re-established anew that the ultimate guarantee of peace which they provide is not obviated by an improvement in the conventional balance, however dramatic, or by a receding risk of conflict, however reassuring. In fact, nuclear weapons with as diversified a range of deterrent options as we can afford, but in lesser numbers, will become relatively more important for the preservation of peace. At the same time, the residual inherent risks of nuclear weapons will recede further with the diminishing likelihood of conflict. We need a renewed overriding rationale, especially if we are

mean for the Alliance structure, for the feasibility and form of forward defence and for U.S. troop presence in Europe. On a general level, we will have to understand what it means for our populations to live without or with a starkly diminished perceived threat. Indeed, we must move further. There is no time to be lost in conceptualizing about the defensive structures which are coming our way, but on which neither the Alliance nor most general staffs seems to have worked in any detail. Yet, it

is very important that we preempt a debate on the military structures of the future, lest the peace movements, the academic world or, worse, the Soviets do it. Of course, the Soviets will also have considerable problems with conventional arms control reductions. Psychologically, they may be worse off than we are. If the unilateral reductions now being implemented set free 70,000 to 90,000 officers, members of a privileged class soon without a place to go — what will it mean when 300,000 Soviet officers will

Nicola Natale: *Space with woman*, 1989, distemper on board.

to avoid a series of suicidal debates about single weapon systems in which one after the other of our deterrent options becomes attacked.

IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY

A Paradox of Instability.

What are the implications of Soviet change for stability and for the Alliance's quest for overall security? Today, many are tempted to indulge in nostalgia for the cosy comforts of the Cold War. For forty years, NATO nations have enjoyed stability — one might speak of a paradox of stability. Alliance cohesion, credible defense and nuclear deterrence have created stability and the reassuring perception of stability. This has been against all odds of Soviet superiority — conventional and then nuclear — and against an untenable situation in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in the face of a clearly aggressive doctrine, manifested most visibly in the Third World. There is the strong likelihood that, from this paradox of stability,




we may now move to a paradox of instability. The world is going our way; the Soviet Union is scaling down its military effort; regional hotbeds of crises are attenuated; human rights are allowed to flourish more and more; East European countries emancipate themselves; overcoming the division of Europe is no longer a mere dream. Yet, the result of these welcome developments is, paradoxically, a new measure of instability.

However, one countervailing and overall positive feature exists: Gorbachev needs stability in the external conditions for his own reform work. Thus, efforts to maintain stability get some support from the Soviet leadership. Gorbachev is likely to seize opportunities to cooperate with the West in stabilizing moves, or may even suggest such moves in regional crises, or in the United Nations. He may be persuaded to become more cooperative as regards destabilizing arms transfers and proliferation. There are also grounds for predicting that the Soviet Union, with stability in mind, will not make a determined move to undercut the generic U.S. presence in Europe or the transatlantic dimen-


sion of the Alliance. It will not undercut European integration either, because the stabilizing roles and helpful service of both the Transatlantic Alliance and the European Community are now more clearly perceived in the East. One might therefore question the wisdom accepted in many quarters of the Alliance that driving the Americans out of Europe and impeding West European integration are permanent priority objectives of Soviet policy. Indications now show that the Soviet Union has substantially reordered earlier foreign policy priorities, as a matter of practical policy — whatever their mental reservations for later periods, more propitious for Soviet great power pursuits. For the West, it is better to take sober stock of these more stabilizing Soviet policies than to cultivate ingrained fears and suspicions of the past.

An Unpredictable Soviet Policy.

Yet, despite relative help from the Soviet leadership, the prospects of instability, of tectonic shifts in the East that increasingly defy notions of controllability, are overwhelming. They relate to both the Soviet Union itself and to Eastern Europe. This is the area where the management challenges for the Alliance are likely to be the most formidable.



Nicola Natale: *The player*, 1976, wood.



Nicola Natale: *Manikins*, 1989, chalks and cinchona on card-board.

doctrine. It would be done preferably with new non-military methods, but with undiminished vigor and determination. Intervention with military means might be a last resort and an increasingly distant prospect. Yet, it could by no means be excluded should they see their vital security interests under threat. Many in NATO speculated on what the eventual release event for such an intervention might be. As late as last December, it was generally postulated that the Soviet Union would never abandon its demands both for monolithic party dominance in the political systems of Eastern Europe, and for membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In the light of recent developments, there is no doubt that we must shift our marker. Soviet policy today appears less predictable than before and may become less predictable still, entailing some nervousness in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. But are we not at the point where a far-reaching disengagement of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe cannot be excluded altogether? Could it not be that the Soviet Union increasingly comes to the conviction that a direct extension of its power position into Eastern Europe has ceased to be within its power reach?

A Conceptual Framework for the East-West Relationship.

If so, we would face a totally new situation in Eastern Europe. It would be characterized, at least in the longer run, by a power vacuum constituted by a collection of free-floating states on which the West would exercise a tremendous economical and political sucking effect. Any possible combination of these elements leads to the following questions: what are the structures for the Europe of which we speak? What grand design has been planned and, indeed, how serious is our quest for overcoming the division of Europe? In the accepted view, the CSCE (3) will provide the model of a cooper-

Professor Dau (2) has undertaken to weigh the astounding — if still differentiated — progress in the emancipation of East European countries from Soviet rule and from the communist system against the dangers and insufficiencies incurred in that process. Two sets of questions emerge concerning Eastern Europe, both huge and of course unanswerable at present. First, what are the Soviet Union's future intentions? Next, what are the likely elements of a future political order in Europe? As to Soviet intentions, the recent-

ly prevailing and firmly held view was that the Soviet Union would continue, even in its weakened state, to look at Eastern Europe as an integral and permanent part of its world power system. The Soviets consider it as a power pawn reaching into the midst of Europe, as a result of the second World War on which history had set its seal, as much as a symbol of power. That theory reads that the Soviet Union would hold on to its power position in Eastern Europe, although without the automaticity of the Brezhnev

ative order uniting both Western and Eastern Europe, but its documents do not adequately capture the institutional angle of the relationship between states. The CSCE agreements call for cooperative procedures, but the core of the CSCE process is an individualistic human right approach. It is an explosive, even disruptive message by itself; yet, it does not offer principles of order for the organization of a larger European Commonwealth. To be self-critical, isn't it somewhat facetious that the West places overcoming the division of Europe highest on its political agenda without a clearer concept — and clearer signals to East European countries — of what structures and relationships are envisaged and where the East Europeans could seek recourse for their economic and human rights woes? In other words, is the West really willing to face the consequences of a possible fulfillment of its own elevated demands, from a removal of the Berlin Wall to a mass exodus of co-Europeans in the name of freedom and human rights? The resulting dilemma for the East is no doubt compounded by the fact that, at least in some countries, there are no clear traditional role models nor historical reference points for building new nation states out of themselves. What can we offer? What is the future of the EEC? What kind of organic relationship with the East can we envisage? How does NATO wish to handle the German question when it comes up, as it will? Can we think of Finland-like patterns — voluntary associations between East and West with merely a mild residual shadow cast over these countries by the Soviet Union? All this is uncharted territory. The Alliance should urgently develop a conceptual framework on these issues. I personally think that we would need very soon a "High Level Group". This group would not only study the whole future of Eastern Europe in a confidential mode, but monitor and de-




velop compatible policies in a longer term effort.

Is the Soviet Restructuring Controllable?

Under the angle of stability the Soviet Union's internal developments are even more troubling. An indispensable part of the restructuring is, of course, the need for the Soviet leadership to set free some new energies. As these energies increasingly engage in free play, however, they acutely raise a question on the process: is it and, more

importantly, will it remain controllable? We have heard views on the degrees of integration and disintegration of the Soviet Union, and what new patterns of economy may evolve in the various parts of the Empire. The Soviet Union is undoubtedly going through a highly unstable period with uncertain outcomes. While this may further reinforce the leadership's quest for stability abroad, it also gives rise to a particularly troubling thought, which parallels those on Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union has no historical reference



Nicola Natale: *From a dream*, 1984, distemper on card-board.

model. It is rootless. After the downfall of ideology and the elimination of the revolutionary history as an integrating factor, there may be very little left. In my view, Gorbachev's attempt to uphold a purified and embellished version of Leninism as the one still valid reference point will not last. What then is left? Czarism? The memory of the fledgling Kerensky republic? The traumatic recollection of failed role as a world power? What will the loss of direction and

purpose, the cynicism mean, which will necessarily correspond to a futile search for historic reference points? These are open questions in a highly precarious situation.

THE ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE

How will the Alliance digest these implications of Soviet change? There is at least one hopeful development to report. At the recent Summit, Allied leaders have shown their full awareness of the challenges. The importance of the Summit Declaration

has not been completely understood yet. However timid this document may appear, it precisely addresses the daunting and unprecedented management challenges which I have described in part. With this Declaration, the Alliance finally moves beyond the status quo and reaches out, preparing to stimulate and steer change in the East and in a global context. The text bears careful reading. The Summit has clearly been a turning point in understanding future Alliance roles. The Declaration reveals an Alliance on the move that embraces a broader security concept and plays a more active role. It is a new Alliance, more fit to take on some of these formidable new tasks than its historic predecessor — the Alliance of the first 40 years. There is one prerequisite for success. These management tasks in Eastern Europe and vis-à-vis the Soviet Union are such that our primary goal within NATO and as Europeans must be to strengthen our own bonds. Only a united Alliance with a strong transatlantic partnership and an increasingly united Europe can provide the strength to face a huge and troubled Soviet Union. It is the pre-condition for the fulfillment of the management tasks in the East. Both the recent European Summit meeting and NATO leaders have clearly demonstrated that they embrace this historic logic.

Ambassador Henning Wegener

Ambassador Henning Wegener is the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The views contained in this paper represent the personal positions of the author.

NOTES

- (1) New Economic Policy.
- (2) Dau, Mary, "Europe - East and West - and the Soviet Union".
- (3) The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

SOVIET CHANGE: ITS POLITICAL-ECONOMIC IMPLICATION FOR THE ALLIANCE

POLITICAL MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET TRANSITION FOR THE ALLIANCE



Since our subject is the Soviet Union in transition, it might be appropriate to look at the implications of this transition for our Western Alliance. I would like to set the scene concerning the effects of some of these dramatic and potentially far-reaching developments from the East that seem to occur almost daily.

THE ALLIANCE: SUCCESSES AND CRISES

First, I will make a few comments, perhaps not very original, about NATO. It is something of a truism that alliances between nation-states have traditionally been formed to prosecute war, and have tended to disintegrate pretty rapidly at war's conclusion. All too often and too quickly, former allies have become enemies. Certainly, history abounds with examples of great wartime alliances that have failed to withstand the more subtle but nevertheless very real challenges of peace. NATO was, of course, formed for a very different purpose — actually to preserve peace. That its original twelve — and now sixteen — nations have enjoyed a 40 year period of unparalleled security and prosperity is ample testimony to its effectiveness. This might surely underline any

Dragoons of S.A.R., 1683

view of the Alliance: success, in its prime endeavour, is the very hallmark of NATO.

It is true, however, that NATO has another characteristic. Apparently, the Alliance is in a state of perpetual crisis — and not always of the kind precipitated by the problems of its potential adversaries. Indeed, NATO has stood firm and even become stronger in the face of successive crises involving the Eastern bloc. That is perhaps understandable. Less easily explicable to some who are not “working the NATO treadmill” daily are the tensions which have historically existed within the Alliance itself. Our last Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, was wont to remark that he felt distinctly uncomfortable when NATO was not in crisis. In my own view, it would be pretty remarkable if there were not differences of opinion — sometimes fairly deep differences — between sixteen democratic nations as diverse as those which form our great Alliance. They are, after all, a pretty varied lot. Their histories are as different as those of the United States and Denmark, and they range in size from Canada to Luxembourg. The differences in culture between, say, Norway and Italy or Portugal and the Netherlands need no exaggeration: they are there for all to see! The differences in language between the European nations (and, if I dare say, across the great Atlantic Ocean) are very much more than mere sound. They represent, in some cases, a fundamental divergence in the way people think and in the way they see the world and its problems.

As a European — but more particularly as an Briton, I stand close to the geographic middle of our Alliance. Seen from that position, the 44 years of peace that have reigned, albeit fitfully, in Europe since the end of World War II can hardly have been expected to totally transform the way Europeans look at one

another — let alone at the rest of the world. At any rate, to understand the Alliance fully, I believe we have to treat the word European with a great deal of care. By no means does it yet signify any sort of homogeneous existence! That is not to deny the emergence of a strong European identity over the last 50 years, a

milestone of which will be the European Single Act due to take effect on 31 December 1992. I share the not always popular view that Europe will become ever more an association of nations and perhaps, one day, some sort of loose federation of states. (While I would accept all of Mary Dau's caveats about the great



The White Cross Regiment, 1680.

difficulties to be overcome, I would hope that we will be talking eventually of not just Western Europe).

NATO has recently survived yet another crisis — and survived it, to my mind, with the reputation of the Alliance considerably enhanced. I must say that we needed it. For rather too long, we have appeared

just too over-cautious and too self-protective. We have even looked unnaturally underconfident in the face of the blandishments, the seductive promises, the faultlessly timed “offers we can’t refuse”, the vision and (without being too churlish) the media-hype of a “show-biz superstar” — President Mikhail Gor-

bachev. It has been difficult to convince the peoples in our sixteen nations that what was happening was all a result of NATO’s success; that we were winning the argument on our own terms; that what the East was now offering was helpful but not enough — “a good start”, but still leaving the Warsaw Pact with enormous numerical advantage in almost every class of modern war-fighting system. It was also hard to promote the notion that capability, not intention, still concerned us; that it was all so much easier for Comrade Gorbachev, who did not need to consult with and protect the interest of fifteen sovereign independent allies before making his bold pronouncements. None of these arguments were enough. I am sure we were beginning to look reactionary stubborn and negative in our response and this was, in fact, nowhere near the truth. In matters of media reporting and newsgathering, however, truth can become something of an endangered species.

Anyway, Gorbachev was and is “news”; NATO was not. Now, things are perhaps beginning to change and I am delighted that they are. As a military man, I would still urge a certain caution. Yet it must be in our common interest — both East and West — to drive down the level and expense of the armaments which now confront each other across that traditional cockpit of war that is Central Europe. It must also be mutually advantageous to use those resources for the many worthwhile causes that exist in the world. We are not there yet — by some way. Undoubtedly, Gorbachev will still be capable of pulling, in the words of Sir Geoffrey Howe, “more well-armed rabbits from his well-stocked hat”. The threat may be less these days, but we must not “let the wish become father to the deed”.

We cannot assume that total and eternal peace has already broken out,



Saluzzo Regiment, 1680

and that the only evidence of conflict in the Europe of the future will be in the sporting arena. We cannot abandon ourselves either to hedonism untrammelled, with the continent ringing to the echoes of Mardi Gras, or the merry cries of beaming peasants, happily circling their gaily-decorated maypoles. There are signs that some, particularly among the young, were beginning to think that way. For instance, the results of a recent poll of the "under 25" in the Federal Republic of Germany suggested that their primary concerns were "health, friends, family, love and leisure". All those are very worthy, but there was no mention of security! Actually, what worried me rather less as a Briton is that there was no mention of work either. If true, this might make things a bit easier for us after 1992.

PROSPECTS FOR "PROJECT 1992" AND PERESTROIKA

What about 1992? First, I do not see 1992 as marking any great sea change — certainly in transatlantic relationships. The forces leading us there have been at work for some time. By natural evolution, the commercial, industrial and research policies of the various European defence industries have long been following a process of adaptation and accommodation to the idea of a single market. As an interested observer of these matters, I hope that — whatever common industrial policy emerges — Europe will have learned the lessons of its agricultural (and unnatural) step-brother, the dreaded "CAP". One would think that anti-dumping measures, reciprocity clauses and "local content" rules are things of the past. From what I read, I am not yet convinced of that. It worries me that what, in Europe, we see as deregulation and economic

liberalisation may look, to the rest of the world, suspiciously like a self-protectionist amalgam of existing national constraints on free trade. I believe we should be working towards the encouragement of enterprise through deregulation, with the single market open to the world and with the ramparts of "Fortress

Europe" as outdated as the Berlin Wall itself.

Bringing all this together, I would say that two great experiments are proceeding apace in Europe. In the West, there is "Project 1992"; in the East, Perestroika. Each has its dangers, each its prospects for success. Were both to succeed, Europe



La Marina Regiment,
Granadier Company, 1685.

would be an exciting and challenging place in which to live. Were both to falter, we would inevitably be flung sharply back into the bitterness, the suspicions, the fears and

the confrontation of cold war. The next cold war would be even more sterile and dangerous than the last, however. At worst, it could even become hot. Should Project 1992 fail

Chablais Regiment, 1687.

by reason of protectionism, economic backbiting and in-fighting between the nations of the Western Alliance, it would seem more than likely that the US commitment to the defence of Europe would become the weaker. It might have become so anyway because the prospect of a post-1992 Europe had seemed to make it less necessary. In the East, as things look now, Perestroika will not fail in the near future. It will not fail, that is, before it has achieved a further relaxation of tensions across Europe; further arms reductions, which are essential to the very economic survival (let alone, regeneration) of the Soviet Union; and, more important in this context, the convergence of super-power interests over however narrow a range.

These developments will again tend towards the decoupling of direct American involvement in European defence. Taken together, Western Europe could thus find itself in the worst of all worlds. It could be disunited by the failure of 1992; threatened by the reversal of Perestroika; and unprotected — certainly to the degree it now is — by its great transatlantic ally. This prospect should not delight any of us. I believe it should act as an additional spur to the success of our own experiment in a strong, confident, outward-looking, competitive but caring Europe. Nor should we forget (in the words of Mrs. Thatcher in that often misunderstood speech at Bruges) that Warsaw, Prague and Budapest are also European cities.

Sir Michael Knight

Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Knight, KCB, AFC, FRAeS, RAF was the United Kingdom Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee at the time this paper was presented.



8 SEPTEMBER 1943 -

THE MISERY OF THE ITALIAN

THE RELUCTANT SAMARITAN

Shortly after the armistice of September 8th, 1943 between Italy and the Allies a young British Officer was sent to Greece to get in touch with the Greek partisans and what was left of the Italian forces in order to organize an effective resistance against the Germans. He found himself charged with an extremely delicate mission and eventually saved thousands of Italian lives.

This report written in first person by Lt. Col. Philip Worrall is somewhat more than a witness on a crucial historical period whose interest does not fade with the passing years. Two seldom coupled qualities go together in this journal: the straight sincerity of the jotted notation and the good literary level of the page. The end of hostilities between the Allies and Italy, which the former had actively promoted through a shrewd propaganda and made possible with the help of a clever diplomacy, caught by surprise the Allied HQ's in the Mediterranean theatre, which remained when confronted with the new event as much disoriented as the Italians. In Italy the disorientation was great and the lost opportunities many, but in the Balkans and Greece the Allied action was, if not more intelligent, more timely. However the situation there was entirely different, because a guerrilla warfare had been waged for some time. The phasing out of one of the Axis partners, namely Italy, was nevertheless a new fact of great importance; so much so that it was deemed necessary to send some liaison officers to help the resistance movement but, above all, to prevent it from favouring the advent of puppet governments tied to Moscow. This was chiefly a Churchill's worry, because Roosevelt, gravely ill, was no more in condition to understand much.

Once in Greece, young Worrall was quick to grasp that a sizeable Italian force, namely Pinerolo Division and Lancieri Aosta, had remained disciplined and compact and could profitably contribute to resistance. But he also understood that the Greeks were divided in two factions hostile to each other and to the Italians. With a reserve of gold sovereigns and diplomacy he was able to obtain all that was obtainable, but he could not help the disarmament of the Italian troops done by the Greeks through cheating, nor the attempts of the Greeks to starve the Italians. Lodging the Italian soldiers in small villages where they could make the most of their abilities as craftsmen and establish better relations with the natives, Worrall was successful in keeping starvation at bay.

The Allied HQ, then in Cairo, took no interest whatsoever in the fate of the Italians, and all Worrall achieved was due entirely to his deep human feeling and his ability and initiative. Abandoned on an incredibly dry and stony land, amidst inhospitable mountains scarcely inhabited by poor mountaineers, threatened by the German units still occupying Greece, betrayed and harassed by the Communist partisans, the Italians found in this young British officer a Samaritan somewhat reluctant to his role, that he eventually played superbly.

Some of the judgements found in this journal are hot blood impressions, inspired by the terrible moments that many people had to endure there and then. Many friendship lasted through the years from that period and some Italian official praise bear witness to the truthfulness of what is in these pages, whose reading we deem superfluous to recommend. Reading the first lines, indeed, you feel compelled to read the whole text till the end. If it is not a happy end in Hollywood style, it is all the same satisfactory: the Italians who survived suffering and disease could at last embark and go back, in rags but alive, to the Italian shores.

Giorgio Pirrone



19 DECEMBER 1944

FORCES IN THESSALY, GREECE

Why did 7.000 officers and men from the Divisione di Fanteria "Pinerolo" and the 6th Regiment "Lancieri di Aosta", part of 111 Corpo d'Armata, decide at the Armistice of 8 September 1943 to move into the Pindus Mountains in Thessaly and agree to join the Greek partisans, rather than surrendering to the Germans? Greece at that time was a rugged, primitive vicious and politically complicated place. And who was responsible for the decision? Was it General Adolfo Infante, the recently appointed Commander of the Pinerolo at Larissa, who had been Military Attaché in Washington and London; or Colonel Giuseppe Berti, commanding the beleaguered Aosta at Trikkala?

Within a month, despite the presence of a small British Military Mission (BMM) drawn from the Special Operations Executive (SOE), they were disarmed by the powerful communist partisan force, ELAS and concentrated in the once lovely mountain resort of Neraida. During the harsh winter of 1943/44 they suffered terribly; over 1.000 dying of exposure, starvation and disease. Their humiliation and suffering lasted for fifteen months until late December 1944, when midst escalating conflict between ELAS and the British liberating force, they were evacuated from Volos on the Aegean in British troopships to Taranto.

Could this suffering and humiliation have been avoided? But, was it not inevitable that given the chance the Greeks would take their revenge against the most unwelcome of the three occupying powers, who adding insult to injury had since April 1941 been responsible for all sorts of

retaliatory measures, not only against the partisans, but against the civilian population?

So what went wrong? The simplest answer is that the Germans stayed too long. At the Armistice everyone in Greece believed they would be out of the country within weeks. If this happened the fractured and ill-equipped elements of Pinerolo would probably have survived and returned the quickest way home to Italy as proven allies with full military honours.

Did anyone in Rome, Washington, London or in the Cairo Headquarters of General Wilson, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, really care what happened to the officers and men as long as the weapons and equipment passed into the hands of the partisans? Certainly in Greece the rival partisans had been waiting for months for just this moment to transform their ragged units, not as it turned out to fight the Germans, but to fight each other

for the total domination of the country before the British Army arrived as liberators to install a new, and definitely anticommunist Greek Government.

By chance a SOE sabotage-trained, twenty five year-old "Il Maggiore Inglese", Philip Worrall, was parachuted into the Pindus a few days after the Armistice to join the BMM. Although accredited to the partisans as liaison officer, he found that instead of doing the job he was sent in to do, he was ordered by Colonel "Chris" Woodhouse, commanding the BMM, to help the

Facing page.

Our Lady of the Sea, distemper with pewter on old helm of fishing boat.

Below.

The Virgin Mary in glory with a group of Saints, distemper with pure gold and silver on ancient board.





The Creation of the animal kingdom, distemper with pure gold and silver on board of Russian pine-tree.

Italians. There was no one else available. Armed with bags of gold sovereigns, he managed to keep the majority alive, despite the uncompromising attitude of ELAS in whose territory the Italians found themselves. He and the Italians not only had to contend with the ELAS, but with the hostility of the villagers of Thessaly, many of whose homes had been destroyed by the occupying powers. Added to this the Germans went on the rampage in the mountains in search of the partisans and anyone helping them. They burnt Neraida to the ground, just as the first snow of winter covered the Pindus.

Finally the Italians were billeted in the houses of Greeks all over the Pindus for which BMM paid in sovereigns. Some critics have likened this to "slave labour"; but the im-

portant thing was that the majority survived until December 1944.

Philip Worrall tells his story in the first person as at that time he was the only one involved; no one else was allowed by ELAS to do anything for the Italians in Thessaly. He admits he had prior to his arrival in Greece no experience of this kind of work. He had never even met an Italian, even though he was with SOE in Tunisia 1942/43. For his work in Greece, he is a *Commendatore dell'Ordine della Corona d'Italia*; *Cavaliere al Merito*; and has the Gold Medal of the *Lancieri di Aosta*. The British awarded him the MBE, raised to the OBE after he was again parachuted by SOE, this time outside Berlin where ten days before the end of the war in Europe he managed to rescue 20,000 allied prisoners before the arrival of the Russians from the East.

In late 1942 a small sabotage team from the British Special Operations

Executive (SOE) was parachuted into Greece. In November of that year, aided by the two main partisans (Andartes) bands (ELAS and EDES) they blew up the Gorgopotamos viaduct, cutting Rommel's North Africa armies. Instead of evacuation the team, all young and without any political experience, were ordered to stay behind and establish the British Military Mission (BMM). The purpose of SOE was "to co-ordinate all action by way of subversion and sabotage against the enemy overseas"; and told by Churchill "to set Europe ablaze". In Greece BMM arranged for the partisans to receive weapons, ammunition, clothing and money in the form of gold sovereigns.

I was parachuted, a few days after the Armistice of 8 September 43, into the Pindus, above Kalabaka and near to the Meteora Monastery in Thessaly, right in the middle of Greece. I was one of a tiny number

of British and Commonwealth officers and men operating in uniform in Hitler's European Fortress. However, instead of joining the partisans as an SOE sabotage-trained liaison officer, I was to become, as a twenty five year-old Major, inexorably involved in the struggle to save 7,000 Italians from the Greeks, the Germans and the cruel winter of 1943/44.

My job for the next fifteen months was to try to alleviate the humiliation and suffering of the Pinerolo Infantry Division and the 6th Regiment Lancieri di Aosta who, at the Armistice, escaped the Germans and joined the partisans in the Pindus.

On 9 September, Colonel Rufus "Hills" Sheppard of BMM had taken the "surrender" of Aosta and Pinerolo, with the leaders of ELAS. Sheppard was perhaps the only officer of BMM who believed the communist-controlled ELAS partisans would, strengthened by Italian equipment and know-how, make an all-out assault on the Germans. The rest of BMM, under Colonel 'Chris' Woodhouse, knew ELAS' real aim was the elimination of all rival partisans and the total domination of Free Greece before the country was liberated by the British Army in support of a anti-communist government.

In an interview with a British journalist in late 1944, Sheppard described the events. "Anticipating the surrender, ELAS forces surrounded the Trikkala Headquarters; and the day after the Armistice there were some 4,000 partisans around the town. The garrison consisted of the crack Aosta Cavalry Regiment under Colonel Berti. I entered the town, but Berti refused to surrender without orders from General Infante, commanding the Pinerolo Division at Larissa. The latter arrived much excited that evening, the Germans having attempted to disarm his troops. He brought with him the greater part of the Larissa garrison. The ELAS leaders and I at once made an agreement with him whereby he placed his Division at our disposal with co-belligerent status".

Roosevelt and Churchill certainly wanted the weapons and equipment in occupied countries; but no thought was given to the plight of the troops. Churchill was more worried by the fate of 74,000 British prisoners still held in Italy. If units would turn and fight the Germans, so much the better. But from now on the fate of Pinerolo and Lancieri di Aosta was not to be the concern of Washington, London or Rome, but in the hands of less than a dozen people who, with the exception of General Wilson, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, were all in Thessaly.

Until the Armistice, the Headquarters of Pinerolo had been at Larissa, the capital of Thessaly. Its units were scattered over a large area through which ran not only the north-south railway, but also the only road across the Pindus, through Trikkala and Kalabaka north to Albania and Italy. The Division of about 23,000 men had antiquated equipment; and was short of ammunition, motorised transport and food. Morale was low owing to the curtailment of home leave; and malaria. Most of the troops just wanted to get home to their families.

So what prompted Pinerolo and Aosta to put their necks in the Greek noose? Belief that the Germans were about to leave Greece? Probably there was no choice for Aosta, surrounded by the partisans; and with some officers sympathetic to the Greeks. But for the units of Pinerolo it was different. They could have sat tight until disarmed by the Germans. But they didn't; or to be exact about one third of them came with General Adolfo Infante to Trikkala. These included three battalions from the 14th and 313th Infantry Regiments, three batteries from 18th Artillery Regiment, a squadron of armoured cars, and other forces. Most of the soldiers just loyally followed their officers. But many senior officers did not follow Infante knowing that every Greek had already branded them as fascists.

In the confusion of 8 September none could have been expected to make a correct long-term military appreciation. However Infante, Berti (who had bravely returned from Rome that day) and a number of officers considered it preferable to go to the mountains rather than surrender to, or join, the Germans. It has been said the Pinerolo would have taken the opposite course had the old General Benelli still been in command of the Division. And Del Giudice, commander of Pinerolo would never have left the Germans had he not been seized by the partisans.

There are conflicting accounts as to whether it was Berti who persuaded Infante to go to Trikkala; or Infante who had planned to go to the mountains via the Aosta. The former has said that late on the 8th he called in at Larissa on his way back from Rome, and asked Infante to come to Trikkala; but Infante was in two minds about what action to take. Lieutenant Gigi Villoresi, the famous racing driver, told me that he went from Volos to Larissa early on the morning of the 9th and attended a meeting at which Infante decided to go to Trikkala, taking with him some infantry and armoured cars. He was able to do this "because the Germans were not thick on the ground". Only those he had been able to contact on the radio knew of his plans. He told the German liaison officer he was going "to help Aosta fight off the partisans".

So why did Infante do it? He must have decided that in the circumstances to change sides at this point would bring honour to the Division which he must have thought would soon be on the way home with full military honours. He certainly was not a "fighting general", rather perhaps an opportunist with special relations both with the House of Savoy and with General Ambrosio. He also was unhappy about being stuck in Greece when so much was going on in Italy.


As Infante had only taken command of Pinerolo on 12 July he was untainted by the stigma of reprisals and atrocities during the years of oc-

Our Lady of the Steppe, painted in memory of the Fallen and the Missing soldiers on the Russian front.

cupation. The Greeks could not call him a fascist. He was also well aware that his background would make him very acceptable to the British and Americans. On the Tagliamento in 1917 he had been awarded a British decoration; and had spent many years as Military Attaché in both London and Washington. He spoke very good English. His credentials for dealing with BMM and General Wilson in Cairo were beyond reproach; but perhaps Italian intelligence officers had misled him about the size and influence of the BMM.

In fact relations between BMM and ELAS had been at a low ebb for months. BMM scattered in ones and twos over the length and breadth of Greece had realised it no longer had effective control over the powerful and expanding communist-led ELAS. Although ELAS had agreed to take orders from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East in Cairo, they had made it plain to BMM that they intended to carry them out in their own way. However, in July BMM had managed to bring the main partisans together for a short, and crucial time for the Italians. A joint headquarter (JGHQ) was set up at Pertouli in the Pindus to the west of Trikkala and Kardhitsa. But the only thing they agreed upon was the need to obtain as much as possible of the Italian equipment which they knew was within their grasp since 25 July when a Greek intermediary representing Infante had met Shepard and ELAS secretly in the mountains.

After the landings in Sicily the Badoglio government began feeling its way towards an end to the war. On 3 August, the same day as that first meeting in Lisbon, contact was made with ELAS and BMM by the Italian command in Trikkala. It certainly looked as if Ambrosio had passed the word to former colleagues in Thessaly. The next day, Colonel "Chris" Woodhouse, the twenty six-year old Head of BMM, informed GHQ, Middle East; and discussed



the matter with General Saraphis, the military Commander of ELAS. The latter resented the fact that the Italians would not surrender immediately to ELAS; and was further incensed when General Wilson ordered that all arms and equipment surrendered should become the sole responsibility of BMM, and should be divided equally between the partisan bands. Saraphis said that General Wilson had no right to order this as it was the JGHQ who had to decide. This Woodhouse would not agree to, fearing EDES, over in Epirus, would get nothing. There was from that moment clear indication that ELAS intended to get its hands on everything, despite the presence of BMM and EDES at the Pertouli JGHQ.

Later Woodhouse was to receive a message from General Wilson with orders, first to obtain the weapons and get the Italians to fight the Germans; and if this failed to seize everything by force.

On the night of 9 September, after Infante and his troops had joined Berti in Trikkala, Major Aristide Ferrante of Aosta was taken to Pertouli for discussions with JGHQ. On 11th, Colonel Woodhouse met Infante, Berti and Del Giudice at Porta in the foothills who put the Division at the disposal of BMM. Later the formal Agreement was signed by Saraphis, Ravtopoulos (EDES), Woodhouse and Infante. Italian units, in small groups were to take up positions in the foothills under cover of the Greek forces; and to fight the Germans.

Three paragraphs of the Agreement specifically affected the officers and men. JGHQ undertook to repatriate, when the situation allowed, those so desirous (Infante informed his troops that the Italian Navy would do this). Those prepared to fight the Germans should keep their arms. And BMM undertook to finance the feeding of the Italians on the same basis as the partisans. However a few days later GHQ, Middle East informed Woodhouse that they had no intention of honouring his undertaking to support the Italians financially. But af-

ter Woodhouse protested they could not live on thin air while fighting on our side, Cairo relented; and Infante was given sovereigns by Woodhouse to buy food for his men and fodder for the horses and mules.

On 14 September Woodhouse accompanied Infante to inspect his units. He felt "Infante had both Berti and Del Giudice firmly under control". Later that day, Woodhouse told me that as no one else was available, I was to act as liaison with the Italians. The main problem would be feeding them as already the Greeks were denying Infante the right to buy food.

We established an Anglo-Greek-Italian Buying Commission in Kardhitsa, a small town in the Thessaly Plain to the south of Trikkala. With the help of Lieutenant Giacomo Protto from 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment and locally enlisted Greeks from the BMM, we managed despite the transport problem, to get supplies to the troops. Protto, a Doctor of Economic Sciences, had at various times been Pinerolo's liaison with the Greek civil authorities in Larissa and Trikkala. He, Ferrante, a regular officer, and Captain Mastropasqua, the transport officer, were some of the very few acceptable to the Greeks.

I was now in control of procurement for an estimated 7,000 with a budget of 40,000 sovereigns to cover the six winter months. I was allowed to spend one sovereign a month on each officer and man; and half that for each animal. We were also buying medical supplies; and running and maintaining the transport. Our aim was to build up stocks in depots in the mountains to see to Pinerolo through the winter. All the supplies had to be found and transported from under the noses of the Germans who visited Kardhitsa every day. Our visits to the town were always at night and we were away back to the mountains by dawn. At that time we could exchange the sovereigns for 325,000 drachmas, but soon it was millions. From then on everything we obtained was priced

against the sovereign.

The Division was spread over two hundred kilometres with Forward HQ at Porta. Some soldiers had already been taken by ELAS; and a small number had agreed to be integrated into partisan units. On 22 September, the Germans tried to move through Kalabaka up the road to Ioannina, but were repulsed by a squadron of Aosta under Captain Di Crescenzo.

On 23 September General Infante became the Commander of not only the Pinerolo but of elements from other Divisions in the Karpenesion area to the south. The Italian Headquarters were settled in Pertouli, and included Del Giudice (Deputy) and Berti (Chief of Staff). Others of the staff included Ferrante (Chief of Operations), Lieutenant Ravalli (Intelligence), Mastropasqua, Villoresi and Lieutenant Dal Verme. Protto was appointed liaison with the elements in Karpenesion.

On 26 September, General Zervas, leader of the republican/monarchist EDES in Epirus worried that ELAS, his arch rival, would get all the Italian equipment wrote to Infante suggesting he should bring all his forces over to him. Infante put this to Woodhouse but with the ELAS dominating JGHQ nothing could be done.

At the end of the month, GHQ, Middle East ordered JGHQ, through BMM, to attack the Larissa airport to destroy Luftwaffe planes. ELAS surprisingly refused to take part. BMM supposed ELAS thought this heralded a British landing. No one had any inkling of the ELAS' real reason for not committing their forces. Unfortunately everything went wrong with the raid. The volunteer Italian force under Captain Riccardo Massimo of Aosta had no time for detailed rehearsals; and had difficulty in atrocious weather, crossing the ninety kilometres of Plain. The British officer and a newly arrived American were unable to integrate the sabotage party. The Germans replied by burning villages which all the Greeks blamed on the Italians. It



The Last Supper, distemper with pure gold and silver on big and ancient board.

was becoming obvious that ELAS had no intention of allowing Pinerolo units to operate independently.

On 6 October Infante complained to JGHQ about the treatment of his troops; and ELAS promised satisfaction. But they had no intention of doing this; all they wanted was to mislead Infante and the Mission (now the Allied Military Mission (AMM) after the arrival of some American officers) about their immediate intentions. Treachery was now the order of the day. On the morning of the 14th, the day after Italy declared war on Germany, the officers were all invited out to lunch by local ELAS commanders. When they returned to their units they found the troops had been disarmed. Only a group from Aosta resisted; Lieutenant Chaplain Don Pilati and nineteen soldiers were killed, and another fifty wounded.

That day I was nearly captured by the Germans in Kardhitsa, and it

took me two days to rejoin the Italian units. I was horrified by the action of ELAS, about which the Mission knew nothing until told by Infante to whom ELAS had written saying "unfortunately we find it necessary to take these drastic steps; and we take all responsibility to feed your disarmed troops". I knew they neither wished; nor could do this.

A few days earlier ELAS had informed Woodhouse that "they considered themselves to be at war with EDES". It heralded the start of the civil war. ELAS had disarmed the Italians to equip their partisans to fight EDES. Aris Veloukhiotis, their black fur-hatted Captain immediately rushed the captured weapons across the Pindus to eliminate the EDES forces of General Napoleon Zervas. Just as Colonel Sheppard had earlier been the odd man out, an American, Captain Ergott who had recently arrived, was hoodwinked into believing ELAS was going to fight the Germans. They offered him command of the cavalry, and wanted him to deal with Cairo without informing the Mis-

sion. Coming from the US 7th Cavalry he perhaps saw himself riding the Aosta horses to victory.

It was from the disarmament that the terrible suffering and humiliation of Pinerolo really began; and it lasted for another terrible fifteen months until late December 1944 when, amidst escalating conflict between ELAS and the British Army, we were able to evacuate all, but a few, from Volos. Perhaps if the Germans had withdrawn, or had been forced out of Greece before the 14th October, Pinerolo would have survived. But the Allies, locked in bitter battles in Italy and preparing for the invasion of France, just could not find enough troops for a landing in Greece.

I now became responsible for all the Italians stranded in Thessaly, which brought me into conflict with not only ELAS, but their political masters, EAM and KKE, the communist party. Between them they now controlled everything and everybody. The Greeks would say the Pinerolo and Lancieri di Aosta were doomed from the moment they

participated in the campaign of Greece, one of the darkest chapters of military history. Ill equipped they had been operating under difficult conditions, for the winter war had been bitterly fought. To add insult to injury they became part of the hated army of occupation on 24 April 1941. As the years of occupation dragged on they found themselves surrounded by an increasing number of partisans determined to gain revenge by tormenting the most unwelcome of the three occupying powers. By and large the civilian population was sympathetic to the partisans. Greece in those days was a primitive, vicious, hostile and politically complicated place.

The disarmed Italians were held separately by ELAS; the officers away from the men; and the hospital, under Captains Rotundi and Manetti at Tyrna. All were nearly starving; and none of these places in the foothills were habitable for more than a few days. And winter was beginning. ELAS now called Woodhouse and Infante together and said "we now find ourselves unable to carry out our previous guarantee". Consequently the Mission "assumed responsibility for the Italians until such time as the Greeks were in a position to take over".

The moment the civil war started GHQ, Middle East halted the supply of weapons and clothes to ELAS; and ordered the Mission to

stop giving them sovereigns. This decision aggravated the appalling situation of the Italians, in that from now on, I was using sovereigns to feed their old enemies, whilst they had none for their underfed partisans.

For me the problems were mounting. I was accredited to the partisans, without whose sanction I could do nothing for the Italians. ELAS could at a stroke starve all of them to death by denying me the right to obtain for them, accommodation, food, transport, and medical supplies. I'm afraid to say the ELAS leaders could not care a damn now what happened to them. They could always blame the Mission, who on humanitarian grounds took on the task and provided me with the sovereigns and a larger locally enlisted Greek staff.

After heated exchanges with ELAS's political advisors we managed to get Neraida to accommodate the Italians. It was situated in the Pindus and was about a thousand metres above sea-level. It was 18 kms south of Kardhitsa and 3 kms from the Mission's airstrip, called Featherbed. Its past was one of luxury, being the summer resort of the richest families of Central Greece. It was before the war a beautiful place set amongst woods. On a clear day one could see Mount Olympus across the Plain of Thessaly. The awful thing was that Neraida became hell for so many; and the graveyard

for nearly one thousand Italians.

On 26 October two Dakotas landed at Featherbed. That afternoon ELAS released the men and herded them towards Neraida where they arrived in poor shape with only 50% of their clothes, boots, bedding etc. But they did bring with them sufficient utensils to make an immediate start with the food we had collected prior to the disarmament. Luckily Neraida had a good water supply and two bakeries. The 5,600 were allotted by Major Ferrante of Aosta to the one hundred and ten houses.

From now on I was to have the greatest help from a number of dedicated officers and men, including above all, Ferrante, Protto, Massimo, Don Ennio Iacovone and the Aosta Medical Officer Carlo Manetti. In addition I was able to obtain the services in my Headquarters at Neraida of a number of loyal soldiers under Sergeant Gaia of Aosta who spoke not only good english but a number of other languages. He brought with him a devoted group of men. I wish space would allow me to thank them all by name.

The house had been a Mission sub-HQ for some time. In addition to the Italians I had a British radio operator; and a Greek staff of four, including at one time two refugee

The Virgin Mary with Jesus and a group of Saints (Deesis), distemper with pure gold and silver on big and thick ancient board.



Jewish sisters. Also at Neraida we had for a short time a reasonable ELAS representative, Zarbalis who lived in another house with a group of partisans. Once everybody had settled in things seemed to be going well. Life, although difficult, was not impossible. The weather was still mild; the houses were good; and there was plenty of food. The rations included maize, macaroni, black and white beans, potatoes and chestnuts; and even some white bread. Oil and salt were scarce; and medical supplies low.


I even began to feel that, given some goodwill by ELAS, Neraida and its facilities would see us through until the Germans left. But soon we knew they had no intention of going for they went on the rampage against the partisans and anyone suspected of helping them. In early November they started an offensive through Kalabaka to open up the road. This forced Mission and ELAS HQ to leave Pertouli; and ELAS to free the officers and allow them to join us at Neraida.

The Germans also attacked in the Karpension area. All the Italians there, from other Divisions, were herded north by ELAS. At each village on the way ELAS forced the villagers to give the Italians a little of their own scarce food. As payment the villagers robbed them of their clothes. Many died on the way, but the majority arrived in Neraida by 16 November in a terrible condition.

Swollen by their arrival, Neraida was now the shelter for some 5,600. With them came a shot-down US pilot, Joel Hartmeister, who became my Deputy. He collected 300 and billeted them comfortably in the nearby village of Castania. Only one senior officer arrived from Karpension, Lieutenant Colonel Maraglino. I am sorry to say that many officers failed to stay with their men.

From now on it was not possible for an Italian to venture out of Neraida without getting his clothes and boots seized. Armed villagers even raided the house at night. With their own homes burnt and looted they were in a distressing state; and with

Saint Anne, the Virgin and Jesus with Saints, distemper with pure gold and silver on olive-board.



the tacit agreement of the partisans they turned against the Italians who they saw, at that time, being very adequately fed and housed by the Mission. I was very glad that the other part of my job was to give sovereigns to the villagers in form of relief, so defusing the situation a little.

The whole concept of a safe haven for the Italians was shattered when a large force of Germans occupied Kardhitsa on 28 November. The next day they moved up towards Featherbed and we had to evacuate the 100-strong airstrip party. Then they moved up the hill towards Neraida. The partisans withdrew. At the last moment I ordered everyone to disperse into the inhospitable, snow-

clad mountains in the direction of a small village, Saika, where we had a store of food and medical supplies. There was no alternative. We had to leave behind those in the makeshift hospital who were unable to walk, expecting the Germans to hand them over to the Red Cross in Kardhitsa. The weather was atrocious. I left with a small party including Villoresi and Colonel Berti who, fearing for his life, never left my side. We were delayed when one of the mules, carrying 2,000 sovereigns fell into a ravine. Looking back we saw smoke rising high in the sky above Neraida.

I returned well ahead of the partisans. The effect of the German four-day blitzkrieg was appalling. On

the way I had passed through at least five burnt villages, but these were mildly dealt if compared to Neraida which now was a charred mess. All the houses, the bakeries, and the chapel had been dynamited down the hill; and the water supply destroyed. But the worst was the fate of the sick, who we had been obliged to leave behind. Most of them were lying in the burnt hospital, shot through the back of the neck. Others we found later, dead in the woods. All our supplies had been taken away. General Del Giudice and an alike-minded group had gone with the Germans.

Soon the Italians were streaming back having had more of their clothes seized; and all starving having eaten almost nothing in seven cold and miserable days. I remember my feelings when I saw the terrible state they were in. It was snowing; and all I had to give them was just sixty kilos of black beans. I wanted to send them all down to the Red Cross; but the new, sadistic and infamous Neraida Chief of Police, Pelopeethus, would not allow this. I needed advice, so decided to go and see the Mission, now at Viniano near Karpenesion. I felt ELAS GHQ must be confronted with the awful situation. Unfortunately I got a bad attack of jaundice on the way. During my short absence, Hartmeister and Ferrante set about rebuilding some of the houses. Of the 5,600 who had fled Neraida, only 3,600 returned, the remainder had gone elsewhere, or found work in the villages; or had perished.

Needing sovereigns, the merchants soon began bringing their produce up to us, including 1,000 kilos of potatoes a day. But the cold, the exposure and the rations meant the death-rate rose inexorably. Officers and men were living 40-50-60 in a small rebuilt room with no fire, few clothes and few cooking utensils. I cannot praise anyone more than the Aosta Doctor, Manetti who remained with the soldiers for the full fifteen months. We could have done with more of his colleagues; but they did not return at once.

The attitude of ELAS, Pelopeethus and his henchmen, including some Italians, remained uncompromisingly severe and unsympathetic. He forced those at Castania to move to Neraida. I objected so strongly that Pelopeethus had me arrested which made me even more determined to help to my utmost the Italians. In all my fifteen months of walking around the mountains alone, or with an Italian muleteer, often carrying sovereigns, this was the first and only time I was in any way molested. Despite my job with the Italians, I was everywhere treated with great kindness and respect.

With the New Year we were able to obtain an adequate supply of food; but even so the death-rate rose to 7 a day. But the worse was yet to come. ELAS, with little or no food of their own, suddenly put a tax of 25% on everything coming up for us. It took nineteen days to get the tax removed; nineteen days of the worst and coldest weather of that winter. The death-rate mounted to as high as 21 a day. By the end of January, 850 had died at Neraida.

It was at this dreadful time that Hartmeister and I began to work out some alternative. The Mission and I put forward a proposal to the political masters of ELAS whereby we would pay villagers to keep Italians in their homes. It was to become known as the "Village System".

During February, whilst the idea was being considered by ELAS and GHQ, Middle East, the weather improved and food began arriving in larger quantities than ever before. We had to double the size of the storerooms to find place for 19,000 kilos of maize, 4,000 of wheat, 1,700 of black beans, as well as oil, raisins, sugar and even for the first time soap and cigarettes. But health and accommodation were still unbelievably primitive. Luckily from now on the Germans left us alone.

In February, I spent 2,600 sovereigns on the Italians, bringing the total since September to over 12,000. This does not include those given to Infante by Woodhouse immediately after the Armistice.

With the help of Ferrante and others and in preparation for the beginning of the "Village System" we divided the 3,600 left in Neraida into five categories; 2,550 were in a relatively good state of health; 500 were still physically unable to work; 200 were non-walking hospital cases; there were 250 officers; and 100 employed on administration and on Featherbed.

The 2,550 presented no problem as long as ELAS and the villagers agreed to accept them. The 700 sick had to be treated differently, so we doubled their rations and bought clothes and more medical supplies from as far away as Athens. We sent a number of officers up to Saika, with an American sergeant, to establish a base for the hospital cases, and the officers. We began moving a lot of food up there by mule (and women and children if the local ELAS insisted).

We knew that throughout the mountains many officers and men had found work in the villages as housebuilders, bakers, barbers, doctors, etc. Some had set up their own workshops making and selling shoes, and other things. We decided that for the moment we would only pay the villagers for those who were actually taken away from the hell of Neraida.

Saraphis and ELAS were still finding excuses to delay the start of the System, ostensibly on the grounds of security; and they said "there were complaints that Italian labour would deprive local people of work; and there was a danger of relations developing between the Italians and the village girls".

At last the System was agreed by all concerned. I was to pay a half sovereign a month to every householder who kept and fed an Italian. I was to monitor it by regular visits to the hundreds and hundreds of scattered and often inaccessible villages in a huge area of the Pindus. Each month the head of each village would, accompanied by one or two Italians, come to my HQ (now in Neohorion) with the list of those in this village. I and my staff would

Our Lady of Jagodnji, distemper with pure gold and silver on wooden board.



MADONNA DI IAGODNJI

check the numbers before payment.

By 15 March all the able bodies had been taken away. The remainder were moved to Saika, together with all the surplus food. At last we had seen the end of that horrible place Neraida. At Saika, as soon as a man was pronounced fit he would be taken off to a village. ELAS insisted that no officer should leave Saika.

The "Village System" was a suc-

cess from the moment it started. The Italians were pleased to get out of the squalor of Neraida, and into another environment. The villagers, controlled by ELAS, welcomed the money even if the partisans took part of it in one form or another. Sovereigns were the commercial life-blood of all Greece. And anyhow the agricultural season was beginning and the Italians would be useful not

only on the land, but as superb craftsmen.

In my opinion, the "Village System" saved the lives of thousands, enabling them to survive the next nine months before evacuation from Volos. There was no way of getting them home any earlier. Gabrio Lombardi in his book "L'8 settembre fuori d'Italia" calls the System "lavoro coatto" and talks about "il mercato degli schiavi". In the circumstances, including the enigmatic Lieutenant Ravalli (later Prefect of Rome) found many who were ill treated; but by and large the System worked.

It must be remembered that the Greeks who took them into their homes were primitive people scraping a living from small patches of rocky soil. They had no electricity, no sanitation, and no running water. Their houses had no glass in the windows; and the groundfloor was reserved for the few sheep and goats from which they got milk, cheese, meat and shoe leather. The women wove coarse cloth; and were expected to do all the heavy work. Often their simple houses had been burnt and looted on numerous occasions.

Eventually most of the officers were allowed into the villages. However, ELAS refused to allow some to leave Saika still branding them as fascists. I kept Ferrante, Massimo, Protto, Dal Verme, Manetti, Don Ennio Iacovone and some others to help run the System. After a month or so we began paying for those who had already been in the villages prior to 15 March.

My budget was now 3,500 sovereigns a month. By the end of May 1944, we had spent 22,400 on trying to keep the Italians alive. By the time they were evacuated in December, the total had risen to 37,350.

On 31 May we drew up a list of all those/under my care (tab. 1).

On 1 June 1944, I was evacuated from Featherbed to Bari with a suspected appendicitis. One of my first

Table 1

	Officers	Men
In villages	400	5,500
At Saika (Hospital and Officers)	70	630
With my HQ	10	50
Featherbed airstrip party	1	49
Total alive and supported by Mission	481	6,229
Died during winter 1943/44	30	1,000
With partisans perhaps 300.		

visitors in hospital was General Infante, who earlier had been evacuated by the Mission in Epirus to become aide-de-camp of Lieutenant General Umberto of Savoy. His evacuation has rightly or wrongly been seen as a mistake, however under the circumstances his continued presence in Greece with his troops would not probably have made much difference. I was shocked to learn nothing was being planned to get his stranded forces home to Italy.

Rome was liberated on 5 June; followed immediately by the Allied landing in Normandy.

In Cairo I wrote a long report, ending with what I thought could be done to help the Italians. I suggested an Italian plane should land at Featherbed with Red Cross medical and welfare stores, but pointed out that unless at least a quarter could be given to the Greeks, ELAS would confiscate the lot. In addition a mail service should be operated from Bari. Needless to say none of this was attempted. Later in Rome I saw a number of high-ranking officers at Italian and Allied Headquarters, but had the sad impression that none really cared one way or another. One of the reasons perhaps was that because of ELAS's attacks on EDES and the former's lack of co-operation, the whole of the Mission

in Greece was in danger of being withdrawn. If this had happened I dread to think what would have been the fate of the Italians in Thessaly.

I ended my report: "Another winter in Greece". "I consider that 75% will die. The success of our work is that there are over 6,000 still alive. My job when I go back will be to arrange for their homecoming. If I can tell them that something is being done to help them, my task will be that much easier".

Twenty days after my operation for appendicitis, on 27 September I returned to Featherbed with the Provisional Greek Government.


Everyone was there to greet me. I had just time to say goodbye to Ferrante, Villosesi and twenty other sick Italians who were returning to Italy in the plane. This was the first time ELAS allowed any of them to leave. Ferrante took with him the Standard of the Lancieri di Aosta.

At last on 4 October the Germans began to withdraw north, allowing me to bring the Italians down from the mountains into Kardhitsa. On the 12th the British "Scobie Force" arrived in Athens. I drew up an ambitious plan for eventual evacuation from Volos on the Aegean Sea; and arranged with the British there to receive the Italians and provide food, clothing and accommodation to

await their departure by troopships. I had envisaged convoys of trucks, escorted by British troops, ferrying them in great style from Kardhitsa. Each Italian was given a pass signed by me, emphasizing they were not prisoners of war and they should only be sent direct to Italy.

But how wrong I was! ELAS started fighting the British, first in Athens and then further north. As the situation worsened we became more and more isolated as ELAS moved their rear operational HQ into the Thessaly Plain. I had contact once a day with Bari and Cairo by morse; but with none in Greece. This made planning extremely difficult. Tension all around us was mounting. After Churchill made a speech, the communist Mayor of Kardhitsa sent for me and asked if I was responsible for it. To him I was not just an Englishman, but represented England with whom ELAS was at war.

On 7 December there was a big demonstration in Kardhitsa; and things for both me and the Italians looked threatening. The next day, with no help possible from the British Army, I told everyone to make their way on foot along the ninety kilometre disused railway line to Volos, thereby avoiding the main ELAS centre in Larissa. Except for some



The Virgin of Tenderness with a group of Saints, distemper with pure gold and silver on ancient board.

who were taken by ELAS to clear snow, they all arrived unmolested. As troopships arrived they were taken off.

Although my direct responsibilities for the Italians were ended, I decided to remain until all got safely away. During the night of 16 December, ELAS moved into the hills surrounding the harbour. The next day there were huge demonstrations against the British and the new Greek Prime Minister.

On 19th, ELAS gave the British force an ultimatum to be away by 4 p.m. We still had large numbers of Italians in the town. Luckily at the very last moment, the troopship Banfora hove into sight; and we managed to rush almost everyone aboard. We sailed a few minutes before the ultimatum expired. For the record we had on the Banfora, 2,150 Italians includ-

ing 35 officers, not only from the Pinerolo and Aosta but from Macedonia and elsewhere. A party remained with the hospital in Kardhitsa, including Colonel Novelli, Lieutenant Protto, Lieutenant Sandrini and the Aosta Doctor, Carlo Manetti. They did not go back to Italy for another two months. Berti and Ravalli were held by the Greeks in prison for over a year.

On the Banfora, nearing Brindisi, I made my farewell speech of which I made no copy. Much to my surprise, a transcript of this

Below.

The Virgin of Tenderness with scenes of the Life and Passion of Christ, distemper with pure gold and silver on big wooden board.



The Virgin with Jesus, distemper with pewter on ancient board.

has been given much prominence in at least two books: Gabrio Lombardi's "L'8 settembre fuori d'Italia"; and Vincenzo Palmieri's "Quelli delle Jonie e del Pindo".

So at last after fifteen cruel months the Italians who joined the Allies after the Armistice were home in time for Christmas and the New Year. I went on to do another rescue operation outside Berlin as the war ended in Europe.

Philip Worrall


The article is illustrated with Ikon painting to lieutenant general Vittorio Luoni.

ITALY'S WAR

SCENES FROM

by

G. M. TREVELYAN



My heart goes out the poor little families all over this great kingdom who stood the brunt and strain of the war, and gave their men gladly to make other men free, and other women and children free. These are the people, and many like them, to whom, after all, we owe the glory of this great achievement.

PRESIDENT WILSON AT ROME
January 1919


CHAPTER VII

Caporetto and the Retreat, October 1917.

Now followed, as if from a blue sky, that tremendous cataclysm which almost ruined Italy and bade fair to ruin the cause of her Allies, but ended in giving to her a new national purpose and discipline, and to the Allies a closer unity. History, obedient to the popular instinct for the concentrated and the picturesque, has already decided to call the whole sequence of great events by the name of a little Alpine market-town. All the meanings now implied by the word "Caporetto" — the immense and complicated causes and effects of the disaster of which the military sweep over two provinces and the rally on the Piave were merely the symbols; the mentality and character of a race; the merits and defects of its political and educational system; the relations of the different classes and parties to the war; the enemy propaganda; the grievances of the soldiers at the front; the world-strategy of Ludendorff and the new German tactics; the actions of Cadorna and his subordinates; Rapallo and the coming of the Allies; and all the shifting fortunes of that wide-flung winter battle-field — these things will fill volumes, shelves, and libraries in the generations to come. And, regardless of all this massive learning and controversy, the people's own tradition, told by the peasant at his fireside, will burn itself, deep as the shame and pride of Cannae and its sequel, into the memory of the oldest civilized race in the world. Here I have only a few remarks to offer and a few scenes to describe, which have no claim to notice beyond the fact that I had lived long with the army most involved in the disaster, and that I was one of the straws whirled on that vast ebb-tide.

In order to understand the nature of the phenomenon, before inquiring into its causes, it is necessary to realize that there were three distinct categories of conduct among the Italian troops. To confuse any one of these three categories with either of the other two is to misunderstand the whole affair.

First, there were a few regiments who, in accordance with a previously-formed intention, abandoned their duty, and surrendered on purpose. This was "Caporetto" in the narrower and more strictly accurate sense, for it was only in that geographical zone that such betrayal occurred; but unfortunately Caporetto was the key to the whole strategic position. The phenomenon of voluntary surrender had been so common in the Austrian army throughout



the war, beginning with the early battles round Lemberg, that an elaborate system based on trustworthy machine gunners had been devised to meet it; but it was so exceptional in the Italian army that it took the authorities who might have prevented it by surprise, and struck them with something akin to panic.

When, consequently, a general retreat had been ordered, the second category of conduct was observable in a much larger number of men. The army of Bainsizza, San Gabriele, and Gorizia, who had no thought of giving way when the enemy offensive began in the last week of October, successfully resisted the attacks made on their positions, until the order came from Cadorna to retreat beyond the Tagliamento. They carried out irreproachably the difficult retirement across the Isonzo gorge and out of the hills; but as they proceeded over the plain, hustled by the victorious enemy pouring down on their flank from Cividale, they were gradually infected by the sense that all was lost. Mainly between Udine and the Tagliamento, they gave way at length to the war-weariness which had so long been at strife with their valour and patriotism, flung away their rifles wholesale, and passed round the word, "Andiamo a casa" ("We're going home"). The last scenes of the Second Army were a sad falling from what the same men had shown themselves two months before.


The third and largest category of all consisted of the troops who did their duty throughout. Most of, though not quite all, the Third Army from the Carso, and the Fifth, First, and Fourth Armies on the Cadore and Trentino fronts, saved Italy by holding fast where necessary, so that the shorter line was successfully established in the early days of November. Many heroic feats of individual companies, regiments, and di-

visions illumined the worst hours of the Retreat. And some of the finest of these were performed by units of the Second Army itself, both in the mountain region of Matajur above Caporetto, and in the plain of Udine.

I may be regarded as partial, but I believe that the Second Army, though it can scarcely complain if it has been made to bear the sins of the nation, was not really a worse army than any other, except for the untried and undesirable elements whom the authorities had carelessly thrust into Caporetto that autumn. The men at Plava and Gorizia had up till then performed the most brilliant and sustained feats of arms done by any part of the Italian forces, and if at last they gave way worse than the others, that was only in proportion to their geographical propinquity to the break-through on their flank and rear. Elements in the Third Army suffered the same disintegration for the same reason. The half-million men of whom the Second Army was composed must not be condemned in a mass, nor their previous achievements forgotten. None the less the now established tradition that the Duke of Aosta's Third Army saved the situation by its superior discipline in the retreat from the Carso and by turning to bay behind the Piave, represents an essential truth.

Such in the main were the phenomena; but their causes are a subject far more diffused and obscure, on which I can only aspire to throw some feeble lights from my personal experience and observation.

Of the positive treachery at Caporetto itself I can say little, because I was not there, and the cars of our Unit had been withdrawn from that zone before the regiments in fault were sent up. It is common knowledge that the ranks of these regiments were filled up with several thousands of the munition work-



ers who had taken part in the recent Turin revolt. To concentrate these men at Caporetto as a punishment was not a very fortunate inspiration. I know from what I have been told by those who were in Caporetto in the last weeks before the disaster, that the soldiers made no secret of their intentions, and that many of their officers lived in fear of their own men, locking themselves up carefully at night. Indeed, certain of these troops refused to accept the usual gift distributed by patriotic agencies among the men at the front, grounding their refusal on the fact that they regarded themselves as no longer in service. This refusal, as I know, gravely alarmed certain persons in Venice, and was, therefore, probably known in other quarters up and down Italy. But since there had been so little treachery in the Italian army heretofore, and since Caporetto was regarded as a quiet part of the line, the responsible authorities left matters alone. Possibly the too great isolation in which the Comando Supremo was said to live under General Cadorna's régime is partly responsible for the failure to scent the smoke before the fire. If so, that General, to whom Italy and the Allies owe so much, has dearly paid for the defects of his qualities.

With regard to the bulk of the Second Army, I can speak at first hand of the

men who had hitherto borne the burden and heat of the day, but who, after the retreat had been ordered, were gradually infected by the cry of "Andiamo a casa". I had had for more than two years the opportunity to hear their point of view and to observe their psychology.

Let us take the case of an imaginary "Giuseppe," and try to reconstruct in his person a type of the *povero fante*. Giuseppe comes from a farm in the Apennines, where, in the summer of 1915, he left a wife and five small children. His simple and intensely human thoughts and affections are all centred upon them, and upon his farm and a village made up of persons like himself. Outside that circle he has no experience, no knowledge, nor much interest in life beyond a good-natured but uninstructed curiosity in whatever may be going on under his eyes. Of politics he knows nothing. No one has attempted to instruct him in them, except the priest, who told him not to vote because the State was wicked, and the Socialist, who exhorted him to seize the land. He is silently suspicious, both of priest and of Socialist, as he is of every one pretending to authority. But their combined exhortations can have done little to fortify his sense of patriotism or of civic duty, which must in his case be instinctive, since they have never been inculcated. He has, indeed, heard of

Garibaldi, and knows that the Austrians are *brutte bestie*. If he comes from the Veneto, local traditions on the latter point are more definite, and patriotism proportionally more vivid. Giuseppe can read, which is more than can be said of a quarter of his regiment, chiefly coming from the south (1). But he sets little store by the newspapers — they do not talk about things that interest him; besides, he regards them as being part of the system of authority, and, therefore, their statements are to be regarded with the respectful scepticism that he accords to all things official.

Between battles there is little drill, training, or discipline. The life of the soldier seems to Giuseppe dull and purposeless. His officers, who expose themselves well in battle, are patriotic, and know all the reasons for the war, but they live by themselves. Sometimes the Colonel reads the regiment a manifesto about the Italian eagle perching on the highest summit of the Alps, but some of Giuseppe's companions say under their breaths, "Porca Madonna! Vogliamo andare a casa." The officers are not unpopular and never cruel, but they do not look after Giuseppe very much. There once were two young *sottotenenti* who tried to prevent the sergeant taking all the good food; they succeeded for a week, and then things went on as before. The food that

reaches Giuseppe is much less good and plentiful than it was. The trenches are very wet and cold when they are not very hot, and they are always terribly dull; several times he has been left in them two months on end by some Staff muddle about changing battalions. And even when he is *in riposo* life is wet, dirty, and dull. It is seldom one is near a *casa del soldato*. But "*Pazienza*," Giuseppe says; that is his great peasant virtue, on which the ungrateful State is built.

Giuseppe did not make the war: it was not made in the village; the crowds in the town made it that night in May when they marched to the Syndic's with the flags. But when they called up Giuseppe, he said to his wife, "*Pazienza*," and went cheerfully. His brother, who had been in the town that night and heard the speeches, said Italia needed them; so they went. His brother died of cholera under Sabotino that winter.

There are several Socialists in the regiment who conduct most of the discussions. Some of them are patriots, but Aristodemo talks them all down. Giuseppe does not understand all that Aristodemo says; it is vague, distant talk coming from the world outside his village. But it seems too have some relation to things that are real to him; the chief of these are his wife's letters, saying that prices are so high that she can no longer feed the children on the separation allowance. She also writes that the priest says the Pope has declared there will be peace in a month, but that the chemist says they must go on fighting for another three months and then they will win. Giuseppe has just come off San Gabriele, and knows they will not win in three months. Half the regiment was killed there. He doubts if they will ever win at all. Russia has given in: he understands that much about world politics; also that the Inglesi are very stubborn. Aristodemo says the Russians are sensible fellows. *Porca miseria!* he says, what are we doing shivering and starving and dying here to win these barren mountains where no one lives at all except a few barbarians who cannot even talk Italian? What are we fighting for? The Inglesi pay our masters to go on with the war, says Aristodemo, but none of it comes our way, except five-pence a day in the front line and three-pence behind! Giuseppe has had two leaves of ten days each since he joined in 1915, and each time he went back his wife was more depressed and thinner, and every one in the village had turned against the war except the chemist — but he is always against the priest anyhow.

Oh yes, says Aristodemo, the Russians have got liberty, and so they have

all gone home to their farms, and taken the land into the bargain! They have had revolution, and so should we. Well, but Giuseppe has twice seen the King in the line, and every one in the regiment agrees that he is not *imboscato*, and that his grandfather chased the Austrians out of Italy. But then says Aristodemo, there are plenty of others who are *imboscato*. All the "great guns", he says, keep their sons and nephews *imboscato*; they sit in the *retrovie*, eating beef-steak, and give us poor soldiers in the trenches dry chestnuts. Giuseppe laughs at that, and sings a song about it, the forbidden song. It has many verses that every one knows, and Aristodemo is always writing new ones. One verse says: "*A Cividale e Udine ci son imboscati; Hanno le scarpe lucide e capelli profumati.*"

("At Cividale and Udine the embuchés live. They have shining boots and perfumed hair".)


The officers first try to stop the song. But it bores them to be disobliging, so they soon laugh, and shrug their shoulders when they hear it begin.

Giuseppe has been two and a half years away from home, and here is a third winter coming on. When he gets away from Aristodemo he wishes he could talk about things to the young sub-lieutenant as he did one day last year, when the sub-lieutenant made it all so clear to him, and talked about Italia. But now the sub-lieutenant has gone. His arm was blown right off him on that accursed mountain, and he just said, "*Viva l'Italia!*" and then his skin grew like wax. But Giuseppe carried him away so that the *brutte bestie* never got him.

On the top of all this came the news of Caporetto, and Cadorna's order to retreat. So they trudged off, sad at first that it had all come to nothing, and sad to leave behind so many dead comrades on those barren hills — above all, the two sub-lieutenants, who would mind so much if they knew. But as they went on they began to feel they were going home. The roads in the plain were so crowded that they soon began to pass the artillery and cars standing blocked in rows. It was raining like ruin. No one gave orders or made them keep rank. They just splashed on, getting more and more like a mob, in the mood of children coming back from school. "*Andiamo a casa*", they said. Evidently Cadorna had given it up, and the war was over. As there is going to be peace now, said Aristodemo, let us throw away our rifles, and then no fool of an officer can turn us back to fight when it is no use. Well, says Giuseppe, the rifles are very heavy, and we have not eaten for two days. There is an Inglese; let us ask him what he thinks about the war now! Giuseppe asks him, not unkindly, and the Englishman smiles in a sickly way, meant to be at once pleasant and inscrutable. He feels that he is being chaffed in the way that he used to be chaffed when his side lost the general election at home, and he has to try and smile as he used to then.

To me the thing that needs explaining is not why the Retreat occurred, but why it did not occur long before, and how the Italian army and nation rallied and reconstituted their *moral*, and imposed on themselves a new and better discipline. These peasant soldiers were neither educated up to understanding the objects and ideals of the war like the English and American soldier, nor terrorized like the soldier in the enemy ranks. It was instinctive patriotism, natural courage, and the peasants' stamina and patience that enabled the Italian to put up so long with such conditions of life, and to endure war losses of 460,000 dead in a population only half the white population of the British Empire. The Italians are magnificent material, and if only they were given good education, they would respond splendidly in peace as in war to the requirements of their age and their country.

Until midsummer, 1917, our Unit had a small station of cars at Caporetto. We regarded the happy valley as a health resort, where drivers who had had a particularly severe time at Plava or Gorizia could serve a turn under peace conditions. The atmosphere of the place was idyllic, protected as it was by great Monte Nero, safe in the hands of the Alpini. Behind that rampart the





Isonzo valley opened out broad and green to Tolmino, where, indeed, the Austrians lay, but very quietly. A shell was the rarest of events, and Caporetto roofs were intact. The statue of a local Austrian poet looked out on the square, where life, civil and military, went on as in the age of gold. There, beside our garage, was the school where some sympathetic Italian officers taught the little Slovene children and kept them happy little mortals, whom it was a joy to see at work or play.

Such were the ideas that the word "Caporetto" conjured up in my mind in those days, and such, it seems *mutatis mutandis*, were the ideas entertained of it by the Italian Supreme Command when the blow fell. A combination of circumstances marked it out to the genius of Ludendorff as the place for the German attack. A magnificent road, and a railway alongside it which the Italians had just finished, led down a gorge through the hills from Caporetto to Cividale, and if once the Austro-Germans could debouch on Cividale they had turned the flank and rear of all the armies on the Isonzo front. It was true that Monte Nero could not be taken by assault, but if low-lying Caporetto was captured behind it, the Alpini on the great mountain could be isolated and masked while the race to the plain went on. Caporetto could be attacked from Plezzo and from Tolmino, down and up

the course of the Isonzo. The Monte Nero positions were really too high up to protect the town at their feet. These operations were rendered the easier by the dangerously sharp angle here formed by the Italian line. This angle was threatened by the Austrians' bridgehead at Santa Lucia, which their successful defence of Lom in the last days of August had still left in their hands. And now they were in correspondence with the disaffected regiments sent up to guard these vital but little regarded positions. Everything pointed to this as the place for the attack by von Below's six German divisions, employing Ludendorff's new tactics of "infiltration," with which successful experiments had already been made on the Russian front in September.

On these lines the stroke was played on October 24, 1917, with complete success (2). The pace and course of the Austro-German advance after Cadorna had given the general order to retreat can be traced on Map XI. Not only did the debouchment into the plain at Cividale compel the rapid retirement of the Gorizia and Carso armies, but as the right wing of the victorious advance swept along the northern edge of the plain, closing up one valley's mouth after another, they dictated an everhastier evacuation of the Carnic, Cadore, and Feltrine Alps by the Fourth Italian Army. Alpini officers have described to me

their misery at having to abandon, through no fault of their own or of the men under them, not only their guns but all the marvellous positions in the highest Alps which it had been for two years past their pride to guard and perfect for Italy. Many of the retreating columns fought magnificent rearguard actions, attacking and thrusting back the enemy from points which imperilled the retreat of other units in the vast and difficult area of evacuation.

After a heavy bombardment at Ravne, in which another of our cars was destroyed, our men evacuated the last of the wounded off the Bainsizza in the difficult and orderly retreat which the army effected out of that dangerous salient. On the evening of October 27th they finally left behind our old scenes of Plava and Quisca, after assisting our friend Professor Baldo Rossi of the Città di Milano surgery to get away not only his patients, but his invaluable material (3).

All this had been done before I arrived back from English leave on the morning of October 27th. That night the last of our cars, under Philip Baker's command, left Gorizia when the Italians evacuated the scenes of so much glory. As we left the house in the chestnut grove, where we had been such a happy family for more than a year past, with the silent scurry of retreat in all the familiar lanes around, I certainly never



expected to see the place again. Yet in twelve months and a few days I was going over the old house once more with Geoffrey Young, and laughing to find a German war-loan poster on our own notice board.

That same evening (October 27th) I had received orders to evacuate Villa Trento and replant the hospital at Conegliano. But it was now too late to save the material, and only just in time to save the personnel. Our good friend Colonel Morino, now medical chief of the Second Army, had honoured Dr. Brock and the workers of our hospital by choosing it as one of the last to function in that zone after the neighbouring hospitals had had orders to retire. We took in all the wounded who came in these last days, and evacuated them all. But we were left on the night of October 27th with nothing but our own ambulances, and not all of them, to save the material of the hospital, the garage, and all that the Unit had in the world, with only a few hours to do it in upon the blocked roads before the enemy cut in from the north. We had sent off the nurses that evening in two ambulances to make sure of their escape. But since most of our drivers were arriving at Villa Trento exhausted by several consecutive days and nights of work on the Bainsizza and in Gorizia, we determined to spend a last night in the old home, so that they could snatch a few hours' sleep


before the final departure for a very unknown destination.

But Baker and I were not easy about the situation, and when, at three o'clock in the morning, a neighbouring small-arms munition dump (or so we supposed) began going off with a rattle exactly like that of machine guns, the noise was so horribly suggestive that, although we guessed its real cause, we roused the dozing drivers and started the columns which had been loaded up overnight with as much as the cars were capable of carrying. So we left Villa Trento in the dark, though not, as we then feared, for ever.

Outside the Villa gates, in the main road from Cormons to Udine, we worked our way into the column of retreat, that was at first moving a few yards at a time, but soon came to an absolute standstill for the rest of the night. The column was stretching all the way on to Udine, and beyond Udine, through Codroipo to the Tagliamento. We found that there was a tacit understanding on the retreat that no one moved at all for half the night, because all the horses and most of the drivers went to sleep. At dawn they woke up, and the irregular serpent jogged on again by fits and starts, here a little, and there a little. There was absolutely no road management. I did not see a single Carabinieri on the road between the Isonzo and the Tagliamento, not even

in the streets of Udine. The only officer whom I saw attempting at one place to direct the traffic was doing just the wrong thing — namely, forbidding the motor vehicles to pass the horse vehicles, which they could not infrequently have done without causing confusion, since no one was trying to come back against the tide, and everything, therefore, was going the same way on the broad road. But the slowest set the pace, even when there was not a complete standstill. Meanwhile thousands of farm carts, bearing the fugitive peasantry and their household goods, joined the procession of military retreat, adding greatly to the congestion. The entire absence of traffic control, either general or detailed, must, I think, have doubled the number of cannon, lorries, and carts that fell into the enemy's hands. Every one did that which was right in his own eyes; but, fortunately, being Italians, they were a good-natured crowd, and although most of them were starving, and all discipline had disappeared, there was neither violence nor fear of it.

Under these conditions the only thing to be done was to get off the main road and let the cars work round singly or in small convoys by the by-roads and strike in again near Codroipo to cross the Tagliamento bridge. As it turned out, our cars that took the southern routes fared badly, getting into crowds as immovable as those on the main road it-



self, so that finally more than a dozen had to be abandoned before the approach of the enemy. But those of us who chanced to take the norther circuit found clear by-roads on the other side of Udine, and reached the Tagliamento bridge the same evening (October 28th), nearly a day ahead not only of the cars that had started with us from Villa Trento, but of the nurses who had left eight and twelve hours before.

Passing through Udine at midday on the 28th, I found all sign of authority had already disappeared from the interior of the town. No one pretending to give orders was visible on the streets, and any one who wished was looting. We had scarcely got outside the western gate when the same noise that had decided our departure from Villa Trento broke out on the other side of the town. Again I felt sure that it was a small-arms munition dump being let off, but the Italians in charge of the cannon amid which our cars were now jammed held other views. And indeed I subsequently learned that they were right in their opinion; an advanced party of the enemy had pushed from Cividale on Udine, and were scrapping with the Arditi at the other end of the town. As we looked back and wondered what the noise meant, a German aeroplane, like a vulture on the corpse, swooped down

low over the roofs, firing as it dived. But the Arditi held their ground, and Udine did not fall till next day.


As the vehicles in front of us had now been many of them deserted, it was impossible for us to move another yard down the main road from Udine to Codroipo. Our small convoy of six cars perforce turned off the road by the only way we could move, across the open fields to the north. A single broad ditch would have imprisoned us, but we had the luck to get through on to by-roads which were comparatively clear for twenty miles, and brought us out on to the main road again, beyond the hopeless block in Codroipo, close up to the Tagliamento bridge itself.

That evening (October 28th) our little party crossed the bridge as dusk fell. On that wet Beresina day the mile-long wooden bridge spanned a torrent which spread its tossing waves from shore to shore. The unwonted fury of the Alpine floods gave us poor fugitives the welcome sense that once across we were in safety, even though we looked in vain for any sign of the preparations for permanent defence of the Tagliamento, upon which we had hitherto counted. For the time being, the flood seemed security enough.

The rain fell steadily, increasing the physical misery and mental depression

of retreat. But it saved Italy, perhaps, from destruction, by impeding the pursuit and preventing the full use of aeroplanes. The Italians had no sufficient means at hand to combat aircraft, and a vigorous attack might have rendered impossible the passage of the crowded and narrow bridge, as well as of the Latisana bridge farther south over which the Third Army was escaping. In the pursuit of the Austrians a year later over the same roads, our side found it difficult enough to keep up the pace, with the line of communications ever lengthening; but then at least we were blessed with a month of perfect weather and hard ground. Indeed, when I saw the Codroipo bridge again early in November 1918 the scene and the circumstances were very different. The winter sun was gaily shining on the distant circle of the Alps and Monte Nero's ledge of snow; the river bed was stone dry, white shingle a mile broad; the bridge that had borne the weight of so much misery had disappeared, burnt to the ground, and cheerful American "doughboys", who knew not the tragic meanings that the place had to us Europeans, were marching over dry-shod to help garner the fruits of Austria's irreversible "Caporetto".

But on the evening of October 28, 1917, the task was to save the present,



not to spin day-dreams about the future. Once we reached the farther shore of the Tagliamento we set foot on a more hopeful and active world, where officers and Carabinieri were sorting out the men as they arrived over the bridge, and orders were being given and obeyed. That night we reached Pordenone, twenty kilometres farther on, where we had agreed that our numerous small convoys and isolated cars should meet. There I found Dr. Brock, who had already secured the villa for our hospital at Conegliano. But it was now highly doubtful whether we should ever have a hospital there or elsewhere. I spent a wet and anxious night in the public square at Pordenone watching for arrivals, but no one came. At morning I was faced by the ugly fact that the nurses, who had started in two parties nine and six hours before us from Villa Trento, had not yet arrived. And among the persons still unaccounted for was Geoffrey Young on crutches, who, together with the devoted Matron, Miss Power, had left Villa Trento with the last of us. There could be no question of driving back to the bridge against the throng, so I set off to walk.

Before I reached the bridge I had the relief of my life. I met first the Matron and Young, and then half the nurses and sure news of the other half. They had all been obliged to abandon their cars in the block and walk. How Young had come so many miles without a car in his then condition only he and those who

helped him through can tell. Next year he got an artificial leg fitted by the famous orthopaedist, Professor Putti of Bologna, and rejoined us on the Piave in time for the battle in June.

One party of the nurses had been accompanied and aided in the worst part of their retreat by Colonel Hayley of the British batteries, who, reduced like them to pedestrianism, had fallen in with them by the way, and shown them the same friendliness that all the officers of the British batteries had always shown to the Croce Rossa Britannica. The Red Cross was able to repay their kindness, for it was owing to the indefatigable work of some cars of Mr. Alexander's Third B.R.C. Unit, attached to the batteries on their retreat from the Carso by the Latisana bridge, that no British sick or wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. These services General Hamilton recognized in a generous letter.

All the British guns were got away, though they started late off the Carso. Heaven knows how it was done. The English are wonderful in misfortune. Not a man or woman in the retreat, whether British army or B.R.C., but rose to the height of the occasion. Ours was not a grumbling Unit, as English people go, but it was the only week in the war when no one grumbled about anything. Yet, Heaven knows what they had to put up with.

We gathered our remnants together as they came in to Pordenone — half

our cars, but fortunately all our men — and thence drove straight on to Padua. To stop at Conegliano was out of the question, even if we had had material for a hospital, for the line of the Piave was the utmost that any one now proposed to hold. And, indeed, the days of our hospital work were numbered, for we had lost even the little that we had taken from Villa Trento in the cars that had been abandoned. Only some of our garage plant was left us. So the ladies, who for two years had done such magnificent work for Italy, went back to England from Padua.

One scene at Padua stays in my mind's eye. In the Piazza Garibaldi stands the statue of the liberator, looking down with his face of simple faith and valour. In front of his pedestal, hour after hour, day after day, passed the files of the dejected and unarmed, his countrymen. It was impossible not to think him alive and watching. One almost heard his voice upbraiding them. In all the wonderful changes and chances of the year that followed, that graven image, hand on sword hilt, seemed to watch and know. After the end of the June battle that saved Italy and the cause of freedom, I saw the crowd in front of him cheering the King as he drove by, a victor. And once more, on the night of the armistice that ended Austria, the Paduans set between Garibaldi's arms the staff of the flag he loved.

G. M. Trevelyan

(continued)

- (1) I remember, when I found two soldiers who were drawing water at a forbidden source just under a large prohibitory notice, saying to them, "Can't you read?" and being effectively silenced by the quiet reply, "No, we can't".
- (2) On that day a station of the 2nd B.R.C. Unit, who had succeeded us at Caporetto, had one driver wounded and two cars destroyed in the courtyard where our cars used to stand so peacefully in old days, and where the school used to be.
- (3) As a testimony to the help of the Unit on this and other occasions the Croce Rossa Italiana conferred the rather unusual honour of the silver medal of its society on F.G. Penman, the driver in charge of our ambulances on the Bain-sizza after September 11th, when Baker went to Gorizia.



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
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MUSEO STORICO ITALIANO DELLA GUERRA ROVERETO

The Museum was set up in 1920 by a committee promoted by Antonio Piscal, Antonio Rossaro, Giuseppe Chini and Giovanni Malfer.

Taking up the irredentist theme of 1906, which sought to turn the Austrian barracks into an Italian history museum, the committee was further encouraged by the terrible tragedy of the First World War, which had just finished, to create a museum with the cultural and educational purpose of studying and illustrating, in the interests of peace, the phenomenon of «war» in the various forms it has taken and the various means it has used over the centuries.



On 21st October 1921, the Museum was opened by Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy.

In 1924 the Museum was granted a Statute and was recognised as a non-profit agency.

From 1925 to 1960, the great «Campana dei caduti» (the Bell of the fallen), the creation of don Antonio Rossaro to commemorate the war dead of all nations, was part of the Museum as a symbol of peace over the instruments of war.





The Museum has thirty rooms or sections, with a vast collection of weapons, documents, relics and uniforms which exhaustively illustrate aspects of war and of armies in various periods of history.

Particularly well covered is the technological development of weapons, from the shaped and smoothed flints of prehistoric times to the sophisticated machine guns and artillery of the Second World War (1939-1945).



Of particular interest for their artistic features are the antique weapons section, the central collection of which was donated by the heirs of Riccardo Caproni, and the rooms devoted to some of the nations who fought in the First World War and whose collections were donated by their governments.

An integral part of the collection is the artillery park in the old moat of the castle; it is one of the largest and most complete collections in Italy with more than 40 pieces of artillery dating from the 1850s up to the Second World War, including the 305/10 mod. 11 (Skoda) mortar, which can be found in Piazza del Podestà at the foot of the castle.

There is also an important art section. This includes more than 200 drawings by the Italian artist Pietro Morando made between 1915 and 1919 during his time in the trenches and as a prisoner and which express the harshness and the terror of some of



the moments lived through. There are about 20 «anti-war» oils by the German painter Federico von Rieger, most of them painted in secret between 1940 and 1947 and whose realism shows both horror for war and pity for its victims. Other works on display include paintings by Maceo Casadei, Piero Coelli, Balata, Wenter-Marini and some that are anonymous. Of interest also is the «Disperso in Russia» (Missing in Russia) sculpture by Piero Brolis from Bergamo.

Over the years, the Museum has been reorganised several times in order to make its educational message of peace clearer to visitors.



OPENING TIMES

The Museum is open to the public from 1st March to 30th November, from 9-12 am and 2-6 pm.


For further information, please phone 0464/438100 or write to: Museo della Guerra, 38068 - Rovereto (TN).

Other public buildings in Rovereto:

La Campana dei Caduti (the Bell of the Fallen) - La Galleria Futurista Depero (the Depero Futurist Gallery) - Il Museo Civico e di storia naturale (The Civic and Natural History Museum) - The Public Library - The «R. Zandonai» Theatre - The House of the Philosopher Antonio Rosmini and the library open to the public.

Future events in Rovereto:

«Progetto Rovereto estate»: exhibitions, theatre, cinema, music and entertainment - «Palio Città della Quercia»: sports events in August - International Motorcycle Rally in August - «Festival Oriente-Occidente» (East-West Festival) in September - Local Handicrafts Exhibition in September - Mozart festival in September.






At the corners stand three towers and a rampart; from here the solidiers could defeat or defend the curtains in any direction.

The exterior of the castle, as it can be seen today, was built between 1417 and the early years of the 16th century by Venetian architects and military constables (Malipiero, Marino, Coltrino and d'Alviano), even though the most important work was carried out at the end of the 15th century. For this reason the castle is one of the earliest existing examples of a fortification designed for defence by guns.

But the origins of the castle are much older. Traces of earlier building work show that there was once a Roman tower on this site, in its turn built over a prehistoric fort.



Towards 1300 Guglielmo di Castelbarco, Lord of Vallagarina, built the early castle over the Roman tower, perhaps in the form of a square, and, at the same time, he enclosed the town with walls, the remains of which are joined to the castle and are still visible, thanks to recent restoration work which removed structures that had been built on top of the walls in a later period.

The castle has played a leading role in many battles. In 1487 the castle, which had been a Venetian fortress since 1416, was besieged by 30,000 German soldiers led by Sigismund, Archduke of Tyrol and held out for 37 days, defended by only 60 men. Two months later it was retaken by Venetian troops from Thiene. It remained under the authority of the Republic of Venice until 1509 when, after the defeat of the Venetians at Ghiara d'Ad-da, it fell into the hands of Maximilian of Hapsburg.

Up to the Napoleonic period (first the Kingdom of Bavaria (1806-09), then the Kingdom of Italy (1810-14)), it had a military role which declined in importance. After the defeat of Napoleon, it was used as a poorhouse (1833-52), then as a penitentiary (1852-59) and finally as a barracks (1859-1918).

The last troops to be stationed at the castle were two companies of the 3rd Kaiserjäger regiment.

During the First World War (1914-1918), one of the two 305 mm mortars of the 20th Battery of the 2nd S.A.R. (Schwere Artillerie Regiment - Heavy Artillery Regiment) was set up in the old moat, from where it bombarded the Italian lines on the Zugna.

Immediately after the Armistice (requested at Serravalle all'Adige, near Rovereto, on 29 th October 1918), the castle housed Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war who, to keep warm through the hard winter of 1918-1919, chopped up and burnt all the wooden furniture and floors, leaving the castle in ruins.

After the war, it was decided to restore the castle and to turn it into a national history museum.



THE MILITARY SERVICE FOR WOMEN SEEN BY GABRIELLA D'AIUTO

In the E.U.R. area and beyond, limited by the via Laurentina, green stretches remind the citizen, who comes out of a feverish and chaotic city like Rome, that in its outskirts there are still wide extents where the eye can wonder, subsequently enquiring on the paradisiacal images consequently coming back to mind.

Here, Gabriella D'Aiuto, "...Astonished at light and desert, deep-rooted in the still obscure existence, full of that anxiety that since childhood accompanies us to the adolescence of impossible flights..." — as Calabrese says in the preface to her work "La Via di Siraad" (Siraad Route) —, precisely here, as we were saying, Gabriella has set her most recent roots, so that memory could find, in the horizon line moved only by the soft slopes, those life paths already crossed and images and thoughts which formed the future of memory itself and of the artist.

City both close and far, for a house which rises and descends, crosses a small study, descends further widening on a view sloping down into a green field, whose green is still being planned: it is only here that the eyes can rest, after having been forced, inside the house, to follow a multitude of souvenirs, pictures, sculptures, tortuous gorges and rising of lines which leave flabbergasted, leading to the fragrant aroma of a coffee, offered in a mystical/ritual way, just like the images dating back to the times of Meta and Cardile, villages witnesses of Gabriella D'Aiuto's childhood.

And "Immagini" (Images) is precisely the title of an all together legendary, fascinating and romanticized biography, which offers a precise description of the Sorrentine society during the Fifties and Sixties,



through the recovery and analysis of those feelings and emotions which characterized the significant moments in the author's life.

A novel of memories, construct-

Gabriella D'Aiuto: *Rome. Among the ruins*, water color, cm 50 x 70, 1989.



Gabriella D'Aiuto: *Summer service uniform*, water color on cartoon, cm 35 x 50, 1989



Gabriella D'Aiuto: *Winter service uniform*, water color on cartoon, cm 35 x 50, 1989



Gabriella D'Aiuto: *Service uniform*, water color on cartoon, cm 35 x 50, 1989




Gabriella D'Aiuto: *Fighting uniform*, water color on cartoon, cm 35 x 50, 1989



Gabriella D'Aiuto : *Friends*, oil-painting, cm 100 x 150, 1986.

Gabriella D'Aiuto : *Back to the temple*, water color on paper, cm 50 x 70, 1989.



ted and plotted with the author's various experiences, fairly free from time: a small "old world", created through individual flashbacks; a series of "sepia portraits", still linked by the freedom of memory.

As for the narrative structuring, Gabriella D'Aiuto has woven, with almost geometric exactness, the plot of this book, well-balancing the moments relating to some chronological inversion and the side cuts of some connection.

Just as straightforward is the linguistic compound, despite being a heterogeneous mixture: not only relevant from a lexical point of view, but also from a syntactical one, with the interchange of expressive means, dictated from time to time by the narrative circumstances.

Circumstances which sometimes lead the author herself to use vernacular symbols and constructions, to set and define in the best possible way those elements and moments which register the world of feelings: irony, melancholy, abandonment,

resignation, contemplation, regret, up to the lyrical tones of elegy and idyll.

And here, having lost the full and global contact with ordinary language forced by an obvious interior need, she intermediates this feeling of consciousness by using the most precious words, compounds and metaphores.

And if it is true that in the book "Immagini" the poetical moment is morphologically divided from the narrative and pictorial one, it is just as true that such distinction is the result of a choice which in no way refers to any kind of physical distinction, as might be made by those who observe "the symbol" only from one point of view, heritage of academic shackles. The symbol is sound, it is the magic of colours, it is word and, according to new cultural trends, it is also noise and emotion; the same pathos of communication.

Gabriella D'Aiuto's talent has already sensed it and realized it in the "tissue of knowledge", fully coordi-

nated — her world and way — in the communication system.

Graphic symbol, word and colour create a correspondence of meaning, as a wanted and known value, ready to perform the above-mentioned communication, adapting itself, through simple and almost mechanical determinations, to any and every kind of representation.

So, subsequently, the volume "La Via di Siraad" must have been created, having extinguished, in the meander of memory, the echoes of voices of men and animals; where everything is expressed in a poetical vein, beyond the impulses and values, emphasizing the content rather than the form, which dictated it. It is precisely here that the fulfilment of Gabriella D'Aiuto's art is evident; precisely as a consequence of the assembling of various experiences, apparently divided in the volume's morphology.

So, in this Slataper-like novel/poem, with the addition of a sequence of African images, universal in their composition and graphic Mediterranean references — with some aspects in the setting out dictated by study and a Central European culture —, it is no longer right to distinguish the various moments; since poetry creates images just as images create poetry: and prose (an awkward definition) avails itself of rhythms, figures of speech and metaphors teeming with the poetical universality of the images it proposes.

It is muazin time; night shadows descend like crows on their prey. Dazzled by the last sun, the dunes become gloomy, undulating masses. The wind's long cry becomes more intense: new questions with no answer. The moon awaits on the imaginary line of the Chisimaic Equator. With no opposition long beaches give in to the high tide.

(from "La Via di Siraad" pag. 26)

Her poetry reminds us of Tagore and sometimes of Gibran's prophetic expressions.

Moreover, our author has been in-

fluenced by the charm and has developed the meticulous expression of Apollinaire, writing poems on picture, or describing images or imagining fairy-tale metaphors in Indian ink and African sun on palm-trees and old memories, where a space-time adventure, in the syntactical-temporal inversion, should be re-analyzed in the light of psychoanalysis to savour the total fullness and richness.

The fairy-tale lion has no place, hunted by man it cannot save the woman abandoned in the scrub.

One hears of it in yesterday's stories.

(from "La Via di Siraad" pag. 27)

Here we find ourselves faced with the violation of the basic space-time correlations, typical of the unconscious, used by Freud to demonstrate how ES ignores space and time. And this characteristic, typical of dreams, is used by Gabriella D'Aiuto when she proposes soliloquy/poems and in the fantastic interpretations of those feelings from which, from time to time, they originated.

It is the village's old sage whom we hear sing-songing the images and stories of the Siraad Route; where men and animals cross their ways and fates, in the calm fatalism of one

Dance sequence of the glass Sculptures made in Murano following a project made by Gabriella D'Aiuto.



who knows he cannot understand what is bigger than himself. So he adapts himself to the rhythms of day and night, where the sacrifice of life, the only meaningful thing, guides the steps on "the shiny paving of time", leaving, in the negative, sand footprints, until "the darkness will descend on the world".

But what allows our artist to penetrate different worlds, just as a chameleon changes colour, is the ability to penetrate "the group", expressing herself through the forms of collective consciousness of the group itself.

According to Goldman, such consciousness is the result of a determined social group, comparative and in line with its own mental structures and with the internal policy of society as a whole.

Gabriella D'Aiuto was born in "different worlds" and this is why she manages to find herself in the very special and particular structures which "go along" the Siraad Route and other routes.

Her culture, juxtaposed in the social expression of her "Neapolitan origins" (a few years ago I defined Naples as "the city from which all wonders are born"), has determined in the artist the capacity to express the collective consciousness felt by the group she is investigating, with the greatest coherence in the structure of her works. Something which, still according to Goldman, is the prerogative of the best authors.

And, without changing tune, I find again these global capacities in the story which continues, or begins anew, her work as figurative artist.

I shall not look for names of famous authors with whom to compare Gabriella's art. On the other hand, I shall simply say that all her works — in the mark's incredible, nervous, continuous dance — always have a verse, a feeling of memory, of recollection and of communication where the main themes proposed are peace, love, human solidarity.

Everything is story and dream in the fables of this wanderer of the universe, always running away from the inhuman handling of existence

in large cities. Maybe, in a short while, she will discover a new world/haven with things which will tell us stories of the time of times, rich in wonders and magic, endless routes of endless existences, in the announcing movements of dance and light in her sculptures, drawings and novels.

Just like we did with the authors we previously interviewed, we are going to ask Gabriella D'Aiuto a few questions on the military service for women:

Question: Gabriella, what do you think of an Army made of women namely the auxiliaries?

Answer: Probably what I think does not reflect a more generalized opinion, but anyhow I believe that since women wish it they have a right to enter military life. On "how" to enter this new world, this new collective function, one will have to refer to their capacities and their particular qualities, so that they can not only cooperate and give their contribution for the institutional purpose, but also and above all take advantage of the gratifying aspect of this contribution.

Q.: What you have said is rather relevant: up to now one had more or less spoken in terms of a need for a female contribution. Instead you say that women "want" the Army, want to participate: so it is not the Italian Army which asks, but women who claim their right on a territory up to now unavailable for them.

And in which role or roles would you see women employed: as fighting soldiers side by side with men, or as support for logistic services or something else?

A.: I refer everything to individual sensibility, as I said before: if a woman identifies herself in the role of a fighting soldier, then it is her own business: let her go to fight!

However, since women are mothers, I honestly doubt that they can as a rule identify themselves in the role of the fighting soldier, precisely because they are for tradition preservers of the species, containers of genes, continuation of humanity.

Q.: If you could go back in time, would you attend the military service?

A.: No, I would not because I don't wish it. And it is also easy to explain why: I am satisfied with my profession and my art, otherwise I could have wished to find satisfaction in some other way, maybe being an auxiliary. My cousin Isabella, a very pretty girl, was the first "woman" merchant captain in the Italian Merchant Navy and, apart from the initial difficulties and the heavy shifts, she fully succeeded in her profession and is completely satisfied.

There is however the fact that a woman's task is psychologically profound: she can go where a man can't.

Q.: How would you imagine a woman's uniform?

A.: Very comfortable and light; it should however be made to improve the figure and not to make it look awkward.

And the skirt... Well I wouldn't mind at all if it remained the most important part of a woman's uniform.

Giampiero Linardi



Gabriella D'Aiuto was born in Sorrento on May 10th 1941. In 1963 she graduated in Naples with a degree in Eastern Languages (Russian) and obtained a diploma in art and history of art in the Istituto Meridionale di Cultura. Subsequently she devoted herself to the art of engraving (first aqua fortis on Dostojevskij) and frescoes (three frescoes in the Civitavecchia and Tarquinia dioceses). She held many exhibitions of which we shall only mention the most important ones: Naples (1964), Venice (1973), Florence and Rome (1977), Milan (1978), Verona (1980), l'Aquila (1973), Catania (1976), Madrid (1980-81), Civitavecchia (1973/1984), Mogadiscio (1985). Other personal ones were held in Africa, Turkey, United States and Switzerland.

Apart from various graphic works, sculptures, engravings and frescoes which guarantee for her success in the figurative arts, in 1984 she published the volume "Immagini" (Images), in which she collected prose and poetry dealing with early childhood. In 1988 she put together and published in one volume her experiences in Somalia: in "La Via di Siraad" (Siraad Route) (Epica ed. 1988) prose/poetry and poetical stories, through images, pass on the message of this beautiful African land, in the way in which Gabriella D'Aiuto's imagination and creativity captured and interpreted it.

Many writers have described her work such as M. Antolin, P. Amatiello, G. Bonacina, M. Bonavia, T. Bonavita, P. Bonetti, L. Bozzetto, E. Buda, G. De Lorenzo, D. Di Bartolomeo, P. Di Somma, G. Grassi, L. Gravalos, G. Linardi, B. Lucrezi, M. Millet, G. Mugnone, T. Paloscia, G. Manzani, M. Rivosecchi, B. Rubino, F. Russo, F. Simongini, J. Trenas and A. Vanzetti.

Many the acknowledgements received: her works are included in the most important public and private collections in Italy and abroad. Above all in Civitavecchia and Tarquinia, Meta di Sorrento, Naples, Madrid, Mogadiscio and in other cities in Turkey, United States, France, Switzerland etc. She has been invited to hold an exhibition in Paris, in the Pompidou Centre, by the Sorbonne University, and in 1989 in Buenos Aires, San Paulo in Brasil and Caracas.

She lives in Rome, in via del Fosso della Castelluccia in the Laurentina area.

ENGLISH - ITALIAN

GLOSSARY

V

vaccination

valley

river **v.**

v. approach

valve

exhaust **v.**

van

command post v.

radio **v.**

refrigerator **v.**

shop **v.**

vantage

point of **v.**

v. ground

variation

magnetic **v.**

v. of temperature

to vax

ski-vax

vedette

v. boat

vehicle

amphibious **v.**

armoured fighting **v.**
(AFv)

armoured infantry **v.**

vaccinazione

valle

valle fluviale

avvicinamento sul

fondovalle

valvola

valvola di scarico

furgone, autofurgone

carro ufficio (per posto
comando)

autoradio

autofrigorifero

carro scaffalato per

officina campale

vantaggio

posizione di forza;

terreno favorevole

variazione

declinazione magnetica

variazione di

temperatura

sciogliere

sciogline

vedetta

nave vedetta

veicolo

veicolo anfibio

veicolo corazzato da
combattimento;

veicolo corazzato per
fanteria

cargo **v.**

general utility **v.**

landing **v.** tracked (LvT)

out sized **v.**

self-propelled **v.**

snow **v.**

tracked **v.**

transport **v.**

v. commander

v. distance

vehicular

v. radio communications
(VRC)

v. traffic

velocity

muzzle **v.**

vertical

v. circle

v. rudder

v. take-off

very good

"Very" pistol

v. light (**v.** signal)

vessel

veteran

veicolo da carico

veicolo di uso generale

veicolo cingolato da
sbarco

veicolo fuori misura

veicolo semovente

veicolo da neve

veicolo cingolato

veicolo da trasporto

capo macchina

distanza interveicolare

veicolare

apparato radio veicolare

(montato su veicolo)

circolazione di veicoli

velocità, rapidità

velocità iniziale (di un

proiettile)

vertical

circolo azimutale

timone di direzione

(aeron.)

decollo verticale

superiore alla media

pistola very (da

segnalazione)

segnale luminoso

vascello

veterano, ex

combattente

V

victory
view
 field of v.
violation
 border v.
visa
visibility
 v. range
 reduced v.
vital
 v. ground
 v. wound

vittoria
 vista
 campo di vista
 violazione
 violazione di confine
 visto, vidimazione
 visibilità
 raggio di visibilità
 visibilità ridotta
 vitale
 tratto vitale
 ferita mortale

volume
 cubic v.
volunteer
vomiting
 v. gas (agent)

voucher
 issue receipt v.
vulnerability
 v. radius
vulnerable
 v. area

volume (in ogni senso)
 cubatura
 volontario
 vomitatorio
 gas (aggressivo)
 vomitatorio
 buono, ricevuta
 buono di consegna
 vulnerabilità
 raggio di vulnerabilità
 vulnerabile
 area vulnerabile

W

war
 internal w.
 limited w.
 w. of attrition
 w. of subversion
 world w.
ward
 medical w.
warfare
 biological w.
 chemical w.
 containing w.
 conventional w.
 economic w.
 electronic w.
 global w.
 landmine w.
 mountain w.
 nuclear w.
 psychological w.
 trench-type w.
 unconventional w.
warhead
 atomic w.
 nuclear w.
 thermonuclear w.
warned
 w.-exposed
 w.-protected
warning

air control w.(ACW)

air-raid w.
 early w. (EW)
 emergency w.
 nuclear strike w.

w. of assignment

w. of attack
 w. order
warrant

guerra
 guerra civile
 guerra locale
 guerra di logoramento
 guerra sovversiva
 guerra mondiale
 sala, padiglione, reparto
 reparto medicina
 guerra, il guerreggiare
 guerra batteriologica
 guerra chimica
 guerra d'arresto
 guerra convenzionale
 guerra economica
 guerra elettronica
 guerra generale
 guerra di mine
 guerra in montagna
 guerra nucleare
 guerra psicologica
 guerra di trincea
 guerra non tradizionale
 testata, testa esplosiva
 testata atomica
 testata nucleare
 testata termonucleare
 preavvisato
 preavvisato e esposto
 preavvisato e protetto
 avviso, preavviso,
 allarme
 sistema di controllo e
 riporto
 allarme aereo
 avvistamento lontano
 preavviso di emergenza
 preavviso di attacco
 nucleare
 preavviso di
 destinazione
 preavviso di attacco
 preavviso
 autorità, autorizzazione,
 sanzione

w. officer
warship
wartime
water
 drinking w.
 high w. s
 mined w. s
 non-potable w.
 territorial w. s
 w. point (WP)
 w. supply point (WSP)

w. tank
 w. trailer
watering
waterproof
watershed

wave
 assault w.

blast w.
 carrier w.
 helicopter w.
 leading w.

long w.
 shock w.
 short w.
 successive w.

ultra-short w.
 very short w.
 w. length
weapon (wpn)
 air cooled w.

atomic w.
 automatic w. (AW)
 biological w.
 breech loaded w.
 chemical w.
 close supporting w.

sottufficiale (maresciallo)
 nave da guerra
 tempo di guerra
 acqua
 acqua potabile
 alta marea
 acque minate
 acqua non potabile
 acque territoriali
 punto acqua
 posto di rifornimento
 acqua
 cisterna per acqua
 rimorchio per acqua
 abbeverata
 impermeabile
 spartiacqua, linea di
 displuvio
 onda, ondata
 ondata d'assalto
 (operaz. anfibie)
 onda esplosiva
 onda portante
 ondata di elicotteri
 ondata d'assalto,
 avanzata
 onda lunga (trasm.)
 onda d'urto
 onda corta (trasm.)
 ondata successiva
 (operaz. anfibie)
 onda ultra corta (trasm.)
 onda cortissima (trasm.)
 lunghezza d'onda
 arma, ordigno
 arma con
 raffreddamento ad aria
 ordigno atomico
 arma automatica
 arma batteriologica
 arma a retrocarica
 arma chimica
 arma di
 accompagnamento

conventional w.	arma convenzionale	unladen w.	peso di un mezzo di trasporto senza carico, ma con il conduttore ed il suo equipaggiamento
crew-served w.	arma di reparto		benessere
direct fire w.	arma a tiro diretto	welfare	ovest, occidente
flat-trajectory w.	arma a tiro teso	west	occidentale
guided w.	telearma	western	verso occidente
heavy w.	arma pesante	westwards	ruota
high-angle w.	arma a tiro curvo	wheel	ruotato
individual w.	arma individuale	wheeled	veicolo ruotato
light w.	arma leggera	w. vehicle	allargamento
mass-destruction w.	arma di distruzione di massa	widening	allargamento di una breccia
	arma ad avancarica	w. of a gap	larghezza, ampiezza
muzzle-loaded w.	ordigno nucleare		ampiezza di spiaggia (operaz. anfibia)
nuclear w.	arma del tipo senza rinculo	width	vincere
recoilless-type w.	arma con canna ad anima rigata	beach w.	verricello, argano
	arma semovente		spostamento laterale causato dal vento nella traiettoria di un proiettile
rifled-bore w.	arma semiautomatica	to win	parabrezza
	arma a caricamento singolo	winch	tergicristallo
self-propelled w.	arma con canna ad anima liscia	windage	falsa ogiva, cappuccio balistico
semi-automatic w.	arma speciale		ala, aerobrigata
single loading w.	arma di accompagnamento o di appoggio	windscreen	ala fissa
	ordigno nucleare tattico	w. wiper	ala rotante
smooth-bore w.	ordigno termionucleare	windshield	apertura d'ala
	arma trainata		vincitore
special w.	indossare	wing	filo, cordoncino telefonico
supporting w.	indossare una uniforme	fixed w.	cordoncino telefonico d'assalto
	tempo atmosferico	rotatory w.	filo spinato
tactical nuclear w.	ogni tempo	w. span	cordoncino telefonico campale
thermonuclear w.	condizioni del tempo	winner	rolo di cordoncino telefonico
towed w.	valutazione delle condizioni meteorologiche	wire	siepe (recinto) di filo spinato
to wear	previsioni del tempo		senza fili, radio
to w. a uniform	bollettino meteo	assault w.	radiocomando
weather	peso	barbed w.	radiotelegrafista
all-w.	peso di un mezzo di trasporto senza carico	field w.	radiotelegrafia
w. conditions	peso caricato (nel trasporto aereo), peso di un veicolo a pieno carico		radiotelefonica
w. estimate	peso (carico) massimo permesso (autorizzato)	roll of w.	ripiegare
	peso di un aereo caricato al massimo per una missione di emergenza	w. fence	ripiegamento
w. forecast	peso totale di un aereo con il massimo carico permesso	wireless	manovra in ritirata
w. report	peso netto di un veicolo senza il carico	w. control	legna
weight	peso base di un aereo più peso di carburante, olio, acqua ed equipaggio	w. operator	legna da ardere
basic w.		w. telegraphy	legna per riscaldamento
		w. telephony	boschi
laden w.		to withdraw	combattimento nei boschi
		withdrawal	parola
maximum allowable w.		w. action	nominativo di maglia
maximum alternate gross w.		wood	parola convenzionale,
		fire w.	parola in codice
maximum gross w.		w. for heating	parola d'ordine
		woods	
net w.		combat in w.	
ready-for-loading w.		word	
		call w.	
		code w.	
		pass w.	

W

procedure w. s
(prowords)

work

dummy w.

earth w.

field w.

permanent w.

protective w.

team w.

working paper

workshop

field w.

mobile w.

termini di procedura

radiotelefonica

lavoro, opera

lavoro (opera) simulato

lavoro di sterro

opera campale

opera permanente

lavoro di protezione

lavoro di gruppo

carta di lavoro

officina

officina campale

officina mobile

wound

flesh w.

penetrating w.

to dress a w.

vital w.

w. resulting in

amputation

w. resulting in fracture

wounded

w. in action

(WIA)

wrecker

ferita

ferita superficiale

ferita profonda

medicare una ferita

ferita mortale

ferita con conseguenza

di amputazione

ferita con frattura

ferito

ferito in combattimento

autosoccorso

Y

yard

iarda (misura di
lunghezza pari a m.
0,914.383)

yield

nuclear y.

rendimento, prodotto

rendimento di un

ordigno nucleare

Z

zero

actual ground z.

desired ground z. (DGZ)

ground z. (GZ)

zone

black-out z.

blocking z.

combat z. (CZ)

communication z.

(COMZ)

defensive z.

zero

punto zero reale (espl.
nucleare)

punto zero desiderato

punto zero (espl.
nucleare)

zona

zona di oscuramento

zona di arresto

zona di combattimento

zona delle

comunicazioni, retrovie

sistema difensivo

delay z.

dropping z. (DZ)

embarkation z.

general outpost z.

landing z. (LZ)

main defensive z. (UK)

time z.

z. of action

z. of interior (ZI)

zulu

z. time

zona di frenaggio

zona di lancio

zona di imbarco

zona di sicurezza

zona di atterraggio, zona

di sbarco

posizione di resistenza

fuso orario

settore di azione

zona degli interni

zulu

ora zulu

